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   The	   1991	  Child	   Support	  Act	   is	   seen	   as	   one	  of	   the	  most	   controversial	   and	  notorious	   policy	  
failures	   in	  Britain,	  being	  described	  as	   ‘the	  most	   incompetent	  and	   inhuman	  agency	  ever	  set	  up	  by	  a	  
British	  government’	  (Ingrams,	  1997).	  Its	  first	  year	  in	  operation	  was	  marked	  by	  administrative	  chaos,	  
error,	  and	  failure.	  This	  thesis	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  this	  failure	  was	  ‘foreseeable’	  and	  ‘foreseen’.	  This	  
thesis	  is	  both	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  British	  policy-­‐making	  process,	  and	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  	  
Analysis	   focuses	   primarily	   on	   policy	   formation,	   assessing	   the	   reasons	   behind	   why	   policy-­‐makers	  
pursued	  certain	  actions,	   and	  ultimately	  how	  a	   foreseeable	  and	   foreseen	  policy	   failure	  was	  able	   to	  
gain	  cross-­‐party	  support.	  	  
	   It	   examines	   the	   role	   of	   power,	   imbalance	   of	   resources,	   and	   inter-­‐Departmental	   and	   inter-­‐
Ministerial	  battles.	  Parliamentary	  processes,	   together	  with	  a	  detailed	  assessment	  of	  Parliamentary	  
discussions,	  are	  also	  addressed.	  The	  existence	  of	  dual	  origins,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  ‘policy	  transfer’,	  or	  as	  
this	  thesis	  argues,	  ‘incoherent	  dual-­‐policy	  transfer’	  are	  examined.	  The	  thesis	  re-­‐introduces	  the	  stages	  
approach	  as	  an	  appropriate	  framework	  for	  examining	  policy-­‐making	  in	  general,	  and	  analysing	  policy	  
failure	  in	  particular.	  It	  draws	  on	  evidence	  gained	  through	  interviews,	  official	  documents,	  unpublished	  
consultation	  responses,	  Parliamentary	  debates,	  and	  materials	  from	  pressure	  groups	  and	  think-­‐tanks,	  
as	  well	  as	  academic	  literature.	  	  	  	  
	   Examination	   of	   the	   policy	   formation	   process	   shows	   that	   the	   Child	   Support	   Act	   had	   two	  
separate	  paths	  of	  origin.	  These	  conflicting	  origins	   led	   to	   ‘incoherent	  dual-­‐policy	   transfer’,	  whereby	  
the	  policy	  pursued	  by	  Newton	  and	  Mackay	  was	  undermined	  by	  Thatcher	  and	   the	  Treasury.	   It	   also	  
demonstrates	   that	   the	   Bill’s	   flaws	   were	   magnified	   by	   ineffective	   legislative	   process.	   It	   ends	   by	  
illustrating	   the	   roots	   behind	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act’s	   failure,	   and	   the	   ultimate	   failings	   of	   the	  
British	   policy-­‐making	   process.	   The	   larger	   implications	   for	   these	   findings	   is	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	  
idea	  of	  ‘perfect	  legislation’,	  which	  shows	  us	  what	  leads	  to,	  and	  thus	  provides	  a	  criteria	  for	  avoiding,	  
policy	  failure.	  	  
	  






	   I	  would	  firstly	  like	  to	  express	  my	  appreciation	  and	  gratitude	  to	  my	  supervisor	  Professor	  Pete	  
Dorey,	   who	   has	   been	   a	   continuous	   source	   of	   invaluable	   support,	   guidance,	   and	   encouragement	  
throughout	  my	  time	  at	  Cardiff	  University.	  
	  
	   Equally,	   I	  would	   like	   to	   thank	  my	   close	   and	   long-­‐suffering	   friend	  Matthew	  Close,	  who	  has	  
painstakingly	   proofread	   the	   entire	   document	   countless	   times.	   He	   has	   provided	   invaluably	  
constructive	  criticism	  and	  friendly	  advice	  throughout	  my	  research.	  
	  
	   I	   would	   also	   like	   to	   thank	   Professor	   Nick	   Wikeley	   (Southampton	   University)	   for	   kindly	  
providing	  me	  with	  unpublished	  research	  material,	  as	  well,	  Mike	  Daley	   (Cardiff	  School	  of	  Computer	  
Science	  and	  Informatics’)	  for	  ‘saving	  the	  day’	  during	  a	  hard-­‐drive	  malfunction.	  
	  	  
	   I	   am	   also	   extremely	   thankful	   to	   those	   individuals	   who	   agreed	   to	   be	   interviewed.	   Their	  
willingness	  to	  discuss	  their	   thoughts	  at	   length,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  hospitality	  and	  encouragement,	  not	  
only	   provided	   invaluable	   insight,	   but	   also	   a	   source	   of	   inspiration	   that	   continued	   throughout	   my	  
writing.	  	  
	  
It	   is	  only	   right	   to	  end	  with	   thanks	   to	  Liam,	  my	  Fiancé,	  who	   in	   recent	  months,	  above	  all	  others	  has	  
endured	  my	  seemingly	  endless	  monologues.	  	  I	  am	  sincerely	  grateful	  for	  his	  honest	  and	  enlightening	  
views	   on	   a	   number	   of	   issues	   related	   to	   the	   project,	   as	  well	   as	   his	   unwavering	   patience,	   support,	  
dedication,	  and	  love.	  
	   	  
iv	  
	  
Table	  of	  Contents	  
	  
Abstract	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   ii	  
	  
Acknowledgements	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   iii	  
	  
List	  of	  Figures	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   ix	  
	  
Chapter	  One	  –	  Intellectual	  Justification,	  Research	  Design	  and	  Literature	  Review	   	   1	  
	  
1.1 Introduction	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1	  
	  
1.2 Approaches	  to	  Policy	  Analysis	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1	  
	  
1.3 Theories	  and	  Models	  in	  the	  Field	  of	  Policy	  Analysis:	  An	  Overview	   	   3	  
1.3.1 Brief	  History	  of	  the	  Field	  of	  Policy	  Analysis	   	   	   	   3	  
1.3.2 Theories	  and	  Models	  in	  the	  Field	  of	  Policy	  Analysis	   	   	   6	  
	   	  
1.4 Stages	  and	  Cycles:	  A	  Framework	  of	  the	  Policy	  Process	   	   	   	   9	  
1.4.1 The	  Attack	  on	  the	  Stages	  Approach	   	   	   	   	   13	  
1.4.2 A	  Defence	  of	  the	  Stages	  Approach	   	   	   	   	   13	  
	   1.4.2.1	  Concluding	  a	  Rebut	  of	  the	  Criticisms	   	   	   	   18	  
1.4.3 Has	  Policy	  Analysis	  Outlived	  the	  Stages	  Approach?	   	   	   19	  
	  
1.5 The	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  –	  A	  Brief	  Overview	   	   	   	   	   21	  
1.5.1 Existing	  Relevant	  Literature	   	   	   	   	   	   21	  
	  
1.6 Scope	  of	  the	  Research	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   25	  
1.6.1 How	  this	  Thesis	  Intends	  to	  use	  the	  Stages	  Approach	  –	  	  
	  Organisation	  of	  Thesis	   	   	   	   	   	   	   25	  
1.6.2 Research	  Methods	   	   	   	   	   	   	   26	  
1.6.3 Overview	  of	  Thesis	   	   	   	   	   	   	   27	  
	  
	  
Chapter	  Two	  –	  The	  Background,	  ‘Setting	  the	  Scene’	   	   	   	   	   	   30	  
	  
2.1	   Introduction	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   30	  
	  
2.2	  	   The	  Social	  Environment	  -­‐	  The	  Growth	  of	  Lone	  Parents	   	   	   	   30	  
	  
2.3	   The	  Economic	  Environment	  -­‐	  The	  Growing	  Cost	  of	  Lone-­‐Parents	   	   33	  
	  
2.4	  	   The	  Political	  Environment	  –	  Changing	  Attitudes	  and	  Policy	  Developments	   37	  
	  
2.5	  	   Lone-­‐parents	  as	  the	  ‘Problem’?	  	   	   	   	   	   	   40	  
	  
2.6	   	  Conclusion	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   41	  
	  
	  
Chapter	  Three	  -­‐	  Problem	  Definition	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   42	  
	  




3.2	  	   Problem	  Definition:	  An	  Introduction	   	   	   	   	   	   42	  
	  
3.3	   ‘Problem’	  Representation	   	   	   	   	   	   	   43	  
	  
3.4 The	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act:	  Multiple	  ‘Problems’,	  Different	  Frames,	  and	  False	  
Representations	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   47	  
3.4.1 A	  System	  in	  Need	  of	  Change	   	   	   	   	   	   47	  
3.4.2 Feckless	  Fathers	  and	  the	  Demonization	  of	  Lone	  Parents	  	   	   49	  
3.4.3 Strain	  on	  Treasury	   	   	   	   	   	   	   51	  
	  
3.5	  	   What	  ‘Problem’	  was	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  Claiming	  to	  Remedy?	   	   52	  
	  
3.6	  	   Language	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   53	  
	  
3.7	  	   Problem	  Representation	  and	  Power	   	   	   	   	   	   54	  
	  
3.8	   Why	  Construct	  and	  Mask	  a	  ‘Problem’	  and	  Past	  Attempts	   	   	   55	  
	  
3.9	   Problem	  Definition	  and	  Links	  to	  Policy	  Failure	   	   	   	   	   56	  
3.9.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Multiple	  Frames	  and	  Policy	  Failure	   	   	   	   	   56	  
3.9.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Language	  and	  Policy	  Failure	   	   	   	   	   	   60	  
	  
3.10	   Conclusion	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   61	  
	  
Chapter	  Four	  –	  Policy	  Formation:	  ‘Dual-­‐Policy	  Transfer’	  and	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  	   62	  
4.1	  	   Introduction	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   62	  
	  
4.2	  	   What	  is	  Policy	  Transfer?	   	   	   	   	   	   	   62	  	  
	  
4.3	  	   Policy	  Transfer	  and	  Links	  to	  Policy	  Failure	   	   	   	   	   63	  	  
	  
4.4	   Policy	  Transfer	  and	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	   	   	   	   	   64	  
	   4.4.1	  	   Policy	  Transfer	  from	  America?	   	   	   	   	   	   65	  
	   	  	   4.4.1.1	  	  Inappropriate,	  Incomplete,	  and	  Uniformed	  Policy	  Transfer	   67	  	  
	  
4.5	  	   The	  idea	  of	  ‘Dual	  Policy	  Transfer’	   	   	   	   	   	   70	  
4.5.1	   Policy	  Transfer	  from	  Australia?	  	   	   	   	   	   72	  	  
	  
4.6	  	   Conclusion:	  Dual	  Policy	  Transfer,	  Advancing	  our	  Understanding	  of	  Policy	  	  
	  	   Transfer	  and	  its	  Links	  to	  Policy	  Failure	   	   	   	   	   	   74	  
	  
	  
Chapter	  Five	  –	  Policy	  Formulation:	  The	  Imbalance	  of	  Power	  within	  the	  Core	  Executive	   	   76	  
5.1	  	   Introduction	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   76	  
5.2	  	   Power	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   77
	  	   	  
vi	  
	  
5.3	  	   Resources	  and	  Strategy	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   78	  
5.4	  	   The	  Core	  Executive	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   79	  
5.4.1	  	   The	  Power	  and	  Resources	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	   	   	   81	  
5.4.1.1	  Thatcher	   	   	   	   	   	   	   83	  
5.4.2	  	   The	  Role	  and	  Power	  of	  the	  Cabinet	   	   	   	   	   86	  
5.4.3	   The	  Power	  Resources	  of	  a	  Department	  Minister	   	   	   87	  
	  	   5.4.3.1	  The	  Power	  of	  Newton	  and	  Mackay	   	   	   	   87	  
5.4.4	  The	  Power	  Resources	  of	  the	  Treasury	   	   	   	   	   89	  
	  
5.5	  	   Core	  Executive	  Battles	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   90	  
5.5.1	  	   DSS	  vs.	  The	  Treasury	   	   	   	   	   	   	   90	  
5.5.2	  	   DSS	  vs.	  Inland	  Revenue	  	   	   	   	   	   	   95	  	  	  
	  
5.6	  	   The	  Imbalance	  of	  Power	  -­‐	  Links	  to	  Policy	  Failure	   	   	   	   98	  
	  
5.7	  	   Kingdon’s	  Policy	  Streams	   	   	   	   	   	   	   100	  
	  5.7.1	  	   Conflicting	  Origins:	  Five	  Streams,	  One	  Window	  	   	   	   101	  
	  
5.8	  	   Conclusion:	  The	  Imbalance	  of	  Power,	  Conflicting	  Formation	  -­‐	  Two	  Policies,	  	  
	  	   One	  Bill	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   105	  
	  
Chapter	  Six	  -­‐	  The	  Flawed	  Legislative	  Process	   	   	   	   	   	   	   107	  
6.1	  	   Introduction	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   107	  
6.2	  	   The	  Child	  Support	  Bill	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   107	  
6.3	  	   Inadequate	  Consultation	  -­‐	  Children	  Come	  First:	  White	  Paper	  and	  Responses	   109	  
6.3.1	  	   Consultation	  Process:	  Foreseeable	  and	  Foreseen	  Failure	   	   113	  
	  
6.4	  	   The	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  in	  Parliament	   	   	   	   	   	   119	  
6.4.1	  	   The	  House	  of	  Lords	   	   	   	   	   	   	   119	  
6.4.2	  	   House	  of	  Commons	   	   	   	   	   	   	   124	  
6.4.3	  	   And	  Back	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Lords…	   	   	   	   	   128	  
	  
6.5	  	   The	  Role	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  Social	  Security	  Committee	   	   	   129	  
6.5.1	  	   Second	  Report	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   129	  
6.5.2	  	   Third	  Report	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   130	  
	  
6.6	  	   The	  Media	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   132	  
6.7	  	   Conclusion:	  Two	  Houses,	  Zero	  Influence	   	   	   	   	   133	  
	  
Chapter	  Seven	  –	  Positioning	  Implementation	  Studies	   	   	   	   137
	   	  
7.1	   	  Introduction	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   137	  
vii	  
	  
7.2	  	   The	  Literature,	  and	  Research	  Developments,	  within	  the	  Study	  	   of	   	   137	  
	  	   	   Implementation	  
	  7.2.1	  	   The	  ‘Top	  Down’	  Approach	   	   	   	   	   	   138	  
	  7.2.2	  	   The	  ‘Bottom	  Up’	  Approach	   	   	   	   	   	   141	  
	  
7.3	   Positioning	  of	  Implementation	  Studies,	  and	  the	  Approach	  Adopted	  in	  	   	  
	  	   this	  Study	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   142	  
	  7.3.1	  	   Understanding	  Policy	  Success	  or	  Failure	  in	  Implementation	  	  
	  Studies	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   144	  
	  
7.4	  	   Implementation	  and	  ‘Next	  Steps’	  Agencies	   	   	   	   	   146	  
7.5	  	   Conclusion	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   148	  
	  
Chapter	  Eight	  -­‐	  The	  Failure	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	   	   	   	   	   149	  
8.1	  	   Introduction	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   149	  
8.2	  	   Failure	  to	  Meet	  Targets	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   149	  
8.3	  	   The	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  in	  Operation	  -­‐	  Controversies	  within	  the	  CSA’s	  	  
	  First	  Year	  of	  Operation	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   152	  
	  8.3.1	  	   Media	  and	  Public	  Response	   	   	   	   	   	   152	  
	  8.3.2	  	   Political	  Response	   	   	   	   	   	   	   153	  
	  8.3.3	  	   The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Act	   	   	   	   	   155	  
	  
8.4	  	   Policy	  Design	  Failure,	  Not	  Implementation	  Failure	  	   	   	   	   157	  
8.5	  	   The	  Roots	  to	  Failure	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   159	  
	   8.5.1	   Unattainable	  Targets	  and	  an	  Operational	  Disconnect	   	   	   159	  
	   8.5.2	   Unclear/Inappropriate	  Lines	  of	  Accountability	   	   	   	   161	  
	  8.5.3	   Unrealistic	  Time-­‐frames	  Allotted,	  and	  Inadequate	  and	  	  
	  Inappropriate	  Resources	  Assigned	   	   	   	   	   	   162	  
	   8.5.4	   Lack	  of	  Trial	  or	  Simulation	  Runs	  	   	   	   	   	   164	  
	   8.5.5	  	   Ineffective	  Parliament	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   164	  
	   8.5.6	   Unengaged,	  Ineffective	  Opposition,	  Motivated	  by	  Political	  	  
	   Blame	  Avoidance	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   165	  
	   8.5.7	   Ineffective	  Pre-­‐legislative	  Scrutiny	   	   	   	   	   166	  
	   8.5.8	  	   Unclear,	  Complex,	  Ill-­‐throughout	  Policy	  Details	  	   	   	   168	  
	   8.5.9	  	   Ineffective	  Consultation	  	   	   	   	   	   	   169
	   	  8.5.10	  	   Uninformed	  Anticipated	  Reaction,	  a	  Deficit	  in	  Deliberation,	  	   	  
	   and	  a	  Cultural	  Disconnect	   	   	   	   	   	   	   169	  
	  8.5.11	  	   Policy	  Based	  on	  an	  Inaccurate	  Theory	  of	  Cause	  and	  Effect	   	   171	  
	   	   8.5.12	  	   Inadequate	  Research	  Undertaken,	  Alternative	  Options	  	  	   	  
	   	   Not	  Fully	  Considered	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   172	  
	  
8.6	  	   Summarising	  the	  Roots	  of	  Failure	   	   	   	   	   	   173	  
viii	  
	  
8.7	  	   The	  Idea	  of	  ‘Perfect	  Legislation’	  	   	   	   	   	   	   173	  
8.8	  	   Conclusion	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   175	  
Conclusion	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   177	  
Final	  Thought	  and	  Scope	  for	  Future	  Research	   	   	   	   	   	   	   180	  
Bibliography	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   181	  
Appendices	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   197	  
	  Appendix	  One:	  Appendix	  One	  –	  List	  of	  Organisations	  Commenting	  on	  the	   	  
Government’s	  White	  Paper	  Children	  Come	  First	   	   	   	   	   197	  
	   	  
ix	  
	  
List	  of	  Figures	  
	  
Figure	  1.1:	  	   Types	  of	  Study	  of	  Public	  Policy-­‐Making	   	   	   	   	   	   2	  
Figure	  1.2:	  	   Reconnecting	  the	  study	  of	  policy	  analysis	   	   	   	   	   3	  
Figure	  1.3:	  	   The	  Cycle	  of	  Policy-­‐Making	   	   	   	   	   	   	   11	  
Figure	  1.4:	   Feedback	  in	  the	  Policy	  Cycle	   	   	   	   	   	   	   18	  
	  
Figure	  2.1:	  	   Number	  of	  Lone	  Parent	  Families	  1961-­‐1991	   	   	   	   	   31	  
Figure	  2.2:	   Rates	  of	  Divorce:	  Percentage,	  per	  thousand	  marriages	   	   	   	   31	  
Figure	  2.3:	   The	  Increasing	  Proportions	  of	  Live	  Births	  Outside	  of	  Marriage	   	   	   32	  
Figure	  2.4:	  	   Numbers	  of	  Lone-­‐parent	  Families	  in	  1971	  and	  1991	   	   	   	   32	  
Figure	  2.5:	  	   Employment	  Trends	  -­‐	  ‘Single’	  Lone	  Mothers	  and	  Married	  Mothers:	  	   	  
	   	   Percentages	  working	  full	  time	  and	  part	  time,	  1977-­‐1991	   	   	   34	  
Figure	  2.6:	  	   Single	  Lone	  Mothers	  and	  Married	  Mothers:	  	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   Percentages	  part-­‐time	  employment,	  1977-­‐1991	   	   	   	   35	  
Figure	  2.7:	  	   Single	  Lone	  Mothers	  and	  Married	  Mothers:	  	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   Percentages	  full-­‐time	  employment,	  1977-­‐1991	   	   	   	   	   35	  
Figure	  2.8:	  	   Single	  Lone	  Mothers	  and	  Married	  Mothers:	  	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   Percentages	  combined	  employment,	  1977-­‐1991	   	   	   	   36	  
	  
Figure	  3.1:	  	   Layers	  of	  Problem	  Definition	   	   	   	   	   	   	   45	  
Figure	  3.2:	  	   Layers	  of	  Problem	  Definition	  as	  applied	  to	  Riker’s	  Nerve	  Gas	  Example	   	   46	  
Figure	  3.3:	   Layers	  of	  Problem	  Definition	  as	  Applied	  to	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	   	   53	  
	  
Figure	  4.1:	  	   Coherent	  Dual	  Policy	  Transfer	   	   	   	   	   	   	   71	  
Figure	  4.2:	  	   Incoherent	  Dual	  Policy	  Transfer	  	   	   	   	   	   	   71	  
Figure	  4.3:	   Dual-­‐Policy	  Transfer	  and	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	   	   	   	   74	  
	  
Figure	  5.1:	  	   Power	  Resources	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  	   	   	   	   	   82	  
Figure	  5.2:	  	   Power	  Resources	  of	  a	  Minister	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   87	  
Figure	  5.3:	  	   Power	  Resources	  of	  the	  Treasury	   	   	   	   	   	   89	  
Figure	  5.4:	   Kingdon’s	  Model	  of	  Policy	  Streams	   	   	   	   	   	   101	  
Figure	  5.5:	  	   Failing	  to	  Open	  the	  Policy	  Window	   	   	   	   	   	   102	  
Figure	  5.6:	  	   Five	  Streams,	  One	  Window	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   103	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6.1:	  	   The	  Passage	  of	  the	  Bill	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   108	  
Figure	  6.2:	  	   Anticipated	  Problems	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	   112	  
Figure	  6.3:	  	   Anticipated	  problems	  highlighted	  at	  Consultation,	  House	  of	  Lords	  and	  	   	  
	   	   House	  of	  Commons,	  and	  (Lack	  of)	  Action	  taken	  by	  Government	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134-­‐135	  
	  
Figure	  8.1:	  	   Criteria	  for	  ‘Perfect	  Legislation’	  	   	   	   	   	   	   175
1	  
	  




The	   overriding	   aim	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   provide	   the	   intellectual	   basis	   and	   methodological	  
approach	   for	  our	   study	  of	   the	  policy	  making	  process	  of	   the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  The	  approach	  
taken	  in	  our	  case	  study	  emphasises	  the	  need	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  field	  of	  policy	  analysis	  and	  
its	   plethora	  of	  methods,	   frameworks	   and	  models.	   Throughout	   this	   chapter	  we	  explicitly	   state	   and	  
justify	   our	   research	   design:	   an	   interpretivist	   approach	   presented	   within	   the	   stages	   framework	   or	  
heuristic.	   The	   thesis	   is	   anchored	   in	   ‘critical	   realism’	   in	   that	   it	   acknowledges	   the	   tradition	   of	  
behaviourism	   within	   political	   science,	   yet	   believes	   that	   it	   is	   important	   to	   also	   capture	   the	  
‘unobservable’	  power	  dynamics	  that	  are	  at	  play	  within	  the	  political	  system.	  This	  chapter	  surveys	  and	  
assesses	  the	  literature	  in	  the	  field	  of	  policy	  analysis	  from	  its	  origins	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  It	  then	  turns	  
to	  the	   literature	   inside	  the	  field,	  mapping	  a	  history	  of	  policy	  analysis,	  discussing	  the	  developments	  
within	   the	   field	   and	   addressing	   the	   various	   debates	   between	   scholars,	   particularly	   regarding	  
attempts	  at	  creating	  an	  overarching	  theory	  and	  ‘concrete’	  knowledge.	  It	  then	  discusses	  the	  various	  
approaches	  to	  policy	  analysis	  before	  stating	  the	  approach	  taken	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
It	   then	   moves	   to	   the	   prime	   focus	   of	   this	   chapter:	   the	   stages	   heuristic.	   It	   introduced	   the	  
framework,	  accounting	  for	  its	  position	  in	  the	  field,	  before	  examining	  the	  criticisms	  that	  the	  approach	  
has	  been	  subject	  to	  by	  various	  academics.	  It	  then	  rebuts	  many	  of	  these	  criticisms	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  
‘stages	  heuristic’	  has	  not	  outlived	  its	  use	  in	  policy	  analysis.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  its	  usage	  allows	  a	  
multi-­‐theory	  and	  multi-­‐method	  approach,	  therefore	  providing	  a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  insight	  into	  policy	  
analysis.	  It	  ends	  by	  introducing	  the	  case	  study	  and	  reviewing	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  
Act	  and	  Child	  Support	  Agency,	  before	  outlining	  the	  scope	  and	  research	  design	  of	  the	  thesis,	  placing	  
particular	  emphasis	  on	  how	  it	  will	  utilise	  the	  stages	  heuristic.	  
	  	  	  	  
1.2	  	  	  	  Approaches	  to	  Policy	  Analysis	  
	  
Before	  we	  engage	   in	  our	  study,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  define	  our	  approach	  to	  what	   is	  generally	  
termed	  ‘policy	  analysis’.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  highlight	  the	  way	  that	  policy	  analysis	   is	  addressed	  in	  this	  
thesis,	   to	   indicate	   what	   literature	   it	   will	   be	   drawing	   upon,	   and	   stress	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   study.	  
Lasswell	   stated	   that	   within	   policy	   analysis,	   there	   are	   two	   ‘separable	   though	   entwined	   frames	   of	  
reference’:	  	  knowledge	  of	  policy	  and	  the	  policy	  process	  and	  knowledge	  in	  the	  policy	  process	  (1970,	  3).	  
This	   distinction	   has	   remained	   in	   policy	   analysis,	   yet	   has	   largely	   been	   re-­‐termed	   and	   advanced	   by	  
2	  
	  
Gordon,	   Lewis	   and	   Young	   (1977).	   They	   point	   towards	   a	   typology	   of	   seven	   classifications	   of	   policy	  
analysis,	  which	  fall	  under	  the	  category	  of	  ‘analysis	  of	  policy’	  or	  ‘analysis	  for	  policy’.	  These	  distinctions	  











Figure	  1.1.	  Types	  of	  study	  of	  public	  policy-­‐making	  (adapted	  from	  Hogwood	  and	  Gunn,	  1981)	  
	  
This	   study	   is	   concerned	   with	   three	   elements.	   Firstly	   assessing	   the	   process	   by	   which	   the	  
policy	   was	   made,	   looking	   at	   the	   actions	   taken	   by	   various	   actors	   and	   institutions	   at	   each	   stage;	  
secondly	  providing	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  a	  policy	  whereby	  failure	  was	  foreseeable	  and	  foreseen	  
was	  able	  to	  obtain	  cross-­‐party	  support,	  and	  lastly;	  highlighting	  what	  lessons	  about	  our	  policy-­‐making	  
process	  we	  can	  draw	  from	  this	  (‘information	  for	  policy	  making’	  and	   ‘process	  advocacy’).	  Although	  
our	  main	   focus	   is	   a	   ‘study	   of	   the	   policy	   process’,	   we	   are	   inescapably	   required	   to	   also	   study	   the	  
‘policy	  content’,	  as	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  former	  (Ham	  and	  Hill,	  1993,	  9).	   	  Whilst	  frequently	  
insightful,	  analysis	  of	  policy	  content,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  origins,	  objectives,	  operation	  and	  impact	  
of	   a	   policy,	   remains	   highly	   descriptive	   and	   detached	   (Hogwood	   and	   Gunn,	   1984,	   26).	   We	   also	  
acknowledge	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	   ‘policy	  outputs’	   is	  also	  required,	  to	  assess	  where	  the	  policy	  
process	  allowed	  the	  passage	  of	  a	  failed	  policy,	  we	  need	  to	  address	  the	  policy’s	  outputs	   in	  order	  to	  
assess	   its	   failure.	   Therefore	   we	   believe	   that	   we	   cannot	   disregard	   insights	   that	   can	   be	   obtained	  
through	  these	  classifications.	  Yet	  this	  thesis’s	  approach	  moves	  beyond	  merely	  describing	  the	  content	  
and	   outputs	   of	   the	   policy,	   and	   instead	   aims	   at	   providing	   a	   conceptualised	   understanding	   of	   the	  
process	  by	  which	  it	  was	  made.	  	  	  
	  
Therefore	   this	   thesis	   does	   not	   situate	   itself	   under	   the	   category	   of	   ‘analysis	   of	   policy’	   nor	  
‘analysis	  for	  policy’	  (as	  highlighted	  in	  Figure	  1.1).	  Whilst	  it	  notes	  the	  practicality	  of	  the	  separation,	  it	  
instead	   views	   the	   above	   seven	   typologies,	   and	   two	   categories,	   as	   entwined,	   and	   the	   separation	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artificial.	   Instead	   it	   suggests	   that	   the	   field	   of	   policy	   analysis	   should	   be	   reconnected,	   as	   the	   below	  










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1.2.	  Reconnecting	  the	  study	  of	  policy	  analysis	  
	  
Figure	  1.1	  suggests	  that	  the	  only	  unifying	  section	  is	  evaluation,	  instead	  the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  this	  
thesis	   suggest	   that	   there	   is,	   and	   in	   most	   cases	   should	   be,	   overlap	   between	   all	   seven	   categories.	  
Whist	  separation	  is	  a	  useful	  visual	  tool,	  the	  study	  of	  policy	  analysis,	  in	  the	  view	  taken	  by	  this	  thesis,	  is	  
that	   of	   both	   ‘analysis	   of	   policy’	   and	   ‘analysis	   for	   policy’.	   The	   field	  of	   policy	   analysis	   should	  use	   its	  
knowledge	  of	  policies,	  and	  policy-­‐making	  process,	  to	  improve	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  and/or	  the	  
policies.	  This	  thesis	  uses	  a	  study	  of	  the	  policy	  process,	  drawing	  on	  policy	  content	  and	  policy	  outputs,	  
to	  gain	  information	  for	  policy-­‐making.	  What	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  do	  is	  enter	  the	  realm	  of	  
policy	   advocacy.	   Whilst	   our	   study	   does	   contain	   normative	   and	   prescriptive	   ideas	   regarding	   the	  
policy-­‐making	  process,	  it	  does	  not	  contain	  normative	  ideals	  regarding	  child	  maintenance	  policy.	  
	  
1.3. Theories	  and	  Models	  in	  the	  Field	  of	  Policy	  Analysis:	  An	  Overview	  	  
1.3.1. Brief	  History	  of	  the	  Field	  of	  Policy	  Analysis	  
	  
This	   section	  provides	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	   the	  history	  of	   the	   field	  or	  policy	  analysis.	  Tracing	  
the	  origins	  and	  development	  of	   the	  field	  enables	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  methodologies	  utilised,	   the	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The	   origins	   of	   public	   policy	   analysis	   which	   focused	   primarily	   upon	   the	   policy	   process	   can	  
largely	   be	   linked	   to	   four	   scholars:	   Harold	   Lasswell,	   David	   Easton,	   Charles	   Lindblom,	   and	   Herbert	  
Simon	  (Parsons,	  1995,	  21).	  Each	  of	  these	  scholars	  promoted	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  field	  and	  authored	  
influential	  works	   that	  provided	   the	   foundations	  of	   the	   field,	  and	   remain	  highly	   influential	   in	  policy	  
analysis	  today.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  their	  work.	  
	  
Lasswell	  is	  commonly	  seen	  as	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  field	  having	  originally	  pioneered	  much	  of	  its	  
work.	  Certainly	  his	  influence	  on	  the	  development	  of	  policy	  analysis	  has	  been	  vast.	  Lasswell	  called	  for	  
an	  approach	  that	  was	  multi-­‐method,	  multi-­‐discipline,	  problem-­‐orientated,	  and	  which	  was	  concerned	  
with	  mapping	   the	   contextuality	   of	   the	   policy	   process,	   policy	   options,	   and	   policy	   outcomes	   (1951,	  
1956,	   1970,	   1971).	   Lasswell	   advocated	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   sub-­‐field	   that	   was	   not	   confined	   by	  
disciplinary	   or	   methodological	   boundaries,	   but	   instead	   utilised	   whatever	   approach	   appeared	  
appropriate	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   both	   knowledge	  of	   and	   knowledge	   in	   the	   policy	   process.	   In	   his	   1956	  
book	   The	   Decision	   Process,	   Lasswell	   proposed	   the	   ‘stages	   approach’	   as	   a	   conceptual	   map	   to	   aid	  
policy	   analysis	   –	   an	   approach	   which	   many	   suggest	   remains	   the	   predominant	   paradigm	   in	   policy	  
analysis	  research.	  	  
	  
Simon	  also	  produced	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  theories	  in	  policy	  analysis,	  
that	   of	   ‘bounded	   rationality’	   (1957,	   1982);	   a	   theory	   that	   is	   deemed	   influential	   across	   various	  
disciplines.	   Simon	   approaches	   policy	   analysis	   in	   a	   similar	   vein	   to	   that	   of	   Lasswell,	   by	   breaking	   the	  
decisions	  process	   into	  a	  sequence	  of	  stages.	  However	  he	  argued	  that	  rational	  thinking	  was	  the	  key	  
component	  driving	  the	  policy	  process.	  Easton’s	  contribution	  is	  also	  highly	  significant,	  and	  frequently	  
referred	  to	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  most	  textbooks	  on	  policy	  analysis.	  Easton’s	  (1953,	  1965)	  ‘black	  box’	  
model	   focused	  on	   conceptualising	   the	   relationship	  between	  external	   inputs	  and	  policy	  out-­‐puts	   in	  
the	  policy	  process.	   Lindblom	   (1959,	  1968,	  1979)	   rejected	   the	  approaches	  put	   forward	  by	  Lasswell,	  
Easton,	  and	  Simon	  and	  instead	  suggested	  that	  the	  policy	  process	  could	  best	  be	  conceptualised	  by	  an	  
act	  of	  ‘muddling	  through’.	  Lindblom	  rejected	  the	  view	  that	  rationalism	  was	  the	  driving	  force	  of	  policy	  
making	  and	  that	  we	  could	  divide	  the	  policy	  process	  into	  stages,	  instead	  suggesting	  that	  we	  view	  the	  
process	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘incrementalism’.	   Alongside	   Lasswell’s	   ‘stages	   approaches’,	   Lindblom’s	  
‘incrementalism’	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  approaches	  in	  policy	  analysis.	  
	  
Following	   on	   from	   the	   pioneering	  work	   by	   the	   ‘four	   founders’	   of	   the	   field,	   policy	   analysis	  	  
soon	   saw	   contributions	   by	   scholars	   such	   as:	   Jones	   (1970),	   Dye	   (1972),	   Anderson	   (1975),	   Jenkins	  
(1978),	   Rhodes	   (1979)	   and	   Wildavsky	   (1979).	   However,	   although	   there	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	   newly	  
devoted	   field	   to	   the	   study	   of	   policy	   analysis,	   Hill	   argues	   that	   little	   of	   the	  work	   during	   the	   period	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between	  1950	  and	  1980	  focused	  on	  gaining	  an	  academic	  understanding	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  (2009,	  
6).	  	  As	  Hill	  commented:	  ‘the	  desire	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  policy	  process	  works	  was	  in	  many	  respects	  a	  
minor	  concern’	   (2009,	  6).	   Instead	  this	  period	  was	  dominated	  by	  works	  of	  prescription,	   rather	   than	  
description,	   with	   scholars	   focusing	   on	   stating	   how	   the	   process	   could	   be	   improved	   rather	   than	  
undertaking	  an	  academic	  inquiry	  into	  studying	  how	  it	  operates	  in	  practice.	  	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  
the	  field	  of	  policy	  analysis	  moved	  to	  the	  other	  extreme,	  academic	  inquiry	  void	  of	  suggestions	  of	  how	  
the	   system	   could	   improve.	   Referring	   back	   to	   the	   earlier	   Figure	   1.1,	   work	   was	   concerned	   with	  
‘analysis	  of	  policy’	  but	   ignored	   ‘analysis	   for	  policy’.	  This	   thesis	  utilizes,	  and	  advocates,	  a	  merger	  of	  
the	  two	  approaches,	  cultivating	  knowledge	  to	  develop	  real	  world	  application.	  	  
	  
The	   field’s	   prescriptive	   tendencies	   can	  be	   seen	   to	  have	  emerged	   largely	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  
external	  economic	  and	  social	  circumstances	  of	  the	  time.	  As	  the	  new	  and	  fragile	  field	  was	  emerging	  in	  
post-­‐war	  America	  it	  quickly	  saw	  itself	  absorbed	  into	  President	  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson’s	  ‘War	  on	  Poverty’	  
(deLeon,	   1998).	   Rather	   than	   being	   a	   means	   to	   cultivate	   knowledge,	   policy	   analysis	   was	   quickly	  
deemed	  a	  mechanism	  to	  solve	  society’s	  problems.	  Hill	  argues	  that	  this	  period	  was	  dominated	  by	  the	  
assumption	   that	  policy	   solutions	  could	  be	   found	   to	   remedy	  social	  problems	   if	  policy	  analysts	  used	  
rational	  and	  empirical	  techniques	  to	  tackle	  policy	  design	  difficulties	  (2013,	  6).	  Hill	  goes	  on	  to	  argue:	  
‘only	  a	  minority	  –	   radical	  analysts	  on	   the	   ‘Left’	  who	  doubted	   that	  modern	  governments	   really	  had	  
the	  will	  to	  solve	  problems,	  and	  radical	  analysts	  on	  the	  ‘Right’	  who	  were	  sceptical	  about	  their	  capacity	  
to	  do	  so	  –	  raised	  doubts	  and	  suggested	  that	  more	  attention	  should	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  determinants	  of	  
policy	  decisions’	  (2013,	  6).	  	  
	  
It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  early	  1980s,	  with	  work	  such	  as	  Ham	  and	  Hill’s	  The	  Policy	  Process	  in	  the	  
Modern	   Capitalist	   State	   (1983),	   that	   the	   field	   of	   policy	   analysis	   began	   to	   concentrate	   fully	   on	  
knowledge	   of	   policy	   and	   the	   policy	   process	   (Hill,	   2013,	   6).	   The	   1980s	   saw	   a	   move	   towards	   the	  
academic	   pursuit	   of	   understanding	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   policy	   process.	   Rather	   than	   seeking	   to	   solve	  
policy	  problems	  directly,	  academics	  began	  to	  advocate	  the	  development	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  policy	  
process	  that	   in	  turn	  would	  provide	  insights	  which	  could	  be	  developed	  to	  create	  successful	  policies.	  
The	  field	  expanded	  with	  the	  development	  of	  theories	  such	  as:	  Institutional	  Rational	  Choice	  (Ostrom,	  
1986,	   1990;	   Moe,	   1984),	   Advocacy	   Coalition	   Framework	   (Sabatier	   &	   Jenkins-­‐Smith,	   1988,	   1993),	  
Multiple	  Streams	  (Kingdon,	  1984;	  Zahariadis,	  1992,	  1995,	  1999),	  and	  Punctuated	  Equilibrium	  (True,	  
Jones,	   &	   Baumgartner,	   1999;	   Baumgartner	   &	   Jones,	   1993).	   However	   these	   approaches	   largely	  
focused	   on	   analysing,	   but	   then	   predicting,	   the	   policy	   process;	   many	   of	   the	   theories	   were	   then	  
applied	   to	   case	   studies	   to	   be	   empirically	   tested,	   hence	   falling	   under	   the	   positivist	   paradigm	   by	  
attempting	  to	  search	  for	  causal	  theories.	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Yet	   it	  can	  also	  be	  suggested	  that	   it	  was	  not	  until	   the	  1990s	  that	  the	  field	  of	  policy	  analysis	  
actually	   started	   to	   embrace	   Lasswell’s	   vision	   of	   a	   multidisciplinary	   and	   multi-­‐methodological	  
approach.	   As	   Fischer	   states:	   ‘In	   contrast	   to	   the	   multidisciplinary	   methodological	   framework	   of	  
Lasswell,	  the	  field	  has	  been	  shaped	  by	  a	  more	  limiting	  methodological	  framework	  derived	  from	  the	  
neo-­‐positivist/empiricist	  methods	  that	  dominated	  the	  social	  sciences	  of	  the	  day’	  (2003,	  4).	  A	  review	  
of	   the	   literature	   in	   the	   field	   of	   policy	   analysis	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   it	   is	   largely	   dominated	   by	   a	  
positivist	  paradigm,	  a	  factor	  that	  has	  indeed	  limited	  our	  understanding	  of	  public	  policy	  and	  the	  policy	  
process.	  	  
	  
	   Since	  the	  late	  1980s,	  and	  more	  particularly	  the	  1990s,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  expansion	  of	  a	  vast	  
array	   of	   literature	   and	   research	   that	   has	   managed	   to	   break	   out	   of	   the	   restricting	   paradigm	   of	  
positivism,	  with	   scholars	   such	   as	   Fischer	   and	   Forester	   (1993),	   Schön	   and	   Rein	   (1994),	   Roe	   (1994),	  
Schneider	   and	   Ingram	   (1997),	   Fischer	   (1998),	   Hajer	   (2003),	   and	   Brunner	   (1991)	   developing	   post-­‐
positivist,	  constructivist	  and	  post-­‐modern	  perspectives.	  These	  works	  move	  beyond	  the	  restrictions	  of	  
positivism	  and	  instead	  embrace	  the	  importance	  of	  values,	  interpretation,	  and	  discourse.	  As	  deLeon	  
and	   Martell	   argue,	   this	   approach	   to	   policy	   analysis	   was	   developed	   in	   response	   to	   the	   field’s	  
shortcomings	  in	  analysis	  and	  provided	  a	  more	  effective	  way	  of	  ‘dealing	  with	  diverse,	  interconnected,	  
value-­‐laden	  policy	  issues’	  (2006,	  55).	  This	  strand	  was	  based	  on	  a	  more	  encompassing	  epistemological	  
perspective	  that	  rejected	  the	  belief	  that	  empiricism	  was	  the	  only	  valid	  form	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  also	  
moved	  away	  from	  utilising	  theories	  to	  identify	  causal	  mechanisms.	  
	  
1.3.2	  Theories	  and	  Models	  in	  the	  Field	  of	  Policy	  Analysis	  
	  
	   Before	  we	   look	   at	   the	   plethora	   of	   theories	   and	   approaches	  within	   policy	   analysis	   and	   the	  
central	  arguments	  surrounding	  them,	  we	  need	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  public	  policy.	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  that	  shape	  and	  influence	  policies;	  as	  Anderson	  emphasises,	  ‘there	  is	  
not	  a	  single	  process	  by	  which	  public	  policies	  are	  formed.	  They	  do	  not	  come	  off	  an	  assembly	  line	  as	  
do	  automobiles	  or	  television	  sets’	  (1994,	  36).	  These	  factors	  are	  often	  complex	  in	  nature	  and	  coalesce	  
to	  imbue	  separate	  policies	  with	  their	  own	  distinct	  traits.	  The	  policy	  area	  is	  one	  such	  factor:	  different	  
fields	   of	   policy	   produce	   variations	   in	   policy	   making	   styles,	   and	   these	   variations	   impact	   on	   which	  
theoretical	  models	   provide	   the	  most	   useful	   explanatory	   framework.	   Typically	   each	   area	   of	   public	  
policy,	   be	   it	   foreign	   policy,	   economic	   policy,	   environmental	   policy	   or	   social	   policy,	   has	   distinct	  
processes,	   involving	  different	  actors,	  norms,	  procedures,	   techniques,	  and	  resources.	   In	  each	  policy	  
process,	  actors	  are	  involved	  that	  hold	  different	  positions,	  character	  traits	  and	  personalities.	  Different	  
actors	   impact	   on	   the	   policy	   process	   in	   their	   own	   idiosyncratic	   manner.	   For	   example	   a	   Transport	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Minister	  with	  a	  strong	  viewpoint	  on	  High	  Speed	  Rail	   is	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  greater	   impact	  on	  the	  
shape	  of	  a	  policy	  in	  that	  field	  than	  a	  minister	  with	  little	  interest	  in	  the	  subject.	  Other	  actors,	  such	  as	  
Civil	   Servants,	   may	   also	   bring	   their	   own	   operational	   methods	   to	   policy	   formation:	   for	   example	  
conducting	   consultations	  with	   interest	  groups	  A,	  B	  and	  C	  which	  may	  produce	  a	  different	  outcome	  
than	   if	   consultations	   had	   been	   with	   groups	   D,	   E	   and	   F.	   The	   motivations	   of	   actors	   must	   also	   be	  
examined	   to	   see	   what	   effect	   they	   have	   on	   the	   policy	   outcome:	   ten	   different	   actors	   in	   a	   policy	  
process	  may	  have	  ten	  separate	  motives	  or	  objectives	  for	  being	  involved.	  We	  need	  to	  note	  the	  impact	  
of	  actors’	  personalities	  on	  the	  policy	  making	  process	  as	  well	  as	  their	  operational	  styles.	  Both	  styles	  
and	   personalities	   are	   frequently	   dictated	   by	   an	   actor’s	   political	   leaning,	   the	   impact	   of	   power,	   the	  
degree	   of	   resources	   available	   to	   the	   individual,	   the	   position	   of	   the	   government,	   political	  
relationships	  and	  economic,	  social	  and	  international	  circumstances.	  	  
	   We	   must	   also	   examine	   circumstances	   unique	   to	   that	   policy,	   including	   degree	   of	   path	  
dependency,	  impact	  of	  a	  department	  upon	  the	  policy	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  consultation	  undertaken.	  If	  
we	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  range	  of	  variables	  involved	  in	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  in	  different	  
policy	   sectors	  we	  begin	   to	   see	  how	  difficult	   it	   is	   to	  create	  or	   choose	  an	  appropriate	   theory	   that	   is	  
able	  to	  encompasses	  the	  variety	  and	  complexity	  of	  all	  the	  above.	  
Since	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  sub-­‐field	  of	  public	  policy	  analysis,	  social	  and	  political	  scientists	  have	  
developed	  a	  variety	  theories	  and	  models	  to	  explain	  the	  policy	  process.	  The	  field	  now	  enshrines	  a	  rich	  
array	   of	   theories,	   models,	   approaches,	   metaphors,	   and	   concepts	   from	   numerous	   disciplines	  
(Parsons,	  1995,	  64).	  Some	  examples	  of	  these	  include:	  
	  
• Stagist	  Approaches:	  Approaches	  which	  view	  the	  policy	  process	  as	  a	  series	  of	  stages,	  
(for	  example,	  Lasswell,	  Simon,	  Easton,	  Jones,	  Anderson,	  Hogwood	  and	  Gunn)	  
• Pluralist-­‐elitist	  Approaches:	  Approaches	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  
amongst	  actors	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  polices	  (for	  example,	  Dahnl,	  Bachrach	  and	  Baratz,	  
Cobb	  and	  Elder,	  Schattnsneider,	  Lukes,	  and	  Crenson)	  
• Socio-­‐economic	  Approaches:	  Approaches	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  economic	  and	  
social	   conditions	   on	   the	   formation	   of	   policies	   (for	   example,	  Wilensky,	   Hofferbert,	  
and	  Downs)	  
• Policy	   Discourse	   Approaches:	   Approaches	  which	   focus	   on	   an	   analysis	   of	   language	  
(For	  example,	  Fischer	  and	  Forester,	  Stone,	  Edelman,	  Rein	  and	  Schön)	  
• Neo-­‐corporatist/Institutionalist	   Approaches:	   Approaches	   which	   focus	   on	   the	  
subsystem	  within	   the	   process	   (for	   example,	   Richardson	   and	   Jordon,	   Heclo,	   Smith,	  




Each	  of	  these	  approaches,	  whilst	  highly	  insightful	  and	  often	  relevant,	  either	  provides	  specific	  
lenses	  through	  which	  to	  view	  the	  world,	  or	   limit	   its	  analysis	  to	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  policy	  process.	   In	  
Allison’s	  (1971)	  novel	  study	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  he	  highlighted	  the	  impact	  of	  placing	  different	  
approaches	  onto	  a	  particular	  case	  study	  and	  demonstrated	  that	  there	  was	  no	  single	  best	  approach.	  
As	  Jenkins	  states,	  ‘the	  nature	  of	  the	  policy	  problem	  is	  such	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  approaches	  are	  required	  
to	  deal	  with	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  process’	  (1978,	  20).	  	  
	  
The	  use	  of	  a	   single	  approach	   lacks	   the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  aspect	  needed	   in	  policy	  analysis,	  
restricting	   our	   insight	   to	   a	   contained	   area	   leading	   to	   a	   partial	   account,	   and	   tainting	   our	  
understanding	   by	   only	   highlighting	   those	   factors	   that	   fit	   inside	   that	   approach	   or	   theory	   (Cairney,	  
2007,	  46).	  	  We	  need	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  each	  approach	  provides	  a	  separate	  focus	  and	  contains	  an	  
idiosyncratic	  strength	  in	  explaining	  certain	  phenomena	  in	  certain	  instances	  (Anderson,	  1975,	  25).	  Yet	  
they	  are	  not	  catch-­‐all	  approaches	  that	  should	  be	  in	  competition	  with	  one	  another.	  As	  Dye	  notes	  we	  
need	   to	   avoid	   falling	   into	   the	   trap	   of	   relying	   upon	   a	   single	   approach	   or	   theory.	   Although	   often	   a	  
particular	  policy	  appears	  to	  lend	  itself	  to	  explanation	  by	  a	  single	  approach,	  most,	   if	  not	  all,	  policies	  
are	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  combination	  of	  theories	  and	  approaches	  (1978,	  20).	  Therefore	  we	  ‘should	  
not	   permit	   oneself	   to	   be	   bound	   too	   rigidly	   or	   too	   dogmatically	   to	   a	   particular	  model’	   (Anderson,	  
1975,	  25).	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  some	  academics	  within	  the	  field	  of	  policy	  analysis	  have	  indeed	  made	  
the	  error	  of	  dogmatically	  advocating	  a	  theory	  or	  model	  of	  their	  choice.	  Here	  they	  have	  mistaken	  the	  
main	  purpose	  of	  policy	  analysis	  and	  replaced	  the	  pursuit	  of	  explanation	  and	  insight	  with	  attempts	  to	  
validate	  a	  particular	  model	  or	  theory:	  their	  objectives	  have	  become	  misplaced.	  	  
	  
In	   recent	   years,	   several	   scholars	   have	   urged	   for	   a	   move	   away	   from	   a	   use	   of	   mid-­‐range	  
theories	   in	   pursuit	   of	   an	   integrated,	   comprehensive	   theory	   (Parsons,	   1995,	   184).	   Sabatier	   argued	  
that	   there	  was	   a	   need	   to	   search	   for	   ‘better	   theories’,	   whilst	   John	   (1999)	   stated	   that	   we	   need	   to	  
create	  a	   ‘synthesised	  approach’.	  However	  this	  desire	  to	  move	  towards	  a	  synthesised	  approach	  has	  
largely	  restricted	  itself	  to	  operate	  inside	  the	  limited	  realms	  of	  positivist	  methodology.	  As	  John	  states,	  
‘most	  of	  all,	  the	  researcher	  needs	  a	  framework	  or	  a	  theory	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  as	  a	  
whole’	  (1999,	  37).	  Many	  academics	  (see	  for	  example	  Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  (1999),	  John	  (1999),	  
and	  Parsons	   (1995))	   have	  pointed	   towards	   four	   approaches	   that	   embodied	   this	   desire	   to	   create	   a	  
comprehensive	  or	  “synthesised”	  approach:	  Punctuated	  Equilibrium,	  Advocacy	  Collation	  Framework,	  
Multiple	   Streams,	   and	  Network	  Approaches.	   These	   four	   approaches	   are	   labelled	   synthetic	   as	   they	  
bring	   together	   much	   of	   the	   research	   already	   existing	   within	   mid-­‐range	   theories	   and	   models,	  
especially	  drawing	  on	  the	  work	  on	  institutions,	  networks,	  socio-­‐economic	  process,	  choices,	  and	  ideas	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(John,	   1999).	   Acknowledging	   the	   limitations	   of	   previous	   work,	   they	   embrace	   several	   mid-­‐range	  
theories	  and	  models	  and	  move	  towards	  what	  Sabatier	  termed	  ‘better’	  theories.	   	  
	  
Yet	   to	   think	   that	   one	   theory	   could	   embrace	   the	   depth	   and	   complexity	   of	   all	   mid-­‐range	  
theories	  to	  create	  a	  comprehensive	  theory	  is	  as	  naïve	  as	  thinking	  that	  one	  of	  the	  above	  theories	  can	  
alone	  explain	   the	  entire	  policy	  process.	  As	  Anderson	   states,	   ‘given	   the	  diversity	   and	   complexity	   in	  
policy	   making	   processes,	   the	   development	   of	   some	   sort	   of	   ‘general	   theory’	   which	   has	   broad	  
explanatory	  power	  is	  an	  unrealistic	  aspiration’	  (1994,	  34).	  No	  one	  theory	  or	  model	  can	  capture	  the	  
complexity	   involved	   in	   what	   Easton	   term	   the	   ‘web	   of	   decision’	   (Easton,	   1953,	   130).	   It	   is	   neither	  
possible	  nor	  desirable	   to	  develop	  a	  unified	   theory	  of	   the	  entire	  policy	  process.	   If	  we	  are	  however	  
lucky	   enough	   to	   stumble	   across	   it	  we	  would	   discover	   that	   it	   is	   too	   general	   and	   broad	   and	   that	   it	  
would	   in	   fact	   not	   provide	  us	  with	   any	   valuable	   insight.	   This	   thesis	   instead	   endorses	   a	  move	   away	  
from	  striving	  towards	  ‘better’,	  over-­‐arching	  theories,	  and	  instead	  utilise	  Lasswell’s	  stages	  approach	  
as	  a	   tool	   to	  embrace	  the	  wealth	  of	  knowledge	  that	  has	  been	  acquired	  by	  mid-­‐range	  theories.	  This	  
does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  simply	  reject	  models	  such	  as	  the	  Advocacy	  Coalition	  Framework	  and	  Multiple	  
Streams;	   rather	   we	   suggest	   that	   they	   can	   be	   utilised	   within	   the	   stages	   heuristic	   (which	   we	  
demonstrate	  in	  our	  case	  study)	  rather	  than	  being	  an	  alternative	  to	  it.	  This	  Chapter	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  
an	  in-­‐depth	  look	  at	  the	  stages	  approach.	  
	  
1.4.	  Stages	  and	  Cycles:	  A	  Framework	  of	  the	  Policy	  Process	  
	  
Although	  no	  originality	  is	  claimed	  by	  any	  one	  academic	  for	  the	  stages	  approach,	  it	  can	  be	  traced	  
back	  to	  over	  half	  a	  century	  ago.	   In	  1956,	   in	  his	  seminal	  work	  The	  Decision	  Process,	  Harold	  Lasswell	  










Lasswell	   proposed	   that	   the	   use	   of	   a	   conceptual	   map	   ‘must	   provide	   a	   guide	   to	   obtaining	   a	  
generalistic	   image	   of	   the	   major	   phases	   of	   any	   collective	   act’	   (Lasswell,	   1971,	   28).	   Here	   Lasswell	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provided	   the	  basis	   for	   arguably	   the	  most	  dominant	   concept	   and	  model	  within	  public	   policy.	   Since	  
1956	  the	  stages,	  or	  cycle,	  approach	  has	  been	  the	  basis	   for	  extensive	  research	  development	  within	  
public	  policy.	  Whilst	  Lasswell’s	  original	   formation	  appeared	  somewhat	  abstract,	  couched	   in	  system	  
theory	   terms,	   and	   detached	   from	   the	   world	   of	   institutes	   and	   actors	   (Nakumura,	   1987),	   it	  
nevertheless	   provided	   the	   foundations	   for	   subsequent	   development	   by	   numerous	   scholars.	  
Throughout	   the	   1970s	   and	   the	   1980s,	   Lasswell’s	   ‘conceptual	  map’	  was	   adapted	   and	   advanced	   by	  
various	  alternatives	  proposed	  by	  scholars	  who	  made	  it	  more	  amenable	  to	  practical	  application	  and	  
increased	   its	   association	   with	   institutional	   actors.	   (see,	   Mack,	   1971;	   Rose,	   1973;	   Brewer,	   1974;	  
Anderson,	  1975;	  May	  and	  Wildavsky	  1978;	  Jenkins,	  1978;	  Brewer	  and	  Deleon,	  1983).	  Hogwood	  and	  
Gunn	  advanced	  the	  categories	  proposed	  by	  Lasswell	  by	  identifying	  the	  following	  stages:	  deciding	  to	  
decide,	   deciding	   how	   to	   decide,	   issue	   definition,	   forecasting,	   setting	   objectives	   and	   priorities,	  
options	   analysis,	   policy	   implementation,	   evaluation	   and	   review,	   and	   lastly	   policy	   maintenance,	  
succession	  and	  termination	  (1984,	  4).	  
	  
While	   there	   remain	   various	   typologies	   of	   the	   stages	   approach,	   this	   thesis’s	   application	   of	   the	  
framework	  to	  the	  Child	  Support	  Act	  will	  utilise	  the	  operationalised	  typology	  of:	  
	  
• Problem	  Definition	  
• Agenda	  Setting	  
• Policy	  Formulation	  






This	  thesis	  immediately	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  is	  often	  not	  a	  rigid,	  linear	  
activity	  therefore	  presents	  the	  stages	  approach	  as	  cyclical.	  This	  more	  accurately	  depicts	  the	  fluidity	  
and	  integration	  between	  the	  stages,	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  feedback	  loops	  within	  the	  cycle.	  As	  we	  will	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  study	  does	  not	  assess	  the	  Evaluation	  or	  Reform	  stages	  due	  to	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  thesis.	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Figure	  1.3.	  The	  Cycle	  of	  Policy	  Making	  	  	  
	  
	  
We	  argue	  that	  the	  above	  provides	  a	  conceptual	  understanding	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  which	  is	  
fundamental	   in	  order	   to	  undertake	   further	  analysis.	  By	  using	   the	   ‘conceptual	  map’,	  or	   framework,	  
we	  are	  able	  to	  explore	  the	  policy	  process	  in	  greater	  depth.	  Whilst	  fully	  accepting	  that	  certainly	  there	  
are	   overlaps	   between	   each	   stage,	   and,	   indeed,	   that	   not	   all	   policies	   adhere	   to	   the	   logical-­‐flow	  
indicated	  above,	  each	   stage	  does	  contain	  distinct	   characteristics,	  procedures,	   institutes	  and	  actors	  
(deLeon,	  1999,	  21)	  that	  warrant	  their	  separation.	  	  
	  
The	  significance	  of	   the	  stages	  approach,	  or	  as	  Sabatier	   labels	   it	   the	   ‘stages	  heuristic,’	   (1999)	   is	  
vast,	  not	  only	  as	  a	  device	  to	  study	  the	  development	  of	  individual	  polices	  but	  also	  as	  it	  encouraged	  an	  
entire	  generation	  of	  research	  inside	  the	  individual	  stages	  (deLeon,	  1999,	  21).	  The	  stages	  framework	  
provided	  a	  starting	  point	  around	  which	  future	  research,	  literature,	  and	  theories	  were	  organised.	  As	  a	  
result,	   this	   has	   led	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   considerable	   volume	   of	   influential	   work,	   particularly	  
relevant	  to	  particular	  stages:	  
	  
• Problem	   Definition:	   Fischer,	   F.	   and	   Forester,	   J.	   (1993)	   The	   Argumentative	   Turn	   in	   Policy	  
Analysis	   and	   Planning;	   Schön,	   D.	   A.	   &	   Rein,	   M.,	   (1994):	   Frame	   Reflection:	   Toward	   the	  
Resolution	  of	  Intractable	  Policy	  Controversies;	  Rochefort	  D.	  A.,	  and	  Cobb,	  R.W.	  (Eds.)	  (1994)	  
The	   Politics	   of	   Problem	   Definition;	   Fischer,	   F.	   (2003)	   Reframing	   Public	   Policy:	   Discursive	  
Politics	   and	   Deliberative	   Practices;	   Dery,	   D.	   (1984),	   Problem	   Definition	   in	   Policy	   Analysis.;	  














• Agenda	  Setting:	  Kingdon,	  J.	  (1995)	  Agendas,	  Alternatives	  and	  Public	  Policies;	  Cobb,	  R.W.	  and	  
Elder,	  C.D.,	   (1971)	   ‘The	  Politics	  of	  Agenda-­‐Building:	  An	  Alternative	  Perspective	   for	  Modern	  
Democratic	   Theory’,	   Journal	   of	   Politics,	   33:	   892-­‐915;	   Cobb,	   R.W.	   and	   Elder,	   C.D.,	   (1972)	  
Participation	   in	   American	   Politics:	   The	   Dynamics	   of	   –Agenda-­‐Building;	   Nelson,	   B.J.	   (1984)	  
Making	   an	   Issue	   of	   Child	   Abuse;	   Cobb,	   R.W.,	   Ross,	   J.K.	   and	   Ross,	   M.H.	   (1976)	   ‘Agenda	  
Building	  as	  a	  Comparative	  Political	  Process’,	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  70:	  126-­‐38.	  
• Policy	  Formulation:	  Rose,	  R.	  (1991)	  ‘What	  Is	  Lesson-­‐Drawing?’,	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Policy,	  11,1,	  
3-­‐33;	  Rose,	  R.	  (1991)	  Lesson-­‐Drawing	  in	  Public	  Policy:	  A	  Guide	  to	  Learning	  Across	  Time	  and	  
Space;	  Dolowitz,	  D.	  and	  Marsh,	  D.	   (1996)	   ‘Who	  Learns	  What	   from	  Whom:	  a	  Review	  of	   the	  
Policy	  Transfer	   Literature’,	   in	  Political	   Studies,	   vol.	   44,	  343–57;	  Dolowitz,	  D.	   and	  Marsh,	  D.	  
(2000)	  ‘Learning	  from	  Abroad:	  the	  Role	  of	  Policy	  Transfer	  in	  Contemporary	  Policy-­‐Making’,	  in	  
Governance,	  vol.	  13	  (1),	  5-­‐24;	  Rhodes,	  R.A.W.	  and	  Dunleavy,	  P.	  (Eds.),	  (1995)	  Introducing	  the	  
Core	  Executive	  in	  Prime	  Minister,	  Cabinet	  and	  Core	  Executive.	  
• Legislation2:	  Norton,	  P.	  (1993)	  Does	  Parliament	  Matter;	  Dunleavy,	  P.	  (1995)	  ‘Policy	  Disasters:	  
Explaining	  the	  UK's	  Record’	  in	  Public	  Policy	  and	  Administration,	  June	  1995,	  10:	  52-­‐70.	  	  
• Implementation:	  Hill,	  M.	  and	  Hupe,	  P.	  (2009)	  Implementing	  Public	  Policy;	  Pressman,	  J.L.	  and	  
Wildavsky,	   A.	   (1984)	   Implementation;	   Mazmanian,	   D.A.	   and	   Sabatier,	   P.A.	   (eds)	   (1981)	  
Effective	   Policy	   Implementation;	   Barrett,	   S.	   M.	   and	   Fudge,	   C.	   (1981b)	   Policy	   and	   Action:	  
Essays	  on	  the	  Implementation	  of	  Public	  Policy;	  Hjern,	  B.	  (1982)	  ‘Implementing	  Research:	  The	  
Link	   Gone	   Missing’,	   Journal	   of	   Public	   Policy,	   1	   (3):	   301-­‐8;	   Hjern,	   B.	   and	   Hull,	   C.	   (1982)	  
Implementing	  Research	  as	  Empirical	  Constitutionalism.	  
• Evaluation:	  Fischer,	  F.	  (1995)	  Evaluating	  Public	  Policy;	  Rossi,	  R.	  Lipsey,	  M.	  W.	  and	  Freeman,	  
H.	   (1979,	   1993)	   Evaluation:	   A	   Systematic	   Approach;	   Palumbo,	   D.J.	   (1987)	   The	   Politics	   of	  
Program	  Evaluation;	  Public	  Policy	  and	  Program	  Evaluation;	  Vedung,	   E.	   (2008)	  Public	  Policy	  
and	  Program	  Evaluation.	  
	  
The	  stages	  approach	  provides	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  conceptualise	  complex	  and	  elaborate	  political	  
phenomena.	  Through	  emphasising	   the	  separate	  stages,	  as	  opposed	   to	   individual	   institutes	   such	  as	  
the	  government	  or	  civil	  service	  or	  attempting	  to	  utilise	  a	  single	  theory,	   it	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  us	  to	  
disaggregate	  the	  policy	  process	   in	  such	  a	  way	  that	   it	  becomes	  amenable	  to	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  
(Hill,	   2009,	   142).	   For	   decades	   the	   stages	   approach	   remained	   the	   dominant	   method	   not	   only	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Legislation	  studies	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  literature,	  this	  is	  something	  that	  we	  will	  address	  in	  Chapter	  Six,	  
which	  looks	  at	  the	  legislative	  stage.	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conduct	   public	   policy	   research	   but	   also	   to	   analyse	   individual	   polices.	   However	   by	   the	   late	   1980s	  
several	   scholars	   led	   the	   rejection	  of	   the	   approach,	   claiming	   that	   it	   had	  outlived	   its	   place	   in	   policy	  
analysis	  and	  needed	  to	  be	  removed.	  
	  
1.4.1.	  The	  Attack	  on	  the	  Stages	  Approach	  
	  
Nakamura	   (1987),	   Sabatier	   (1988,	   1991),	   Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith	   (1993,	   1999),	   and	   John	  
(1999)	  are	  four	  of	  the	  most	  severe	  critics	  of	  the	  stages	  approach.	  Their	  criticisms	  suggested	  that	  the	  
‘stages	  heuristic’	  was	  misleading,	   seriously	   limited	  as	   a	  basis	   for	   research	  and	  prevented	   scientific	  
progress.	   Throughout	   this	   section	  we	  will	   discuss	   the	   critique	   held	   amongst	   scholars	   towards	   the	  
‘stages	  heuristic’.	  
	  
Sabatier	  and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith	   (1993,	  1-­‐4)	   set	  out	   six	  major	   criticisms	  of	   the	   stages	  approach.	  We	  
will	  utilise	   their	  criticisms	   in	  our	  defence	  of	   the	  approach	  as	   they	  encompasses	   those	  most	  widely	  
voiced	  by	  scholars	  who	  reject	  the	  approach.	  
	  
1. “The	  stages	  model	  is	  not	  really	  a	  causal	  model	  at	  all.”	  
2. “The	  stages	  model	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  basis	  for	  empirical	  hypothesis	  testing.”	  
3. “The	  stages	  heuristic	  suffers	  from	  descriptive	  inaccuracy	  in	  posing	  a	  series	  of	  stages…”	  
4. “The	  stages	  metaphor	  suffers	  from	  a	  built-­‐in	  legalistic,	  top-­‐down	  focus.”	  
5. “The	   stages	  metaphor	   inappropriately	   emphasizes	   the	   policy	   cycle	   as	   the	   temporal	   unit	   of	  
analysis.”	  
6. “The	   stages	   metaphor	   fails	   to	   provide	   a	   good	   vehicle	   for	   integrating	   the	   roles	   of	   policy	  
analysis	  and	  policy	  orientated	  learning	  throughout	  the	  public	  policy	  process.”	  
	  
1.4.2.	  A	  Defence	  of	  the	  Stages	  Approach	  	  
	  
Certainly	  we	  cannot	  deny	  that	  the	  stages	  approach	  is	  not	  without	  its	  limitations.	  Yet	  a	  large	  
proportion	  of	  the	  criticism	  placed	  upon	  the	  stages	  approach	  is	  unjustified,	  inappropriate,	  and	  often	  
naïve.	  Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith’s	  focus	  on	  a	  ‘scientific’	  pursuit	  has	  ensured	  that	  their	  criticisms	  of	  
the	   stages	   approach	   have	   become	   drenched	   in	   overtly	   blinkered	   positivist	   epistemology.	   Their	  
detachment	  from	  the	  intentions	  and	  strengths	  of	  the	  stages	  approach	  has	  allowed	  them	  to	  create	  a	  
set	  of	  criticisms	  which	  are	  not	  applicable	   to	   the	  approach;	   they	   in	   fact	  attack	  a	   straw	  man,	  as	  will	  




	  “The	  stages	  model	  is	  not	  really	  a	  causal	  model	  at	  all.”	  
	  
Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  criticise	  the	  stages	  approach	  for	  failing	  to	  identify	  a	  set	  of	  causal	  
drivers.	  They	  approach	  and	  evaluate	  the	  stages	  model	  as	  a	  causal	  theory,	  although	  they	  themselves	  
label	  it	  the	  “stages	  heuristic”,	  not	  a	  causal	  theory.	  This	  is	  the	  underlying	  root	  of	  each	  of	  Sabatier	  and	  
Jenkins-­‐Smith’s	  criticisms,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  stark	  error	  in	  their	  attack.	  Scholars	  who	  author,	  utilise	  and	  
defend	  the	  stages	  approach	  have	  never	  purported	  that	  the	  stages	  approach	  was	  a	  theoretical	  model	  
(deLeon,	  1999,	  24).	  The	  stages	  approach	  does	  not	  adhere	  to	  be	  an	  all-­‐embracing	  theory	  of	  the	  policy	  
process,	  but	  instead	  constitutes	  a	  framework	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  analyse	  the	  complexity	  of	  reality	  and	  
the	  multiplicity	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  process	  and	  politics	  (Hogwood	  and	  Gunn,	  1984,	  
4),	   but	   only	  with	   the	   proviso	   that	  we	   deploy	   it	   accurately,	   namely	   as	   a	   heuristic	   device	   (Parsons,	  
1995,	  80).	  Just	  as	  we	  should	  not	  utilise	  the	  stages	  approach	  outside	  its	  realms,	  we	  should	  not	  assess	  
the	  stages	  heuristic	  outside	  of	   its	  realms	  as	  do	  Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith.	  This	  overlaps	  with	  their	  
next	  criticism,	  which	  is	  that:	  	  
	  
“The	  stages	  model	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  basis	  for	  empirical	  hypothesis	  testing.”	  
	  
Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith’s	  main	  shortcoming	  here	  is	  their	  narrow	  use	  of	  empirical	  theory	  
(e.g.	  attempting	  to	  generate	  hypotheses	  that	  produce	  prediction)	  (deLeon,	  1995,	  24).	  The	  empiricist	  
epistemology	  embedded	  in	  their	  criticism	  perceives	  the	  purpose	  of	  policy	  analysis	  to	  be	  that	  akin	  to	  
natural	   science.	   They	   focus	   on	   the	   pursuit	   of	   prediction	   rather	   than	   insight	   (an	   emphasis	   on	  
explanation	   rather	   an	   understanding),	   therefore	   confining	   themselves	   to	   a	   narrow	   form	   of	  
knowledge.	  As	  Brunner	  stated,	  ‘the	  purpose	  of	  the	  policy	  sciences	  as	  a	  ‘science’	  is	  to	  realise	  more	  of	  
the	  potential	  for	  free	  choice	  through	  the	  sharing	  of	  insight;	  the	  purpose	  is	  not	  prediction’	  (1991,	  80-­‐
81).	   Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith	   are	   allowing	   their	   empiricist	   epistemology	   to	   act	   as	   an	   academic	  
straightjacket.	   The	   above	   criticism	   cannot,	   in	   effect,	   be	   placed	   onto	   the	   stages	   model.	   As	   stated	  
above,	  advocates	  of	  the	  stages	  model	  (as	  well	  as	  its	  various	  architects)	  are	  aware	  that	  the	  heuristic	  
device	  is	  not	  suitable	  to	  formal	  hypothesis	  testing	  or	  prediction	  (deLeon,	  1995,	  24).	  A	  model	  should	  
not	   be	   criticised	   for	   not	   doing	   something	   that	   it	   never	   intended	   to	   do;	   the	   criticism	   is	   therefore	  
invalid.	  	  	  
	  
Although	   the	   stages	  model	   is	   criticised	   for	   its	   inability	   to	   generate	   hypothesis	   testing,	  we	  
need	   to	   note	   that	   hypothesis	   testing	   itself	   within	   the	   field	   of	   policy	   analysis	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	  
unrealistic	   and	   often	   inappropriate	   task.	   The	   political	   world	   is	   rarely	   appropriate	   for	   effective	  
hypothesis	  testing.	  As	  John	  rightly	  states,	  ‘it	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  find	  experimental	  conditions	  to	  
15	  
	  
uncover	  the	  exact	  relationships	  between	  political	  variables’	   (1999,	  11).	  John	  also	  argues	  that	  while	  
association	  and	  correlation	  are	  often	  easy	  to	  identify,	  and	  appear	  to	  be	  explanatory,	  it	  ‘can	  in	  fact	  be	  
spurious	  because	  they	  are	  caused	  by	  some	  other	  factor	  not	  accounted	  for	  or	  impossible	  to	  measure’	  
(1999,	  11).	   	  Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  ignore	  this,	   instead	  advocating	  perceived	  confirmation	  over	  
gathering	   accurate	   insight.	   The	   notion	   of	   generating	   a	   testable	   hypothesis	   is	   symptomatic	   of	   the	  
researcher’s	   positivist/empiricist	   epistemology;	   therefore	   the	   criticism	   is	   misplaced,	   in	   light	   of	   a	  
constructivist/interpretivist	  perspective.	  	  
	  
	  “The	  stages	  heuristic	  suffers	  from	  descriptive	  inaccuracy	  in	  posing	  a	  series	  of	  stages…”	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  criticism	  propagated	  by	  many	  scholars,	  not	  restricted	  to	  Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  
(see	   for	  example	   Lindblom	  and	  Woodhouse,	  1968;	  Nakamura,	  1987).	  Whilst	  placing	  policy-­‐making	  
into	  a	  series	  of	  stages	  may	  appear	  to	  understate	  a	  reality	  that	  is	  frequently	  more	  complex,	  fluid	  and	  
chaotic,	  it	  is	  not	  an	  unreasonable	  or	  impractical	  way	  to	  understand	  the	  process	  (Anderson,	  1996,	  39;	  
Parsons,	  1995,	  81).	  As	  deLeon	  observes	  (1998),	  too	  often	  the	  policy	  process	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  seamless	  
web	  of	  public	  policy	  transactions.	  There	  is	  great	  benefit	  and	  accuracy	  in	  viewing	  the	  policy	  process	  as	  
a	   seamless	  web	   of	   activity;	   however	   the	   idea	   can	   be	   overplayed.	  While	   there	   is	   certainly	   overlap	  
between	  the	  stages,	  we	  cannot	  ignore	  the	  existence	  of	  certain	  concrete	  fractions	  that	  a	  policy	  goes	  
through,	   for	   example	   the	   legislative	   stage.	   Although	   policy	   formation	   and	   problem	   definition	   still	  
occurs	  at	  the	  legislative	  stage,	  it	  does	  contain	  distinct	  features	  that	  oblige	  we	  utilise	  distinct	  areas	  of	  
research.	  As	  Dorey	  states	  ‘the	  fact	  that	  policy	  making	  is	  frequently	  complex	  or	  messy	  actually	  makes	  
it	  even	  more	  useful	  to	  provide	  a	  simplified	  model	  that	  identifies	  some	  of	  the	  constituent	  elements	  of	  
“the	   policy	   process”,	   precisely	   so	   that	   the	   complex	   or	  messy	   reality	   can	   begin	   to	   be	   understood’	  
(2005,	  6).	  
	  
In	   analysing	   public	   policy,	   we	   need	   to	   be	   able	   to	   organise	   our	   ideas	   and	   concepts.	   If	   we	  
simply	   approached	   the	   policy	   process	   as	   a	   seamless	   web	   of	   actions	   without	   defined	   points	   or	  
discrete	   stages,	  we	   risk	  becoming	   lost	   and	   limiting	  our	   insight.	   	  Due	   to	   the	   complexity	  of	   the	   real	  
world,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  politics	  and	  policy-­‐making,	  we	  need	  methods	  to	  simplify	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  
factors	   involved,	   and	   the	   stages	   heuristic	   provides	   these.	   Of	   course,	   when	   using	   such	  models	  we	  
need	  to	  acknowledge	  their	  limitations.	  This	  thesis	  is	  not	  suggesting	  that	  the	  entire	  policy	  process	  can	  
be	  reduced	  to	  neat	  stages	  but	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  device	  to	  be	  utilised	  to	  order	  our	  analysis.	  
	  
Parsons	   (1995,	   60-­‐1)	   emphasizes	   this	   point	   superbly	  when	   he	   points	   to	   the	   use	   of	   Beck’s	  
model	   of	   the	   London	   Underground	   map.	   The	   London	   Underground	   map	   is	   an	   example	   of	   a	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simplification	  of	   a	  highly	   complex	   system	  which	   is	  used	  as	  a	  useful	   tool	  of	   exploration;	   the	   stages	  
model	   should	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   same	   light.	   Furthermore,	   just	   as	   we	   cannot	   criticise	   the	   London	  
Underground	  map	  for	  not	  providing	  a	  tourist	  with	  information	  on	  how	  to	  locate	  tube	  stations	  on	  the	  
surface,	  we	  cannot	  criticise	  the	  stages	  approach	  for	  failing	  thoroughly	  to	  explain	  the	  policy	  process.	  
Just	   as	   Beck’s	   model	   should	   not	   be	   used	   as	   a	   street-­‐level	   map,	   stages	   should	   not	   be	   used	   as	   a	  
theoretical	  explanation	  of	  the	  policy	  process.	  	  
	  
“The	  stages	  metaphor	  suffers	  from	  a	  built-­‐in	  legalistic,	  top-­‐down	  focus.”	  
	  
Utilised	  on	  its	  own,	  the	  stages	  model	  does	  produce	  a	  ‘built-­‐in	  legalistic,	  top-­‐down	  focus’.	  Yet	  
this	  again	  is	  only	  when	  it	   is	  deployed	  incorrectly	  as	  a	  theory	  rather	  than	  used	  as	  a	  heuristic	  device.	  	  
As	  Parsons	  argues,	   ‘on	   its	  own	  the	  simple	  policy	  cycle	   is	  as	   inadequate	  a	  tool	  as	   its	  critics	  suggest’	  
(1995,	  81).	  However,	  we	  need	  to	  reiterate	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  critique	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  
process.	  When	   deployed	   appropriately,	   the	   stages	  model	   becomes	   far	  more	   wide-­‐ranging	   than	   a	  
mere	  list	  of	  stages.	  Instead	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  place	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  the	  context	  of	  problems,	  role	  
of	   values,	   role	   of	   power,	   impact	   of	   institutions	   and	   importance	   of	   all	   actors,	   by	   providing	   a	  
conceptual	  mapping	  tool	  that	  researchers	  can	  use	  to	  apply	  various	  models,	  theories,	  concepts,	  and	  
explanations.	   If	   we	   utilise	   the	   stages	   model	   in	   this	   way,	   the	   above	   criticism	   becomes	   void.	   For	  
example	   within	   the	   stages	   approach	   we	   can	   utilise	   much	   of	   the	   work	   that	   has	   been	   evolved	   by	  
academics	  such	  as	  Hjern	  (1982),	  Hjern	  and	  Hull	  (1982),	  and	  Barrett	  and	  Fudge	  (1981a,	  1981b,	  1981c)	  
on	   bottom-­‐up	   implementation	   studies	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   street-­‐level	   bureaucrats	  
and	  the	  integration	  between	  policy	  formation	  and	  implementation.	  We	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  this	  is	  
particularly	  true	  in	  our	  case	  study	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  
	  
	  We	  need	  to	  emphasize	  (as	  we	  did	  at	  the	  outset)	  that	  the	  stages	  approach	  should	  be	  viewed,	  
and	   typically	   is,	   as	   a	   cycle;	   this	   moves	   us	   away	   from	   a	   hierarchical	   approach	   and	   deflects	   the	  
criticism.	  It	  does	  not	  enforce	  a	  hierarchical	  understanding,	  for	  example,	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  understand	  
policies	  that	  have	  been	  enacted	  top-­‐down,	  as	  well	  as	  adequately	  explain	  policies	  that	  have	  derived	  
from	  public	  protest	  and	  through	  consultation.	  The	  flexibility	  of	  the	  stages	  approach	  allows	  us	  to	  use	  







“The	   stages	   metaphor	   inappropriately	   emphasizes	   the	   policy	   cycle	   as	   the	   temporal	   unit	   of	  
analysis.”	  
	  
Here	  Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  claim	  that	  the	  stages	  approach	  is	  limited	  because	  it	  takes	  us	  
down	  a	  very	  restricted	  linear	  path.	  Yet	  just	  because	  the	  stages	  are	  listed	  in	  a	  certain	  order,	  and	  the	  
institutional	  analysis	  suggests	  they	  take	  place	  in	  order,	  does	  not	  mean	  they	  in	  reality	  are	  sequential.	  
The	   stages	   approach	   is	   better	   viewed	   as	   a	   cycle	   and	   should	   not	   be	   viewed	   as	   finite.	   A	   use	   of	   the	  
stages	   approach,	   as	   a	   way	   to	   order	   themes,	   does	   acknowledge	   that	   the	   stages	   can	   interact	   and	  
overlap,	  as	  well	  as	  varying	  in	  degree	  of	  sequence	  and	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  a	  clear	  end	  point.	  It	  
depends	  on	  the	  policy,	  the	  system,	  the	  context,	  and	  the	  individuals.	  	  
	  
Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith	   can	   also	   be	   seen	   to	   criticise	   the	   stages	   approach	   for	   failing	   to	  
acknowledge	   that	   policy	   making	   occurs	   within	   multiple	   levels	   of	   government	   and	   often	   with	  
interacting	  cycles	  (Parsons,	  1995,	  7).	  While	  different	  levels	  of	  government	  certainly	  have	  their	  own	  
time-­‐frames	   and	   agendas,	   they	   do	   not	   operate	   independently.	   While	   it	   may	   be	   the	   case,	   for	  
example,	  where	  different	  levels	  engage	  in	  problem	  definition	  at	  differing	  times,	  the	  policy	  itself	  can	  
still	  be	  seen	  to	  operate	  in	  an	  overall	  general	  cycle.	  Once	  government	  begins	  to	  act	  on	  an	  issue,	  other	  
levels	   of	   government	   get	   incorporated	   into	   the	   process.	   Therefore	   it	   allows	   us	   to	   look	   deeper	   at	  
relationships	  between	  the	  multiple	  levels	  of	  government	  and	  various	  external	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  
process.	  For	  as	  Hogwood	  and	  Gunn	  claim,	  the	  stages	  approach	  lends	  itself	  ‘to	  the	  identification	  and	  
study	   of	   interactions,	   not	   only	   among	   the	   various	   stages	   in	   the	   process	   but	   also	   among	   various	  
participating	  organisations’	  (1984,	  25).	  	  
	  
“The	   stages	  metaphor	   fails	   to	  provide	  a	  good	   vehicle	   for	   integrating	   the	   roles	  of	   policy	  analysis	  
and	  policy	  orientated	  learning	  throughout	  the	  public	  policy	  process.”	  
	  
This	   criticism	   is	   largely	   confined	   to	   Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith,	   and	   links	   heavily	   with	   their	  
advocated	   alternative,	   the	   Advocacy	   Coalition	   Framework	   (ACF).	   ACF	   holds	   that	   policy	   orientated	  
learning	  is	  central	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  policy	  change.	  Although	  we	  do	  not	  deny	  that	  the	  role	  of	  
policy	  orientated	  learning	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  policy	  process,	  we	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  only	  one	  of	  
the	   factors	   that	  drives	  policy	   change.	  Policy	  making	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   rational	   action	  whereby	  policy	  
makers	  modify	  their	  stance	  based	  solely	  on	  knowledge	  and	  insight.	  This	  criticism	  can	  also	  be	  viewed	  
as	  self-­‐serving;	  they	  are	  simply	  stating	  what	  their	  ACF	  approach	  does,	  and	  inappropriately	  criticises	  
the	   stages	   approach	   for	   not	   doing	   so.	   Although	  we	   argue	   that	   policy	   orientated	   learning,	   an	   ACF	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approach,	  is	  not	  always	  the	  driving	  force	  for	  change	  and	  adaption,	  nevertheless	  we	  acknowledge	  its	  
utility	  and	  can	  be	  explored	  with	  in	  the	  stages	  approach.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  depicted	  as	  a	  cycle,	  the	  stages	  approach	  does	  allow	  us	  clearly	  to	  demonstrate	  instances	  of	  
feedback,	  and	  learning	  that	  occur	  throughout	  the	  process.	  As	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  1.3:	  
	  
Figure	  1.4.	  Feedback	  in	  the	  Policy	  Cycle	  	  
	  
For	  example,	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  experience	  acquired	  at	  either	  the	  legislative	  stage	  
or	  implementation	  stage	  may	  result	  in	  policy	  makers	  redefining	  the	  issue	  or	  re-­‐setting	  objectives.	  As	  
Hogwood	   and	   Gunn	   suggest,	   the	   stages	   approach	   allows	   us	   to	   see	   policy	   making	   through	   a	  
continuous	  film	  rather	  than	  still	  photographs	  (1984,	  24);	  thus	  the	  approach	  is	  not	  as	  rigid	  as	  its	  critics	  
like	  to	  suggest.	  
	  
1.4.2.1	  Conclusion:	  a	  Rebuttal	  of	  the	  Criticisms	  
	  
The	  potential	   root	  of	   the	  misdirected/unjust	  criticism	  of	   the	  stages	  approach	   is	  a	   fundamental	  
misunderstanding	  as	  to	  what	  it	  claims	  to	  do,	  in	  particular	  the	  epistemological	  attacks	  by	  Sabatier	  et	  
al.	  	  If	  one	  takes	  the	  stages	  approach	  as	  epistemology,	  providing	  the	  limits	  of	  where	  valid	  knowledge	  
and	  data	  can	  emerge,	   then	  these	  criticisms	  are	  deserved.	   	  However,	   if	  we	   instead	  see	  the	  cycle	  as	  
highlighting	  the	  realm	  or	  world	  which	  should	  be	  studied,	  where	  policy	  making	  takes	  place	  –	  stages	  as	  















1.4.3	  Has	  Policy	  Analysis	  Outlived	  the	  Stages	  Approach?	  
	  
In	  Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith’s	  leading	  book	  Theories	  of	  the	  Policy	  Process	  (1993),	  they	  assert	  
that	  the	  stages	  heuristic	  has	  outlived	  its	  usefulness	  and	  that	  we	  need	  to	  search	  for	  what	  they	  term	  
‘better	  theories’.	  This	  assertion	  was	  contained	  in	  the	  criticisms	  which	  we	  rebutted	  above.	  They	  argue	  
that	   the	   field	   of	   policy	   analysis	   can	   be	   advanced	   by	   adopting	   a	   multiple-­‐lens	   strategy	   whereby	  
academics	  compare	  and	  test	  the	  strengths	  and	  limitations	  of	  each	  theoretical	  lens.	  Yet	  the	  proposed	  
lenses	  that	  Sabatier	  and	  Jenkins-­‐Smith	  advocate	  are	   limited	  to	  ones	  within	  the	  positivist/empiricist	  
paradigm:	  effectively	  they	  allow	  us	  to	  choose	  any	  lens,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  falls	  within	  a	  range	  of	  shades	  of	  
their	   choosing.	   We	   should	   also	   note	   that	   what	   they	   are	   also	   doing	   is	   playing	   one	   theory	   or	  
framework	  off	  against	  another	  as	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  scenario,	  rather	  than	  acknowledging	  the	  contribution	  
to	  knowledge	  that	  each	  makes.	  As	  Dye	  rightly	  stated,	  we	  need	  to	  move	  away	  from	  viewing	  theories	  
in	  competition	  with	  each	  other	   (1978,	  7).	  One	  reviewing	  the	   literature	  on	  the	  policy	  process	  could	  
easily	  become	  absorbed	  and	   lost	  within	  the	  vast	   fields	  of	   theoretical	  warfare;	   there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  
preoccupation	  with	  defending	  or	  challenging	  theories,	  while	  producing	  insights	  seems	  to	  have	  taken	  
a	  backseat	  for	  many	  academics.	  
	  
Given	   the	   vast	   array,	   and	   detailed	   nature,	   of	   frameworks	   and	  models	   that	   are	   available	   to	  
enhance	   our	   understanding,	   we	   need	   a	   heuristic	   device	   to	   comprehend	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	  
process	  and	  thus	  allow	  us	  to	  utilise	  these	  analytical	  tools.	  As	  Simon	  (1957)	  rightly	  professed,	  there	  
are	   cognitive	   limits	   to	   human	   rationality	   and	   therefore	   a	   need	   to	   reduce	   complex	   processes	   into	  
manageable	   sections.	   This	  does	  not	   reduce	   the	  overall	   insight	   that	  one	   is	   able	   to	  gather,	   rather	   it	  
allows	  us	  to	  increase	  and	  sustain	  our	  deep	  analysis.	  As	  stated	  above,	  we	  cannot	  always	  address	  the	  
policy	  process	  as	  a	  seamless	  web	  of	  integrated	  actions,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  do	  so	  we	  are	  at	  great	  danger	  of	  
losing	   depth	   and	   insight.	   We	   should	   avoid	   a	   search	   for	   an	   overarching	   theory	   as	   advocated	   by	  
scholars	   such	   as	   John	   (1999),	   Sabatier	   (1999)	   and	   Lindblom	   and	  Woodhouse	   (1993),	   and	   instead	  
pursue	  a	  multi-­‐theory,	  multi-­‐model	  approach	  (Cook,	  1985).	  	  
	  
The	  strength	  of	  the	  stages	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  provides	  a	  rational	  structure	  within	  which	  we	  are	  
able	  to	  consider	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  reality.	  The	  heuristic	  device	  provides	  a	  platform	  within	  which	  we	  
can	   layer	   different	   frames,	   theories,	   concepts	   and	   methodological	   approaches.	   Without	   such	   a	  
research	   platform,	   we	   would	   not	   have	   garnered	   such	   deep	   and	   intricate	   knowledge	   of	   both	  
individual	  policies	  themselves	  and	  of	  each	  particular	  stage	  of	  the	  policy	  process.	  	  As	  deLeon	  suggests,	  
‘given	  the	  idiosyncratic	  episodes	  addressed	  by	  most	  policy	  research,	  we	  might	  well	  be	  better	  served	  
to	  devote	  ourselves	  to	  the	  quest	  for	  a	  series	  of	  mid-­‐range	  theories’	  (1999,	  28).	  If	  we	  were	  to	  strive	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for	   a	   single	   hypothesis-­‐generating	   theory,	   typical	   to	   economics,	   we	   would	   overlook	   the	   vast	  
complexity	  of	  reality	  (Parsons,	  1995,	  80).	  	  
	  
Sabatier	  and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith’s	   labelling	  of	   the	   ‘stagist’	  model	  as	  a	   ‘heuristic	  device’	   is	  not	  a	   slur	  
that	  deprives	  the	  approach	  of	  any	  relevance	  regarding	  the	  study	  of	  public	  policy.	   In	   fact,	  as	  stated	  
above,	   Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith	   are	   unwittingly	   realising	   the	   strengths	   of	   the	   approach	   and	  
simultaneously	  making	   their	   criticisms	   obsolete.	   The	   stages	   approach	   is	   a	   heuristic	   device,	   rather	  
than	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  policy	  making	  that	  claims	  to	  understand	  causal	  mechanisms.	  Heuristic	  
devices	   are	   pedagogic	  models	   that	   are	   developed	   to	   aid	   our	   understanding	   of	   complex	   issues	   or	  
processes.	  The	  stages	  approach	  acts	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  incorporating	  various	  theories,	  models	  and	  
devices,	   thereby	   serving	   as	   a	   clear	   way	   to	   advance	   our	   understanding	   of	   policies	   and	   the	   policy	  
process.	  
	  
Although	  the	  policy	  stages	  approach	  was	  developed	  more	  than	  50	  years	  ago,	  the	  creation	  of	  
new	  theories	  does	  not	  challenge	  the	  applicability	  of	   the	  approach,	  nor	  does	   its	  application	  restrict	  
the	  advancement	  of	  policy	   research	   (Rose,	  1973,	  123;	  Hogwood	  and	  Gunn,	  1984,	  25).	  Conversely,	  
rather	   than	  viewing	   the	  stages	  heuristic	  as	  hopelessly	  out-­‐dated	  due	   to	   the	  advancement	  of	  more	  
‘sophisticated’	  synthetic	  approaches,	  we	  propose	  that	  it	  should	  be	  considered	  anew	  as	  a	  progressive	  
framework	  in	  which	  to	  place	  both	  developed,	  as	  well	  as	  developing,	  approaches	  and	  methodologies	  
towards	  policy	  analysis.	  	  
	  
	  Post-­‐positivist	   and	   post-­‐modern	   themes	   can	   effectively	   be	   incorporated	   inside	   the	   stages	  
approach.	  For	  example	  the	  work	  of	  Habermas	  (1970,	  1984),	  Rein	  and	  Schön	  (1977,	  1993)	  and	  Fisher	  
and	   Forester	   (1993),	   can	  be	   effectively	   deployed	   inside	   the	   stages	   framework.	   This	   contrasts	  with	  
models	   such	   as	   Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith’s	   ACF,	   which	   are	   unable	   and	   often	   unwilling	   to	  
encompass	   other	   developments	   in	   policy	   research	   (deLeon,	   1999,	   27;	   Parsons,	   2003,	   129).	   As	  
deLeon	   argues,	   ‘policy	   scholars	   such	   as	   Sabatier	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   possibility	   inhibiting	   the	  
advancement	   of	   the	   policy	   sciences	   by	   clinging	   tenaciously	   to	   the	   problematic	   tenets	   of	   positivist	  
thought	   and	   procedures’	   (1999,	   27).	   	   This	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   stages	   heuristic	   advances	   policy	  
analysis,	  allowing	  us	   to	  be	  not	  only	  multi-­‐theoretical	  but	  also	  multi-­‐methodological,	  allowing	  us	   to	  
view	  the	  policy	  process	  from	  a	  positivist,	  post-­‐positivist	  or	  interpretivist	  lens.	  	  
	  
The	  stages	  model	  may	  not	  explain	  how	  the	  entire	  policy	  process	  works	  and	  may	  not	  enable	  us	  to	  
verify	  or	   falsify	  empirical	  hypotheses,	  but	   if	  we	   integrate	   into	   it	  mid-­‐range	   theories,	   concepts,	  and	  
models	  we	  are	  able	  to	  gather	  a	  deeper	  understanding.	  Although	  it	  may	  appear	  tempting,	  and	  many	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scholars	  fall	  into	  the	  trap	  of	  lusting	  after	  ‘grand	  universal	  theories’,	  it	  is	  often	  dangerous	  and	  to	  the	  
detriment	  of	  our	  understanding.	  	  deLeon	  (1998)	  fittingly	  brings	  to	  our	  attention	  the	  famous	  quote	  by	  
John	  Maynard	   Keynes,	   ‘It	   is	   better	   to	   be	   roughly	   right	   than	   precisely	   wrong’	   (quoted	   by	   deLeon,	  
1999,	  29).	  The	   stages	  approach	  ensures	   that	  we	  can	   indeed	  be	   roughly	   right	   rather	   than	  precisely	  
wrong.	  	  
	  
1.5.	  The	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  –	  A	  Brief	  Overview	  
	  
The	   Child	   Support	   Agency	   (CSA)	  was	   established	   in	   April	   1993	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	  
Support	   Act.	   It	   was	   conceived	   by	   the	   Thatcher-­‐Major	   Governments	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   rapidly	  
growing	   number	   of	   lone	   parents.	   The	   policy	   was	   perceived	   as	   an	   attempt	   at	   social	   engineering,	  
aiming	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  parents	  contributed	  financially	  towards	  their	  children.	  It	  was	  hoped	  that	  the	  
policy	  would	   reduce	   both	   child	   poverty	   and,	  more	   prominently,	   the	   burden	  on	   the	   social	   security	  
budget	   that	   lone	   parents	   created.	   Yet	   throughout	   its	   lifetime,	   the	   CSA	   was	   faced	   with	   constant	  
reforms	   and	   adaption	   in	   the	   face	   of	   enormous	   hostility	   and	   its	   failure	   to	   reach	   targets.	   As	   one	  
distinguished	   journalist,	   Richard	   Ingrams,	   stated,	   it	   is	   ‘about	   the	  most	   incompetent	   and	   inhuman	  
agency	  ever	  set	  up	  by	  a	  British	  Government’	  (The	  Observer,	  5	  January	  1997).	  These	  criticisms	  were	  
echoed	  not	  only	  throughout	  the	  media,	  but	  also	  by	  pressure	  groups,	  politicians,	  think	  tanks,	  and	  the	  
public;	  from	  every	  quarter	  the	  CSA	  was	  routinely	  subject	  to	  strong	  criticism.	  The	  1991	  Child	  Support	  
Act	   proved	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	   most	   controversial	   and	   criticised	   policies	   in	   modern	   British	   politics,	  
attracting	  vast	  media	  coverage	  and	  intense	  debate.	  The	  formulation	  and	  passage	  of	  the	  Act	  can	  be	  
seen	   as	   a	  model	   example	   of	   bad	   piece	   of	   legislation	   and	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   the	   legislative	   stage,	  
while	  the	  Agency	  itself	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  complete	  failure.	  	  	  
	  
1.5.1.	  Existing	  Relevant	  Literature	  	  
	  
The	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  whilst	  being	  arguably	  one	  of	  Britain’s	  biggest	  policy	  failures,	  it	  has	  
received	  relatively	  little	  academic	  attention	  within	  the	  field	  of	  politics	  and	  policy	  analysis,	  especially	  
when	  compared	  to	  other	  policy	  failures,	  such	  as	  the	  Poll	  Tax	  (Community	  Charge).	  The	  attention	  that	  
it	   has	   received	   is	   somewhat	   sporadic,	   and	   frequently	   focuses	   on	   either	   the	   social	   or	   legal	  
implications	  of	   the	  policy.	  While	   there	   is	   a	  wealth	  of	   knowledge	   focusing	  both	  on	   the	   sociological	  
impact	  of	  the	  policy	  (often	  with	  prescriptive	  tendencies),	  and	  on	  the	  policy	  from	  a	  legal	  perspective,	  
there	  is	  a	  lacunae	  in	  the	  policy	  analysis	  literature.	  An	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  
that	   led	   to	   the	  development	   and	  passage	  of	  deeply	   flawed	  policy	  has	   largely	  been	  neglected,	   this	  




The	  most	  comprehensive	  piece	  of	  work	  on	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  within	  academic	  studies	  
is	  Child	  Support	  in	  Action	  (Davis	  et	  al,	  1998).	  	  The	  authors	  of	  this	  piece	  of	  work	  reside	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
legal	  studies;	  therefore	  the	  book	  approaches	  the	  policy	  from	  a	  legal	  perspective.	  The	  book	  is	  drawn	  
from	   a	   major	   empirical	   research	   project	   undertaken	   by	   the	   authors	   who	   focused	   on	   gaining	  
materials	   from	   the	  Agency’s	   case	   files	   in	  order	   to	  monitor	   cases	   from	  both	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	  
Agency	   and	   from	   that	   of	   client/legal	   advisers.	   	  Child	   Support	   in	  Action,	  whilst	   not	   focusing	  on	   the	  
policy-­‐making	  process	  of	  the	  policy,	  or	  written	  from	  a	  policy	  analysis	  perspective,	  not	  only	  provides	  
us	  with	  a	   thorough	  analysis	   from	  a	   legal	  outlook	  but	  also	  provide	  us	  with	  a	   gripping	  and	  valuable	  
insight	  in	  the	  experiences	  of	  actors	  within	  the	  process	  through	  its	  primary	  research.	  	  
	  
There	  are	  also	  other	  texts	  focusing	  of	  the	  legal	  aspects,	  and	  foreseen	  implications,	  of	  the	  1991	  
Child	  Support	  Act	  by	  Bird	  (1991,	  1993)	  and	  Wikeley	  (2006).	  Child	  Support	  Law	  and	  Policy	  by	  Wikeley	  
(2006),	  provides	  a	  highly	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  law	  and	  practice	  governing	  child	  support,	  a	  text	  that	  
not	  only	   serves	  as	   invaluable	  aid	   to	  practitioners	  wrestling	  with	   the	  complexity	  of	   the	   system,	  but	  
also	  provides	  a	  thoroughly	  engaging	  historical	  and	  social	  policy	  understanding	  of	  child	  maintenance	  
systems	  across	  jurisdictions	  and	  over	  time.	  This	  text	  provides	  a	  vital	  source	  of	  reference	  throughout	  
the	  thesis.	  
	  
Another	   notable	   piece	   of	   work	   that	   discusses	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   from	   within	  
academia	   is	   Dunleavy’s	   1995	   article	   entitled	   ‘Policy	   Disasters:	   Explaining	   the	   UK’s	   Record’.	   In	   his	  
seminal	  article	  on	  policy	  failure,	  Dunleavy	  highlights	  six	  major	  policy	  disasters	  that	  have	  occurred	  in	  
Britain,	   one	   of	   them	   being	   the	   Child	   Support	   Agency	   (CSA).	   Dunleavy	   claims	   that	   the	   CSA	   was	  
inadequately	   resourced	   at	   the	   outset,	   operated	   with	   inflexible	   rules	   which	   could	   not	   take	   into	  
account	  existing	  complex	  arrangements	  between	  separated	  parents,	  and	  pursued	  unrealistic	  targets	  
for	   recouping	   expenditures.	   Dunleavy	   proceeds	   to	   provide	   us	   with	   five	   main	   factors	   which	   he	  
believes	   are	   involved	   in	   generating	   policy	   disasters	   (such	   as	   the	   CSA),	   namely:	   scale	   aggregation,	  
overly	   speedy	   legislation,	   political	   hyper-­‐activism,	   the	   ‘arrogance’	   of	   Whitehall,	   and	   ineffective	  
internal	  checks	  and	  balances.	  Through	  applying	  Dunleavy’s	  criteria	  for	  policy	  disasters	  to	  the	  CSA	  we	  
are	  provided	  with	  an	   insight	   into	  why	  the	  Agency	  failed.	   In	  several	  chapters	  throughout	  this	   thesis	  
we	  will	  be	  referring	  back	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Dunleavy,	  and	  his	  understanding	  of	  policy	  disasters.	  	  
	  	  
Dorey	   (2000)	   applies	   Dunleavy’s	   criteria	   specifically	   to	   the	   CSA,	   providing	   them	   with	   more	  
validity	  and	  demonstrating	  their	  relevance,	  successfully	  bridging	  the	  gap	  between	  Dunleavy’s	  theory	  
and	   its	  applicability	   to	   the	  CSA.	  Dorey	  addresses	  each	  of	  Dunleavy’s	  points	  and	  highlights	   that	   the	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CSA	  met	   each	  of	   the	   factors	   that	  Dunleavy	   claimed	   leads	   to	  policy	   failure.	   	   For	   example,	   ‘political	  
hyper-­‐activism’	  was	   evident	   in	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act.	  Hence	  Dunleavy’s	   criteria	   constitute	   a	  
highly	  appropriate	  starting	  point	  for	  analysing	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  CSA.	  
	  
Coming	   from	   a	   different	   angle,	   but	   again	   inside	   the	   field	   of	   policy	   analysis,	   is	   the	   work	   by	  
Dolowitz	   and	  Marsh	  on	  policy	   transfer.	   	  Dolowitz	   claims	   that	   ‘the	  origins	   of	   the	  Agency	   are	   to	   be	  
found	   in	  policy	   transfer	   from	   the	  USA’	   (2001,	   373).	  He	   suggests	   that	   the	  CSA’s	   failure	  was	  due	   to	  
‘inappropriate’,	   ‘uninformed’,	   and	   ‘incomplete’	   transfer	   from	   America.	   This	   thesis	   will	   utilise	   the	  
work	   by	   Marsh	   and	   Dolowitz	   on	   policy	   transfer	   to	   understand	   the	   inherent	   failings	   of	   the	   Child	  
Support	  Act.	  Yet	  this	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  while	  an	  application	  of	  policy	  transfer	  does	  provide	  a	  good	  
insight,	   it	   is	  nevertheless	   limited.	  The	  thesis	  aims	  to	  build	  upon	  the	   insight	  provided	  by	  Marsh	  and	  
Dolowitz,	  by	  suggesting	   that	   the	  view	  that	   ‘inappropriate’,	   ‘uninformed’,	  and	   ‘incomplete’	   transfer	  
from	  America	  occurred	  is	  in	  fact	  only	  partially	  accurate;	  the	  Government	  did	  not	  look	  exclusively	  at	  
the	  child	   support	   schemes	   in	  America	  with	   the	   intention	  of	   transferring	   the	  entire	  policy.	   It	  builds	  
upon	  Dolowitz	   and	  Marsh’s	  work	   by	   suggesting	   that	   ‘dual	   policy	   transfer’	   took	   place,	   and	   indeed	  
here	  lay	  its	  links	  to	  failure.	  	  
	  
We	  also	  need	  to	  note	   the	  valuable	  and	  vast	  contribution	  made	  by	  Millar	   through	  her	  work	  on	  
family	  policy	  and	  child	  maintenance;	  she	  was	  awarded	  an	  OBE	   in	  2001	  for	  her	  prolific	  social	  policy	  
research.	  Millar	   is	   very	  widely	  published	  on	   the	   topic	  of	   child	   support	  and	  has	   looked	  at	   the	  Child	  
Support	   Agency	   in	   several	   of	   her	   publications	   (1991,	   1992a,	   1992b,	   1993,	   1994).	   Although	   she	  
approaches	  the	  CSA	  from	  a	  slightly	  different	  perspective,	  a	  social	  rather	  than	  political	  approach,	  her	  
work	  provides	  an	  important	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  context	  of	  the	  policy	  which	  is	  utilised	  in	  this	  
thesis.	   She	   has	   also	   undertaken	   research	   on	   child	  maintenance	   commissioned	   by	   the	   DSS.	   Other	  
academics	  from	  the	  field	  of	  social	  policy	  have	  also	  produced	  work	  on	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  (see	  
for	   example:	   Bradshaw,	   Corden,	   Glendinning).	   This	   thesis	   aims	   to	   build	   on	   their	   social	   policy	  
understanding	  of	  the	  CSA	  by	  assimilating	  their	  work	  into	  our	  political,	  policy	  analysis	  perspective.	  
	  
Garnham	  and	  Knights’	  Putting	  the	  Treasury	  First:	  The	  Truth	  about	  Child	  Support	  (1994)	  is	  the	  first	  
book	   to	   focus	   entirely	   upon	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act.	   Although	   written	   in	   the	   immediate	  
aftermath	  of	  the	  policy’s	  introduction,	  it	  provides	  us	  with	  valuable	  insight,	  drawing	  primarily	  on	  first-­‐
hand	   experiences	   of	  many	   lone	   parents	   and	   information	   gathered	   from	   the	   Child	   Poverty	   Action	  
Group’s	  Child	   Support	  Monitoring	  Network.	   The	  book	   focuses	  particularly	  on	   the	  operation	  of	   the	  
Agency	  in	  its	  first	  years	  as	  well	  as	  addressing	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  policy	  on	  tackling	  child	  poverty.	  We	  
should	  note	  however	  that	  this	  was	  work	  produced	  by	  CPAG	  rather	  than	  in	  an	  academic	  study.	  The	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purpose	   of	   the	   book	   therefore	   is	   prescriptive	   and	   highly	   normative	   regarding	   policy	   content;	   for	  
example	   the	   concluding	   chapter	   of	   the	   book	   sets	   out	   the	   pressure	   group’s	   ‘radical	   proposals	   for	  
immediate	  reform’.	  Therefore,	  although	  the	  book	  provides	  us	  a	  valuable	   insight,	  with	  highly	  useful	  
primary	  research,	  we	  need	  to	  note	  its	  agenda	  when	  utilising	  it.	  	  
	  
We	   should	   also	   note	   the	   contribution	  made	   by	  the	   Channel	   Four	   television	   documentary	  
series	  ‘Can't	  Pay,	  Won't	  Pay’	  (2000).	  These	  series	  of	  documentaries	  serve	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  useful	  
sources	  of	  information	  on	  the	  CSA.	  They	  contain	  unique	  footage	  of	  interviews	  with	  Ministers,	  MPs,	  
Civil	  Servants,	  and	  Agency	  staff,	  each	  providing	  valuable	   insight	   into	  the	  creation	  of	   the	  policy	  and	  
the	   operation	   of	   the	   Agency.	   This	   thesis	   utilises	   the	   information,	   and	   insight,	   gathered	   by	   the	  
documentary	  at	  several	  sections3.	  	  
	  
Charities,	  pressure	  groups	  and	  think	  tanks	  have	  also	  provided	  us	  with	  a	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  
the	  CSA.	  The	  Children’s	  Society,	  Family	  &	  Parenthood,	  Families	  Need	  Fathers,	  Policy	  &	  Practice,	  and	  
Family	  Policy	  Studies	  Centre	  have	  all	  provided	  a	  vital	  contribution	  to	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  CSA.	  Again,	  
it	  must	  be	  note	  that	  they	  primarily	  focus	  on	  sociological	  empirical	  evidence	  regarding	  the	  negative	  
impact	   the	   CSA	   has	   upon	   families.	   Whilst	   this	   work	   is	   highly	   normative	   and	   produced	   from	   a	  
sociological	  and	  prescriptive	  angle,	  it	  remains	  vital	  to	  enhancing	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  CSA.	  	  
	  
We	  should	  also	  note	  that	  the	  CSA	  has	  already	  been	  the	  prime	  focus	  of	  three	  Doctoral	  theses.	  
The	   first	   of	   these	   being	   by	   Collette	   Roberts	   in	   1998	   (University	   of	   Nottingham)	   entitled,	  Another	  
Disaster	  Foretold?	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency.	  However,	  rather	  than	  specifically	  assessing	  
the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  Roberts	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  historical	  record	  of	  child	  maintenance.	  The	  
thesis	   is	  a	  wide-­‐ranging,	  a	   two	  volume	  exploration	  of	  pressure	  group	  and	  media	   reactions	   to	  child	  
maintenance	  systems	  and	  the	  operation	  of	  CSA.	  The	  thesis	  provides	  a	  cursory	  glance	  towards	  many	  
potential	  topics,	  ranging	  from	  providing	  background	  histories	  of	  several	  voluntary	  organisations	  and	  
protest	  groups	  (including	  a	  history	  of	  their	  membership	  and	  leadership),	  to	  a	  breakdown	  of	  each	  CSA	  
Business	  Paper	  and	  digestion	  of	  political	  party	  manifestos.	  Yet,	  whilst	  broad	  in	  scope,	  the	  analysis	  is	  
limited	   and	  offers	   little	   to	   advance	  our	  understandings	  of	   the	  making,	   or	   the	   failings,	   of	   the	  Child	  
Support	   Agency	   itself;	   whilst	   an	   interesting	   historical	   record,	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   study	   limits	   its	  
analytical	  depth.	  	  	  
	  
In	   2003,	   Francine	   Beadsworth	   (University	   of	   Essex)	   completed	   a	   thesis	   entitled	   The	   Child	  
Support	   Agency:	   Origins,	   Operation	   and	   Failure.	   Whilst	   the	   title	   appears	   strikingly	   similar	   to	   this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  A	  copy	  of	  this	  documentary	  was	  obtained	  from	  the	  producer.	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thesis,	   a	   closer	   reading	  of	   it	   shows	   that	   the	   approach	   is	   very	   different.	   Beadsworth	  writes	   from	  a	  
prominently	  feminist	  perspective	  and	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  the	  social	  context	  of	  the	  policy	  (discussing	  
categories	   of	   lone-­‐parents,	   demographic	   trends,	   history	   of	   child	   maintenance	   and	   family	   policy)	  
rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  policy	  making	  process.	  We	  should	  also	  note	  that	  Beadsworth’s	  research	  
design	   does	   not	   apply	   a	   theoretical	   understanding	   of	   policy	   making.	   Similarly	   to	   	   Roberts,	  
Beadsworth	  does	  not	  engage	  with	  the	  work	  within	  political	  science	  or	  policy	  analysis,	  nor	  does	  she	  
provide	   us	   with	   a	   cause	   behind	   the	   failure,	   but,	   rather,	   provides	   a	   history	   of	   child	   maintenance	  
(dating	  back	  to	  the	  Poor	  Law),	  and	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  CSA’s	  operational	  failure.	  As	  we	  stated	  at	  the	  
start,	  our	  approach	  to	  policy	  analysis	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  policy	  was	  
developed,	  looking	  at	  the	  actions	  taken	  by	  various	  actors	  and	  institutions	  at	  each	  stage,	  which	  led	  to	  
the	   creation,	   and	   passage,	   of	   a	   flawed	   policy.	   Therefore	   there	   are	   vast	   differences	   not	   only	   in	  
approach	  but	  also	  research	  design,	  scope,	  methodology,	  and	  objectives.	  	  
	  
Lastly,	   in	   2005	   Brian	   Sheffield	   (Durham	   University)	   produced	   a	   thesis	   entitled,	   The	   Child	  
Support	  Agency	  under	  new	  public	  sector	  management:	  an	  analysis	  of	  child	  support	  after	  separation	  
within	  a	  next	  steps	  agency.	  Sheffield	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  excellent	  understanding	  of	   the	  operation	  
and	  management	  of	   the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	   from	  a	  business	  and	  management	  perspective.	  The	  
emphasis	   is	   upon	   the	   CSA	   as	   a	   Next	   Steps	   Agency,	   analysing	   the	   internal	   organisation	   and	  
operational	  performances	  within	  the	  themes	  of	  new	  public	  sector	  management	  that	  were	  injected	  in	  
the	   policy.	   Whilst	   Sheffield’s	   work	   fills	   a	   similar	   gap	   in	   the	   literature,	   it	   should	   be	   seen	   as	  
complimentary.	  As	  my	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  the	  developed	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  and	  Sheffield	  
focuses	  on	  the	  Agency’s	  continuing	  operation	  (including	  its	  operation	  after	  several	  reforms),	  I	  would	  
argue	  that	  our	  theses	  would	  make	  valuable	  companion	  pieces	  to	  anyone	  seeking	  to	  understand	  the	  
1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  in	  its	  entirety.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1.6	  Scope	  of	  the	  Research	  
	  
1.6.1.	  How	  This	  Thesis	  Intends	  to	  Use	  the	  Stages	  Approach	  -­‐	  Organisation	  of	  Thesis	  
This	  thesis	  adheres	  to	  the	  framework	  provided	  by	  the	  stages	  heuristic.	  As	  argued	  above,	  the	  
stages	  approach	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  apply	  multiple	  theories	  and	  approaches	  to	  develop	  a	  deep	  holistic	  
understanding	   that	   is	  not	   constrained	  by	  any	  agenda	  other	   than	   to	  gather	   insight	  and	  knowledge.	  
The	   stages	   approach	   will	   allow	   us	   to	   be	   multi-­‐model	   and	   multi-­‐methodological	   and	  
multidimensional.	  This	  thesis	  adopts	  a	  post-­‐positivist,	  interpretivist	  approach	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Cook	  
(1985)	   in	   his	   disillusionment	  with	   literature	   and	  methods	   of	   evaluation	   studies.	   Akin	   to	   Cook,	  we	  
maintain	  that	  there	  is	  no	  singular	  method	  or	  approach	  that	  can	  be	  used;	  instead	  we	  need	  to	  seek	  the	  
26	  
	  
benefit	   of	   multiple	   approaches	   and	   methods.	   As	   reality	   is	   multi-­‐faceted,	   academics	   need	   to	   be	  
armed	  with	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  tools.	  Our	  approach	  argues	  that	  the	  stages	  heuristic	  can	  be	  utilised	  as	  a	  
tool-­‐box	  in	  which	  we	  can	  organise	  our	  tools,	  using	  those	  tools	  that	  we	  believe	  to	  be	  best	  suited	  to	  
our	  case	  study.	   It	  allows	  us	  to	  be	  multi-­‐dimensional	  and	  holistic,	  drawing	  on	  work	  that	  helps	  us	  to	  
analyse	  rather	  than	  drawing	  on	  evidence	  that	   fits	  our	  pre-­‐determined	  analysis.	  This	  speaks	  true	  of	  
the	  origins	  to	  the	  field	  and	  the	  objectives	  of	  Lasswell.	  	  
Therefore	   this	   thesis,	   whilst	   aware	   of	   the	   limitations	   and	   perceived	   naivety	   of	   the	   stages	  
approach,	  rejects	  the	  view	  that	  the	  stages	  heuristic	  has	  outlived	  its	  usefulness	  and	  instead	  maintains	  
that	   its	   application	   is	   the	  most	   effective	   framework	   within	   which	   to	   gather	   insight	   into	   our	   case	  
study	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  Each	  of	  the	  following	  chapters	  will	  correspond	  to	  a	  stage	  within	  
the	  policy	  making	  process,	  allowing	  us	  to	  draw	  on	  a	  wealth	  of	  knowledge	  in	  each	  stage.	  	  	  
	  
1.6.2	  Research	  Methods	  
	  
Based	   on	   our	   ontological	   and	   epistemological	   position	   -­‐	   that	   reality	   is	   largely	   socially	  
constructed,	  knowledge	  is	  based	  on	  interpretation,	  and	  we	  cannot	  always	  seek	  definitive	  answers	  –	  
this	   thesis	   largely	   employs	   qualitative	   methods.	   It	   draws	   heavily	   upon	   material	   gathered	   in	  
interviews,	   from	  which	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   gather	   material	   and	   insight	   that	   has	   not	   previously	   been	  
documented,	  allowing	  us	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  motives,	  objectives,	  and	  values	  behind	  actions.	  Whilst	  the	  
depth	  and	  richness	  of	  this	  information	  is	  evident,	  researchers	  who	  deploy	  this	  method	  are	  typically	  
challenged	  over	  the	  reliability,	  validity,	  and	  lack	  of	  generalizable	  worth	  of	  their	  material.	  Yet	  just	  as	  
the	   stated	   criticism	   voiced	   by	   Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith	   towards	   the	   stages	   heuristic	   does	   not	  
apply,	  the	  same	  can	  be	  suggested	  here.	  The	  criticism	  that	  qualitative	  research	  methods,	  particularly	  
interviews,	   do	   not	   produce	   generalisable	   ‘absolute	   truths’	   is	   based	   on	   the	   researcher’s	  
positivist/empiricist	  epistemological	  position,	  and	  is	  therefore	  invalid	  and	  inappropriate.	  This	  thesis	  
does	  not	  strive	  to	  uncover	  ‘absolute	  truths’	  but	  instead	  aims	  to	  achieve	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  
the	  policy	  making	  process.	  	  
	  
The	  thesis	  also	  draws	  heavily	  upon	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  legislative	  stage,	  and	  here	  it	  engages	  in	  
discourse	  analysis,	  focusing	  on	  the	  debates	  in	  Parliament	  regarding	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Bill.	  The	  
study	   also	   engages	  with	   a	   detailed	   understanding	   of	   the	   consultation	   process	   of	   the	  White	   Paper	  
Children	  Come	  First.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  contact	  was	  made	  with	  those	  organisations	  that	  participated	  
in	  the	  consultation	  process	  to	  obtain	  copies	  of	  their	  unpublished	  consultation	  responses.	  The	  thesis	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also	   draws	   on	   information	   gathered	   from	   Freedom	   of	   Information	   requests,	   Government	   papers,	  
official	  documents,	  documentaries,	  speeches,	  debates,	  and	  press	  coverage.	  
	  
1.5.3.	  Overview	  of	  Thesis	  
	  
Each	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   one	   of	   the	   distinct	   phases	   of	   the	   policy	   process	   and	  will	   include	  
specific	  appropriate	  theories,	  methods,	  approaches,	  and	  models	  that	  are	  relevant	  and	   insightful	  to	  
our	  analysis.	  Whilst	  these	  chapters	  remain	  focused	  to	  a	  specific	  stage,	  integration	  between	  stages	  is	  
acknowledged	  and	  highlighted	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  What	  this	  might	  appear	  to	  lack	  in	  ‘theoretical	  
elegance’	   and	   'generalisability'	  will	   be	   compensated	   for	   by	   the	   production	   of	   a	   rich	   and	   insightful	  
understanding.	  	  
The	  structure	  of	  this	  thesis	  reflects	  largely	  the	  ‘stages	  heuristics’;	  each	  chapter	  engages	  with	  
a	  specific	  stage	  of	  the	  process,	  drawing	  on	  and	  engaging	  with	  different	  bodies	  of	  literature.	  	  	  
	  
Chapter	   Two	   provides	   an	   historical	   and	   contextual	   background	   to	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	  
Act.	  We	  will	  begin	  by	  looking	  at	  trends	  relating	  to	  lone-­‐parent	  families	  in	  Britain.	  This	  will	  include	  a	  
detailing	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  lone-­‐parent	  families	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  
such	  families	  headed	  by	  never-­‐married	  mothers,	  and	  also	  looking	  at	  the	  alleged	  benefit	  dependency	  
of	   such	   families.	   It	  will	   then	   highlight	   how	   developments	   such	   as	   these	   provided	   the	   impetus	   for	  
policy	  change,	  before	  examining	  policy	  developments	  around	  welfare	  reform	  and	  specifically	  in	  the	  
area	  of	  lone	  parent	  families.	  In	  so	  doing,	  setting	  the	  scene	  and	  providing	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  
the	   context	   in	   which	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   was	   formulated	   and	   how	   the	   ‘problem’	   was	  
constructed.	  
	  
Chapter	   Three	   focuses	   on	   the	   problem	   definition	   stage.	   It	   begins	   by	   providing	   an	  
introduction	   to	   the	   study	   of	   problem	  definition,	   before	   highlighting	   how	  we	   can	  make	   use	   of	   the	  
insights	  gained	  from	  studies	  to	  then	  analyse	  the	  policy	  frames	  and	  resulting	  definitions	  of	  several	  of	  
the	   interested	   actors.	   It	   then	   examines	   the	   importance	   of	   viewing	   ‘problem	   representations’	   as	  
something	   separate	   to	   that	   of	   ‘problem	   definition’.	   It	   highlights	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   two	  
terms	  before	  looking	  at	  the	  power	  of	  problem	  representation	  and	  how	  language	  is	  skilfully	  utilised	  
as	  a	  tool,	  before	  finishing	  by	  highlighting	   its	  role	   in	  the	  political	  sphere,	  the	  policy	  making	  process,	  




Chapter	  Four	  starts	  to	  examine	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  It	  assesses	  the	  
role	   of	   Policy	   Transfer	   in	   both	   the	   creation	   and	   failure	   of	   the	  Act.	   It	   examines	   previous	   academic	  
work	  on	  Policy	  Transfer,	  before	  advocating	  that	  the	  approach	  could	  be	  advanced	  by	  introducing	  the	  
idea	  of	  ‘dual	  policy	  transfer’.	  It	  will	  then	  apply	  this	  advanced	  approach	  to	  the	  case	  study	  of	  the	  1991	  
Child	  Support	  Act,	  showing	  that	   ‘dual	  policy	  transfer’	  did	   indeed	  take	  place.	   It	  ends	  by	  highlighting	  
how	  these	  conflicting	  dual	  origins	  laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  the	  eventual	  failure	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  Five	  continues	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  but	  
here	  focusing	  on	  the	  role	  of	   the	  core	  executive.	   It	   looks	  at	  how	  divergent	  agendas	  gained	  position	  
within	  the	  single	  policy	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  power	  dynamics	  that	   influenced	   its	  creation.	   	  Here	   it	  will	  
examine	  this	  imbalance	  of	  power	  whilst	  also	  addressing	  the	  disagreements	  which	  occurred	  between	  
the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  DSS.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  look	  at	  the	  power	  resources	  held	  by	  both	  Thatcher	  and	  
the	  Treasury	  to	  understand	  why	  Newton	  introduced	  a	  policy	  despite	  not	  entirely	  agreeing	  with	  the	  
details.	  
	  
Chapter	   Six	   examines	   the	   legislative	   process,	   assessing	   it	   as	   contributory	   factors	   in	   policy	  
failure.	  The	  CSA	  experienced	  a	  plethora	  of	  administrative	  and	  implementation	  problems,	  all	  of	  which	  
can	   be	   accredited	   to	   the	   policy	   itself.	   Here	   it	   examines	   the	   inadequate	   consultation	   process,	  
highlighting	   the	   concerns	   raised	  by	   several	   pressure	   groups	   and	   then	   the	  disdain	  with	  which	   they	  
were	   received	   by	   policy	   makers.	   	   It	   then	   moves	   to	   examine	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   stage,	   again	  
highlighting	  the	  number	  of	  concerns	  that	  were	  raised.	  	  It	  will	  show	  that	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  
the	  CSA	  were	  foreseeable	  and	   indeed	  foreseen.	   	   It	  will	   then	  highlight	  how	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  
proved	  to	  be	  an	   ineffective	  source	  of	  checks-­‐and-­‐balances,	  by	   in	  effect	  allowing	  a	   flawed	  policy	   to	  
pass	  through	  its	  chamber.	  	  
	  
	   Chapter	  Seven	  assesses	  the	  implementation,	  briefly	  outlining	  the	  work	  of	  some	  of	  the	  major	  
scholars	   in	   implementation	   studies.	   Both	   the	   ‘bottom-­‐up’	   and	   the	   ‘top-­‐down’	   approaches	   are	  
discussed	  and	  critiqued.	  The	  chapter	  then	  discusses	  the	  position	  of	  implementation	  studies,	  before	  
setting	   out	   the	   approach	   and	   position	   adopted	   by	   this	   study.	   It	   argues	   that	   some	   of	   the	   areas	  
typically	  assigned	  to	  the	  implementation	  stage,	  are	  better	  situated	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  policy	  process.	  
The	  Chapter	  ends	  by	  outlining	  ‘next-­‐steps’	  agencies,	  an	  approach	  to	  implementation	  utilised	  by	  the	  
Thatcher	  Government	  which	  presented	  unique	  challenges	   to	   the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	   ,	  and	   the	  




Chapter	  Eight	  focuses	  on	  the	  operation	  and	  apparent	  failings	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  
and	  assess	  the	  root	  of	  these	  failings.	  It	  will	  link	  back	  to	  the	  work	  done	  in	  previous	  chapters	  assessing	  
how	  failings	  at	  previous	  stages,	  in	  particular	  the	  legislative	  stage,	  are	  manifest	  when	  in	  operation.	  It	  
argues	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  was	  foreseeable,	  foreseen,	  and	  ultimately	  avoidable.	  
It	  ends	  by	  presenting	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘perfect	  legislation’	  (as	  opposed	  to	  ‘perfect	  implementation’)	  as	  an	  
appropriate	  framework	  to	  guide	  policy-­‐makers	  through	  the	  complexities	  of	  policy	  making,	  and	  avoid	  
policy	  failure.	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Chapter	  Two	  -­‐	  The	  Background,	  ‘Setting	  the	  Scene’	  
2.1	  Introduction	  
The	   focus	  of	   this	   chapter	  will	   be	  on	   the	  historical	   and	   contextual	   background	   to	   the	  1991	  
Child	  Support	  Act.	   It	  begins	  by	  looking	  at	  trends	  relating	  to	   lone-­‐parent	  families	   in	  Britain.	  This	  will	  
include	   analysis	   of	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   lone-­‐parent	   families	   and	   the	   increase	   in	   the	  
proportion	  of	  such	  families	  headed	  by	  never-­‐married	  mothers,	  and	  also	  looks	  at	  the	  alleged	  benefit	  
dependency	   of	   such	   families.	   It	  will	   then	   highlight	   how	  developments	   such	   as	   these	   provided	   the	  
impetus	   for	   policy	   change,	   before	   examining	   policy	   developments	   around	   welfare	   reform	   and	  
specifically	   in	   the	   area	  of	   lone	  parent	   families.	   In	   so	  doing,	   it	   is	   setting	   the	   scene	   and	  providing	   a	  
deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  was	  formulated	  and	  how	  
the	  ‘problem’	  was	  constructed;	  as	  Davis	  et	  al	  state,	   ‘to	  understand	  this	  fully	  one	  needs	  a	  historical	  
perspective’	   (1998,	  1),	   and	  as	   Seidman	  and	  Rappaport	   claim,	   ‘the	  definition	  of	   a	   social	  problem	   is	  
time,	   place,	   and	   context	   bound’	   (1986,	   1).	   This	   thesis	   does	   not	   intend	   to	   enter	   into	   the	   details,	  
complexity,	   and	   debates	   surrounding	   developing/changing	   family	   circumstances	   and	   composition,	  
but	  aims	  to	  provide	  an	   impression	  of	   the	  period.	  These	   factors	   therefore	  are	  an	   important	  area	   in	  
which	  to	  start	  the	  analysis.	  
	  
2.2	  The	  Social	  Environment	  -­‐	  The	  Growth	  of	  Lone	  Parents	  
	  
From	  the	  1960s	  onwards,	  Britain	  witnessed	  a	  steady	  growth	  in	  the	  number	  of	  lone-­‐parents,	  
the	   figure	   almost	   tripling	   by	   the	   1990s.	   In	   1961	   six	   per	   cent	   of	   all	   families	   were	   headed	   by	   lone	  
parents.	  By	  1971	  this	  had	  increased	  slightly	  to	  eight	  per	  cent,	  and	  by	  1987	  this	  had	  risen	  further	  to	  14	  
per	  cent	   (Bradshaw	  and	  Millar,	  1991).	   In	  a	  20	  year	  period,	  between	  1971	  and	  1991,	  the	  number	  of	  
lone	  parent	  families	  more	  than	  doubled,	  from	  570,000	  to	  1.3	  million,	  which	  equated	  to	  19	  per	  cent	  
of	   all	   families	  with	   children	   (Clarke	  et	   al,	   1993,	   8).	   By	   1993,	   one	   in	   five	  mothers	  with	   dependent	  
children	   was	   a	   lone	   parent.	   We	   should	   also	   note	   that	   whilst	   still	   remaining	   relatively	   small,	   the	  
proportion	   of	   lone	   fathers	   also	  witnessed	   an	   increase	   in	   this	   period.	   Between	   1971	   and	   1993	   the	  
number	   of	   lone	   fathers	   with	   dependent	   children	   doubled	   from	   one	   per	   cent	   to	   two	   per	   cent	   of	  
families	   (Social	   Trends	   26,	   54-­‐55).	   Figure	   2.1	   provides	   a	   summary	   of	   the	   growth	   of	   lone	   parent	  







Figure	  2.1:	  Number	  of	  Lone	  Parent	  Families	  	  
	  
	  
*Source:	  Haskey,	  J.	  Populations	  Trends,	  OPCS,	  Spring	  1993	  
	  
However	  it	  was	  not	  simply	  the	  growth	  in	  the	  number	  of	  lone-­‐parents	  that	  was	  a	  significant	  
development	  between	  1960	  and	   late	  1980;	  the	  period	  also	  witnessed	  a	  change	   in	  the	  composition	  
and	   characteristics	   of	   the	   lone-­‐parent	   population.	   For	   example,	   the	   below	   Figure	   2.2	   shows	   the	  
percentage	  of	  divorce	  rates	  more	  than	  double	  during	  the	  period	  1971	  to	  1991.	  
	  
Figure	  2.2:	  Rates	  of	  Divorce:	  Percentage,	  per	  Thousand	  Marriages	  
	  
Year	   Percentage	   Source	  
1971	   6.0	   CSO,	  Social	  Trends	  1991/92	  
1972	   9.5	   Allen,	  1985	  
1976	   10.0	   CSO,	  Social	  Trends	  1991/92	  
1979	   11.6	   Allen,	  1985	  
1981	   11.9	   CSO,	  Social	  Trends	  1992	  
1990	   12.6	   CSO,	  Social	  Trends	  1993	  
1991	   13.5	   OPCS,	  1991	  
	  
*Adapted	  from	  Fox-­‐Harding,	  L.	  1996,	  56.	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Figures	   also	   show	   that	   the	   proportion	   of	   lone	   parents	   who	   were	   widows	   was	   dramatically	  
decreasing,	  whilst	   the	  proportions	  that	  were	  divorced	  or	  never-­‐married	  mothers	  were	  significantly	  
increasing.	  Table	  2.3	  shows	  the	  increasing	  proportions	  of	  live	  births	  outside	  of	  marriage:	  
	  
Figure	  2.3	  The	  Increasing	  Proportions	  of	  Live	  Births	  Outside	  of	  Marriage	  
	  
Year	  	   Percentage	  
1975	   9.0	  
1980	   11.5	  
1985	   18.9	  
1986	   21.0	  
1987	   22.9	  
1988	   25.1	  
1989	   26.6	  
1990	   27.9	  
1991	   29.8	  
	  
*	  Adapted	  from	  CSO	  Social	  Trends,	  1992	  
	  
The	   route	   to	   lone-­‐parenthood	   and	   its	   characteristics	   were	   changing,	   not	   just	   its	   numbers;	   a	  
qualitative	  as	  well	  as	  a	  quantitative	  change.	  Figure	  2.4	  (below)	  provides	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  changing	  
characteristics	  of	  lone-­‐parent	  families	  between	  1971	  and	  1991.	  
	  
Figure	  2.4:	  Numbers	  of	  Lone-­‐parent	  Families	  in	  1971	  and	  1991	  
	  
Type	   of	   family	   with	   number	   (thousand)	   of	   dependent	  
children	  
%	   of	   lone	   parent	  
families	  
%	  of	  all	  families	  
	   1971	   1991	   1991	   1991	  
Lone	  Mothers	   500	   1,200	   92	   18	  
Single	   90	   440	   34	   6	  
Separated	   170	   250	   19	   4	  
Divorced	   120	   430	   33	   6	  
Widowed	   120	   80	   6	   1	  
Lone	  Fathers	   70	   100	   8	   1	  
Lone	  Parents	   570	   1,300	   100	   19	  




We	  can	  see	  that	   the	  growth	   in	   the	  number	  of	   lone	  parents	  was	   largely	  driven	  by	  both	  the	  
increase	  in	  the	  numbers	  of	  divorced	  mothers,	  and	  the	  growth	  in	  the	  number	  of	  unmarried	  mothers	  
which	   almost	   quadrupled	   between	   1979	   and	   1989	   (Clarke	  et	   al,	   1993,	   8).	   	   The	   developing	   trends	  
regarding	   the	   marital	   status	   of	   lone	   parents	   were	   largely	   reflecting	   changes	   within	   society:	   the	  
proportion	   of	   lone	   parents	   who	   were	   widows	   was	   decreasing	   which	   reflected	   the	   changes	   in	  
mortality	   rates,	  while	   the	   increasing	   in	   proportion	   headed	   by	   divorced	  mothers	   or	   never	  married	  
mothers	  reflected	  relaxing	  divorce	   laws	  and	  a	  more	   liberal	  attitude	  towards	  sex,	  cohabitation,	  and	  
family	   composition.	   These	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   unwelcomed	   developments	   for	   a	   Conservative	  
Government	  that	  was	  enthusiastically	  promoting	  ‘traditional’	  family	  values.	  
	  
2.3	  The	  Economic	  Environment	  -­‐	  The	  Growing	  Cost	  of	  Lone-­‐Parents	  
	  
	   Coinciding	  with	  the	  period	  which	  saw	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  number	  of	  lone-­‐parents,	  the	  UK	  witnessed	  
a	  dramatic	   increase	  in	  public	  expenditure.	  The	  cost	  of	   lone-­‐parents	  was	  one	  of	  the	  fastest	  growing	  
items	  on	   the	   Social	   Security	  budget,	   due	   to	   the	   significant	   increase	   in	   the	  number	  of	   such	  people	  
who	  were	  dependent	  on	   the	  welfare	   state	   as	   their	  main	   source	  of	   income.	   In	  1981-­‐1982,	  welfare	  
benefits	  for	  lone-­‐parents	  were	  costing	  the	  Treasury	  £1.3	  billion;	  by	  1990-­‐1991,	  this	  had	  risen	  to	  £4.3	  
billion	  (Barnes	  et	  al,	  1998,	  8).	  While	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  spent	  on	  benefits	  across	  the	  board	  was	  
rising,	   the	  proportion	  which	  was	   spent	  on	   lone-­‐parents	  was	   rising	  at	   a	  much	   faster	   rate.	   This	  was	  
primarily	  a	  result	  of	  the	  steadily	  growing	  number	  of	  women	  in	  receipt	  of	  Income	  Support	  or	  Family	  
Credit.	   In	  1980	  there	  were	  330,000	   lone	  parent	   families	  dependent	  on	  supplementary	  benefits;	  by	  
1989	  the	  number	  of	  lone	  parent	  families	  dependent	  on	  Income	  Support	  had	  risen	  to	  770,000	  (DSS,	  
1989).	   Of	   these	   770,000,	   less	   than	   half	   were	   receiving	   regular	   maintenance	   payments	   from	   the	  
absent	   parent	   (CM1262,	   Vol	   2,	   i).	   In	   1976	   48	   per	   cent	   of	   lone	   parents	   were	   receiving	   either	  
Supplementary	   Benefit	   or	   Family	   Income	   Supplement;	   by	   1989	   the	   proportion	   claiming	   Income	  
Support	  of	  Family	  Credit	  was	  77	  per	  cent	  (Boden	  and	  Childs,	  1996,	  140).	  The	  Family	  Resource	  Survey	  
stated	   that	   during	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Bill,	   approximately	   75	  per	   cent	   of	   lone	  
parents	   received	  no	   regular	  maintenance	   from	  the	  absent	  parent	  and	  were	   left	  entirely	   reliant	  on	  
Income	  Support	  (The	  Family	  Resource	  Survey,	  1993/94).	  
	  
The	   welfare	   bill	   in	   this	   area	   was	   also	   increased	   not	   only	   by	   the	   number	   of	   lone-­‐parents	  
reliant	  on	   the	  welfare	   state	  but	   the	  number	   that	   remained	  dependent	  on	  welfare	   for	  a	   significant	  
period	  of	  time.	  Due	  to	  the	  economic	  downturn,	  this	  period	  witnessed	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  number	  of	  
lone-­‐parents	   in	   the	   labour	   market.	   In	   1979/1981	   figures	   stood	   at	   49	   per	   cent	   of	   lone	   parents	   in	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employment,	  by	  1990/1992	  this	  had	  reduced	  to	  42	  per	  cent	  (OPCS,	  1991).	  This	  therefore	  resulted	  in	  
an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  welfare	  expenditure	  going	  to	  lone-­‐parents.	  	  
	  
	  It	   is	   also	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   during	   this	   period	   ‘single’	   lone	  mother’s	   experienced	   a	  
different	  employment	  trend	  to	  that	  of	  married	  mothers.	  During	  the	  1977-­‐97	  and	  1989-­‐1991	  married	  
mothers	   experienced	   increased	   participation	  working	   full	   time	   in	   the	   labour	  market,	   from	   15	   per	  
cent	   to	   22	   per	   cent,	   while	   lone	   mothers’	   participation	   dropped	   from	   25	   per	   cent	   to	   11	   per	   cent	  
(General	  Household	  Survey,	  1994,	  200).	   See	  below	   table	  and	  chart	   for	  breakdown	  of	  part	  and	   full	  
time	  trends:	  
	  
Figure	  2.5:	  Employment	  Trends	  -­‐	  ‘Single’	  Lone	  Mothers	  and	  Married	  Mothers:	  Percentages	  working	  
full	  time	  and	  part	  time,	  1977-­‐1991	  
	  
	   77-­‐79	   79-­‐81	   81-­‐83	   83-­‐85	   85-­‐87	   87-­‐89	   89-­‐91	  
Single,	  Lone	  Mother	  
Full	  Time	   25	   27	   18	   9	   14	   12	   11	  
Part	  Time	   11	   11	   12	   11	   13	   14	   18	  
Combined	  Working	   36	   38	   30	   20	   27	   27	   29	  
Married	  Mother,	  dependent	  Children	  
Full	  Time	   15	   15	   14	   15	   17	   21	   22	  
Part	  Time	   37	   36	   35	   37	   40	   40	   40	  
Combined	  Working	   52	   32	   49	   50	   54	   59	   62	  
	  




















*Source:	  General	  Household	  Survey,	  1994.	  
	  












*Source:	  General	  Household	  Survey,	  1994.	  
	  
In	   the	   period	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   there	  was	   increase	   in	   the	  
number	  of	  lone	  parents,	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  number	  of	  lone	  parents	  in	  paid	  employment,	  decrease	  in	  
lone	   parents	   receiving	   financial	   maintenance	   form	   the	   absent	   parent,	   and	   a	   marked	   increase	   in	  
government	  expenditure	  on	  benefits	  to	  lone	  parents.	  	  
	   The	   cost	  of	  providing	   financial	   support	   to	   lone-­‐parents	  was	   increasing	  at	   a	   time	  when	   the	  
neo-­‐liberal	  Conservative	  Government	  was	  searching	  for	  ways	  to	  cut	  the	  costs	  and	  welfare	  role	  of	  the	  
state.	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note	  this	  backdrop	  when	  assessing	  the	  creation	  of	   the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  
Act;	  lone	  parents	  became	  a	  target	  for	  the	  Treasury	  which	  deemed	  child	  support	  policy	  as	  a	  potential	  
area	  to	  curb	  expenditure.	  	  As	  Michael	  Whippman	  stated:	  
	  The	   whole	   story	   of	   policy	   making	   in	   the	   80s	   was	   to	   try	   and	   find	   ways	   of	   saving	  
money	   on	   social	   security	   and	   all	   ways	   of	   saving	   money	   on	   social	   security	   are	  
politically	  unattractive.	  Child	  support	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  politically	  more	  attractive	  way	  
of	   doing	   it	   but	   there	  was	   no	   doubt	   that	   if	   we	   didn't	   get	   the	  money	   that	  way	  we	  
would	  have	  to	  get	  the	  money	  some	  other	  way,	  and	  so	  of	  course	   it	  was	  a	  policy	  to	  
save	  money.	  (Punctuation	  added,	  Whippman,	  Michael,	  Policy	  Director,	  Department	  
of	  Social	  Security,	  1994	  -­‐	  1998,	  "Can't	  Pay	  Won’t	  Pay,	  1999)	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Alongside	   these	  developments,	   the	  UK	   saw	  growing	  hostility	   towards	   ‘single	  mothers’	   as	   a	   ‘moral	  
problem’	   emanating	   from	  many	   politicians,	  media	   sources,	   social	   commentators,	   and	   think-­‐tanks.	  
Below	  we	  will	  assess	  some	  of	  these	  developments.	  	  
2.4	  The	  Political	  Environment	  -­‐	  Changing	  Attitudes	  and	  Policy	  Developments	  
	   Not	  only	  did	  the	  period	  from	  1950	  to	  late	  1980s	  experience	  extensive	  changes	  in	  the	  number	  
and	  characteristics	  of	  lone	  parents,	  it	  also	  witnessed	  changing	  attitudes	  towards	  lone	  parents	  which	  
in	   turn	   also	   reflected	   developing	   policies	   towards	   lone-­‐parents.	   The	   below	   section	   will	   briefly	  
summarise	   influential	   reports	  and	  significant	  pieces	  of	   legislation	   in	   the	  area	  of	   child	  maintenance	  
and	   lone	   parenthood	   in	   the	   years	   preceding	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act,	  
highlighting	  their	  role	  and	  significance.	  	  
	  
Britain	  in	  the	  1950s	  placed	  a	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  the	  ideals	  of	  morality	  and	  Victorian	  values	  
towards	   the	   pursuit	   of	   a	   traditional	   family	   ideal.	   Popular	   attitudes	   frowned	   upon	   illegitimacy	   and	  
sexual	   relationships	   outside	   of	   marriage,	   and	   attached	   great	   social/personal	   stigma	   to	   lone-­‐
parenthood.	   Lone-­‐parents	   were	   seen	   as	   promiscuous	   and	   shameful,	   and	   becoming	   one	   was	  
something	   that	   should	   avoid	   at	   all	   costs.	   However,	   the	   1960s	   experienced	   a	   relaxing	   of	   attitudes	  
towards	   lone-­‐parents	  and	   some	  advances	  were	  made	   regarding	   the	  position	  of	  women	   in	   society.	  
Lone-­‐parent	  families	  began	  to	  be	  viewed	  with	  compassion:	  sympathy	  and	  duty	  replacing	  stigma	  and	  
disapproval.	  The	  growth	  in	  liberal	  attitudes	  towards	  women	  was	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  
progressive	  policies	  during	  this	  period,	  such	  as	  the	  1969	  Divorce	  Reform	  Act	  which	  made	  divorce	  a	  
more	  viable	  option	  to	  women,	  by	  allowing	  petitions	  to	  be	  filed	  on	  the	  sole	  grounds	  of	  ‘irretrievable	  
breakdown’.	  
	  
In	   1969	   the	   Labour	  Government	   appointed	   a	   Royal	   Commission	   to	   assess	   the	   situation	   of	  
lone-­‐parent	   families;	   this	   signified	  somewhat	  of	  a	  defining	  moment	   in	   lone-­‐parent	  policy	  area	  and	  
represented	  the	  increasing	  sympathetic,	  concerned	  and	  liberal	  attitudes	  in	  which	  lone-­‐parents	  were	  
coming	   to	   be	   regarded.	   The	   Royal	   Commission	   published	   its	   report	   five	   years	   later	   in	   July	   1974,	  
entitled	  The	  Report	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  One-­‐Parent	  Families,	  commonly	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Finer	  Report’	  
after	  the	  Chairman	  Morris	  Finer	  (Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Social	  Security,	  1974).	  	  The	  report,	  which	  
made	   230	   recommendations,	   looked	   at	   Income	   Support	   policy,	   child	   maintenance	   and	   the	  
administration	   of	   family	   law,	   and	  was	   considered	   by	  The	  Observer	   to	   be	   ‘one	   of	   the	  major	   social	  
documents	  of	  the	  century’	  (quoted	  in:	  Macaskill,	  1993,	  35).	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  report	  appeared	  to	  be	  to	  
raise	  the	  status	  and	  opportunities	  of	   lone-­‐parents,	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	   lone-­‐parents,	   irrespective	  
of	  circumstance,	  were	  treated	  alike.	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The	   Finer	   Report’s	   primary	   recommendation	   was	   for	   an	   overhaul	   of	   the	   maintenance	  
system,	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  ‘guaranteed	  maintenance	  allowance’	  for	  which	  all	  lone-­‐parents	  would	  
be	  eligible.	  The	  Finer	  Committee	  proposed	  an	  assimilation	  of	  the	  maintenance	  sections	  of	  the	  “three	  
systems	  of	  family	   law”	  (the	  Divorce	  Courts,	  the	  Magistrates’	  Courts,	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  
and	   Social	   Security).	   The	   ‘guaranteed	   maintenance	   allowance’	   would	   replace	   established	  
maintenance	  payments	  and	  see	  the	  state	  assume	  formal	  responsibility	  (as	  the	  single	  administrative	  
body)	   for	   the	  collection	  and	  allocation	  of	  maintenance	  payments	   from	  the	  absent	  parent,	  bringing	  
together	  the	  issues	  of	  private	  obligation	  and	  public	  entitlement	  (Davis	  et	  al,	  1998,	  1-­‐2).	  	  
However	   much	   of	   the	   Report	   was	   overlooked,	   so	   that	   by	   1978,	   only	   38	   of	   the	   Report’s	  
recommendations	  had	  been	  adopted,	   and	  115	  had	  been	   rejected	  or	  disregarded	   (Macaskill,	   1993,	  
35).	   The	  Finer	  Report	   can	   still	   be	   seen	  as	  having	  been	   influential	   in	  altering	   the	  mind-­‐set	  of	  many	  
politicians,	   and	   subsequently	   contributing	   to	   the	   successful	   enactment	   of	   other	   policies	   which	  
acknowledged	  the	  importance	  of	  financial	  support	  for	  lone-­‐parents	  and	  the	  need	  for	  progress	  in	  the	  
field	   of	   lone-­‐parent	   policies	   (Millar,	   1994,	   68),	   such	   the	   extension	   of	   Family	   Allowances,	   the	  
introduction	   of	   the	   Child	   Benefit	   Scheme	   and	   One	   Parent	   Benefit.	   Others	   have	   also	   ascribed	  
significant	   developments	   in	   housing,	   family	   law,	   and	   public	   law	   to	   the	   Finer	   Report	   (Thane	   and	  
Evans,	  2012,	  168).	  	  	  
When	   the	   Conservative	   Government	   entered	   office	   in	   1979,	   it	   promoted	   the	   view	   that	  
Britain	  was	  in	  a	  deep	  economic	  and	  moral	  crisis.	  Thatcher,	  and	  those	  on	  Right	  of	  the	  Party,	  believed	  
that	  economic	  liberalism	  and	  a	  renewed	  emphasis	  on	  individual	  responsibility	  was	  needed	  to	  restore	  
traditional	  morality	  to	  Britain	  and	  reduce	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  ‘nanny	  state’.	  The	  Conservatives	  viewed	  
the	  escalating	   cost	  of	   the	  welfare	   state	   for	  both	   the	   state	   and	   tax-­‐payers	   as	  unacceptable	   and	  an	  
area	  in	  which	  restraint	  was	  needed.	  In	  1985	  the	  Government	  undertook	  a	  major	  review	  of	  the	  social	  
security	   system	   and	   related	   expenditure.	   They	   encapsulated	   this	   view	  by	   the	   passing	   of	   the	   1986	  
Social	   Security	   Act,	   which	   signified	   a	   major	   turning	   point	   in	   the	   Government’s	   approach	   toward	  
benefits	   recipients.	   The	   Act	   was	   a	   significant	   piece	   of	   legislation	   which	   radically	   restructured	   the	  
social	  security	  system,	  aiming	  to	  reduce	  the	  costs	  to	  the	  state	  of	  welfare	  dependency	  by	  restricting	  
benefits.	  The	  Conservative	  Government	   (much	   like	  the	  Conservative-­‐Liberal	  Democrat	  coalition	  we	  
have	  today),	  maintained	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  reduce	  the	  welfare	  budget	  and	  reform	  the	  system	  
in	   a	  way	   that	   actively	   encouraged	   those	   on	   benefits	   to	   find	   employment	   rather	   than	   succumb	   to	  
dependency.	  	  
The	  1986	  Social	  Security	  Act	  had	  both	  a	  direct	  and	  indirect	  impact	  on	  lone	  parents.	  A	  large	  
proportion	  of	  lone	  parents	  were	  reliant	  on	  benefits,	  hence	  the	  reform	  impacted	  heavily	  upon	  them.	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Yet	  the	  reforms	  also	  had	  a	  specific	  impact	  on	  lone	  parents	  due	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  element	  which	  
had	   hitherto	   allowed	   child-­‐care	   costs	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   for	   those	   working	   part-­‐time	   and	  
claiming	  benefits.	  The	  reform	  also	  saw	  social	  grants	  replaced	  with	  a	  repayable	  social	  fund.	  The	  1986	  
Social	   Security	   Act	   represented	   a	   move	   towards	   tightening	   the	   public	   purse,	   and	   as	   a	   result	  
government	   placed	   increasing	   focus	   on	   lone-­‐parents	   as	   an	   avenue	   of	   expenditure	   to	   reel	   in	  
(Bradshaw	   and	  Millar,	   1991,	   1;	   Davis	   et	   al,	   1998,	   4).	   This	   rhetoric	  was	   (and	   has	   remained)	   about	  
‘targeting’	  benefits	  on	  those	  most	  in	  need,	  and	  who	  were	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  ‘deserving’	  poor.	  
As	   the	   Conservative	   Government	   continued,	   and	   as	   momentum	   began	   to	   grow,	   the	  
discourse	  regarding	  lone-­‐parents,	  or	  in	  particular,	  lone	  mothers	  slowly	  began	  to	  alter.	  By	  Thatcher’s	  
third	   term	   (1987-­‐90),	   attitudes	   towards	   lone-­‐parents	   began	   to	   revert	   back	   to	   those	   held	   in	   the	  
1950s.	   Thatcherism	   spoke	   strongly	   of	   Victorian	   values,	   attaching	   blame	   to	   lone-­‐parents.	   A	   strong	  
‘moral’	   tone	  was	   injected	   to	  numerous	  speeches,	   setting	   the	  agenda	   for	  child	   support	   reform.	  For	  
example,	  at	  a	  speech	  given	  to	  the	  National	  Children’s	  Home,	  Thatcher	  stated:	  
...children	  are	  in	  danger	  of	  seeing	  life	  without	  fathers	  not	  as	  the	  exception	  but	  as	  the	  
rule...this	  is	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  threat	  to	  our	  whole	  way	  of	  life,	  the	  long	  term	  implications	  
of	  which	  we	   can	  hardly	  grasp...But	  when	  one	  of	   the	  parents	  not	  only	  walks	  away	  
from	   marriage	   but	   neither	   maintains	   nor	   shows	   any	   interest	   in	   the	   child,	   an	  
enormous	   unfair	   burden	   is	   placed	   on	   the	   other.	   Nearly	   four	   out	   of	   five	   mothers	  
claiming	  Income	  Support	  receive	  no	  maintenance	  from	  the	  fathers.	  No	  father	  should	  
be	  able	  to	  escape	  from	  his	  responsibility	  and	  that	  is	  why	  the	  Government	  is	  looking	  
at	   ways	   of	   strengthening	   the	   system	   for	   tracing	   an	   absent	   father	   and	   making	  
arrangements	   for	   recovering	  maintenance	  more	  effective.	   (Thatcher,	  Margaret,	  17	  
Jan	  1990,	  Speech	  for	  National	  Children's	  Homes)	  
Similarly	  in	  a	  statement	  made	  to	  the	  ‘300	  Group’	  Thatcher	  reiterated	  her	  concern:	  
	  Government	   too	  must	   be	   concerned	   to	   see	   parents	   accept	   responsibility	   for	   their	  
children.	   For	   even	   though	   marriages	   may	   break	   down,	   parenthood	   is	   for	   life.	  
Legislation	   cannot	   make	   irresponsible	   parents	   responsible.	   But	   it	   can	   and	   must	  
ensure	  that	  absent	  parents	  pay	  maintenance	  for	  their	  children.	  It	  is	  not	  fair	  for	  them	  
to	   expect	   other	   families	   to	   foot	   their	   bills	   too.	   (Thatcher,	   Margret,	   during	   a	  
Pankhurst	  Lecture	  to	  the	  300	  Group,	  1990).	  	  
Ministers	   also	   increasingly	   pointed	   towards	   statistics	   and	   indicators	   of	   rising	   lone-­‐parents,	   and	  
increasingly	  used	  negative	  rhetoric	  when	  discussing	  these.	  Lone-­‐parents	  began	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  major	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concern,	  a	  burden	  on	  society	  and	  drain	  on	  public	  money.	  Thatcher’s	  third	  term	  was	  characterised	  by	  
political	   hyperactivism,	   radicalism,	   and	   dogma.	   It	   did	   not	   mirror	   her	   previous	   terms	   that	   were	  
marked	  by	  incrementalism	  and	  quiet	  concern	  for	  support,	  but	  instead	  allowed	  the	  momentum	  of	  the	  
previous	  terms	  to	  encourage	  more	  radical	  and	  ambitious	  attitudes.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  all	  areas	  of	  
social	  policy	  not	  just	  that	  of	  attitudes	  towards	  lone	  parents.	  	  
2.5	  Lone-­‐parents	  as	  the	  ‘Problem’?	  	  
As	  noted	  above,	  it	  is	  vital	  that	  we	  note	  the	  changing	  attitudes	  and	  often	  radicalising	  views	  of	  
politicians	  and	  commentators	  in	  the	  approach	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  Policy	  
is	  not	  made	  in	  a	  vacuum;	  rather	  it	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  attitudes	  and	  views	  of	  the	  times.	  	  	  By	  the	  late	  
1980s,	   less	   sympathetic	   views	   towards	   lone-­‐parents	   were	   starting	   to	   emerge	   among	   many	  
commentators,	   think-­‐tanks	   and	  ministers.	   In	   1988,	   the	   then	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Social	   Security,	  
John	  Moore,	  made	  a	  speech	  at	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  Conference	  which	  raised	  concerns	  regarding	  
the	  relationship	  between	  the	  availability	  of	  state	  benefits	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  lone-­‐parents.	  He	  stated:	  	  
Is	  the	  hope	  of	  a	  council	  flat	  and	  guaranteed	  income	  a	  factor	  in	  unmarried	  teenage	  
pregnancy?	  Is	  the	  knowledge	  that	  the	  state	  will	  provide	  a	  factor	  in	  fathers	  deserting	  
their	   families?	  What	   is	   to	  be	  done	  about	  the	  nearly	  half	  a	  million	  fathers	  who	  pay	  
nothing	  at	  all	   towards	   the	   support	  of	   their	  wives	  and	  children?	   (Quoted	   in:	  Thane	  
and	  Evans,	  2012,	  172).	  
To	  many,	  lone-­‐parenthood	  had	  become	  an	  issue	  which	  required	  attention.	  In	  1988	  it	  was	  announced	  
that	  there	  was	  going	  to	  be	  a	  Ministerial	  Review	  by	  the	  Social	  Security	  Advisory	  Committee	  looking	  at	  
the	   dynamics	   of	   lone-­‐parents.	   The	   ‘problem’	   had	   moved	   from	   the	   systemic	   to	   the	   institutional	  
agenda.	  	  
During	   her	   third	   term,	   Thatcher	   and	  many	   of	   her	   Cabinet	   colleagues	   had	   become	   greatly	  
influenced	  by	  the	  American	  right-­‐wing	  sociologist	  Charles	  Murray	  and	  his	  publications	  such	  as	  Losing	  
Ground	   (1989).	   Murray	   blamed	   lone-­‐parent	   families,	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   what	   he	   termed	   ‘the	  
underclass’,	  for	  the	  increase	  in	  crime	  rates	  and	  a	  growing	  dependency	  on	  the	  welfare	  state.	  This	  was	  
consistent	  with	  the	  period	  which	  saw	  a	  move	  towards	  right-­‐wing	  rhetoric	  and	  a	  discourse	  of	  ‘blame’	  
emerging.	   Murray	   claimed	   that	   the	   easy	   accessibility	   of	   benefits	   was	   militating	   against	   social	  
responsibility	   and	   corrupting	   the	   moral	   values	   of	   a	   section	   within	   society,	   creating	   a	   class	   (or	  
underclass)	  that	  was	  morally	  and	  socially	  delinquent	  and	  which	  was	  in	  turn	  having	  a	  negative	  impact	  
on	   British	   society:	   “…they	   live	   in	   a	   different	   world	   from	   other	   Britons,	   and	   their	   values	   are	   now	  
contaminating	  the	  life	  of	  entire	  neighbourhoods.”	  (Murray,	  1989,	  4).	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   These	   views	   began	   altering	   the	   political	   landscape	   by	   influencing	   many	   within	   the	  
Conservative	  Government,	  and	  in	  turn	  affected	  the	  frame	  through	  which	  they	  viewed	  lone	  parents.	  
By	   Thatcher’s	   third	   term,	   as	   attention	   turned	   towards	   social	   policy,	   these	   right-­‐wing	   views	   had	  
permeated	  much	  of	  the	  Conservative	  Cabinet.	  	  
We	   can	   also	   see	   that	   right-­‐wing	   rhetoric	   and	   ‘blame	   culture’	   began	   to	   seep	   into	   the	  
mainstream	   media.	   Newspapers	   such	   as	   The	   Daily	   Telegraph	   and	   The	   Times	   similarly	   began	   to	  
suggest	   a	   link	   between	   lone-­‐parenthood	   and	   the	   development	   of	   an	   ‘underclass’	   and	   so	   called	  
‘moral	   breakdown’.	   For	   example,	  The	   Sunday	   Times	   published	   an	   article	   by	  Charles	  Murray	  on	  26	  
November	  1989	  which	  stated	  that	  the	  ‘underclass’	  (those	  who	  saw	  no	  point	  in	  working	  and	  lived	  on	  
welfare)	  were	  spawning	  illegitimate	  children,	  which	  in	  turn	  was	   increasing	  the	  crime	  rate,	  having	  a	  
negative	  impact	  on	  society,	  and	  creating	  a	  cycle	  of	  deprivation	  that	  would	  continue	  for	  generations.	  
Sections	   of	   the	  media	   started	   to	   portray	   lone	   parents	   as	   stereotypical	   teenage	  mothers	   living	   on	  
council	  estates	  without	  the	  support	  of	  the	  child’s	  father	  and	  content	  to	  be	  dependent	  on	  the	  welfare	  
state	  for	  ‘hand	  outs’.	  
2.6.	  Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  has	  ‘set	  the	  scene’	  in	  which	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  was	  drafted.	  	  As	  we	  can	  
see,	   the	   period	   preceding	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   was	   one	   of	   considerable	  
change.	   This	   is	   not	   only	  marked	   by	   the	   statistical	   indicators	   that	   highlighted	   an	   increase	   in	   lone-­‐
parents,	   their	   altering	   characteristics,	   and	   increased	   reliance	   on	   the	  welfare	   state,	   but	   also	   a	   vast	  
change	   in	   approach	   to	   politics	   and	   policy	  making	   with	   the	   spread	   of	   New	   Right	   ideas	   within	   the	  
Government	   and	   popular	   press.	   Both	   these	   developments	   fed	   into	   the	   how	   the	   ‘problem’	   was	  
defined,	   how	   the	   policy	   was	   represented,	   and	   subsequently,	   the	   methods	   policymakers	   used	   to	  
ensure	  the	  Act	  was	  successfully	  passed.	  Having	  set	  the	  scene,	  Chapter	  Three	  will	  then	  focus	  on	  the	  
‘problem	   definition’	   stage	   of	   the	   policy	   process	   cycle,	   assessing	   the	   importance	   and	   power	   of	  
‘problem	  representations’	  and	  ‘problem	  definition’.	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Chapter	  Three	  -­‐	  Problem	  Definition	  
3.1	   Introduction	  	  
	  Having	   set	   the	   scene	   in	   the	   preceding	   chapter,	   this	   chapter	   will	   focus	   on	   the	   ‘problem	  
definition’	   stage	  of	   the	  policy	  process	   cycle.	   It	  begins	  by	  providing	  an	   introduction	   to	   the	   study	  of	  
problem	  definition,	  before	  highlighting	  how	  we	  can	  make	  use	  of	  the	  insights	  gained	  from	  studies	  to	  
then	  analyse	  the	  policy	  frames	  and	  resulting	  definitions	  of	  several	  of	  the	  interested	  actors.	  It	  asserts	  
that	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  was	  born	  from	  three	  definitions	  of	  a	  ‘problem’	  and	  
three	   frames.	  The	  Chapter	   then	  examines	   the	   importance	  of	  viewing	   ‘problem	  representations’	  as	  
something	   separate	   to	   that	   of	   ‘problem	   definition’.	   It	   highlights	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   two	  
terms	  before	  looking	  at	  the	  power	  of	  problem	  representation	  and	  how	  language	  is	  skilfully	  utilised	  
as	  a	  tool,	  before	  finishing	  by	  highlighting	   its	  role	   in	  the	  political	  sphere,	  the	  policy	  making	  process,	  
and	  in	  policy	  failure.	  	  
	  
3.2	  Problem	  Definition:	  An	  Introduction	  
Problems	   do	   not	   reflect	   an	   a	   priori	   reality;	   they	   are	   instead	   a	   construction	   by	   interested	  
actors	   promoting	   a	   particular	   agenda.	   This	   approach,	   that	   there	   is	   no	   such	   thing	   as	   an	   innate	  
problem,	   is	   a	   constructivist	   viewpoint.	   As	   Dery	   highlights,	   ‘the	   very	   notion	   of	   problem	   definition	  
suggests	   a	   constructionist	   view,	   that	   is,	   problems	  do	  not	   exist	   “out	   there”;	   they	   are	  not	   objective	  
entities	   in	   their	  own	   right’	  but	  are	   rather	   ‘the	  product	  of	   imposing	  certain	   frames	  of	   reference	  on	  
reality’	   (1984,	   4).	   Spector	   and	   Kitsuse,	   two	   of	   the	   founders	   of	   the	   constructionist	   approach	   to	  
problem	   definition,	   labelled	   those	   involved	   in	   the	   problem	   definition	   process	   as	   ‘claim	   makers’	  
(1977,	  88).	  	  	  	  
	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  the	  benefits	  of	  approaching	  the	  study	  of	  public	  policy	  from	  a	  
constructionist	   or	   post-­‐modernist	   stance	   are	   vast.	   If	   we	   were	   to	   maintain	   an	   empirical/objective	  
approach,	  our	  understanding	  would	  be	  extremely	  limited	  and	  naïve.	  It	  should	  be	  highlighted	  that	  the	  
emphasis,	  and	  often	  purpose,	  of	  those	  approaching	  problem	  definition	  from	  an	  empiricist/objectivist	  
approach	  is	  somewhat	  different	  to	  that	  of	  a	  constructivist.	  	  Empiricism/objectivism	  aims	  explicitly	  to	  
describe	   the	   trends	   and	   development	   of	   a	   certain	   phenomenon,	   whereas	   constructivism	   aims	   to	  
understand	   the	   underlying	   reasons	   and	   processes	   behind	   why	   and	   how	   a	   certain	   issue	   is	   being	  
labelled	   as	   a	   ‘problem’	  warranting	   action.	   Therefore	   the	  material	   that	   this	   thesis	   utilises,	   and	   the	  
literature	   from	  which	   it	  draws	  upon	   to	  establish	  an	  understanding,	   is	  viewed	   from	  a	  constructivist	  
approach.	  The	  social	  constructivist	  literature	  highlights	  the	  integral	  connection	  between	  power	  and	  
problem	   definition,	  while	   a	   post-­‐modern	   approach	   focuses	   on	   examining	   the	   hidden	   assumptions	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within	  a	  phenomenon,	   therefore	  placing	  concern	  on	   ‘deconstructing’	   the	   subject	  or	  definition	  and	  
analysing	  its	  discourse.	  	  
The	   literature	  associated	  with	  problem	  definition	   can	  be	   found	   in	  a	  number	  of	  disciplines,	  
each	  with	  a	  different	  slant	  and	  emphasis.	  The	  way	   in	  which	  we	  examine	  problem	  definition	  within	  
policy	   analysis	   has	   undergone	   an	   evolution,	   moving	   from	   its	   origins	   in	   positivism,	   through	   social	  
construction	   and	   onto	   post-­‐modern	   and	   post-­‐positivist	   approaches.	   The	   evolution	   of	   our	  
understanding	   has	   enriched	   our	   knowledge	   base	   and	   widened	   the	   areas	   in	   which	   we	   examine	  
problem	  definition,	  allowing	  for	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  roots	  and	  underpinnings	  to	  problem	  
definition	  in	  particular	  circumstances.	  	  
How	  an	  issue	  is	  defined	  is	  of	  central	  importance.	  As	  stated	  above,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  the	  
‘problems’	  do	  not	  simply	  exist	  ‘out	  there	  in	  the	  real	  world’	  waiting	  to	  be	  identified	  by	  an	  observant	  
passer-­‐by.	  Instead,	  they	  are	  strategic	  constructs	  created	  through	  conceptual	  lenses	  (Rein	  and	  Schon,	  
1977;	   Wildavsky,	   1979;	   Lindblom	   and	   Cohen,	   1979;	   Schon,	   1983;	   Dunn,	   1988;	   Weiss,	   1989).	  
Problems	  are	  highly	  normative;	  we	  declare	  an	   issue	   to	  be	  a	   ‘problem’	  based	  on	  our	  moral	  beliefs,	  
norms	   and	   values,	   and	   assumptions	   about	   what	   ought	   to	   be.	   Problems	   are	   products	   of	   our	  
judgement,	   and	   how	   we	   define	   a	   problem	   also	   depends	   on	   what	   frame	   we	   approach	   an	   issue	  
through.	  As	  Hogwood	  and	  Gunn	  state	   ‘we	  each	  create	  our	  own	  ‘reality’,	  and	  this	   is	  nowhere	  more	  
accurate	   than	   in	   the	  way	  we	   identify	   ‘problems’	   or	   ‘issues’,	   and	   interpret	   and	   relate	   them	   to	   our	  
mental	  map	  of	  some	  larger	  situation.’	  (1984,	  109).	  This	  highlights	  that	  we	  cannot	  simply	  state	  that	  X	  
was	  the	  problem,	  and	  Y	  was	  the	  policy	  aimed	  to	  tackle	  that	  problem.	  Instead	  we	  need	  to	  assess,	  and	  
then	  understand,	  why	  X	  and	  Y	  were	  labelled	  in	  such	  a	  way.	  	  
3.3	  ‘Problem’	  Representation	  
How	  an	  issue	  is	  presented	  in	  the	  policy	  process	  is	  also	  of	  high	  importance,	  yet	  is	  sometimes	  
taken	  for	  granted	  in	  policy	  analysis.	  	  We	  must	  not	  limit	  our	  understanding	  by	  only	  acknowledging	  the	  
problems	  and	  policies	  which	  are	  defined	  by	  political	  actors,	  but	  delve	  and	  look	  at	  the	  power	  behind	  
problem	  definition,	   and	   then	  problem	   representation.	  Not	  only	   is	   it	   vital	   that	  we	  understand	   that	  
problems	  are	  constructed,	  but	  also	  ‘how’	  and	  ‘why’	  they	  are	  constructed	  in	  that	  way.	  Hogwood	  and	  
Gunn	   state	   that	   ‘who	   defines	   it	   decides	   it’	   (1984,	   114).	  Whilst	   this	   is	   accurate,	   the	   complexity	   of	  
problem	  definition	  actually	  penetrates	  deeper.	  The	  process	  of	  constructing	  a	  problem	  can	  be	  more	  
manipulative;	  actors	  may	  see	  the	  benefits	  of	  constructing	  a	  problem	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  in	  order	  to	  get	  
support	  for	  the	  policy,	  yet	  this	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  what	  they	  internally	  perceive	  the	  ‘problem’	  to	  
be.	   As	   Rochefort	   and	   Cobb	   highlight,	   ‘issue	   definition	   and	   redefinition	   can	   serve	   as	   tools	   used	   by	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opposing	  sides	  to	  gain	  advantage’	  (1994,	  5).	  Therefore,	  we	  not	  only	  have	  to	  look	  at	  how	  the	  problem	  
was	  constructed,	  but	  also	  what	  was	  the	  value	  or	  advantage	  gained	  from	  constructing	  it	  in	  such	  way.	  
We	  need	  to	  move	  beyond	  simply	  analysing	  problem	  definition	  (why	  something	  is	  defined	  as	  
a	   ‘problem’	   depending	   on	   someone’s	   conceptual	   lens),	   to	   understanding	   also	   the	   importance	   of	  
‘problem	  representation’	  (how	  and	  why	  a	  problem	  is	  represented	  in	  a	  certain	  way).	  When	  we	  look	  
closely	  we	  will	  see	  that	  how	  a	  problem	  is	  defined	  by	  an	  individual	  or	  a	  group	  is	  not	  necessary	  what	  it	  
is	   represented	  as.	  How	  a	  policy	   is	   represented	   is	  a	   strategic	   tool	  used	  by	   those	  holding	   the	  power	  
strings	  and	  is	  frequently	  adapted	  throughout	  the	  policy	  process	  in	  order	  to	  win	  support	  for	  a	  policy.	  
As	  Bacchi	  states:	  ‘A	  necessary	  part	  of	  policy	  analysis	  hence	  includes	  identification	  and	  assessment	  of	  
problem	   representation,	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   ‘problems’	   get	   represented	   in	  policy	  proposals’	   (2010,	  
263).	   An	   actor’s	   definition	   of	   a	   problem	   is	   something	   that	   is	   static	   and	  will	   typically	   only	   change	  
when	   he	   or	   she	   has	   undergone	   a	   change	   of	   moral	   stance,	   whilst	   problem	   representation	   is	  
something	   that	   is	   fluid	   and	   adaptable	   throughout	   the	   policy	  making	   process	   as	   actors	   frequently	  
alter	   the	   way	   they	   represent	   a	   problem	   depending	   on	   audience	   and	   political	   circumstances.	   As	  
Bacchi	   highlights,	   ‘we	  need	   to	   keep	  open	   the	  possibility	   that	   a	  particular	   representation	  has	  been	  
selected	  for	  purely	  instrumental	  reasons,	  to	  achieve	  a	  particular	  goal,	  and	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
values	  of	   the	  one	  making	   the	   representation’	   (1999,	  10).	   It	   is	   therefore	  more	  accurate	   to	   refer	   to	  
‘Issue	   Identification’,	   ‘Problem	   Representation’	   and	   ‘Problem	   Definition’	   as	   separate	   elements.	  	  
‘Issue	   Definition’	   involves	   an	   acknowledgement	   of	   an	   issue,	   	   ‘Problem	   Definition’	   is	   an	   internal	  
process	   of	   placing	   the	   identified	   issue	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   individuals	   core	   values,	   norms	   and	  
beliefs,	  and	  then	  attaching	  a	  theory	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  to	  the	  issue.	  ‘Problem	  Representation’	  refers	  
to	   how	   the	   ‘problem’	   is	   represented	   externally,	   the	   created	   image	   of	   the	   issue.	   The	   below	   figure	  





















In	   his	   book	   The	   Art	   of	   Political	   Manipulation	   (1986),	   Riker	   describes	   policy-­‐makers	   as	  
strategic	  architects	  that	  sculpture	  a	  ‘problem’	  and	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  debate	  in	  order	  to	  win	  
support.	  Riker	  puts	  forward	  an	  example	  of	  a	  US	  Senator	  who	  is	  opposed	  to	  plans	  to	  dispose	  of	  nerve	  
gas	  in	  his	  state.	  Aware	  that	  other	  Senators	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  support	  his	  rejection	  of	  the	  proposal	  
(as	  they	  would	  be	  comforted	  in	  the	  knowledge	  that	  their	  state	  was	  not	  chosen),	  the	  Senator	  realised	  
that	   in	   order	   to	   win	   support	   for	   what	   he	   saw	   as	   a	   ‘problem’	   he	   needed	   to	   redefine	   the	   issue.	  
Therefore	  whilst	  his	  private	  ‘problem	  definition’	  was	  that	  of	  the	  disposal	  of	  nerve	  gas	  in	  his	  state,	  his	  
public	   ‘problem	   representation’	   has	   to	   mask	   his	   beliefs	   and	   be	   worded	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   will	  
increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  support	  (see	  Figure	  3.2).	  
In	  this	  case,	  Riker	  shows	  that	  the	  Senator	  represented	  the	  issue	  as	  one	  of	  power	  and	  duty	  –	  
one	   that	   played	   up	   the	   Senate’s	   willingness	   to	   ratify	   treaties	   that	   were	   presented	   by	   a	   ‘power-­‐
grabbing	   executive	   branch’.	   	   Baumgartner	   and	   Jones	   refers	   to	   this	   as	   ‘strategic	   issue	   redefinition’	  
(1994,	   54).	  As	   a	   result	   of	   his	   strategic	   representation	   the	   Senator	  was	   able	   to	  win	   support	   for	   his	  
attempt	  to	  reject	  the	  plan.	  Had	  the	  Senator	  represented	  the	  problem	  as	  he	  has	  internally	  defined	  it,	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This	  shows	  that	  problem	  representation,	  and	  strategic	   issue	  re-­‐definition,	  are	  powerful	   tools	  
that	   need	   careful	   consideration	  when	   analysing	   the	   policy	  making	   process.	   It	   is	   not	   just	   ‘why’	   or	  
‘how’	  an	  individual	  comes	  to	  define	  an	  issue	  as	  a	  problem	  based	  on	  their	  norms	  and	  values,	  but	  it	  is	  
also	  ‘how’	  they	  come	  to	  represent	  an	  issue	  based	  on	  any	  strategic	  plan	  they	  are	  utilising.	  Often	  (but	  
not	   always)	   these	   two	   aspects	   are	   separate.	   As	   Baumgartner	   and	   Jones	   neatly	   summarise	  
‘policymakers	   seeking	   particular	   policy	   outcomes	   attempt	   to	   redefine	   issues	   to	   suit	   their	   needs,	  
taking	   advantage	   of	   circumstances	   as	   they	   can’	   (1994,	   54),	   an	   observation	   endorsed	   by	   Kindgon	  
(1994,	   54)	   when	   he	   shows	   that	   redefinitions	   often	   involve	   attachments	   of	   new	   solutions	   to	   pre-­‐
existing	  ‘problems’.	  (This	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Four,	  which	  looks	  particularly	  at	  
Kingdon’s	  idea	  of	  ‘Policy	  Windows’.)	  
An	  element	  often	  linked	  with	  problem	  representation	  is	  framing.	  Whilst	  the	  two	  concepts	  are	  
similar,	  we	  must	  note	  their	  differences.	  Frames	  or	  conceptual	  lenses	  are	  tools	  of	  definition.	  They	  are	  
the	   way	   in	   which	   actors	   approach	   and	   attach	   meaning	   to	   an	   issue	   or	   set	   of	   circumstances	   (See	  
Fischer	  2003;	  Rein	  and	  Schön	  1993,	  1994).	  Frames	  act	  as	  a	  means	  to	  contain	  information	  around	  a	  
particular	  theme.	  It	   is	  both	  the	  way	  in	  which	  actors	  view	  an	  issue	  and	  how	  they	  communicate	  that	  
perspective	  to	  others;	  in	  effect,	  their	  ‘way	  of	  seeing’.	  An	  actor	  organises	  and	  locates	  an	  issue	  inside	  
their	  conceptual	  lenses	  before	  then	  attaching	  a	  discourse	  through	  which	  the	  issue	  is	  to	  be	  discussed.	  
Frames	  are	  in	  effect	  boundaries	  through	  which	  an	  actor	  interprets	  a	  set	  of	  circumstances	  based	  on	  
an	  actor’s	  norms	  and	  values,	  interests,	  and	  agenda.	  	  
However,	  framing	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  synonymous	  with	  strategic	  problem	  representation	  as	  
discussed	  above.	  Framing	  is	  not	  akin	  to	  ‘spinning	  the	  facts’	  or	  deceivingly	  emphasizing	  a	  false	  line	  of	  
Issue	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thought	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  goal;	  instead	  it	  is	  placing	  more	  emphasis	  upon	  one	  element	  of	  an	  issue	  
than	  another.	  For	  example,	  actors	  who	  have	  concerns	  about	   the	  economic	   impact	  of	   international	  
aid	  will	  portray	  the	  issue	  in	  economic	  terms	  –	  this	   is	  framing.	  Whereas	  if	  the	  real	  concern	  of	  those	  
actors	  was	  a	  ‘dislike	  of	  foreigners’,	  yet	  they	  emphasized	  publically	  economic	  concerns,	  this	  would	  be	  
strategic	   representation.	   Framing	   is	   portraying	   an	   issue	   within	   a	   particular	   set	   of	   boundaries,	  
whereas	  representation	  is	  the	  act	  of	  deliberately	  falsifying	  one’s	  frame	  to	  conceal	  true	  motives.	  
	  
3.4	  	   The	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act:	   Multiple	   ‘Problems’,	   Different	   Frames,	   and	   False	  
Representations	  	  
Definitions	   and	   representations	   of	   problems	   are	   neither	   static	   nor	   concrete;	   they	   are	  
continually	  evolving	  to	  suit	  many	  different	  factors.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  we	  can	  
identify	   three	   ‘problems’,	   each	  of	   them	   focusing	  on	  different	   issues	  and	  developed	   from	  different	  
frames	   and	   conceptual	   lenses,	   and	   held,	   or	   portrayed	   by	   different	   actors.	   We	   will	   also	   see	   that	  
problem	   definition	   is	   a	   thread	   that	   runs,	   and	   develops	   throughout	   the	   policy	   process.	   During	   the	  
formation	   and	   passage	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Bill,	   different	   approaches	   and	   frames	   to	   the	  
problem	   were	   emphasised	   at	   different	   stages	   by	   different	   actors.	   Below	   will	   delineate	   the	   three	  
alternative	   frames:	   those	  who	  believed	  the	  current	  child	  maintenance	  system	  was	  not	  working	   for	  
both	  lone	  parents,	  and	  the	  state;	  those	  who	  emphasized	  the	  ‘negative’	  social	  and	  moral	  impact	  of	  an	  
increase	   in	   lone-­‐parents;	   and	   those	   who	   were	   motivated	   primarily	   by	   a	   desire	   to	   reduce	   public	  
expenditure.	   	  The	  end	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  highlight	  the	  significance,	  and	  danger,	  of	  having	  multiple	  
frames	  and	  definitions	  of	  a	  problem	   in	   the	   formation	  of	  a	  policy,	  and	  how	  these	  might	  contribute	  
towards	  policy	  failure.	  
3.4.1 A	  System	  in	  Need	  of	  Change	  
The	  White	  Paper	  Children	  Come	  First	  was	  published	  on	  29	  October	  1990,	  and	  proclaimed	  the	  
need	  for	  reform	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  erstwhile	  child	  maintenance	  system	  was	  ‘fragmented,	  uncertain	  
in	  its	  results,	  slow	  and	  ineffective’	  (Department	  of	  Social	  Security,	  CM.	  1263,	  1990,	  1).	  	  It	  was	  widely	  
recognised	   that	   the	   system	  was	   in	   clear	   need	   of	   improvement	   and	   reform.	   	   It	   was	   deemed	   both	  
inadequate	   in	   achieving	   a	   sufficient	   system	   of	   child	  maintenance	   for	   the	   lone	   parent,	   and	   highly	  
exploitive	  of	  the	  state	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  heavy	  burden	  on	  public	  expenditure.	  The	  main	  reason	  behind	  
this	  dual	   inadequacy	  was	  that	  the	  court	  system	  was	  largely	  unsuccessful	   in	  delivering	  maintenance	  
effectively;	  in	  1989	  only	  22	  per	  cent	  of	  Income	  Support	  claimants	  were	  receiving	  maintenance,	  and	  
only	  30	  per	  cent	  of	  lone	  parents	  in	  total	  (Bradshaw	  and	  Millar,	  1991,	  78).	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  In	  cases	  where	  a	  maintenance	  arrangement	  was	  achieved,	  the	  payments	  were	  irregular	  and	  
insufficient.	   The	   system	   through	   the	   courts	   was	   proving	   to	   be	   highly	   problematic,	   as	   research	  
commissioned	  by	  the	  then	  Department	  of	  Social	  Security	  (DSS)	  discovered:	  	  
…not	  all	  women	  receive	  awards,	  the	  awards	  made	  are	  low…many	  awards	  are	  not	  
paid	  or	  paid	  irregularly,	  awards	  are	  not	  increased	  over	  time	  and	  the	  arrangements	  
for	  enforcing	  maintenance	  are	  often	  not	  used	  and	  are	  unsatisfactory.	   (Bradshaw	  
and	  Millar,	  1991,	  78).	  	  
	   As	  the	  system	  was	  largely	  based	  on	  the	  discretion	  of	  hundreds	  of	  individual	  courts	  and	  DSS	  
offices	   throughout	   Britain,	   the	   outcomes	   were	   extremely	   inconsistent.	   The	   court	   system	   also	  
enabled	   maintenance	   payments	   to	   fall	   into	   arrears,	   whereupon	   the	   parent	   ‘with	   care’	   was	   left	  
without	   maintenance	   and	   the	   outstanding	   monies	   were	   never	   recovered	   (Garnham	   and	   Knights,	  
1994,	  21).	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  system	  was	  unable	  to	  gather	  any	  maintenance	  from	  the	  absent	  parent,	  
leading	  a	  Senior	  Minister	  in	  the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet	  (Minister	  A)	  to	  state	  that,	  ‘an	  order	  was	  just	  a	  piece	  
of	   paper,	   it	   doesn’t	   do	   you	   any	   good	  when	   you	   need	  money	  –	   you	   can’t	   bank	   it!’	   (interviewed	  by	  
author	  on	  19	  July	  2011).	  Inside	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor’s	  Office,	  a	  compelling	  motive	  for	  change	  was	  the	  
notion	  that	  the	  existing	  system	  was	  devoid	  of	  justice	  (Interviewed	  by	  author	  on	  19	  July	  2011).	  
	   Handling	  maintenance	   claims	   in	   local	  DSS	  offices	  was	   the	   responsibility	   of	   Liable	  Relatives	  
Officers,	  a	  system	  which	  was	  extremely	  weak	  and	  ineffective.	  This	  was	  largely	  due	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  
the	  amount	  of	  staff	   time	  devoted	  to	  tracing	  absent	  parents	  and	  obtaining	  maintenance	  payments.	  
Between	  1981	  and	  1988,	  staff	  numbers	  fell	  by	  a	  third	  from	  2,356	  in	  1981	  to	  1,578	  in	  1988	  (National	  
Audit	  Office,	  1990,	  5).	  Bradshaw	  and	  Millar	  also	  noted	  that	  Liable	  Relatives	  Officers	  were	  under	  great	  
pressure,	  over-­‐worked,	  and	  frequently	  reallocated	  around	  the	  Department	  to	  carry	  out	  other	  benefit	  
related	  tasks	  (1991,	  79).	  The	  administration	  of	  the	  system	  was	  also	  inefficient,	  time-­‐consuming,	  and	  
often	  without	  reward.	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  compulsory	  element	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  benefit	  penalty	  meant	  
that	  co-­‐operation	  with	  the	  system	  was	  low.	  	  The	  circumstances	  in	  Britain	  at	  the	  time	  further	  reduced	  
the	   success	   of	   Liable	   Relatives	  Officers;	   the	   1980s	   saw	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   unemployed	  
absent	  parents	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  never-­‐married	  lone	  parents	  –	  factors	  which	  meant	  
that	   Liable	   Relatives	   Officers	   were	   increasingly	   unable	   to	   track	   absent	   parents,	   and	   secure	  
maintenance	  payments.	  
	   The	   court	   system	  was	   also	   highly	   exploitative	   towards	   the	   state,	   reaping	  money	   from	   the	  
welfare	  state	  and	  accumulating	  a	  high	  legal-­‐aid	  bill.	  Prior	  to	  the	  -­‐Child	  Support	  Act,	  settlements	  were	  
highly	  expensive	  for	  the	  state	  due	  to	  the	  ‘benefit	  efficiency’	  approach	  often	  taken	  by	  the	  lawyer.	  The	  
courts	  would	  frequently	  listen	  to	  lawyers	  attempting	  to	  balance	  the	  payments	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	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parent	   with	   care	   could	   maximise	   their	   benefits	   from	   social	   security,	   thus	   reducing	   the	   amount	  
required	   from	   the	   absent	   parent.	   A	   then	  Minister	   in	   the	   Thatcher	   Cabinet	   deplored	   the	   method	  
often	   taken	   by	   lawyers	   and	   the	   court	   to	   arrive	   at	   maintenance	   arrangements	   claiming	   that:	   ‘the	  
courts	   lent	   themselves	   to	   this,	   [lawyers]	  used	  to	  say	  how	  much	  benefit	  do	  you	  get	  and	  how	  much	  
can	   you	   get	   out	   of	   the	   system	   and	   then	   [the	   courts]	   would	   award	  maintenance	   taking	   that	   into	  
consideration’	   (Minister	   B,	   interviewed	   by	   author	   on	   19	   July	   2011).	   In	   effect	   Britain	   had	   a	   highly	  
inefficient	   and	   costly	   publically-­‐funded	   system	  which	   produced	   inadequate	   private	   arrangements,	  
and	  which	  exploited	  the	  resources	  of	   the	  welfare	  state.	  The	   failing	  system	  created	  a	  solid	  case	   for	  
change	  and	  fuelled	  an	  attempt	  to	  produce	  a	  fair	  and	  reliable	  child	  maintenance	  system	  that	  would	  
benefit	   the	   lone	   parent,	   the	   child,	   and	   the	   tax	   payer.	   This	   was	   the	   frame,	   and	   ‘problem	  
identification’,	  that	  was	  held	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Social	  Security	  and	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor’s	  Office.	  
3.4.2 Feckless	  Fathers	  and	  the	  Demonization	  of	  Lone	  Parents	  
During	   the	  1980s,	   statistics	   showed	   that	  Britain	  was	  witnessing	  a	   rise	   in	   lone	  parents,	   and	  
perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  proportion	  dependent	  on	  means-­‐tested	  benefits.	  The	  
number	  of	   lone-­‐parent	   families	   in	   receipt	  of	   state	  benefit	   increased	  by	  86	  per	   cent	   between	  1981	  
and	  1988,	  yet	   the	  proportion	   receiving	   regular	  maintenance	  had	   fallen	   from	  50	  per	  cent	   to	  23	  per	  
cent	   (NAO,	  1990,	  5).	  By	  1988,	  only	  eight	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  supporting	   lone-­‐parent	  families	  on	  
benefit	   was	   recovered	   from	   absent	   parents	   and	   benefits	   expenditure	   on	   loan	   parents	   grew	   from	  
£2.4	  billion	  during	  1978/79	   to	  £6.6	  billion	  during	  1990/91	   (Bradshaw	  and	  Millar,	   1991,	   78).	   These	  
indicators	  encouraged	  the	  Conservative	  Government	  to	  perceive	  the	  child	  maintenance	  system	  as	  a	  
problem.	  Social	  changes	  pushed	  child	  maintenance	  reform	  back	  onto	  the	  institutional	  policy	  agenda.	  
Here	  we	  witness	  the	  close	  relationship	  between	  indicators	  and	  ideology.	  As	  stated	  above,	  problems	  
are	  socially	  constructed;	  policy-­‐makers	  make	  judgements	  regarding	  a	  set	  of	  indicators	  based	  on	  their	  
dominant	   values,	   norms	   and	   beliefs	   –	   indicators	   themselves	   do	   not	   declare	   an	   issue	   to	   be	   a	  
‘problem’.	   These	   social	   indicators	   conflicted	  with	   the	   Conservatives’	   ‘macro’	   level	   ideals,	   those	   of	  
neo-­‐liberalism	   and	   individualism,	   in	   two	   ways:	   the	   ideal	   of	   ‘family	   values’	   and	   self-­‐reliance	   was	  
threatened	  and	  an	   increasing	   social	   security	  budget	  was	   seen	  as	  an	  unjust	  drain	  on	  state	   finances	  
and,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  tax-­‐payer	  –	  the	  ‘moral	  majority’.	  
Statistics	  showing	  the	  increase	  in	  lone	  parents	  and	  unmarried	  mothers	  produced	  something	  
of	  a	  moral	  panic,	  and	  seemingly	  exemplified	  the	  views	  of	  Charles	  Murray;	  socio-­‐demographic	  trends	  
went	   against	   normative	   views	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   family.	   According	   to	   Murray,	   the	   welfare	  
system	  was	  increasingly	  to	  blame	  for	  encouraging	  lone	  parenthood,	  by	  making	  life	  as	  a	  lone	  parent	  
on	  benefit	  financially	  viable	  and	  attractive	  lifestyle	  choice.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  ‘these	  women’	  
were	  socialising	  their	  children	  into	  accepting	  a	  dependency	  on	  welfare	  and	  therefore	  creating	  a	  cycle	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of	  dependency.	  Murray	  also	  condemned	  the	  sexual	  irresponsibility	  of	  young	  men	  for	  fuelling	  juvenile	  
delinquency.	  His	  reasoning	  was	  that	  by	  denying	  their	  children,	  especially	  sons,	  a	  working	  male	  role	  
model	   in	   the	   household,	   they	   were	   increasing	   the	   chance	   that	   those	   children	   would	   succumb	   to	  
crime,	  as	  adolescent	  males	  looked	  to	  local	  gangs	  and	  their	  leaders	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  father	  figure	  
at	   home.	   Murray	   believed	   that	   the	   traditional	   nuclear	   family	   crucially	   socialised	   children	   into	  
appropriate	   behaviour	   and	   roles,	   with	   boys	   learning	   the	   importance	   of	   work	   as	   the	   means	   of	  
financially	   supporting	  wife/mother	  and	  children.	  Furthermore,	  within	   this	   sexual	  division	  of	   labour	  
and	  allegedly	  innate	  gender	  roles,	  fathers	  provided	  the	  main	  source	  of	  authority	  and	  discipline,	  while	  
mothers	  were	   the	  primary	  providers	  of	   love	  and	  affection.	  Without	  a	   father,	   therefore,	  boys	  were	  
more	   likely	   to	   become	   undisciplined	   and	   develop	   behavioural	   problems	   in	   adolescence	   (Murray,	  
1990).	  	  
Murray’s	  critique	  encouraged	  many	  senior	  figures	  within	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  to	  seek	  to	  
tackle	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   ‘underclass’.	   Lone-­‐parent	   families	   became	   the	   focus	   of	   many	   of	   the	  
concerns	  surrounding	  the	  erosion	  of	   family	  values	  and	   its	  detrimental	   impact	  on	  society.	  As	  Ridley	  
austerely	  stated,	  ‘single	  parents	  were	  free-­‐riders	  on	  the	  system,	  directly	  exploiting	  the	  dependency	  
culture’	   (1991,	   91).	   The	   Conservative	   Government’s	   predominant	   ideology	   was	   identifying	   the	  
current	  system	  as	  a	  problem.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  that	  many	  Conservatives	  began	  to	  look	  for	  ways	  
to	  tackle	  the	  ‘problem’	  of	  lone-­‐parents,	  many	  of	  which	  they	  thought	  were	  encouraged	  to	  actively	  get	  
pregnant	  outside	  of	  wedlock	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  being	  dependent	  on	  the	  state.	  In	  a	  lecture	  to	  the	  
National	   Children’s	   Homes	   in	   January	   1990,	   Thatcher	   emphasised	   parents’	   obligation	   to	   their	  
children	  and	  stated	  that,	  ‘No	  father	  should	  be	  able	  to	  escape	  from	  his	  responsibility	  and	  that	  is	  why	  
the	   Government	   is	   looking	   at	   ways	   of	   strengthening	   the	   system	   for	   tracing	   an	   absent	   father	   and	  
making	  the	  arrangements	  for	  recovering	  maintenance	  more	  effective’	  (Thatcher,	  1990).	  	  
According	   to	   this	  definition	  of	   the	  problem,	   the	  blame	   lies	  with	   the	   ‘irresponsible	  mother’	  
and	   ‘feckless	   father’,	  both	  of	  which	  were	  products	  of	   the	   ‘underclass’.	  What	  we	  have	  seen	  here	   is	  
the	   demonization	  of	   lone	  parents	  with	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   the	   ‘underclass’	   closely	   attached.	  What	  we	  
should	  note	  is	  the	  change	  in	  views	  towards	  lone	  parents	  during	  the	  period	  1970-­‐1990.	  Millar	  (1996)	  
highlights	  that	  the	  perception	  people	  held	  towards	  lone	  parenthood	  in	  the	  1970s	  was	  one	  of	  poverty	  
(see	  also:	  Macaskill1993;	  Mackay	  et	  al,	  1972;	  Bradshaw	  and	  Millar,	  1991).	  At	  this	  point	  single	  parents	  
were	  not	  viewed	  upon	  as	  immoral	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  vulnerable	  sector	  of	  the	  society	  that	  were	  at	  risk	  at	  
falling	  below	  the	  poverty	   line.	  Concern	  regarding	  potential	  deprivation	  was	  shown	  to	   lone-­‐parents	  
rather	  than	  attaching	  blame	  to	  them.	  (Glendinning	  and	  Miller,	  1992;	  NCOPF,	  1977;	  Townsend,	  1979).	  
Yet	  by	  the	  late	  1980s,	  attitudes	  towards	  lone-­‐parents	  had	  been	  radically	  transformed	  (amongst	  the	  
majority	   of	   the	   governing	   Party);	   concern	   for	   the	   plight	   of	   lone	   parents	   had	   been	   replaced	   with	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anxiety	   about	   moral	   decline	   and	   the	   undeserving	   poor.	   The	   perception	   of	   lone	   mothers	   as	   the	  
vulnerable	  females	  escaping	  an	  abusive	  relationship	  had	  been	  replaced	  with	  a	  perception	  of	  young	  
women	  making	  a	  conscious	  decision	  to	  get	  pregnant	  in	  order	  to	  willingly	  and	  fully	  ‘live	  off	  the	  state’;	  
a	  lifestyle	  choice.	  	  
Akin	  to	  this	  newly	  developed	  perception	  of	  lone	  mothers	  there	  was	  also	  the	  demonization	  of	  
young	   ‘underclass	  men’,	  who	   irresponsibly	   impregnated	  women	  yet	  had	  no	   intention	   to	   stay	  with	  
the	  mother	  or	  provide	  any	  emotional	  or	  financial	  support	  to	  them	  and	  their	  child.	  These	  views	  were	  
largely	   a	   result	   of	   the	   changing	   political	   ideology	   of	   the	   Conservative	   Party	   under	   Thatcher	   (with	  
economic	   liberalism	   being	   accompanied	   by	   a	   strong	   strand	   of	   moral	   absolutism	   and	   social	  
authoritarianism),	   and	   the	   impact	   of	   both	   the	   writings	   of	   authors	   such	   as	   Charles	  Murray,	   and	   a	  
desire	   to	   imitate	   America	   with	   a	   New	   Right	   stance.	   These	   views	   had	   transformed	   the	   political	  
landscape,	  and	  this	  created	  the	  frame	  through	  which	  the	  Government	  viewed	  lone-­‐parents.	  This	  was	  
also	  frequently	  how	  the	  problem	  was	  represented	  to	  the	  public	  and	  the	  media.	  	  
3.4.3 Strain	  on	  the	  Treasury	  
Economic	   issues	  motivated	  the	  bulk	  of	  Conservative	  thinking	  during	  this	  period.	  Thatcher’s	  
preoccupation	   with	   wanting	   to	   ‘roll	   back	   the	   state’	   and	   to	   reduce	   public	   expenditure	   dominated	  
most	   areas	  of	  policy	  making	  and	   reinforced	  her	   ideological	   approach	   towards	   social	   policy.	   This	   is	  
particularly	   true	   with	   regard	   to	   social	   security,	   for	   as	   the	   most	   expensive	   area	   of	   Government	  
expenditure	   it	   was	   a	   prime	   target	   for	   attack.	   As	   Deakin	   notes,	   ‘social	   policy	   objectives	   [were]	  
subordinated	   to	   the	   general	   goals	   [of]	   the	   economy’	   (1994,	   84).	   	   Thatcher’s	   neo-­‐liberal	   economic	  
ambitions	  to	  reduce	  spending	  largely	  shaped	  the	  policy	  agenda	  and	  were	  central	  to	  the	  development	  
of	   social	   policies.	   By	   the	   late	   1980s	   her	   focus	   had	   reached	   child	   maintenance	   reform	   and	   thus	  
elevated	  it	  onto	  the	  institutional	  agenda.	  Thatcher	  sought	  a	  method	  of	  privatising	  the	  ‘problem’	  and	  
therefore	  removing	  the	  financial	  strain	  lone	  parents	  were	  placing	  on	  the	  state.	  	  The	  foundations	  of	  
this	   ‘frame’	  were	  primary	  economic.	   It	  was	  not	   so	  much	  an	  attempt	   to	  promote	   traditional	   family	  
values	  and	  recreate	  a	  Britain	  which	  consisted	  of	  ‘moral’	  and	  ‘normal’	  nuclear	  families,	  but	  rather	  an	  
attempt	   to	   rein	   in	   public	   expenditure.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   although	  many	  Conservatives	  were	  
both	  socially	  authoritarian	  and	  economically	   liberal,	  often	   these	  strands	  were	  not	  compatible	  with	  
one	   another	   or	   held	   different	   emphasis/priorities.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   lone-­‐parents,	   the	   socially	  
authoritarian	  ideal	  of	  ‘moral’	  nuclear	  families	  was	  subordinated	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  economically	  liberal	  
ideal	  of	  saving	  the	  Treasury	  money.	  	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  way	  they	  constructed	  the	  formula	  which	  
forced	  the	  Agency	  to	  target	  middle-­‐class	  men	  as	  they	  earned	  a	  bigger	  income.	  This	  was	  the	  frame,	  
and	  private	  ‘problem	  identification’,	  that	  was	  held	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury.	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3.5	  What	  ‘Problem’	  was	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  Claiming	  to	  Remedy?	  
Much	  public	   policy	  making	   is	   not	  open	  and	   transparent,	   for	   the	  nature	  of	   politics	   is	   often	  
clouded	  in	  rhetoric	  and	  strategic	  representation.	  Often,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  policy	  is	  presented	  and	  
the	   true	   motives	   of	   the	   policy	   are	   different;	   we	   cannot	   simply	   look	   at	   a	   White	   Paper	   or	   the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  agreed	  policy	  to	  get	  an	  accurate	  understanding	  of	  what	  ‘problem’	  policy	  makers	  
were	  trying	  to	  solve.	  Instead,	  to	  glean	  such	  an	  understanding,	  we	  must	  examine	  two	  aspects:	  	  what	  
the	   ‘problem’	   was	   officially	   presented	   as,	   and	   secondly,	   how	   the	   problem	   was	   represented	  
throughout	  the	  process.	  	  
The	   White	   Paper	   Children	   Come	   First	   was	   published	   on	   the	   29	   October	   1990.	   The	  
justification	   for	   child	  maintenance	   reform	  was	  presented	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  need	   to	   replace	  a	   failing	  
system	  that	  was	  ‘fragmented,	  uncertain	  in	  its	  results,	  slow	  and	  ineffective’	  (DSS,	  Cmnd.	  1263,	  1990,	  
i)	  and	  to	  remove	  the	  problem	  of	  absent	  parents	  not	  honouring	  their	  responsibility	  to	  their	  children;	  
little	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  on	  wider	  social	  and	  economic	  aims	  (Davis	  et	  al,	  1998,	  8).	  The	  problem	  was	  
characterized	  in	  terms	  of	  system	  failure	  and	  the	  moral	  responsibilities	  and	  obligations	  of	  the	  absent	  
parent.	  	  The	  main	  principles	  and	  objectives	  which	  Children	  Come	  First	  emphasised	  were	  that	  parents	  
should	   honour	   their	   responsibility	   to	   their	   children	   when	   they	   could	   afford	   to	   do	   so,	   and	   that	  
dependence	  on	  the	  state	  should	  be	  reduced	  when	  possible.	  The	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  on	  the	  moral	  
aspect	   of	   parental	   responsibility;	   a	   desire	   to	   reduce	   expenditure,	   whilst	   present,	   was	   secondary,	  
whilst	  an	  attempt	  to	  discourage	  lone-­‐parenthood	  was	  absent.	  
The	  ensuing	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  perfectly	  displays	  an	  example	  of	  the	  power	  of	  strategic	  
problem	   representation;	   the	   ability	   to	   influence	   the	   system	   through	   its	   strategic	   portrayal	   of	   a	  
problem.	  What	  we	  see	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	   is	   that	   the	   representation	  of	   the	  
policy	  continued	   to	  adapt.	  The	  official	   line	  of	  emphasis,	  one	  of	  moral	   responsibility	  and	  creating	  a	  
fairer	  system	  which	  would	  put	  children	  first,	  allowed	  little	  scope	  for	  opposition	  by	  pressure	  groups,	  
charities	   or	   other	   parties.	   The	   continual	   re-­‐emphasis	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   responsibility	   and	   family	  
values	   almost	   guaranteed	   Opposition	   support,	   as	   it	   set	   a	   narrow	   frame	   in	   which	   the	   topic	   was	  
discussed	   (in	   this	   instance,	   to	   oppose	   the	   proposals	   would	   be	   seen	   as	   being	   opposed	   to	   a	   fairer	  
system	  that	  would	  benefit	  vulnerable	  children,	  which	  nobody	  would	  dare	  attempt	  to	  be).	  	  
	   As	   stated	   earlier,	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   had	   three	   separate	   strands	   of	   problem	  
definition,	  the	  most	  influential	  being	  that	  held	  by	  the	  Treasury	  and	  Thatcher.	  If	  we	  apply	  Figure	  3.1	  
Layers	   of	   Problem	   Definition	   to	   the	   views	   held	   by	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   we	   get	   a	   clearer	  













	   Policy	  representation	  is	  a	  fluid	  and	  adaptable	  process,	  something	  that	  is	  chosen	  to	  maximise	  
support	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  particular	  goal.	  With	  our	  case	  study	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  we	  
can	  see	  that	  how	  the	  policy	  was	  represented	   in	  the	  White	  Paper	  and	  how	  it	  was	  represented	  as	   it	  
went	  through	  Parliament	  was	  different	  to	  how	  it	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  representation	  to	  
the	   public	   did	   not	   place	   the	   emphasis	   on	   a	   failing	   system,	   but	   rather	   was	   filled	   with	   New	   Right	  
discourse	  blaming	   ‘feckless	   fathers’	   and	   ‘council	   estate	  mothers’.	  Here	  we	   see	   the	  outer	   core	  was	  
changing.	  The	  ‘problem’,	  as	  defined	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury,	  continued	  being	  that	  of	  the	  cost	  
to	  the	  Treasury	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  reduce	  the	  budget	  but	  representation	  changed	  to	  suit	  the	  purpose	  
and	  adapt	   to	   the	  audience.	  The	  public	   representation	  utilised	  by	  Thatcher	  and	   the	  Treasury	  was	  a	  
cleverly	  disguised	  strategic	  plan	  to	  achieve	  a	  maximum	  level	  of	  support.	  	  
3.6	  	   Language	  
While	  it	  is	  commonly	  accepted	  that	  there	  is	  no	  one	  definition	  of	  a	  problem,	  and	  we	  are	  often	  
offered	   competing	   views,	   less	   attention	   is	   paid	   to	   the	   words	   and	   delivery	   of	   both	   problems	   and	  
policies.	  However,	  as	  Finlayson	  states,	  ‘politics	  is	  very	  much	  a	  matter	  of	  words	  expressed	  in	  certain	  
ways,	   in	   certain	   formats	   or	   locations	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   certain	   effects’	   (2003,	   16).	   Finlayson	  
discusses	  the	  strategic	  use	  of	  words	  to	  win	  support	  during	  a	  campaign,	  but	  the	  same	  approach	  can	  
apply	  when	  trying	  to	  ensure	  support	   in	  Parliament,	  among	  Cabinet	  Colleagues,	  and	  the	  Opposition	  
(2003,	  16).	  The	  language	  utilised	  by	  politicians	  can	  often	  be	  used	  as	  an	  influential	  tool,	  especially	  in	  
winning	  support	  for	  a	  policy	  or	  approach.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  
















allowed	  to	  pass	  through	  Parliament	  with	  relative	  ease.	  	  Attention	  needs	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  symbolic	  
significance	  of	  language	  and	  methods	  of	  communication	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  fully	  the	  formation	  
and	  passage	  of	  the	  Bill.	  As	  Finlayson	  states,	  ‘politics	  is	  in	  large	  part	  about	  the	  art	  of	  communicative	  
persuasion’	  (2003,	  40).	  	  
When	  looking	  at	  policy	  representation,	  we	  need	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  great	   importance	  and	  
power	  that	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  choice	  of	  language.	  Language	  is	  an	  influential	  power	  tool	  with	  which	  
policymakers	  can,	  should	  they	  wish,	  mask	  true	  motives,	  attach	  blame,	  disguise	  underlying	  objectives,	  
determine	  media	  image,	  and	  indeed	  set	  the	  boundaries	  within	  which	  objectors	  can	  object.	  We	  need	  
to	  note	  that	  language	  is	  not	  neutral,	  but	  instead	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  values,	  a	  power	  resource,	  and	  a	  
political	   strategy.	   As	   Rochefort	   and	   Cobb	   state,	   ‘[t]he	   uses	   of	   language	   are	   crucial	   to	   the	   political	  
analysis	  of	  public	  policy	  making	  and	  problem	  definition...	  	  Language	  can	  be	  the	  vehicle	  for	  employing	  
symbols	  that	   lend	  legitimacy	  to	  one	  definition	  and	  undermine	  the	   legitimacy	  of	  another’	   (1994,	  8).	  
As	  noted	  above,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  words	  such	  as	  ‘family’,	  ‘child’,	  ‘children’,	  
‘responsibility’,	  ‘fairness’,	  ‘duty’,	  ‘values’,	  and	  ‘child	  welfare’	  were	  used	  to	  control	  the	  frame	  in	  which	  
the	   policy	   was	   discussed.	   The	   representation	   of	   the	   policy,	   through	   these	   words,	   was	   helping	   to	  
mask	   the	   problem	   that	  was	   identified,	   and	   objectives	   pursued,	   by	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury.	   As	  
Andrew	  Mitchell	  MP	   recalled,	   ‘it	  was	   all	  motherhood	   and	   apple	   pie,	   nobody	   looked	   at	   the	   detail’	  
(Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  Pay,	  1999).	  	  
3.7	  	   Problem	  Representation	  and	  Power	  
	   Power	  consists	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  get	  one’s	  way,	  to	  achieve	  a	  desired	  outcome.	  As	  Dahl	  notably	  
stated,	   power	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   getting	   people	   to	   do	   something	   that	   they	   would	   not	   otherwise	   do	  
(1957).	  This	  can	  be	  done	  through	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways,	  utilising	  different	  power	  tools.	  Power	  
tools	  can	  be	  both	  overt,	  such	  as	  through	  punishment,	  cohesion,	  or	  promise	  of	  rewards,	  and	  covert	  
by	   limiting	   the	   scope	   for	   opposition	   (as	   Bachrach	   and	   Baratz	   emphasised	   in	   their	   work	   on	   the	  
‘second’	   or	   ‘hidden’	   face	   of	   power).	   In	   democratic	   societies	   those	   who	   wish	   to	   exert	   power	   are	  
typically	  not	  attempting	  to	  alter	  the	  internal	  political	  views	  of	  the	  actors	  involved,	  but	  instead	  alter	  
or	   control	   their	   reaction	   to	   certain	   events	   or	   proposals;	   this	   allows	   them	   to	   achieve	   their	   targets.	  
Therefore	  the	  power	  tools	  that	  are	  typically	  utilised	  are	  covert	  and	  involve	  limiting	  the	  options	  for,	  
or	   reducing	   the	   credibility	   of,	   those	   who	   are	   likely	   to	   oppose.	   This	   is	   something	   that	   will	   be	  
addressed	  more	  fully	  in	  Chapter	  Five.	  	  
	   As	  Foucault	  (1977)	  clearly	  highlighted,	  creating	  a	  climate	  in	  which	  an	  issue	  is	  discussed	  is	  a	  
form	  of	  control,	  therefore	  a	  power	  tool.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  problem	  representation	  stage	  of	  the	  1991	  
Child	   Support	  Act,	   and	  during	   its	   passage	   through	  Parliament,	   the	  Conservative	  Government	  used	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language	  as	  a	  method	  of	  controlling	  the	  environment	  and	  ensuring	  support	  for	  the	  Bill.	  The	  strategic	  
use	  of	  language	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  imagery	  that	  surrounded	  the	  policy	  were	  able	  to	  ensure	  support	  
for	  a	  policy	  that	  was	  deeply	  ideological	  and	  fundamentally	  flawed.	  	  
	   The	  power	   to	   represent	  a	  policy	  or	  a	  problem	   in	  a	  particular	  way	   through	  strategic	  use	  of	  
language	   almost	   forces	   an	   actor	   to	   react	   in	   a	  way	   that	   they	  would	   not	   otherwise	   do.	   As	   Parsons	  
observes,	   ‘power	   resides	   as	   much	   in	   the	   capacity	   to	   command	   action	   as	   to	   command	   inaction.’	  
(1995,	   112).	   In	   this	   case,	   Labour	   opposition,	   or	   even	   internal	   opposition	   coming	   from	   the	  
Conservative	  Party,	  was	  reduced	  and	  support	  was	  granted.	  Therefore	  A	  made	  B	  do	  something	  that	  B	  
would	   not	   otherwise	   have	   done	   if	   it	   was	   not	   for	   the	   control	   A	   had	   enforced	   over	   B.	   Due	   to	   the	  
Conservative	   Party’s	   successful	   control	   over	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   policy,	   virtually	   any	   opposition	  
could	   be	   perceived	   or	   portrayed	   as	   opposition	   to	   both	   establishing	   a	   reliable	   system	   of	   child	  
maintenance	  and	  supporting	  family	  responsibility,	  something	  that	  the	  Labour	  Party	  felt	  unable	  to	  do.	  
As	  The	  Sunday	  Times	  highlighted:	  	  ‘Sold	  to	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  legislation	  to	  help	  children,	  it	  was,	  
in	   fact,	  aimed	  purely	  at	   removing	  the	  burden	  of	  support	   from	  the	  exchequer	  and	  placing	   it	  on	  the	  
already	  burdened	   shoulders	   of	   the	   families	   themselves’	   (The	   Sunday	   Times,	   18	   September,	   1994).	  
The	  scope	  of	   the	  debate	  was	   limited	   to	  either	  showing	  support	  or	  opposition	   for	   ‘the	  principle’	  of	  
the	   policy,	   leaving	   little	   scope	   for	   opposing	   or	   engaging	   in	   discussion	   surrounding	   a	   deeply	  
ideological	  and	  flawed	  policy.	  	  
3.8	   	  Why	  Construct	  and	  Mask	  a	  ‘Problem’?	  
It	   is	   often	   recognised	   that	   in	   order	   to	   get	   a	   policy	   passed	   through	   Parliament	   and	   attain	  
support	  of	  the	  British	  media	  and	  British	  public,	  a	  policy	  or	  ‘problem’	  needs	  to	  be	  masked.	  Having	  the	  
ability	  to	  do	  this	   is	  a	  considerable	  power	  resource	  in	  a	  Government’s	  armoury.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  Child	  
Maintenance,	  the	  problem	  had	  already	  been	  acknowledged	  by	  John	  Moore	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  when	  
he	   was	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Health	   and	   Social	   Services.	   Moore	   recognised	   the	   increase	   in	   the	  
number	   of	   lone	   parents	   as	   both	   an	   economic	   and	   moral	   concern	   and	   declared	   that	   punitive	  
measures	   needed	   to	   be	   introduced	   to	   eradicate	   this.	   In	   October	   1988,	   at	   the	   Conservative	   Party	  
Conference,	   Moore	   made	   a	   speech	   whereby	   he	   expressed	   concerns	   regarding	   ‘excessive	   state	  
provision’	  encouraging	  lone-­‐parents	  families.	  Moore	  stated:	  
Is	  the	  knowledge	  that	  the	  state	  will	  provide	  a	  factor	  in	  father	  deserting	  their	  
families?...	  What	  is	  to	  be	  done	  about	  nearly	  half	  a	  million	  fathers	  who	  pay	  nothing	  
at	   all	   towards	   their	   wives	   and	   children?	   (Conservative	   Party	   Conference,	   12	  
October,	  1988).	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Yet	  Moore’s	  proposals	  and	  approach	  were	  deemed	  too	  radical	  and	  unlikely	  to	  win	  support.	  Shortly	  
afterwards	  Moore	  was	  himself	   quickly	  ushered	   to	   the	  back-­‐benches.	  However	   the	  policy	  proposal	  
and	  ideas	  advocated	  by	  Moore	  bear	  remarkable	  similarity	  to	  those	  contained	  within	  the	  1991	  Child	  
Support	  Act.	   It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	   it	  was	  recognised	  that	  Moore,	  an	  openly	  harsh	  right-­‐wing	  Tory,	  
would	  not	   achieve	   the	  political	   support	  needed	   to	  ensure	   the	   successful	   passage	  of	   the	  policy	   (as	  
during	  his	   tenure	  as	   Social	   Security	   Secretary	  he	  had	  drawn	  criticism	   from	  all	   sides	  of	   the	  House).	  
However	   a	  moderate	   Tory	   such	   as	   Tony	  Newton	  would	   be	  more	   likely	   to	  win	   support	   for	   such	   a	  
policy	  due	  to	  his	  softer	  image	  and	  more	  congenial	  approach.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  the	  replacement	  of	  John	  Moore	  with	  Tony	  Newton,	  and	  the	  change	  in	  how	  
the	  problem	  was	  represented,	  was	  all	  part	  of	  the	  power,	  rhetoric	  and	  strategy	  that	  was	  deployed	  by	  
the	  Government	  to	  mask	  the	  true	  motives	  of	  the	  desired	  policy.	  This	  was	  point	  will	  be	  returned	  to	  in	  
Chapter	  Five,	  which	  utilises	  Kingdom’s	  (1984)	  idea	  of	  ‘policy	  streams’	  to	  illustrate	  attempts	  to	  ‘open	  
the	  policy	  window’.	  
3.9	   Problem	  Definition	  and	  Links	  to	  Policy	  Failure	  
As	  Bosso	  notes,	  ‘the	  politics	  of	  problem	  definition	  has	  become	  so	  critical	  to	  success	  or	  failure	  
in	   policy	   formation’	   (1994,	   182).	   Two	   things	   are	   apparent	   in	   the	   policy	   formation	   stage	   of	   the	  
formation	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  Firstly	  there	  were	  multiple	  definitions	  and	  multiple	  frames	  
present	   throughout	   the	   process,	   and	   secondly	   there	  was	   a	   strategic	   use	   of	   language	   and	   imagery	  
used	  by	  those	  who	  aimed	  to	  achieve	  their	  desired	  outcome	  (the	  successful	  and	  covert	  passage	  of	  a	  
somewhat	   ideological	   and	   controversial	   policy).	   Both	   of	   these	   elements	   were	   used	   as	   power	  
resources	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury,	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  
fundamentally	  flawed	  policy	  that	  was	  predestined	  for	  failure.	  The	  below	  section	  will	  briefly	   look	  at	  
both	  of	  these	  factors,	  highlighting	  how	  they	  contributed	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  policy.	  
	  
3.9.1	  	   Multiple	  Frames	  and	  Policy	  Failure	  
During	  the	  formation	  and	  passage	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  there	  was	  no	  one	  defined	  
problem.	  Each	  of	  the	  three	  approaches	  and	  frames	  highlighted	  above	  were	  emphasized	  at	  different	  
stages	  and	  to	  different	  audiences	  by	  different	  actors.	  This	  caused	  problems	  for	  two	  reasons.	  Firstly	  it	  
allowed	   for	   inconsistency	  and	   ‘messy’	  policy	  making,	  because	  actors	  engaged	   in	   the	  policy-­‐making	  
process	  of	   the	  Act	  were	  working	   towards	  different	  aims	  and	  objectives.	  Secondly,	   the	  presence	  of	  
multiple	   frames	   was	   utilised	   as	   a	   power	   resource	   by	   certain	   actors,	   as	   the	   existence	   of	   multiple	  
definitions	  allowed	  for	  certain	  ‘definitions’	  to	  be	  emphasised	  at	  different	  stages	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  
support	  for	  the	  policy	  whilst	  masking	  its	  true	  motives.	  Below	  will	  discuss	  each	  in	  turn.	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The	  existence	  of	  multiple	  frames	  remained	  hidden	  under	  a	  layer	  of	  ambiguity	  which	  allowed	  
policy	   makers	   to	   proceed	   without	   a	   clearly	   defined	   objective.	   By	   each	   working	   within	   their	   own	  
frame,	  to	  their	  own	  definition	  of	  the	  problem,	  without	  clearly	  specifying	  or	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  true	  
intentions	  of	  other	  actors,	  it	  made	  the	  policy	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  failure.	  This	  caused	  the	  problem	  of	  
inconsistency	  and	  messy	  policy	  making.	  Wolman	  astutely	  highlights	  the	  role	  of	  multiple	  definitions	  
and	  their	  link	  to	  policy	  failure:	  
Too	   frequently	   rhetoric	   is	   substituted	   for	   adequate	   conceptualization,	   resulting	   in	  
vagueness	   and	   lack	   of	   direction	   through	   the	   entire	   formulation	   and	   carrying	   out	  
process.	   The	   end	   result	   is	   perceived	   to	   be	   a	   program	  which	   has	   failed	   to	   solve	   a	  
problem	  even	  though	  no	  one	  is	  quite	  certain	  what	  the	  problem	  is…	  thus	  ‘problems’	  
frequently	  appear	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  agenda	  without	  having	  been	  adequately	  
conceptualised	  or	  though	  through.	  (1981,	  463).	  
As	   highlighted	   below,	   this	   may	   be	   strategic;	   yet	   frequently	   it	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   poor	  
communication	   amongst	   actors.	   Even	   without	   being	   used	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   smuggle	   through	   a	  
controversial	   policy	   disguised	   within	   another	   frame,	   the	   existence	   of	   multiple	   frames	   allows	   for	  
inconsistency,	  poor	  formulation,	  and	  inefficient	  or	  inappropriate	  scrutiny	  to	  take	  place.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  the	  presence	  of	  multiple	  frames	  had	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  
the	  policy.	  One	  Minister	  in	  the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet	  suggested	  that	  contradictory	  messages	  were	  being	  
given	  to	  Parliamentary	  Counsel	  during	  the	  drafting	  process:	  
it	  got	  to	  the	  point	  of	  insisting	  that	  Parliamentary	  Counsel	  be	  present	  at	  all	  meetings,	  
because	   it	   became	   clear…	   that	   they	   weren’t	   getting	   clear	   instructions	   from	   the	  
department	   in	  order	  to	  know	  to	  what	  to	  draft.	  They	  didn’t	  know	  what	  to	  put	   in	   it.	  
	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Minister	  in	  Thatcher	  Cabinet	  A,	  interviewed	  by	  author,	  19	  July,	  2011).	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  two	  competing	  frames,	  there	  was	  the	  existence	  of	  two	  competing	  policy	  paths:	  the	  
Department	  of	  Social	  Security	  (DSS)	  and	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor’s	  Office	  on	  one	  side	  and	  Thatcher	  and	  
the	  Treasury	  of	  the	  other.	  The	  often	  unspoken	  and	  unacknowledged	  conflicting	  objectives	  pursued	  
by	  both	  the	  DSS	  and	  the	  Treasury	  created	  uncertainty	  for	  the	  Parliamentary	  Counsel	  as	  to	  what	  to	  
actually	  include	  in	  the	  draft	  Bill.	  This	  led	  to	  ambiguity	  manifesting	  itself	  within	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill.	  
Here	   we	   can	   see	   that	   the	   presence	   of	   multiple	   frames	   not	   only	   hindered	   Parliament’s	   ability	   to	  
scrutinise	   the	   Bill	   effectively,	   it	   also	   led	   to	  major	   problems	   in	   operation	   of	   the	   policy,	   due	   to	   its	  
unclear,	   contradictory,	   and	   unrealistic	   objectives	   and	   targets.	   This	   originated	   in	   actors	   not	   clearly	  
establishing	  a	  definition	  of	  a	  problem	  to	  which	  they	  were	  attempting	  to	  combat,	  which	  meant	  that	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when	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act,	   the	   Child	   Support	   Agency	   began	   operation	   it	  
quickly	  encountered	  vast	  problems.	  
	  	   Additionally,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  the	  presence	  of	  multiple	  frames	  was	  
used	  as	  a	  power	  resource	  and	  a	  means	  of	  pushing	  through	  a	  poorly	  formed	  policy.	  By	  allowing	  actors	  
to	   believe	   that	   it	   was	   their	   definition	   of	   the	   problem	   that	   they	   were	   working	   towards,	   and	   also	  
publically	  promoting	  these	  definitions,	  opposition	  to	  the	  covertly	  ideologically	  driven	  policy	  that	  was	  
being	   driven	   through	   was	   minimalised.	   Actors	   were	   almost	   manipulated	   into	   silence.	   As	   stated	  
above,	   at	   different	   stages,	   different	   definitions	  were	   highlighted.	   For	   example,	   as	   the	   policy	  went	  
through	  Parliament,	  the	  problem	  was	  linked	  to	  a	  failing	  system,	  and	  a	  duty	  the	  Government	  had	  in	  
creating	  a	  reliable	  system	  to	  see	  absent	  parents	  pay	  towards	  their	  children	  (the	  problem	  defined	  by	  
the	  DSS	  and	  LCO).	  This	  definition	  of	  the	  problem	  was	  emphasised	  as	  it	  was	  likely	  to	  won	  support.	  The	  
cost	   to	   the	   Treasury,	   or	   the	   concern	   for	   an	   emerging	   ‘underclass’	   was	   almost	   absent.	   The	  
Government’s	   encouragement	   of	   the	   Lord	   Chancellor’s	   Office	   to	   act	   as	   the	   Bill’s	   sponsor	   was	  
another	  strategic	  measure	  designed	  to	  enhance	  the	  emphasis	  on	  this	  definition.	  
As	   Chapter	   Six	   will	   also	   show,	   this	   continued	   throughout	   the	   Bill’s	   passage	   through	  
Parliament.	   Immediately	  we	   can	   see	   this	   in	   the	  naming	  of	   the	  white	  paper,	   ‘Children	  Come	  First’.	  
From	  the	  outset,	  the	  problem	  was	  represented	  in	  a	  way	  that	  limited	  disagreement.	  	  Throughout	  the	  
Bill’s	   progress	   through	   the	  House	  of	   Lords	   and	  House	  of	   Commons,	   the	  policy	  was	   emphasised	   in	  
terms	  of	  its	  ‘principle’	  of	  reforming	  the	  system.	  Whilst	  objections	  to	  aspects	  of	  the	  Bill	  were	  raised,	  
and	  indeed	  within	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  strong	  opposition	  to	  a	  number	  of	  aspects	  was	  voiced,	   it	  was	  
cast	  aside	  when	  emphasis	  on	  the	  ‘principle’	  was	  reiterated,	  which	  ensured	  symbolic	  agreement	  and	  
reduced	   the	   weight	   of	   the	   criticism.	   Opposing	   voices	   frequently	   used	   qualifying	   phrases	   such	   as:	  
‘those	  principles	  are	  surely	   right.	  However…’	   (HL	  Deb	   (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.526,	  col.805)	  and	   ‘The	  concept	  
behind	  the	  Bill…	   is	  entirely	  unexceptionable…	  it	   is	  only	  right	  and	  proper	  that	  we	  should	  support	   it…	  
However,	  perhaps	  the	  Department	  as	  adopted	  a	  somewhat	  knee-­‐jerk	  approach	  (HC	  Deb	  (1990-­‐1991)	  
Vol.	   192	   Col	   212).	   The	   policy	  was	   presented	   and	   framed	   in	   a	  way	  which	   skilfully	   allowed	   it	   to	   be	  
passed	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   apparent	   ‘principle’	   and	   ‘philosophy’.	   As	   Garnham	   and	   Knights	   stated,	  
‘opposition	  was	  afraid	  of	  appearing	  to	  oppose	  the	  principle	  of	  parental	  responsibility.’	  (1994,	  37)	  
In	   the	  public	  sphere,	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  on	  the	  moral	  objective	  of	   tracing	  errant	   fathers	  
and	   making	   them	   face	   their	   parental	   responsibilities.	   The	   manner	   in	   which	   Thatcher	   and	   the	  
Treasury	   concealed	   the	   policy’s	   economic	   objectives,	   behind	   a	   ‘moral	   crusade’	   to	   bring	   runaway	  
fathers	  to	  justice,	  was	  effective	  and	  initially	  ensured	  support	  from	  the	  majority	  of	  newspapers	  which	  
appeared	  to	  approve	  of	  Thatcher’s	  guise	  as	  defender	  of	  the	  traditional	  family.	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In	  the	  case	  of	  agenda	  setting,	  and	  frame	  setting,	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  we	  can	  see	  
language	  being	  deployed	  in	  two	  ways.	  Firstly,	  the	  initial	  image	  created,	  and	  problem	  represented,	  by	  
Thatcher	  was	  one	  of	  traditional	  family	  values,	  and	  absent	  parent’s	  moral	  and	  financial	  responsibility	  
towards	   their	   children.	   A	   strong	   ‘moral’,	   and	   ‘family’,	   tone	   was	   injected	   to	   numerous	   speeches,	  
setting	   the	   agenda	   for	   child	   support	   reform.	   Phases	   such	   as	   ‘responsibility	   to	   children’,	   ‘a	   fairer	  
system	  for	  children’,	  ‘unfair	  burden	  on	  the	  lone-­‐parent’,	  and	  ‘duty	  of	  responsibility’	  were	  frequently	  
used.	   For	  example,	   at	   a	   speech	  given	   to	   the	  National	  Children’s	  Home	  George	  Society,	   although	  a	  
speech	  aimed	  at	  discussing	  homelessness	  amongst	  children,	  Thatcher	  stated:	  
...when	   one	   of	   the	   parents	   not	   only	   walks	   away	   from	   marriage	   but	   neither	  
maintains	  nor	  shows	  any	  interest	  in	  the	  child,	  an	  enormous	  unfair	  burden	  is	  placed	  
on	  the	  other….	  No	  father	  should	  be	  able	  to	  escape	  from	  his	  responsibility	  and	  that	  is	  
why	  the	  Government	  is	   looking	  at	  ways	  of	  strengthening	  the	  system	  for	  tracing	  an	  
absent	  father	  and	  making	  arrangements	  for	  recovering	  maintenance	  more	  effective.	  
(Thatcher,	  Margaret,	   17	   Jan	   1990,	   Speech	   for	   National	   Children's	   Homes,	   George	  
Thomas	  Society)	  
Thatcher	   used	   the	   platform	   of	   the	   National	   Children’s	   Home	   speech	   to	   set	   the	   agenda	   for	   child	  
maintenance	   reform.	  Arguably,	   it	   could	  be	   suggested	   that	   she	  used	   this	  platform	   to	   reinforce	  an	  
image	   of	   family	   values	   and	   duty	   to	   children.	   Numerous	   speeches	   set	   the	   tone	   in	   which	   the	  
subsequent	  policy	  would	  be	  framed,	  and	  discussed.	  
Thatcher’s	  emphasis	  on	  ‘family	  values’	  and	  use	  of	  emotive	  language	  struck	  a	  national	  chord.	  
She	   managed	   to	   effectively	   influence	   the	   press,	   and	   therefore	   a	   large	   majority	   of	   the	   public,	   in	  
supporting	   the	   policy	   by	   only	   focusing	   on	   its	   outer	   emotive	   philosophy.	   The	   way	   it	   was	   framed	  
publicly,	   which	   led	   to	   widespread	   media	   support,	   meant	   that	   it	   was	   difficult	   for	   the	   (Labour)	  
Opposition	  to	  oppose	  the	  policy	  directly,	  which	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  ineffective	  scrutiny.	  Although,	  as	  
Chapter	  Six,	  which	  assesses	  the	   legislative	  stage	  of	   the	  policy,	  will	  demonstrated,	   the	  Labour	  Party	  
was	   aware	   of	   the	   policy’s	   flaws,	   its	   potential	   negative	   impact,	   and	   controversial	   nature.	   However	  
Labour	  felt	  obliged	  to	  support	  the	  Bill	  to	  avoid	  appearing	  out-­‐of-­‐touch	  with	  to	  the	  public,	  and	  to	  risk	  
losing	  electoral	  credibility.	  It	  is	  easier	  to	  allow	  a	  Government	  with	  a	  sizable	  majority	  to	  pass	  a	  policy	  
that	  has	  popular	  support	  rather	  than	  oppose	  it,	  even	  if	  as	  it	  was	  in	  this	  case	  evidently	  flawed.	  
The	  successful	  representation	  meant	  that	  there	  was	  public	  and	  parliamentary	  support	  for	  a	  
policy	  that	  was	  strategically	  presented	  to	  ensure	  symbolic	  support	  and	  obscure	  detail;	  the	  image	  of	  
the	  problem	  that	  they	  presented	  in	  each	  of	  these	   instances	  was	  not	  the	  actual	  problem	  they	  were	  
attempting	  to	  tackle	  in	  practice.	  This	  ensured	  that	  the	  policy	  did	  not	  have	  adequate	  scrutiny	  at	  either	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of	   these	   levels.	   Newton,	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Social	   Security,	   and	   Lord	   Mackay,	   the	   Lord	  
Chancellor	  who	  sponsored	  the	  Bill,	  were	  almost	  used	  as	  tools.	  Their	  gentle	  approach	  and	  moderate	  
standing	   enabled	   the	   Government	   to	   win	   support	   for	   what	   was	   portrayed	   as	   a	   principled	   policy	  
attempting	   to	   create	   a	   better	   system.	   Beneath	   the	   surface,	   however,	   the	   views	   and	   intentions	   of	  
Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   were	   ‘bubbling	   away’,	   remaining	   concealed	   until	   the	   Bill	   was	   safely	  
enacted	  into	  Law,	  and	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  was	  operational.	  	  
3.9.2	   Language	  and	  Policy	  Failure	  
Closely	   linked	   to	   the	   role	   of	   multiple	   frames	   is	   the	   strategic	   use	   of	   language,	   for	   as	   we	  
highlighted	   in	   the	   sections	   above,	   the	   role	   of	   language	   is	   a	   vital	   and	   powerful	   in	   policy	   making.	  
However,	  not	  only	  do	  we	  need	  to	  emphasise	  its	  ability	  as	  a	  power	  tool,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  look	  at	  its	  
role	  in	  policy	  failure.	  As	  Young	  states:	  
A	   shared	   language	   may	   mask	   multiple	   and	   conflicting	   meanings…	   while	   theses	  
ambiguities	   may	   facilitate	   agreement	   at	   symbolic	   level,	   they	   preclude	   clear	  
speciation	  of	  ends	  of	  policy	  and	  so	  inhibit	  the	  proper	  identification	  of	  feasible	  means	  
for	  its	  achievement.	  (1987,	  94).	  	  
The	   above	   quote	   applies	   superbly	   to	   the	   poor	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   ‘problem’,	   one	   that	   was	  
masked	   in	   strategic	  and	  ambiguous	   language,	  which	   led	   to	   the	  creation	  of	   the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  
Act.	   Language	   can,	   as	   indeed	   it	   did	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Act,	   mask	   true	   motives.	   Words	   can	   be	  
interpreted	   in	   several	   ways,	   leading	   to	   different	   actors	   pursuing	   different,	   even	   conflicting,	  
objectives.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Act	  we	  can	  argue	  that	  this	  was	  not	  only	  down	  to	  the	  accidental	  use	  of	  
ambiguous	   language	   that	   limited	   the	   degree	   of	   opposition	   and	   instead	   guaranteed	   symbolic	  
agreement,	   but	  was	   also	   a	   result	   of	   the	   strategic	   use	   of	   ambiguous	   and	   symbolic	   language	  which	  
provided	   a	   protecting	   veil	   to	   mask	   the	   policy’s	   true	   intentions.	   This	   led	   to	   an	   ideological	   and	  
inconsistent	   policy	   proposal	   being	   met	   with	   inadequate	   scrutiny	   and	   given	   quiet	   support	   by	   the	  
majority	  as	  a	  result.	  
However,	  the	  presence	  of	  vague	  language	  and	  technical	   jargon	  was	  recognised	   in	  both	  the	  
House	  of	   Lords	   and	   the	  House	  of	   Commons	   as	   the	  Child	   Support	  Bill	  went	   through	   the	   legislative	  
process.	  On	  several	  occasions,	  concerns	  were	  raised	  over	  the	  degree	  of	  ambiguity	  that	  was	  present	  
within	  the	  Bill.	  Lord	  Mischon	  noted	  that	  several	  of	  the	  clauses	  contained	  in	  the	  Bill	  were	  ‘very	  loosely	  
worded’,	  adding	  that	  ‘one	  may	  think	  that	  the	  noble	  and	  learned	  Lord	  (Lord	  Mackay)	  would	  not	  wish	  
to	  excise	  himself	  for	  any	  vagueness	  of	   language	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  being	  flexible	  or	  because	   it	  was	  
too	  technical’	  (HL	  Deb	  (1990-­‐1991)	  Vol.	  526,	  col.	  778).	  Yet	  although	  the	  use	  of	  ambiguous	  language	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was	   recognised,	   it	   did	   not	   remove	   its	   effectiveness	   as	   a	   power	   resource.	   The	   use	   of	   both	  
unintentionally	   or	   deliberately	   ambiguous	   language,	   both	   in	   the	  writing	   of	   the	   Bill	   and	   in	   its	   oral	  
presentation	   to	   Parliament	   and	   the	   public,	   prevented	   the	   undertaking	   of	   effective	   scrutiny	   of	   its	  
proposals	   by	   either	   of	   the	   two	   aforementioned	   groups.	   This	   lack	   of	   effective	   scrutiny	   was	  
responsible	  for	  allowing	  a	  flawed	  piece	  of	  legislation	  to	  make	  it	  onto	  the	  Statute	  Book,	  which	  in	  turn	  
would	  eventually	  contribute	  to	  the	  policy’s	  failure.	  	  
3.10	   Conclusion	  
An	  assessment	  of	  the	  ‘problem	  definition	  stage’	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  shows	  us	  that	  
there	  are	  considerable	  links	  between	  how	  a	  problem	  is	  defined	  and	  policy	  failure.	  Rising	  numbers	  of	  
lone	  parents,	  a	  child	  maintenance	  system	  that	  was	  unfit	   for	  purpose,	  and	  a	  Government	  obsessed	  
with	   curbing	   public	   expenditure,	   provided	   the	   context	   for	   inconsistent	   and	   uncertain	   problem	  
definition.	   There	   were	   numerous	   actors	   in	   the	   policy-­‐making	   process,	   each	   viewing	   the	   policy	  
through	  a	  different	  frame,	  and	  thus	  attaching	  different	  definitions	  of	  what	  the	  problem	  was	  that	  the	  
policy	  sought	  to	  rectify.	  This	  led	  to	  there	  being	  no	  clear	  definition	  of	  the	  aims	  and	  objectives	  of	  the	  
policy	   being	   contained	   within	   the	   Bill.	   The	   fact	   that	   some	   actors	   were	   using	   covert,	   ‘problem	  
representation’	   tactics	   to	   mask	   their	   true	   aims	   and	   objectives	   only	   intensified	   the	   ambiguity.	  
Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  deployed	  a	  strategic	  use	  of	  language	  and	  frames	  to	  both	  garner	  popular	  
support,	   and	   strangle	   any	  potential	   opposition.	   Rather	   than	   frame	   the	  debate	   in	   economic	   terms,	  
they	   represented	   it	   in	   terms	   of	   principles	   of	   parental	   and	   failed	   systems.	   This	   led	   to	   inadequate	  
scrutiny	  of	  the	  policy	  which,	  along	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  clear	  aims	  and	  objectives,	  eventually	  contributed	  
to	  its	  failure.	  	  
This	   chapter	   has	   shown	   that	   it	   is	   important	   to	   examine	   the	   problem	   definition	   stage.	  
Ambiguity	  in	  defining	  the	  problem	  or	  multiple	  actors	  approaching	  it	  from	  multiple	  frames	  can	  have	  
repercussions	   at	   later	   stages,	   such	   as,	   during	   Parliamentary	   scrutiny.	   It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   view	  
problem	  representation	  as	  being	  different	  to	  problem	  definition,	  as	  representation	   is	  a	  power	  tool	  
that	   can	   be	   used	   by	   policymakers	   to	  mask	   true	  motives	   and	   objectives.	   Use	   of	   language	   and	   the	  
strategic	  use	  of	  multiple	  frames	  are	  also	  tools	  that	  policy-­‐makers	  have	  at	  their	  disposal	  when	  trying	  
to	  achieve	  their	  aims.	  A	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  power	  and	  strategy	   in	  problem	  definition	  affords	  us	  a	  
greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  fragility	  of	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  in	  Britain,	  and	  how	  easy	  it	  can	  be	  
manipulated	   and	   undermined	   in	   order	   to	   attain	   the	   support	   of	   the	   popular	   press,	   silence	   the	  
concerns	  of	  Opposition,	  and	  weaken	  the	  scrutiny	  process.	  Policy	  failure	  does	  not	  just	  happen	  in	  the	  
implementation	  phase.	  Even	  before	   the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  has	  begun,	  when	  policy-­‐makers	  are	  




Chapter	  Four	  –	  Policy	  Formation:	  ‘Dual-­‐Policy	  Transfer’	  
4.1.	  Introduction	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  Here	  we	  will	  look	  at	  
the	  role	  of	  Policy	  Transfer	  in	  both	  the	  creation,	  and	  failure,	  of	  the	  Act.	  It	  will	  firstly	  state	  what	  Policy	  
Transfer	  is,	  and	  discuss	  how	  it	  can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  analytical	  tool	  to	  enhance	  our	  insight	  into	  the	  ‘black	  
box’	   of	   policy-­‐making.	   It	   will	   then	   examine	   previous	   academic	   work	   on	   Policy	   Transfer,	   before	  
advocating	   that	   the	   approach	   could	  be	   advanced	  by	   introducing	   the	   idea	  of	   ‘dual	   policy	   transfer’.	  
This	  Chapter	  will	  then	  apply	  this	  advanced	  approach	  to	  the	  case	  study	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  
showing	   that	   ‘dual	   policy	   transfer’	   did	   indeed	   take	   place.	   It	   will	   end	   by	   highlighting	   how	   these	  
conflicting	  dual	  origins	  laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  the	  eventual	  failure	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  
4.2.	  What	  is	  Policy	  Transfer?	  
Whilst	  policy	  transfer	  is	  a	  vital	  model	  that	  can	  enhance	  our	  understanding	  of	  policy	  making	  
and	  public	  policy,	  and	   is	   increasingly	  being	  used	   in	  policy	  making,	   the	  academic	  work	  analysing	   its	  
role	   remains	   somewhat	   limited.	   Policy	   Transfer	   refers	   to	   ‘the	   process	   by	   which	   knowledge	   of	  
policies,	  administrative	  arrangements,	  institutions	  and	  ideas	  in	  one	  political	  system	  (past	  or	  present)	  
is	   used	   in	   the	   development	   of	   policies,	   arrangements,	   institutions	   and	   ideas	   in	   another	   political	  
system’	   (Dolowitz	   and	  Marsh,	   2000,	   5).	   Dolowitz	   and	  Marsh,	   the	   leading	   academics	   in	   this	   area,	  
suggest	  that	  several	  components	  of	  a	  policy	  are	  transferred	  in	  the	  process;	  these	  can	  include	  policy	  
objectives,	   institutions,	   ideas,	   ideology,	   attitudes	   and	   concepts,	   structure	   and	   content,	   policy	  
instruments,	  administrative	  techniques	  and	  negative	  lessons	  (2000,	  12).	  	  	  	  
Policy	  Transfer	  as	  a	  conceptual	  framework,	  whilst	  only	  making	  ground	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  with	  
the	  work	  of	  Dolowitz	  and	  Marsh,	   is	  not	  an	  entirely	  new	  approach.	   It	  acts	  as	  an	  umbrella	  term	  that	  
builds	   on,	   and	   connects,	   earlier	   fragmented	   work	   established	   by	   academics	   such	   as:	   Rose	   (1991,	  
1993)	   on	   ‘lesson	   drawing’,	   Bennett	   (1991)	   on	   ‘policy	   convergence’,	   and	  Walker	   (1969)	   and	   Grey	  
(1973)	   on	   ‘policy	   diffusion’.	   Policy	   Transfer	   seeks	   to	   further	   advance	   these	   earlier	   debates	   on	   the	  
role	   and	   international	   movement	   of	   ideas	   and	   policies.	   	   Policy	   Transfer	   acts	   as	   a	   framework,	   or	  
analytical	  tool,	  which	  we	  can	  utilise	  to	  understand	  and	  analyse	  the	  influence	  of	  nations	  upon	  other	  
nations	   who	   have	   adopted	   a	   particular	   policy	   from	   the	   former,	   as	   well	   as	   seeking	   to	   gain	   an	  
understanding	  of	  both	   the	  adopting	  process	  and	  possible	  problems	  with	   that	  process.	   It	  examines	  
why	  a	  lesson	  was	  drawn,	  where	  a	  lesson	  was	  drawn	  from,	  who	  is	  involved,	  and	  what	  is	  transferred.	  
But	  as	  James	  and	  Lodge	  highlight,	  Policy	  Transfer	   is	  not	  a	  theory	  of	  policy	  change,	  or	  policy	  failure	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(2003).	  It	  cannot,	  nor	  attempts	  to	  be,	  a	  full	  explanation,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  refute	  its	  value.	  As	  Barry	  
highlights:	  
Our	  understanding	  of	  a	  subject	  may	  be	  advanced	  if	  concepts	  and	  processes	  can	  be	  
translated	   into	   other	   terms	   are	   readily	   grasped	   and	   fruitful	   analogy	   will	   suggest	  
new	   lines	   of	   enquiry	   by	   provoking	   the	   speculation	   that	   relationships	   found	   in	   one	  
field	  may	  hold,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  in	  the	  other	  as	  well.	  (1975,	  68)	  
Policy	  Transfer	  is	  instead	  a	  tool	  that	  enhances	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  operations	  inside	  the	  ‘black	  
box’	  of	  policy	  making.	  It	  places	  emphasis	  on	  examining	  the	  origins	  of	  a	  policy	  in	  terms	  of	  where	  the	  
‘new’	  knowledge	  or	  approach	   that	  a	  Government	   is	  proposing	  has	  originated	   from.	   It	   forces	  us	   to	  
not	   only	   question	   the	   source	  of	   that	   knowledge,	   but	   to	   also	   then	   gather	   an	  understanding	  of	   the	  
political,	  economic,	  social,	  and	  cultural	  setting	  in	  which	  this	  knowledge	  was	  approached,	  transferred,	  
and	  then	  applied.	  We	  can	  also	  use	  Policy	  Transfer	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  motivations	  of	  actors,	  be	  they	  
ideological,	   political,	   economic,	   or	   practical	   as	   to	  why	   they	   embarked	   on	   Policy	   Transfer	   to	   begin	  
with	  (Hulme,	  2006,	  174).	  	  
The	  movement	  of	  ideas	  and	  policies	  between	  countries	  has	  attracted	  considerable	  academic	  
attention	   (for	   example,	   Ball	   1998;	   Daguerre	   and	   Taylor-­‐Gooby,	   2004).	   Significant	   focus	   has	   been	  
placed	  on	  the	  transfer	  of	  policies	  and	   ideas	  from	  America	  to	  Britain,	  especially	  under	  the	  Thatcher	  
and	   Blair	   Governments.	   The	   exchange	   of	   policies	   between	   countries	   is	   fuelled	   by	   a	   number	   of	  
factors,	   namely;	   close	   relationships	   between	   epistemic	   communities;	   common	   cultural,	   economic	  
and	  ideological	  links	  and	  a	  common	  discourse;	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  adopt	  a	  ‘successful’	  and	  ready-­‐made	  
solution	   to	   complex	   or	   new	   policy	   areas.	   The	   expansion	   of	   easily	   available	   methods	   of	  
communications,	   increased	   movements	   of	   civil	   servants,	   politicians,	   and	   policy	   entrepreneurs,	  
increased	  use	  of	  SPADS,	  and	  closer	  co-­‐operation	  between	  countries,	  has	  resulted	  in	  an	  escalation	  in	  
frequency	  of	  Policy	  Transfer.	  	  
4.3	  Policy	  Transfer	  and	  Links	  to	  Policy	  Failure	  
Whilst	  it	  would	  be	  assumed	  that	  policy-­‐transfer	  would	  largely	  lead	  to	  successful	  public	  policy	  
making	  –	  countries	  would	  adopt	  a	  successful	  policy	  from	  another	  country	  and	  apply	  it	  to	  their	  own,	  
which	  would	  lead	  them	  to	  experience	  policy	  success	  –	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case;	  policy	  transfer	  can	  
often	  result	  in	  policy	  failure.	  Dolowitz	  and	  Marsh	  argue	  that	  three	  factors	  contribute	  to	  failure	  after	  
policy	  transfer:	  ‘uninformed	  transfer’,	  ‘incomplete	  transfer’,	  and	  ‘inappropriate	  transfer’	  (2000,	  17).	  
Uninformed	  transfer	  suggests	  the	  borrowing	  country	  has	   inadequate	   information	  about	  the	  policy,	  
its	  goals	  and	   its	  operation	   in	   its	  original	   country.	   Incomplete	   transfer	   suggests	   failure	  may	  occur	   if	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‘crucial	  elements’	  of	   the	  policy	  are	  missed	  or	   ignored	   in	   the	   transfer	  process.	  Lastly,	   inappropriate	  
transfer	  refers	  to	  there	  being	  insufficient	  understanding	  and	  consideration	  of	  the	  economic,	  political,	  
social,	   legal,	   and	   ideological	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   which	   leads	   to	   failure.	   The	  
process	   of	   policy	   transfer,	   or	   rather	   incomplete,	   uniformed,	   inappropriate	   policy	   transfer,	   partly	  
explains	  the	  subsequent	  failure	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  	  	  
4.4	  Policy	  Transfer	  and	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  
The	  existence	  of	  Policy	  Transfer	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  through	  a	  number	  of	  sources.	  These	  
include	  official	  press	   releases	  or	   references	   to	  media	   reports,	  official	   studies	  commissioned	  by	   the	  
Government,	  Governmental	   references	   to	   studies	  published	  by	   independent	  organisations,	   official	  
records,	   information	  obtained	   through	  FOIs,	   and	  personal	   interviews.	  By	  utilising	   these	   sources	  of	  
information	   we	   are	   able	   to	   show	   that	   Policy	   Transfer	   occurred,	   then	   analyse	   it	   through	   this	  
approach.	  Dolowitz	   and	  Marsh	   already	   pursued	   this	   approach	  with	   their	   use	   of	   the	   Child	   Support	  
Agency	  as	  a	  case	  study	  for	  Policy	  Transfer.	  	  
Dolowitz	  claims	   that	   ‘the	  origins	  of	   the	  agency	  are	   to	  be	   found	   in	  policy	   transfer	   from	  the	  
USA’	  (2001,	  373).	  Yet	  this	  thesis	  has	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  only	  partially	  true.	  The	  Government	  did	  not	  
look	  exclusively	  at	  the	  child	  support	  schemes	  in	  America	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  transferring	  the	  entire	  
policy;	   indeed,	   it	  was	  never	   the	   intention	  of	   the	  Department	  of	   Social	   Security	   (DSS)	   to	  adopt	   the	  
American,	  or	  more	  specifically,	  the	  Wisconsin	  system.	  	  
The	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   have	   developed	   from	   two	   sources:	   from	   the	  
result	  of	  the	  interdepartmental	  workings	  of	  the	  DSS	  and	  the	  Lord	  Chancellors	  Office	  (LCO),	  and	  from	  
the	   ideological	   pursuit	   of	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury.	   These	   divergent	   sources	   looked	   towards	  
different	   countries;	  as	  a	  Minister	   in	   the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet	   stated	   ‘[the	  DSS]	   looked	  mainly	   towards	  
Australia…	  our	  Prime	  Minister	   looked	   towards	  Wisconsin’	   (interviewed	  by	  author	  on	  19	   July	  2011,	  
Minister	  A).	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  lay	  in	  the	  contrasting	  objectives	  that	  were	  underpinned	  by	  differing	  
definition	   of	   the	   problem,	   as	   identified	   in	   Chapter	   Three.	   They	   both	   identified	   different	   problems	  
and	  thus	  sought	  different	  solutions	  to	  remedy	  them.	  Thatcher’s	  unwavering	  determination	  to	  push	  
the	  DSS	   towards	   introducing	   a	   system	   like	   that	   of	  Wisconsin’s	   Child	   Support	   Enforcement	   System	  
(CSES)	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  damaged,	  incomplete	  policy.	  We	  can	  utilise	  the	  framework	  of	  policy	  
transfer,	  and	   its	   role	   in	  policy	   failure,	   to	  understand	  the	   inherent	   failings	  of	   the	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  
Below,	  we	  will	   first	   look	   at	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   in	   terms	   of	   Policy	   Transfer	   from	  America,	  




4.4.1.	  Policy	  Transfer	  from	  America?	  
Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  turned	  their	  attention	  towards	  the	  Wisconsin	  system	  for	  several	  
reasons.	   They	   perceived	   the	   Wisconsin	   CSES	   system	   to	   be	   highly	   successful	   in	   reducing	   public	  
expenditure,	  tackling	  a	  culture	  of	  dependency	  amongst	  lone	  parents,	  and	  instilling	  responsibility	  and	  
family	   values	   into	   both	   parents.	   The	   problems	   which	   America	   experienced	   in	   enforcing	   child	  
maintenance,	  which	  were	   similar	   to	   those	   experienced	   by	   Britain,	   led	   it	   to	   initiate	   reform	   over	   a	  
decade	   before	   Britain.	   This	   justified	   Thatcher’s	   desire	   to	   look	   towards	   America,	   as	   it	   had	   already	  
established	   a	   system	   to	   tackle	   the	   very	   problems,	   that	   according	   to	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury,	  
Britain	  was	  facing.	  Therefore	  Thatcher	  deemed	  it	  appropriate	  for	  Britain	  to	  look	  towards	  America	  for	  
a	  solution.	  
The	  Wisconsin	   system	  was	   viewed	   as	   a	  method	   of	   imposing	   a	   neo-­‐conservative	  model	   of	  
family	  values	  and	  parental	  responsibilities.	  Although	  aware	  that	  Britain’s	  existing	  child	  maintenance	  
system	   was	   inadequate,	   Thatcher’s	   main	   concern	   was	   the	   subsequent	   effect	   it	   had	   in	   creating	   a	  
reliance	   on	   the	   state	   which	   raised	   public	   expenditure	   and,	   in	   her	   view,	   create	   a	   ‘culture	   of	  
dependency’.	  As	  Dolowitz	  highlights,	  	  ‘policy	  makers	  associated	  single	  parents	  dependency	  with	  the	  
necessity	   to	   develop	   a	   more	   coherent	   maintenance	   system,	   capable	   of	   shifting	   the	   financial	  
responsibility	   for	   children	   from	   the	   state	   onto	   their	   biological	   parents’	   (2001,	   378).	   One	   of	   the	  
underpinning	  motives	  behind	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  CSES	   in	  America,	  and	  the	  CSA	  in	  Britain,	  was	  the	  
ideological	  argument	  that	  both	  parents	  should	  maintain	  responsibility	  for	  their	  children,	  ideally	  in	  a	  
married	   relationship,	   but	   if	   not,	   then	   to	   do	   so	   regardless	   of	   their	   marital	   status.	   This	   view	   was	  
expressed	   in	   both	   the	   opening	   statement	   of	   the	   1984	   American	   Child	   Support	   Enforcement	  
Amendment	  (ACSEA)	  and	  in	  the	  1990	  White	  Paper	  Children	  Come	  First.	  The	  1984	  ACSEA	  states:	  
	  All	  children…	  in	  need	  of	  assistance	  in	  securing	  financial	  support	  from	  their	  parents	  
will	   receive	   such	   assistance	   regardless	   of	   their	   circumstances’	   (US	   Government,	  
1984,	  Introduction).	  	  
The	  DSS	  echoed	  this	  sentiment	  in	  the	  opening	  page	  of	  Children	  Come	  First,	  stating:	  
	  Although	  events	  may	  change	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	  parents…	  those	  events	  
cannot	  in	  anyway	  change	  their	  responsibilities	  towards	  their	  children…	  the	  payment	  
of	  child	  maintenance	   is	  one	  crucial	  way	   in	  which	  parents	  fulfil	   their	  responsibilities	  
(DSS,	  Cmnd.	  1263,	  1990,	  ii).	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It	  was	  believed	  that	  this	  approach	  would	  encourage	  financial	  responsibility	  and	  prevent	  promiscuous	  
behaviour	  by	   irresponsible	  young	  men.	  This	  would	   in	   turn	  encourage	   traditional	   family	  values	  and	  
prevent	  an	  increase	  or	  consolidation	  of	  an	  ‘underclass’.	  	  
Another	   compelling	   reason	   as	   to	   why	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   sought	   to	   adopt	   the	  
Wisconsin	   system	   was	   that	   they	   perceived	   it	   to	   fit	   their	   neo-­‐liberal	   agenda,	   which	   prioritised	   a	  
reduction	   in	   public	   expenditure.	   As	   a	   Minister	   in	   the	   Thatcher	   Cabinet	   recollects,	   ‘an	   economic	  
approach	   to	   social	   policy	   was	   very	   appealing	   to	   the	   neo-­‐liberals’	   (interviewed	   by	   author,	   19	   July	  
2011,	   Minister	   A).	   This	   perceived	   opportunity	   to	   reduce	   public	   expenditure	   strongly	   influenced	  
Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury,	  and	  directed	  their	  approach	  to	  reforming	  child	  maintenance.	  A	  reduction	  
of	   public	   expenditure	   had	   been	   on	   the	   Thatcher	   Government’s	   institutional	   agenda	   since	   she	  
became	  Prime	  Minister	   in	  1979.	  This	  objective	  predetermined	   their	   view	  of	   the	  welfare	   state,	   the	  
manner	   in	  which	   they	  sought	   to	   reform	  social	   security,	  and	   influenced	   their	   judgement	  of	  polices.	  
Much	   of	   the	   politics	   and	   policy	   reforms	   surrounding	   welfare	   in	   the	   1980s	   centred	   on	   restricting	  
public	   expenditure;	   indeed	   reducing	   public	   expenditure	   became	   a	   constant	   theme	   amongst	   neo-­‐
liberals,	   albeit	   frequently	   aligned	   to	   neo-­‐conservative	   themes	   about	   individual	   responsibility,	   and	  
family	   values.	   The	   intention	   to	   use	   the	   Wisconsin	   CSES	   system	   to	   reduce	   public	   expenditure	   is	  
evident	  in	  the	  opening	  of	  Children	  Come	  First	  which	  states	  that	  the	  system	  would	  ensure	  that	  single	  
parents	  would:	  	  
avoid…	   	   becoming	   dependent	   on	   Income	   Support	   whenever	   this	   is	   possible	   and,	  
where	   it	   is	  not	  possible,	  to	  minimize	  the	  period	  of	  dependency…	  it	   is	  not	  right	  that	  
taxpayer…	  should	  shoulder	  the	  responsibility	  instead	  of	  parents	  who	  are	  able	  to	  do	  
it	  themselves.	  (Children	  Come	  First,	  DSS,	  Cmnd.	  1263,	  1990,	  5).	  	  
The	  Thatcher	  Government	  perceived	  the	  Wisconsin	  CSES	  system	  as	  being	  highly	  successful	  in	  
reducing	  public	  expenditure;	  therefore	  it	  was	  a	  desirable	  policy	  in	  terms	  of	  achieving	  their	  economic	  
agenda.	   In	   1986,	   Thatcher	   responded	   to	  David	  Willetts’	   report	   (after	   he	   had	  met	  with	   one	  of	   the	  
architects	  of	   the	  Wisconsin	   system,	   Irwin	  Garfinkel)	  on	   the	  CSES	  by	   stating	   “nail	   the	  guilty	   fathers	  
and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  cut	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  off	  the	  social	  security	  budget	  –	  give	  the	  man	  a	  rise”	  
(Popham,	  1994,	  124,	  quoted	  in	  Dolowitz,	  2001).	  Thatcher	  therefore	  saw	  reform	  of	  child	  maintenance	  
as	   a	   method	   of	   getting	   closer	   to	   what	   was	   proving	   an	   inherently	   difficult	   goal	   –	   curbing	   public	  
expenditure.	  	  
The	   American	   system	   also	   complemented	   the	   Thatcher	   Government’s	   New	   Public	  
Management	   project	   -­‐	   the	   ‘Next-­‐Steps’	   initiative.	   This	   entailed	   reducing	   central	   Government’s	  
responsibilities	  and	  transferring	  responsibility	  to	  semi-­‐autonomous	  agencies.	  While	  strategic	  control	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of	   the	   Agency	   would	   remain	   under	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  
operations	   of	   the	   Agency	   was	   delegated	   to	   a	   Chief	   Executive.	   Thatcher	   favoured	   the	   Wisconsin	  
system	  of	  enforcing	  child	  maintenance	  as	  it	  reflected	  her	  desire	  to	  reduce	  waste	  and	  bureaucracy	  by	  
installing	  private	  sector	  principles	  into	  the	  public	  sector.	  Thatcher	  entered	  office	  with	  the	  objective	  
of	  changing	  the	  Civil	  Service	  in	  three	  ways:	  to	  cut	  manpower,	  to	  attack	  'waste'	  and	  to	  inject	  business	  
management	  principles	  into	  Departments	  (Gay,	  1997,	  8).	  The	  Wisconsin	  system	  of	  child	  support	  was	  
viewed	   as	   a	   means	   of	   developing	   this	   initiative,	   whereupon,	   a	   newly-­‐created,	   semi-­‐autonomous	  
agency	  would	  reduce	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  DSS	  by	  handing	  responsibility	  to	  a	  semi-­‐autonomous	  agency	  
that	   took	   responsibility	   for	   the	   calculating,	   collecting,	   and	   payment	   of	   child	   maintenance.	   For	  
Thatcher,	  the	  CSES	  was	  not	  simply	  attractive	  in	  terms	  of	  delivering	  potential	  expenditure	  savings,	  but	  
also	  as	  a	  means	  of	  achieving	  wider	  political	  objectives.	  	  	  
4.4.1.1.	  Inappropriate,	  Incomplete,	  and	  Uniformed	  Policy	  Transfer	  
Several	   of	   the	   problems	   which	   the	   Child	   Support	   Agency	   (CSA)	   faced	   were	   a	   direct	  
consequence	  of	  the	  attempted	  policy	  transfer	  from	  Wisconsin.	  Thatcher’s	  uninformed	  perception	  of	  
the	   CSES,	   the	   pick-­‐and-­‐mix	   manner	   in	   which	   components	   were	   transferred,	   and	   a	   disregard	   for	  
social,	   political,	   and	   cultural	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   countries,	   all	   contributed	   to	   the	   CSA’s	  
eventual	   failure.	   The	   Thatcher	   Government’s	   New	   Right	   ideological	   outlook	   shaped	   what	   it	  
extrapolated	   from	   the	   Wisconsin	   system	   ‘to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	   it	   was	   able	   to	   ignore	   the	  
problematic	   operational	   realities	   of	   the	   system	   in	   favour	   of	   its	   ability	   to	   help	   advance	   their	  
ideological	  rhetoric’	   (Dolowitz,	  2001,	  378).	  By	  utilising	  Dolowitz	  and	  Marsh’s	  three	  causes	  of	  policy	  
transfer	  failure,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  underpinning	  the	  
problems	  subsequently	  experienced	  by	  the	  CSA.	  	  
As	   Dolowitz	   and	  Marsh	   claim,	   one	   of	   the	   factors	  which	   leads	   to	   policy	   failure	   in	   cases	   of	  
policy	  transfer	  is	  that	  of	  an	  uninformed	  understanding	  of	  the	  policy	  (1996,	  344).	  This	  factor	  is	  indeed	  
present	  in	  the	  case	  of	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  Thatcher’s	  strongly	  ideological	  perspective	  meant	  that	  
she	  possessed	  an	   inaccurate	  understanding	  of	   the	  policy.	  Her	   adherence	   to	   a	  neo-­‐liberal	   ideology	  
and	  her	   profound	  desire	   to	   emulate	  Reagan’s	   injection	  of	   free-­‐market	   principles	   into	   social	   policy	  
restricted	  or	  skewed	  the	  information	  she	  extracted	  from	  the	  policy.	  Thatcher	  was	  in	  such	  awe	  of	  the	  
policy’s	  apparent	  ability	  to	  achieve	  aspects	  of	  her	  New	  Right	  agenda	  that	  it	  obscured	  the	  operational	  
reality	  of	  the	  policy.	  As	  Dolowitz	  argues,	  
had	   the	  Thatcher	  Government’s	  New	  Right	   ideological	  beliefs	  not	  dominated	   their	  
perception	  of	  the	  US	  system,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  CSES’s	  inherent	  weaknesses…	  would	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have	   been	   more	   carefully	   considered	   before	   they	   were	   integrated	   into	   the	   CSA.	  
(2001,	  380).	  
The	   practical	   failures	   and	   negative	   effects	   of	   the	   CSES	   were	   either	   disregarded	   or	   not	  
recognised,	   and	   the	   system	  was	   viewed	  as	   desirable	   to	   emulate	   in	  Britain.	   Thatcher’s	   uninformed	  
position	  also	  led	  her	  to	  ignore	  how	  the	  CSES	  failed	  to	  accomplish	  the	  economic	  objectives	  that	  she	  
perceived	  it	  had	  achieved;	  the	  Wisconsin	  model	  having	  failed	  to	  reduce	  expenditure	  on	  lone-­‐parent	  
benefits.	   If	  Thatcher	  had	   invested	  as	  much	   interest	   in	   the	  operational	  performance	  of	   the	  CSES	  as	  
she	  did	  its	  potential	  to	  achieve	  public	  expenditure	  savings,	  her	  yearning	  to	  transfer	  the	  policy	  would	  
almost	  certainly	  have	  been	  moderated.	  
Incomplete	   transfer	   suggests	   that	   failure	  may	   occur	   if	   ‘crucial	   elements’	   of	   the	   policy	   are	  
missed	  or	   ignored	   in	   the	   transfer	   process	   (Dolowitz,	   2001).	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury’s	   approach	  
failed	  to	  transfer	  several	  of	  the	  vital	  aspects	  needed	  for	  successful	  policy	  transfer	  in	  the	  case	  of	  child	  
maintenance.	   Whilst	   the	   CSES	   was	   derived	   from	   Reagan’s	   neo-­‐liberal	   objective	   of	   transferring	  
dependency	  from	  the	  state	  to	  the	   individual,	   it	  nevertheless	  enshrined	  a	  social	  element,	  operating	  
alongside	  welfare-­‐into-­‐work	  polices	  such	  as	  the	  1988	  Family	  Support	  Act,	  which	  developed	  a	  system	  
that	   incorporated	  work,	  training,	  education,	  and	  child	  care.	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  misread	  the	  
objective	  of	  the	  Wisconsin	  system;	  the	  Wisconsin	  system	  was	  not	  motivated	  by	  expenditure	  savings.	  
As	  Irwin	  Garfinkel,	  the	  architect	  of	  the	  Wisconsin	  system,	  when	  asked	  questioned	  about	  the	  failure	  
of	  the	  British	  CSA,	  stated:	  	  
Rule	  number	  one;	  don’t	  make	  budget	  savings	  an	  objective.	  I	  never	  had,	  nor	  
did	  Wisconsin	  Agency	  Officials,	  have	  savings	  of	  public	  funds	  as	  an	  objective.	  In	  fact,	  
from	  the	  start	  the	  belief	  was	  that	  whatever	  savings	  came	  out	  of	  the	  system,	  would	  
be	  put	   right	  back	   into	   the	   system	   to	   further	   reduce	  poverty…	  do	  not	  make	   saving	  
money	  a	  principle	  objective…	  this	  was	  the	  single	  most	  important	  piece	  of	  advice	  we	  
gave	  them	  (Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  Pay,	  1999)	  	  	  	  
Thatcher	  and	   the	  Treasury	  were	  oblivious	   to,	  or	   chose	   to	   ignore,	   these	  aspects	  of	   the	   system	  and	  
focused	  only	  on	  the	  policy’s	  New	  Right	  ideological	  appeal.	  They	  also	  ignored	  the	  flexibility	  enshrined	  
in	  the	  Wisconsin	  formula	  and	  replaced	  it	  with	  a	  formula	  that	  was	  rigid	  and	  bound	  to	  be	  unpopular.	  
For	  example,	  the	  British	  formula,	  failed	  to	  include	  a	  consideration	  of	  previous	  property	  and	  financial	  
settlements	   that	   had	   been	   agreed	   upon.	   By	   failing	   to	   include	   this	   vital	   aspect,	   the	   CSA	   was	  
increasingly	   exposed	   to	   criticism	   and	   non-­‐compliance	   from	   its	   target	   subjects.	   This	   disregard	   for	  
flexibility	  was	  a	  result	  of	  their	  economic	  preoccupation;	  including	  this	  element	  of	  the	  formula	  would	  
have	  reduced	  public	  expenditure	  savings	  accrued	  from	  maximizing	  CSA	  revenue.	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As	  well	  as	  failing	  to	  transfer	  elements	  of	  the	  policy,	  they	  also	  failed	  to	  transfer	   its	  mode	  of	  
implementation.	   Britain	   did	   not	   adopt	   an	   incremental	   approach,	   but	   instead	   rushed	   the	   policy	  
through	  in	  its	  entirety.	  	  While	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Wisconsin	  had	  system	  reflected	  the	  need	  to	  
take	   gradual	   steps	   so	   that	   it	   could	   address	   any	   problems	   that	   arose,	   the	   British	   policy	   was	  
immediately	  imposed	  upon	  the	  old	  system	  with	  no	  room	  for	  slowly	  allowing	  the	  public	  –	  or	  officials	  –	  
to	   adjust.	   If	   Britain	   had	   adhered	   to	   a	   similarly	   phased	   process	   of	   implementation	   it	   is	   likely	   that	  
fewer	   problems	   and	   less	   non-­‐compliance	  would	   have	   ensued.	  However,	   by	   the	   end	   of	   Thatcher’s	  
Premiership,	   she	   had	   succumbed	   to	   political	   hyper-­‐activism,	   favouring	   radical	   ‘big-­‐bang’	   policies	  
which	  would	  produce	  instant	  results.	  	  
It	   is	  also	  apparent	   that	   inappropriate	   transfer	  was	  present,	  as	   the	  social,	   legal	  and	  cultural	  
differences	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   were	   not	   considered	   by	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury.	   Their	  
failure	  to	  recognise	  such	  differences	  might	  have	  reflected	  an	  exaggerated	  or	  simplistic	  view	  of	   the	  
apparent	   similarities	  between	  Britain	   and	   the	  US.	  However,	   these	  differences	  were	  acknowledged	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  Government.	  As	  one	  Minister	  in	  the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet	  stated,	  ‘the	  American	  society	  
is	  different	   to	  ours,	  particularly	   in	   its	  attitude	  to	  the	  poor.	  You	  couldn’t	   just	  adopt	   their	  views	  and	  
enforce	  their	  culture:	  it	  doesn’t	  work	  like	  that’	  (interviewed	  by	  author,	  19	  July	  2011,	  Minister	  B).	  The	  
American	   culture	   and	   the	   general	   views	   of	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   its	   citizens	   made	   them	   more	  
receptive	   to	   right	  wing	  policies	  and	  more	  willing	   to	  accept	   the	  CSES.	  The	  role	  of	   the	  state	  and	  the	  
degree	  of	  welfare	  provisions	  in	  both	  countries	  were	  vastly	  different.	  This	  meant	   in	  Britain,	  the	  CSA	  
was	  viewed	  as	  intrusive,	  whereas	  in	  America	  CSES	  was	  widely	  accepted.	  American	  citizens	  had	  never	  
experienced	  the	  degree	  of	  welfare	  provision	   that	   the	  British	  had;	   therefore,	   to	   them	   it	  was	  not	  as	  
radical	  or	  as	  controversial.	  Thatcher	  was	  attempting	  to	  enforce	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  and	  individualist	  culture	  
onto	  a	  society	  that	  had	  previously	  experienced	  ‘cradle	  to	  the	  grave’	  support	  from	  the	  welfare	  state.	  
Therefore	   the	   degree	   of	   non-­‐cooperation	   with	   the	   CSA	   once	   it	   was	   operational	   can	   be	   linked	   to	  
social	  and	  cultural	  differences	  between	  Britain	  and	  America.	  It	  was	  too	  simplistic	  to	  assume	  that	  two	  
countries	  with	   differing	   social	   and	   cultural	   attitudes	  would	   react	   to	   a	   policy	   in	   the	   same	  manner;	  
attention	  to	  these	  differences	  needed	  to	  be,	  but	  were	  not,	  addressed	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury.	  	  
Thatcher’s	  objective	  was	  not	  that	  of	  creating	  a	  reliable	  child	  maintenance	  system	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  
all	   parties,	   as	   it	  was	   for	   the	  Department	   for	   Social	   Security	   (DSS)	   and	   the	   Lord	  Chancellor’s	  Office	  
(LCO);	  it	  was	  an	  ideological	  pursuit	  to	  achieve	  a	  New	  Right	  agenda.	  The	  decision	  to	  transfer	  elements	  
of	   the	   CSES	   was	   unquestionably	   influenced	   by	   Thatcher’s	   ideological	   desire	   to	   copy	   what	   she	  
thought	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  was	  endeavouring	  to	  do.	  Yet	  her	  ideologically	  derived	  ignorance	  
allowed	   her	   to	   change	   the	   principal	   objective	   of	   the	   policy.	   Thatcher	   failed	   to	   understand	   the	  
significance	  of	  the	  CSES’s	  other	  elements	  and	  aims.	  Not	  only	  did	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  decide	  to	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pick-­‐and-­‐mix	   parts	   of	   the	   CSES	   policy,	   they	   also	   failed	   to	   undertake	   a	   policy	   learning	   process	   by	  
interpreting	   the	   policy	   incorrectly,	   and	   furthermore	   failed	   to	   take	   into	   consideration	   the	   cultural,	  
political,	  and	  legal	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  These	  errors	  all	  contributed	  to	  the	  CSA’s	  
eventual	  problems	  and	  ultimate	  failure.	  	  
4.5.	  The	  Idea	  of	  ‘Dual	  Policy	  Transfer’	  
As	   stated	   above,	   Dolowitz’s	   claim	   that	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   CSA	   are	   found	   in	   policy	   transfer	  
from	  the	  USA	  is	  only	  partially	  accurate.	  The	  Government	  did	  not	  look	  exclusively	  at	  the	  child	  support	  
schemes	  in	  America	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  transferring	  the	  entire	  Wisconsin	  policy;	   it	  was	  never	  the	  
intention	  of	  the	  DSS	  and	  LCO	  to	  adopt	  the	  American	  system.	  By	  looking	  at	  primary	  sources,	  such	  as	  
official	   documents	   and	   information	   gathered	   from	   Freedom	   of	   Information	   requests,	   as	   well	   as	  
undertaking	  interviews	  with	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  policy	  making	  process,	  it	  can	  be	  identified	  that	  the	  
1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   was	   developed	   from	   two	   separate	   sources.	   Whilst	   policy	   transfer	   from	  
America	   was	   present,	   as	   demonstrated	   above,	   it	   was	   not	   limited	   to	   America	   alone,	   as	   also	  
demonstrated	  by	  Millar	  and	  Whiteford	  (1993)	  and	  Maclean	  (1994),	  but	  instead	  ‘dual	  policy	  transfer’	  
took	  place.	   The	   contrasting	  objectives	   and	  definitions	  of	  problems	   identified	   in	   the	  Chapter	  Three	  
meant	  that	  divergent	  actors,	  the	  DSS	  and	  the	  LCO	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  on	  
the	  other,	  looked	  towards	  different	  countries	  and	  thus	  different	  systems	  in	  order	  to	  attempt	  to	  fulfil	  
their	  objectives,	  and	  remedy	  their	  identified	  problems.	  	  
The	  work	   conducted	   on	   policy	   transfer	   to	   date	   does	   not	   acknowledge	   the	   possibility	   that	  
policy	  transfer	  may	  be	  occurring	  from	  more	  than	  once	  source	  –	  two	  established	  policies	  feeding	  into	  
the	  creation	  of	  one	  new	  policy.	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  assumed	  that	  policy	  transfer	  is	  a	  single	  and	  isolated	  
process,	   a	   simple	   case	   of	   taking	   policies	   and	   ideas	   from	  one	   country	   to	   another,	   and	   if	   problems	  
arise	   then	  we	   can	   use	   an	   understanding	   of	   ‘uninformed’,	   ‘incomplete’,	   and	   ‘inappropriate’	   policy	  
transfer	  as	  a	  way	  to	  assess	  it.	  However,	  we	  need	  to	  also	  acknowledge	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  may	  
be,	  intentional	  or	  unintentional,	  ‘dual	  (or	  multiple)	  policy	  transfer’	  occurring.	  	  Dual	  policy	  transfer	  is	  
where	  ideas	  from	  more	  than	  one	  country	  are	  used	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  policy.	  	  Although,	  we	  should	  
also	  note	  that	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  form	  of	  ‘dual	  policy	  transfer’;	  we	  can	  label	  these	  as	  ‘coherent	  
dual	  policy	  transfer’	  and	  ‘incoherent	  dual	  policy	  transfer’.	  	  
‘Coherent	   dual	   policy	   transfer’	   is	   whereby	   policy	   makers	   are	   looking	   at	   two,	   or	   more	  
countries,	   learning	   and	   discussing	  merits	   of	   both,	   with	   a	   clear	   objective	   to	   extrapolate	   and	   learn	  
from	  each	  of	   them.	  This	   leads	   to	   the	  policy	   transfer	  being	   a	  more	  unified	  process,	  whereby	  aims,	  
objectives,	   administrative	   systems,	   implementation	   plans,	   etc.,	   are	   fed	   into	   a	   condensing	   process,	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creating	   a	   clear	   integrated	   plan	   for	   formulating	   the	   borrowing	   country’s	   policy.	   As	   the	   Figure	   4.1	  
demonstrates:	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.1	  Coherent	  Dual	  Policy	  Transfer 	  
	  
	  
But	   there	   can	   also	   be	   ‘incoherent	   dual	   policy	   transfer’	   which	   occurs	   where	   there	   has	   been	   no	  
integrating	  or	  condensing	  process	  of	  different	  country’s	  policies	  into	  a	  coherent	  plan.	  This	  tends	  to	  
reflect	   little,	   or	   no,	   communication	   amongst	   those	   looking	   at	   different	   countries.	   Instead,	   two	  
separate	  groups	  of	  actors	  have	  looked	  at	  two	  different	  countries,	  and	  fed	  directly	  into	  the	  new	  policy	  
they	   are	   attempting	   to	   create.	   There	   has	   been	   no	   formulation	   of	   clear	   plan	   to	   integrate	   the	   two	  
polices.	   Instead,	   the	   transfer	   process	   leads	   to	   the	   feeding	   of	   multiple,	   incompatible,	   and	   even	  
conflicting	  aims	  or	  systems	  into	  one	  policy.	  As	  Figure	  4.2	  demonstrates:	  
	  
Figure	  4.2	  Incoherent	  Dual	  Policy	  Transfer	  
	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   ‘incoherent	   dual	   policy	   transfer’	   certainly	   took	  
place.	  	  Below	  will	  highlight	  the	  second	  attempt	  of	  policy	  transfer	  that	  occurred,	  that	  from	  Australia,	  
before	  then	  assessing	  how	  ‘incoherent	  dual	  policy	  transfer’	  was	  able	  to	  occur,	  why	  it	  happened,	  and	  







4.5.1.	  Policy	  Transfer	  from	  Australia?	  
As	  was	  the	  case	  in	  America	  and	  Britain,	  Australia	  was	  also	  facing	  an	  upsurge	  in	  divorced	  and	  
never-­‐married	  single	  parents.	  Yet	  Australian	  society	  did	  not	  view	  this	  as	  a	  shameful	  decline	  of	  family	  
values;	  instead,	  it	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  ensuing	  link	  to	  increasing	  poverty	  amongst	  lone	  parents.	  
The	  number	  of	  lone	  parents	  in	  Australia	  who	  were	  living	  in	  poverty	  was	  43	  per	  cent	  in	  1981-­‐82	  and	  
47	   per	   cent	   in	   1985-­‐86	   (Saunders	   and	   Matheson,	   1990,	   ii).	   It	   was	   figures	   such	   as	   these	   which	  
motivated	   the	   Australian	   Government	   to	   reform	   child	   maintenance.	   Indeed,	   concern	   about	   child	  
poverty	  was	  a	  significant	  factor	  shaping	  Australian	  social	  security	  policy	  in	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  1980s.	  The	  
predominant	   attitudes	   within	   each	   government	   towards	   social	   security	   were	   very	   different.	  
Governments	  in	  America	  and	  Britain	  were	  pre-­‐occupied	  with	  rolling-­‐back	  the	  state	  and	  reducing	  the	  
social	   security	   budget,	  while	   in	  Australia	   the	  main	   focus	  was	  on	   increasing	   the	   living	   standards	  of	  
those	   in	  need,	  a	   facet	  which	  was	  snubbed	  by	  Thatcher	  and	   the	  Treasury	   in	   their	   search	   for	  a	  new	  
child	  maintenance	  system	  which	  would	  deliver	  expenditure	  savings.	  	  
However,	  the	  motivation	  for	  reform	  within	  both	  the	  DSS	  and	  the	  LCO	  was	  similar	  to	  that	  in	  
Australia	  -­‐	  a	  desire	  to	  remedy	  a	  failing	  system.	  Like	  Britain’s	  DSS,	  Australian	  reformers	  emphasised	  
that	  their	  current	  court	  system	  was	  largely	  unsuccessful.	  As	  Harrison	  et	  al	  state,	  ‘the	  lack	  of	  private	  
financial	  support	  emanating	  from	  non-­‐custodial	  parents	  has	  detrimental	  effects’	  (1987,	  93).	  In	  1982,	  
nearly	  70	  per	  cent	  of	  female	  lone	  parents	  in	  Australia	  were	  in	  receipt	  of	  Income	  Support	  and	  only	  25	  
per	  cent	  received	  regular	  maintenance	  (Harrison	  et	  al,	  1987,	  94).	  The	  court	  system	  was	  experiencing	  
vast	   problems,	   most	   notably	   that	   it	   produced	   inconsistent	   results,	   the	   level	   of	   maintenance	   was	  
inadequate,	  and	  the	  frequency	  of	  payments	  was	  poor.	  The	  origins	  of	  the	  reformed	  Australian	  system	  
lay	  in	  creating	  a	  reliable	  maintenance	  system	  that	  would	  assist	  lone	  parents	  and	  reduce	  poverty;	  any	  
desire	   to	  reduce	  the	  strain	  on	  the	  public	  purse	  was	  of	  secondary	  concern.	  This	  was	   fundamentally	  
different	   to	   what	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   sought.	   However	   the	   DSS	   and	   LCO	   held	   the	   same	  
definition	  of	   the	  problem	  as	  the	  Australian	  Government	  held,	  and	  therefore	  viewed	  the	  Australian	  
policy	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  social	  objectives	  rather	  than	  economic	  ideology	  or	  neo-­‐liberalism.	   	  
The	  most	  striking	  difference	  between	  Australia	  and	  America,	  and	  then	  Britain,	  was	  that	  the	  
Australian	   system	  was	   administered	   through	   the	   Tax	  Office,	   so	   that	   child	   support	   payments	  were	  
collected	   in	  a	  manner	  similar	   to	   that	  of	   Income	  Tax.	  While	   this	  method	  was	  seen	  as	  more	   reliable	  
and	   effective,	   and	  was	   encouraged	  by	   the	  DSS	   and	   LCO,	   the	   Treasury	  was	   quick	   to	   denounce	   the	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idea,	  and	  with	  Thatcher’s	  backing,	  it	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  proposed	  policy.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  CSA	  was	  
operated	  through	  the	  DSS,	  which	  was	  even	  then	  perceived	  as	  a	   less	  effective	  method	  of	  collection	  
(Social	  Security	  Committee,	  1991,	  xvi).	  Whilst	   the	  DSS	  and	  LCO	  believed	  the	  CSA	  would	  have	  been	  
more	   appropriately	   administered	   through	   the	   Inland	   Revenue	   (Minister	   in	   the	   Thatcher	   Cabinet,	  
interviewed	  by	  Author,	  19	  July	  2011,	  Minister	  B)	  the	  power	  of	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  to	  reject	  
this	  element	  subsequently	  led	  to	  incomplete	  policy	  transfer	  from	  Australia.	  	  
There	  were	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  Australian	  system	  which	  were	  also	  overruled	  by	  Thatcher	  
and	   the	   Treasury.	   The	   British	   system	   upheld	   no	   maintenance	   ‘disregard’	   for	   lone	   parents	   –	   any	  
maintenance	   received	  was	   treated	   as	   income,	   and	   benefit	   reduced	   pound	   for	   pound	   accordingly.	  
Thus	   lone	  parents	   in	  Britain	   receiving	   Income	  Support	  could	  not	  benefit	   financially	   from	  receipt	  of	  
child	  maintenance	   through	   the	   CSA.	   This	   differed	   in	  Australia,	  where	   the	   lone	   parent	   kept	   75	  per	  
cent	   of	   the	   maintenance	   awarded	   when	   the	   father	   had	   low	   earnings,	   this	   proportion	   declining	  
towards	  50	  per	   cent	   as	   the	   father’s	   earnings	   increased.	   In	  Britain,	   lone	  parent	  on	   Income	  Support	  
gained	  nothing	  until	  the	  maintenance	  paid	  takes	  the	  family	  off	  benefits	  altogether.	  The	  progressive	  
element	   of	   the	   Australian	   system	  was	   banished	   from	   the	   British	   CSA’s	   formula.	   This	   again	   was	   a	  
result	  of	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  Treasury	  and	  Thatcher’s	  ideological	  objectives.	  The	  priority	  of	  curbing	  
public	   expenditure	   purged	   the	   new	   British	   system	   of	   any	   progressive	   element,	   which	   in	   turn	  
undermined	  the	  DSS’s	  objectives	  and	  signified	  an	  incomplete	  policy	  transfer,	  which	  subsequently	  led	  
to	  serious	  operational	  problems,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  loss	  of	  legitimacy	  or	  popularity	  for	  the	  policy.	  
The	  hyperactivity	  of	  Thatcher	  during	  her	  last	  few	  years	  in	  office	  meant	  that	  an	  incremental	  
approach	   to	   implementing	   the	  policy	  was	  dismissed.	  As	  a	  Minister	   in	   the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet	   stated,	  
her	   desire	   for	   ‘big	   bang	   policies’	   required	   it	   to	   be	   rushed	   through	   in	   its	   entirety	   (interviewed	   by	  
author,	   July	  19	  2011,	  Minister	  A).	   The	   implementation	  method	  of	   the	  Australian	   system,	  although	  
intended	  by	   the	  DSS,	  was	   ignored,	  although	   it	  had	  proven	   to	  be	   successful,	  because	  of	  Thatcher’s	  
pursuit	   of	   radicalism.	   However,	   the	   DSS	   fought	   to	   adhere	   to	   the	   Australian	   incremental	  
implementation	  method	  but	  they	  were	  overruled	  by	  the	  Treasury	  (Deakin	  and	  Parry,	  1999:	  120).	  As	  
stated	   previously,	   this	   method	   was	   also	   present	   in	   the	   Wisconsin	   system,	   yet	   Thatcher	   and	   the	  
Treasury	   ignored	   its	   importance	   and	   forced	   through	   an	   incomplete	   policy	   transfer.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  
policy	   transfer	   from	   Australia	   they	   consciously	   fought	   against	   it,	   leading	   therefore	   to	   incomplete	  
policy	  transfer.	  	  
This	  was	   another	   example	  of	   how	   ideology	   replaced	  practicability	   to	   the	  detriment	  of	   the	  
policy.	  As	  well	  as	  removing	  important	  elements	  of	  the	  Australian	  system	  that	  conflicted	  Thatcherite	  
ideology,	  dominance	  by	   the	  Treasury	  meant	   that	  additional	  aspects	  were	   included.	  Most	  strikingly	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was	   that	   the	  British	  system	  was	  applied	   in	   retrospect,	  whereas	   the	  Australian	  system	  only	  applied	  
the	  formula	  to	  cases	  after	  1989.	  	  Again,	  the	  insistence	  and	  determination	  by	  the	  Treasury	  to	  reap	  the	  
maximum	  revenues	  possible	  exposed	  the	  CSA	  to	  serious	  problems,	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  	  criticism	  and	  
non-­‐compliance	  by	  those	  absent	  parents	  who	  had	  previously	  reached	  maintenance	  settlements,	  but	  
also	  by	  massively	  increasing	  the	  workload	  of	  the	  CSA	  staff.	  	  
4.6.	   Dual	   Policy	   Transfer:	   Advancing	   Our	   Understanding	   of	   Policy	   Transfer	   and	   Links	   to	   Policy	  
Failure	  
Although	  Dolowitz	  suggests	  the	  CSA’s	  failure	  can	  be	  linked	  to	  incomplete,	  inappropriate	  and	  
uninformed	  policy	  transfer	  from	  America	  (2001),	  this	  is	  not	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  policy	  
transfer	  process.	  The	  complexity	  surrounding	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  problem,	  which	  was	  discussed	  in	  
Chapter	  Three,	  was	  also	  present	   in	   the	  policy	   formation	  process.	   Just	   as	   there	  were	   two	   separate	  
origins,	  there	  were	  also	  two	  distinct	  strands	  of	  policy	  transfer.	  	  







As	   discussed	   above,	   it	  was	   not	   exclusively	   a	   case	   of	   policy	   transfer	   from	  one	   country	   to	   another;	  
while	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  looked	  towards	  Wisconsin,	  the	  DSS	  and	  the	  LCO	  were	  enamoured	  
with	  the	  Australian	  model.	  The	  latter	  system	  was	  more	  appropriate,	  sophisticated	  and	  more	  reliable	  
in	  collecting	  child	  maintenance	  than	  the	  American	  systems.	  The	  DSS	  and	  the	  LCO	  were	  aware	  of	  this	  
and	   attempted	   to	   undertake	   policy	   transfer	   from	   Australia,	   yet	   their	   attempt	   was	   sabotaged.	  
Australia’s	  model	  was	  viewed	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  as	  unsuitable	  in	  terms	  of	  achieving	  their	  
ideological	  agenda;	  creating	  a	  reliable	  child	  maintenance	  system	  was	  secondary	  to	  their	  objective	  of	  
curbing	  social	  security	  expenditure	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.	  	  
As	  stated	  above,	  when	  this	  Chapter	  introduced	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘dual	  policy	  transfer’,	  it	  can	  either	  
take	  place	   in	   the	   form	  of	  what	  can	  be	   labelled	   ‘coherent	  dual	  policy	   transfer’	  or	   ‘incoherent	  dual	  
policy	  transfer’.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  act	  it	  was	  the	  latter.	  What	  can	  be	  seen	  during	  
Policy	  Transfer	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this	  process	  of	  Policy	  Transfer	  was	  Thatcher	  and	   the	  Treasury’s	  power	   to	  enforce	   their	  attempt	  of	  
‘uninformed’,	   ‘incomplete’,	  and	   ‘inappropriate’	  policy	   transfer	   from	  America,	  on	   to	   that	  of	   the	  DSS	  
and	  LCO’s	  attempt	  at	  policy	  transfer	  from	  Australia.	  Rather	  than	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  directly	  
stating	  that	  they	  were	  attempting	  to	  introduce	  the	  American	  system	  and	  not	  the	  Australian	  system,	  
they	   allowed	   the	   DSS	   and	   LCO	   to	   continue	   with	   Policy	   Transfer	   from	   Australia,	   while	   covertly	  
injecting	  aspects	  of	  the	  American	  system	  into	  the	  policy,	  and	  to	  undermine	  it	  at	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  
Bill.	  There	  was	  no	  condensing	  process,	  whereby	  a	  strategic	  plan	  was	  devised	  to	  integrate	  elements	  
of	   both	   policies,	   instead	   both	   groups	   of	   actors	   fed	   directly	   into	   the	   new	  policy.	   Thatcher	   and	   the	  
Treasury	   successfully	   injected	   parts	   of	   their	   policy	   into	   the	   DSS’s	   policy	   idea,	   leading	   to	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  poor	  policy	  that	  was	  full	  of	  conflict	  and	  contradiction.	  To	  successfully	  introduce	  a	  
policy	   that	   fulfilled	   their	   agenda	   and	  objectives,	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   	   covertly	   pushed	   their	  
flawed	  attempt	  at	  policy	  transfer	  onto	  that	  of	  the	  DSS	  and	  LCO,	  just	  as	  they	  did	  with	  their	  definition	  
of	  the	  problem	  (as	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  Three).	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  is	  not	  a	  single	  case	  of	  failed	  policy	  transfer	  from	  one	  
country	  to	  another,	  as	  Dolowitz	  claimed.	  Instead,	  there	  was	  ‘incoherent	  dual	  policy	  transfer’	  which	  
led	  to	  an	  inconsistent	  mix	  of	  the	  DSS’s	  attempt	  to	  introduce	  an	  appropriate,	  complete,	  and	  informed	  
policy	  transfer	  from	  Australia,	  and	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury’s	  determination	  to	  introduce	  what	  was	  
incomplete,	   inappropriate,	  and	  uniformed	  policy	  transfer	  from	  America.	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  
allowed	  the	  DSS	  and	  to	  undertake	  policy	  transfer	  from	  Australia,	  only	  to	  undermine	  it,	  as	  the	  policy	  
presented	  by	  the	  DSS	  seemed	  more	  likely	  to	  win	  support.	  	  It	  can	  be	  suggested	  that	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  
Treasury	  allowed	  ‘incoherent	  dual	  policy’	  transfer	  to	  occur,	  almost	  using	  it	  as	  a	  strategic	  tool	  to	  push	  
through	  their	  radical	  agenda	  through	  the	  guise	  of	  moderate	  and	  principled	  policy	  proposal.	  	  The	  next	  
chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  power	  relations	  and	  ‘battles’	  that	  occurred	  within	  the	  core	  executive.	  It	  will	  
assess	   the	   power	   resources	   that	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   utilised	   to	   successfully	   push	   through	  
their	  Treasury	  driven	  agenda.	  It	  will	  also	  advance	  upon	  Kingdon’s	  idea	  of	  ‘policy	  windows’	  (1984)	  to	  
demonstrate	  how	  this	  was	  achieved.	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Chapter	  Five	  –	  Policy	  Formulation:	  The	  Imbalance	  of	  Power	  within	  the	  Core	  Executive	  
5.1.	  Introduction	  
Chapter	  Three	  argued	  that	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  adopted	  a	  separate	  definition	  of	  the	  
‘problem’	   to	   that	   of	   the	   Department	   of	   Social	   Security	   (DSS)	   and	   Lord	   Chancellor’s	   Office	   (LCO).	  
Chapter	  Four,	  which	  looked	  at	  the	  role	  of	  policy	  transfer,	  proceeded	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  led	  them	  to	  
search	   for	   different	   policies	   to	   meet	   their	   separate	   agendas.	   This	   chapter	   will	   examine	   the	  
formulation	  stage	  of	  the	  policy	  itself.	  It	  will	  look	  at	  how	  divergent	  agendas	  gained	  position	  within	  the	  
single	   policy	   (albeit	   some	   were	   concealed)	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   power	   dynamics	   that	   influenced	   its	  
creation.	  	  Studying	  both	  the	  distribution	  and	  use	  of	  power	  within	  the	  core	  executive	  provides	  us	  with	  
an	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Treasury	  triumphed	  over	  the	  will	  
of	   the	  DSS	  and	  LCO,	  to	  be	  become	  the	  predominant	   influence	  embedded	   in	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill.	  
The	  Chapter	  will	  examine	  this	  imbalance	  of	  power4	  whilst	  also	  addressing	  the	  disagreements	  which	  
occurred	  between	  the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  DSS.	  This	  provides	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  
the	  DSS	   and	   its	   inability	   to	  prevent	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   suffocating/reorienting	   the	  policy’s	  
true	  objectives,	  using	  it	  instead	  as	  a	  platform	  to	  achieve	  their	  wider	  agenda.	  We	  need	  to	  look	  at	  the	  
power	  resources	  held	  by	  both	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  to	  understand	  why	  Newton	  introduced	  a	  
policy	  despite	  not	  entirely	  agreeing	  with	  the	  details.	  
This	  Chapter	  will	  also	  highlight	  that	  much	  of	  the	  power	  exchanges	  that	  operated	  during	  the	  
creation	   of	   the	   policy	  went	   beyond	   that	   of	   simple	   demand	   and	   compliance;	   power	  was	   not	   zero-­‐
sum.	  	  Power	  in	  the	  core	  executive	  is	  not	  merely	  quantitative,	  but	  qualitative;	  not	  just	  the	  number	  of	  
Departments/Ministers	  for	  or	  against	  a	  policy	  option,	  but	  their	  importance,	  seniority,	  significance,	  as	  
well	   as	   personalities,	   approach,	   and	  use	  of	   resources.	  We	  will	   demonstrate	   that	  whilst	   the	   ‘Prime	  
Minister	  versus	  the	  Cabinet’	  debate,	  and	  possibly	  also	  that	  of	  ‘presidentialism’,	  appears	  prevalent	  in	  
this	  case	  study,	  we	  can	  in	  fact	  utilise	  much	  of	  the	  work	  conducted	  via	  core	  executive	  studies	  and	  the	  
idea	   of	   ‘prime	  ministerial	   predominance’	   to	   gain	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	   complex	   internal	  
dynamics.	  To	  do	  this,	  this	  Chapter	  will	  first	  look	  at	  power	  more	  generally	  and	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   It	   should	  be	  acknowledged	   that	  many	  power	   resources	  are	   covert,	   indeed	   their	   success	  often	  depends	  on	  
them	  being	  so.	  As	  Hill	  highlights,	  this	  can	  often	  raise	  issues	  for	  those	  studying	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  Due	  
to	  much	  of	   the	  process	   being	  unobservable	  we	   are	   frequently	   required	   to	   engage	   in	   research	   that	   involves	  
inferences	  from	  that	  data	  that	   is	  obtained.	   In	  connection	  with	  this,	  analysts	  of	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  (or	  
indeed	   social	   scientists	   more	   generally)	   frequently	   find	   themselves	   in	   situations	   that	   they	   are	   unable	   to	  
validate	   their	   findings	   by	   revealing	   the	   source	   of	   their	   information.	   This	   leads	   them	   to	   be	   particularly	  
vulnerable	   to	   accusations	   that	   their	   work	   is	   predisposed	   to	   a	   particular	   interpretation	   of	   the	   data	   and	   the	  
event.	  (2013,	  10).	  However,	  this	  empiricist	  critique	  as	  to	  the	  invalidity	  of	  unobservable	  data	  is	  itself	  invalid.	  	  As	  
suggested	   above	   (and	   previously	   in	   Chapter	   1)	   by	   adopting	   an	   interpretivist	   epistemological	   approach	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	  utilise	  the	  unobservable,	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  analyse	  the	  nature	  of	  policy-­‐making.	  We	  just	  need	  
to	  iterate	  that	  this	  is	  one	  frame,	  or	  many,	  which	  we	  can	  use	  to	  view	  the	  world.
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the	   conceptualisation	   of	   power,	   before	  moving	   on	   to	   assess	   the	   resources	   that	   each	   player	   held	  
during	   the	  creation	  of	   the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	   It	  will	  end	  by	  advancing	  upon	  Kindgon’s	   (1995)	  
idea	  of	  a	  ‘policy	  window’	  to	  demonstrate	  where	  and	  how	  the	  power	  resources	  of	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  
Treasury	  were	  used,	  and	  subsequently	  how	  their	  ‘definition	  of	  the	  problem’	  and	  ‘vision	  of	  the	  policy’	  
succeeded.	  	  
5.2.	  Power	  
Central	   to	   this	   chapter	   is	   the	   role	  of	  power.	  Politics	   is	   in	  essence,	  as	  Lasswell	   stated,	   ‘who	  
gets	  what,	  when	  and	  how’	   (1936,	  passim);	   how	  power	   is	  distributed	  and	  utilised.	   There	  are	  many	  
different	  approaches	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  power,	  each	  drawn	  from	  different	  theoretical	  and	  disciplinary	  
traditions	  and	  focusing	  on	  different	  levels	  of	  analysis	  with	  a	  different	  emphasis.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  
to	   assess	   the	   distribution	   of	   power	  within	   the	   core	   executive,	  we	   first	   need	   to	   establish	  what	  we	  
mean	  by	  power	  and	  state	  what	   interpretation	  of	  power	  will	  be	  utilising	  during	  this	  chapter.	  Simply	  
put,	  power	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  Dahl’s	  definition:	  ‘A	  has	  power	  over	  B	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  he	  gets	  B	  to	  do	  
something	  that	  B	  would	  not	  otherwise	  do’	  (Dahl,	  1957,	  203).	  This	  thesis	  is	  suggesting	  that	  Thatcher	  
and	  the	  Treasury	  had	  the	  power	  to	  get	   the	  Social	  Security	  Secretary,	  Tony	  Newton,	   to	   introduce	  a	  
flawed	  policy	  which	  he	  did	  not	  entirely	  support	  (therefore	  A	  got	  B	  to	  do	  something	  they	  would	  not	  
have	  otherwise	  have	  done),	  hence	  this	  Chapter	  is	  interested	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  power.	  	  
However,	  to	  fully	  understand	  power	  we	  need	  to	  move	  beyond	  Dahl’s	  one	  dimensional	  view	  
of	   power	   and	   to	   recognise	   that	   power	   can	   be	   exerted	   in	   many	   ways.	   Advancing	   upon	   Dahl’s	  
pluralistic,	   one-­‐dimensional	   view	   are	   Bachrach	   and	   Baratz	   (1962,	   see	   also	   Schattschneider,	   1960).	  
They	  argue	  that	  power	  moves	  beyond	  that	  of	  direct	  force	  and	  instead	  power	  has	  ‘two	  faces’.	  They	  
acknowledge	  that	  power	  can	  be	  exercised	  directly,	  but	  also	  noted	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  less	  visible	  face	  
of	   power,	   whereby	  A	   limits	   the	   choices	   of	   B	   in	   order	   for	  A	   to	   achieve	   its	   desired	   outcome.	   This	  
interpretation	   of	   power	   acknowledges	   that	   power	   is	   often	   unobservable	   and	   not	   objectively	  
measurable,	  advocating	  also	  the	  existence	  of	  non-­‐decision	  making,	  which	  suggests	  that	  the	  threat	  of	  
action	   is	   itself	   often	   powerful	   enough	   to	   shape	   decisions.	   	   Their	   typology	   of	   power	   extends	   to	  
include	  coercion,	   influence,	  authority,	   force	  and	  manipulation	   (Bachrach	  and	  Baratz,	  1962,	  22-­‐28).	  
We	  will	  see	  that	  Thatcher’s	  use	  of	  power	  was	  not	  simply	  direct;	  much	  of	  the	  power	  that	  she	  exerted	  
was	   through	   influence,	   authority,	   and	   manipulation.	   Influence	   is	   whereby	   A	   causes	   B	   to	   change	  
his/her	  course	  of	  action	  without	  resorting	  to	  tacit	  or	  overt	  threat	   (Bachrach	  and	  Baratz,	  1962,	  30).	  
Authority	  is	  when	  ‘B	  complies	  because	  he	  recognises	  that	  A’s	  command	  is	  reasonable	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  
own	  values’,	  typically	  due	  to	  a	  belief	  that	  their	  view	  or	  actions	  hold	  legitimacy	  (Bachrach	  and	  Baratz,	  
1962,	   34-­‐37).	   Lastly,	   manipulation	   is	   where	   ‘compliance	   is	   forth-­‐coming	   in	   the	   absence	   of	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recognising	   the	   complete	   part	   of	   the	   source	   or	   the	   exact	   nature	   of	   the	   demand	   upon	   them’	  
(Bachrach	  and	  Baratz,	  1962,	  28).	  	  
Lukes,	  as	  well	  as	  many	  others,	  enhances	  our	  understanding	  of	  power	  by	  suggesting	  a	  third	  
face	  of	  power	  (1974).	  This	  takes	  manipulation	  as	  a	  form	  of	  power	  further,	  suggesting	  that	  power	  can	  
be	  covertly	  manipulating	  the	  desires	  of	  people,	  similar	  to	  the	  Marxist	  ideas	  of	  ‘false	  consciousness’	  
amongst	   the	   working	   classes.	   Whilst	   this	   conceptualisation	   of	   power	   certainly	   advances	   our	  
understanding	  of	  power,	  and	  is	  present	  in	  our	  society,	  it	  goes	  beyond	  the	  level	  of	  concern	  studied	  in	  
this	   thesis.	  Rather	   than	   the	   structural	  manipulation	   suggested	  by	   the	   third	   face,	   this	   thesis	   argues	  
that	   there	   can	  be	  exploitation	  of	   the	  desires	   and	  objectives	  of	  others	   in	   a	   concealed	  manner.	  But	  
rather	   than	  merely	  utilising	   the	  anticipated	   reaction	  of	  others,	   as	   in	   the	   second	   face	  of	  power,	  an	  
actor	  may	  be	  using	  this	  reaction	  as	  a	  screen.	  	  Behind	  which	  they	  carry	  out	  their	  designs,	  letting	  the	  
screen	  distract	  or	  misdirect	   those	  who	  may	  object.	   	  Rather	  than	  attempting	  to	   force	  through	  their	  
designs	  (direct	  power)	  or	  manipulate	  others	  to	  do	  what	  they	  wish	  (in-­‐direct	  power),	  they	  instead	  use	  
misdirection	  (misdirected	  power)	  to	  achieve	  their	  objectives.	  This	  thesis	  is	  concerned	  with	  direct	  and	  
in-­‐direct	  power,	  but	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  below	  (and	  as	  highlighted	  in	  Chapter	  Three	  which	  looked	  at	  
the	   role	   of	   ‘problem	   representation’),	   misdirected	   power	   played	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   Thatcher’s	  
approach	  to	  policy-­‐making.	  
5.3.	  Resources	  and	  Strategy	  
Power	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  deriving	  from	  the	  possession	  of	  resources.	  As	  stated	  above,	  power	  has	  
gone	  beyond	  that	  of	  demand,	  and	  can	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  resource	  dependency	  (see	  Rhodes,	  1981;	  
Smith	  1995,	  Dunleavy	  and	  Rhodes	  1990;	  Greenaway,	  1991).	  Frequently	  A	  will	  need	  B	  to	  undertake	  a	  
certain	  course	  of	  action	  in	  order	  for	  A	  to	  achieve	  their	  objective,	  or	  A	  needs	  to	  access	  the	  resources	  
that	  B	  holds;	  thus	  A	   is	  dependent	  on	  B	   in	  order	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  resource.	   In	  order	  to	  achieve	  
this,	  A	  can	  either	  exert	  overt	  or	  covert	  power	  (be	  it	  force,	  influence,	  authority	  or	  manipulation)	  or	  A	  
can	   partake	   in	   resource	   exchange	  with	  B.	   All	   actors	   have	   resources	   and	   therefore	   all	   actors	   have	  
something	   which	   they	   can	   bargain	   with	   during	   the	   policy	   making	   process	   (Jessop,	   1990).	   The	  
strength	  of	  their	  bargaining	  position	  is	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  the	  resources	  they	  hold,	  and	  how	  much	  
other	  actors	  need	  those	  resources	  (Smith,	  1991,	  31).	  	  
This	   resource	   dependency	   approach	   acknowledges	   the	   role	   of	   both	   agency	   and	   structure	  
and	  the	  interaction	  between	  these;	  how	  one	  influences	  and	  shapes	  the	  other	  (Diamond,	  2014,	  15).	  
Resources	  are	  linked	  to	  structure	  (the	  roles	  of	  the	  actors),	  for	  example	  the	  Foreign	  Secretary	  will	  be	  
handed	   certain	   resources	   upon	   taking	   office,	   but	   resources	   are	   also	   attached	   to	   the	   individual	  
political	   actor.	   Ministers	   do	   not	   have	   equal	   resources,	   not	   only	   amongst	   those	   of	   different	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departments	   but	   also	   amongst	   those	   that	   have	   held	   the	   same	   positions.	   For	   example,	   arguably	  
Estelle	  Morris,	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Education	  and	  Skills,	  was	  not	  as	  powerful	  as	  Ruth	  Kelly.	  As	  
Diamond	  highlights,	  ‘agents	  are	  affected	  by	  structural	  change,	  but	  political	  actors	  are	  ‘resource-­‐rich’,	  
having	  the	  capacity	  to	  adopt	  and	  modify	  institutions.’	  (2014,	  15).	  
However,	   it	   is	   not	   enough	   for	   actors	   simply	   to	   possess	   resources,	   as	   resources	   do	   not	   in	  
themselves	   equate	   to	   power.	   Instead	   it	   is	   the	   strategy	   and	   tactics	   in	   which	   actors	   deploy	   their	  
resources,	   and	   the	   circumstances	   in	   which	   they	   do	   so,	   which	   creates	   the	   power.	   Strategy	   is	   the	  
overall	  plan	   for	  achieving	  a	  desired	  outcome,	  whereas	  tactics	  are	  the	  means	  and	  manner	   in	  which	  
resources	  are	  used	  to	  achieve	  goals	   in	  particular	  situations	   (Smith,	  1999,	  33).	  To	  achieve	  a	  desired	  
outcome,	   an	  actor	  decides	  on	   the	  most	   effective	   strategy	  and	   tactics	   to	  deploy	  depending	  on	   the	  
situation	  and	  context.	  As	  James	  states,	  ‘even	  a	  Prime	  Minister	  with	  a	  dominant	  style	  who	  wants	  to	  
intervene	   needs	   to	   understand	   the	   lines	   of	   dependence	   and	  work	   out	   tactics	   accordingly’	   (Smith,	  
1990,	  91).	  Later	  in	  this	  chapter	  it	  will	  assess	  the	  resources,	  strategy	  and	  tactics	  used	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  
the	  Treasury	  to	  successfully	  embed	  their	  agenda	  into	  the	  policy	  proposal	  of	  the	  DSS.	  
5.4.	  The	  Core	  Executive	  
The	  concept	  of	  the	  core	  executive,	  and	  hence	  ‘core	  executive	  studies’	  was	  developed	  in	  the	  
late	  1980s	  	  and	  early	  1990s,	  primarily	  as	  a	  way	  to	  move	  us	  away	  from	  the	  limitations	  imposed	  by	  the	  
‘Prime	  Minister	  versus	  Cabinet’	  debate.	  Political	  scientists	  such	  as	  Rhodes	  (1995)	  and	  Smith	  (1999)	  
emphasised	  that	  we	  needed	  to	  move	  away	  from	  the	  constricted	  debate	  which	   implied	  that	  power	  
was	  zero-­‐sum	  (the	  more	  powerful	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  the	  less	  powerful	  the	  cabinet,	  and	  vice	  versa).	  
The	   core	   executive	   was	   defined	   as	   the	   ‘heart	   of	   British	   Government…	   [containing]	   the	   key	  
institutions	  and	  actors	  concerned	  with	  developing	  policy’	  (Smith,	  1999,	  1).	  The	  core	  executive	  model	  
emphasized	   the	   need	   to	   assess	   the	   role	   played	   by	   all	   individuals	   and	   institutions	   surrounding	   the	  
Prime	  Minister	  that	  are	   involved	   in	  the	  policy	  making	  process,	  such	  as	  the	  Treasury	  (which	  we	  will	  
see	  was	  highly	  influential	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act),	  Departmental	  Ministers	  and	  
bureaucrats.	  	  
An	  emphasis	  on	  the	  core	  executive	  not	  only	  encouraged	  scholars	  to	  devote	  more	  attention	  
on	   the	   wider	   policy	   making	   machine,	   it	   also	   provided	   a	   new	   way	   to	   assess	   power	   within	   policy-­‐
making.	  Less	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  upon	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  order	  a	  course	  of	  action	  
onto	   an	   unwilling	   department,	   and	   more	   emphasis	   was	   placed	   upon	   the	   diversity	   of	   power	  
resources,	   the	   role	   of	   negotiation,	   and	   the	  use	  of	   strategy.	  Whilst	   previous	  Chapters	   have	   argued	  
that	  the	  will	  of	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  triumphed	  over	  that	  of	  the	  DSS	  and	  the	  LCO,	  this	  Chapter	  
will	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  case	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  imposing	  something	  upon	  the	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unwilling	  Department;	   as	   Smith	   stated	   ‘even	   resource-­‐rich	   actors,	   such	   as	   the	  Prime	  Minister,	   are	  
dependent	  on	  other	  actors	   to	  achieve	   their	  goals’	   (2003,	  62).	  Rather	   it	  was	  a	  case	  of	  policy	  actors	  
being	  dependant	  on	  each	  other	  and	  the	  resources	   they	  hold,	  yet	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  being	  
more	  strategic	  and	  guileful	   in	  both	  their	  exchange	  and	  use.	  Power	   is	  not	  static,	  nor	   is	   it	   zero	  sum;	  
rather	   it	   is	  variable	  dependent	  on	  the	   individual	   involved,	  exogenous	  circumstances,	   the	  resources	  
they	  hold,	   and	   their	   skills	   in	  deploying	   them.	  As	  Rhodes	  argues,	   to	  achieve	   their	   goals,	   individuals	  
‘must	   exchange	   resources,	   for	   example,	   money,	   legislative	   authority	   or	   expertise.	   These	   changes	  
take	   the	   form	   of	   games	   in	   which	   actors	   seek	   to	   realize	   their	   objectives	   and	   manoeuvre	   for	  
advantage,	   deploying	   their	   resources	   to	   maximize	   their	   advantage,	   while	   minimizing	   their	  
dependence	   on	   other	   actors.’	   (Rhodes	   1997,	   203).	   To	   this	   end,	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	  
Support	  Act,	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  triumphed	  in	  the	  game	  of	  politics.	  
We	  should	  also	  note	  that	  there	  are	  alternatives	  to	  the	  core	  executive	  perspectives,	  namely	  
that	   of	   the	   ‘presidentialism’	   and	   ‘Prime	  Ministerial	   Predominence’.	   ‘Presidentialism’	   is	   frequently	  
used	   when	   discussing	   Thatcher’s	   policy-­‐making	   style	   and	   degree	   of	   power.	   Whilst	   the	   idea	   of	  
‘presidentialism’	   has	   been	   widely	   applied	   to	   Thatcher	   and	   Blair	   (advocated	   by	   scholars	   such	   as	  
Foley,	  2000;	  1-­‐29,	  348-­‐356)	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  oversimplified	  and	  unhelpful	  description,	  similar	  in	  
thread	   to	   that	  of	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   versus	  Cabinet	  debate.	  Whilst	   it	  depicts	  Thatcher’s	  outward	  
leadership	  style	  it	  does	  not	  accurately	  describe	  how	  she	  influenced	  the	  policy	  making	  process,	  as	  it	  
underplays	   the	  degree	  of	  complexity	  and	  strategy	  at	  play.	  As	  Hefferman	  notes,	   ‘the	  concept	  may	  
illuminate	   but	   it	   also	   confuses’	   (2003;	   349).	   The	   concept	   illuminates	   because	   it	   embraces	   the	  
changes	   in	   leadership	  style,	  but	   it	  confuses	  as	   it	   is	  unrealistic	  and	  naive,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  offers	  no	  
real	  insight.	  	  	  
	  ‘Prime	  Ministerial	  Prominence’	  approach	  which	   is	  advanced	  by	  Burch	  and	  Holliday	  (1996,	  
2004)	  and	  more	  recently,	  Bennister	  (2007,	  2012),	  Hefferman	  (2003,	  2005,	  2013),	  and	  Bennister	  and	  
Hefferman	  collectively	  (2011,	  2014).	  	  Hefferman	  challenges	  the	  ideas	  suggested	  by	  Core	  Executive	  
studies:	   the	   pluralistic	   nature	   of	   the	   resource	   exchange	   approach	   and	   the	   idea	   that	   power	   is	  
relational	  and	  dependency	  bound.	  He	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  ‘only	  partially	  accurate.	  Power	  is	  relational	  
between	  actors	  but	  it	  is	  also	  locational.	  It	  is	  dependent	  on	  where	  actors	  are	  to	  be	  found	  within	  the	  
core	   executive,	   and	   whether	   they	   are	   at	   the	   centre	   or	   the	   periphery	   of	   key	   core	   executive	  
networks’	   (2003,	   348).	   Hefferman	   is	   challenging	   the	   assumption	   that	   power	   is	   fragmented	   and	  
dispersed	   among	   all	   actors,	   and	   instead	   highlighting	   that	   there	   remains	   an	   instilled	   unequal	  
distribution	   of	   resources	   that	   allows	   for	   ‘Prime	  Ministerial	   predominance’.	   He	   suggests	   that	   the	  
likelihood	   of	   Prime	   Ministerial	   dominance	   depends	   on	   their	   possession	   of	   personal	   power	  
resources,	   as	   ownership	   of	   these	   character	   resources	   intensifies	   institutional	   power	   resources	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allowing	   a	   dominant	   approach5.	   ‘All	   core	   executive	   actors	   have	   certain	   institutional	   resources,	  
among	  them	  patronage,	  prestige,	  authority,	  knowledge,	  information	  and	  expertise.	  They	  also	  have	  
personal	   resources	   such	   as	   electoral	   strength,	   policy	   capacity,	   public	   standing	   and	   political	  
reputation.	   Together	   these	   create	   political	   capital’	   (Heffernan,	   2005,	   616).	   This	   emphasizes	   that	  
ability	  to	  dominate	  is	  dependent	  upon	  personality	  and	  strategic	  approach,	  resources	  are	  attached	  
to	   roles	   within	   the	   core	   executive	   but	   their	   strength	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   individual	   actor.	   The	  
power	   of	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   is	   contextual	   and	   dependent	   of	   personal	   resources:	   dominance	   is	  
there	  for	  the	  taking	  but	  only	  when	  paired	  with	  personal	  resources.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  by	  virtue	  of	  
access	  to	  institutional	  and	  personal	  resources	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  exercise	  substantial	  power	  over	  
the	  Government	  (Heffernan	  2003;	  2005).	  This	  is	  what	  we	  can	  see	  with	  Thatcher	  and	  her	  leadership,	  
her	  possession	  of	  personal	  power	  resources	  intensified	  the	  institutional	  power	  resources.	  However,	  
it	  could	  be	  argued	  a	   ‘Prime	  Ministerial	  predominance’	  approach	   is	  at	  risk	  of	  the	  same	  criticism	  of	  
that	  of	  the	  ‘Prime	  Minister	  versus	  Cabinet’	  debate,	  in	  that	  it	  over-­‐emphasises	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Prime	  
Minister,	   and	   on	   so	   doing	   does	   not	   fully	   acknowledge	   the	   role	   of	   other	   actors	   within	   the	   core	  
executive.	  	  
Whilst	  Hefferman’s	  ‘Prime	  Ministerial	  predominance’	  model	  challenges	  elements	  of	  the	  core	  
executive	   approach,	   these	   two	   approaches	   can	   complement	   each	   other,	   furthering	   our	  
understanding	   far	  beyond	   that	  of	   ‘presidentialism’.	   Together	   they	  allow	  us	   to	  understand	  a	  Prime	  
Minister’s	  ability	  to	  gain	  dominance	  over	  policy-­‐making	  by	  looking	  at	  their	  personal	  and	  institutional	  
resources,	  as	  well	  as	  assessing	  a	  Prime	  Minister’s	  relationship	  and	  frequent	  reliance	  on	  other	  actors.	  
Using	  them	  in	  conjunction	  with	  each	  other	  will	  blend	  the	  agency/structure	  divide,	  helping	  us	  assess	  
the	  agent’s	  power,	  their	  role	  and	  structural	  position,	  as	  well	  as	  looking	  at	  the	  institution.	  The	  below	  
section	  will	  assess	  both	  the	  institutional	  and	  person	  power	  of	  the	  actors	  involved,	  before	  discussing	  
how	  power	  was	  utilised.	  	  
5.4.1	  The	  Power	  and	  Resources	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  
As	   stated	   above:	   ‘The	  Prime	  Minister	   can	   neither	   govern	   –	   as	   governing	   occurs	   through	   a	  
myriad	  of	  institutions	  –	  nor	  actually	  make	  decisions	  without	  dependence	  on	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  other	  
actors	  and	  institutions,	  and	  without	  taking	  account	  of	  structural	  context.’	  (Smith;	  1999,	  244).	  But	  this	  
is	  not	   saying	   that	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   is	  on	  equal	   footing	  as	  others	  within	   the	   system	  and	   that	   the	  
system	   is	   operating	   in	   a	   pluralistic	   manner.	   As	   Marsh	   argues,	   there	   are	   ‘patterns	   of	   structured	  
inequality	  which	  affect	  the	  institutions	  and	  processes	  of	  British	  politics’	  (Marsh	  et	  al.	  2003).	  The	  core	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Institutional	  power	  resources	  are	  those	  that	  are	  attached	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  their	  central	  
role	  within	  the	  core	  executive.	  Personal	  Power	  resources	  are	  those	  that	  are	  based	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  
individual	  in	  question	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executive	  is	  asymmetric	  and	  often	  leans	  itself	  to	  allow	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  instil	  
their	  agenda	  into	  all	  areas.	  This	  is	  moving	  us	  away	  from	  the	  approach	  advocated	  by	  Rhodes.	  Whilst	  
resources	   are	  exchanged,	  policy	  making	   is	   co-­‐dependent,	   and	  actors	   are	   resource	  dependent,	   this	  
does	  not	  equate	  to	   the	  system	  propagated	  by	  Rhodes.	  This	  portrays	  an	   ideal	   image	  that	  hides	   the	  
complexity	  of	  power	  within	   the	  system:	  power	   is	   structural,	  personal,	  and	  manipulated,	  not	  plural	  
(Hefferman,	  2003;	  Smith,	  1999).	  As	  Hefferman	  emphasises:	  ‘Power	  is	  relational	  between	  actors,	  but	  
it	  is	  also	  locational.	  It	  is	  dependent	  on	  where	  actors	  are	  to	  be	  found	  within	  the	  core	  executive,	  and	  
whether	  they	  are	  at	  the	  centre	  or	  the	  periphery	  of	  key	  core	  executive	  networks’	  (2003,	  348).	  	  
	   Instead	  of	  seeing	  the	  core	  executive	  as	  suggested	  by	  Rhodes,	  we	  can	  use	  Hefferman’s	  model	  
of	   Prime	   Ministerial	   predominance	   (Hefferman	   2003,	   349–50)	   to	   understand	   the	   policy-­‐making	  
culture	   during	   the	   period	   of	   assessment.	   This	  model	   highlights	   that	   given	   the	   right	   circumstances	  
and	  possession	  of	  personal	  characteristics	  by	  the	  individual,	  the	  systems	  allows	  for	  Prime	  Ministerial	  
dominance,	   as	   Hefferman	   neatly	   sums	   up,	   when	   ‘personal	   power	   resources	   are	   married	   with	  
institutional	   power	   resources,	   and	   when	   the	   prime	  minister	   is	   able	   to	   use	   both	   wisely	   and	   well’	  
(Hefferman,	  2003,	  350).	  	  Below	  (Figure	  5.1)	  is	  a	  list	  of	  ‘personal’	  and	  ‘institutional’	  power	  resources	  
available	  to	  a	  Prime	  Minister.	  	  
Figure	  5.1:	  Power	  Resources	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  
Personal	  Power	  Resources	   Institutional	  Power	  Resources	  
Personal	  prestige	   Political	  Centrality	  and	  Policy	  Reach	  
Personal	  authority	   Authority	  
Supportive	  Media	   Prestige/Patronage	  
Skill	  and	  ability	   Agenda	  Control	  
Communication	   Appointment	  Control	  
Cabinet	  Support	   Legal	  Head	  of	  Government	  
Backbench	  Support	   Large	  Parliamentary	  Majority	  
Reputation	   Recent	  General	  Election	  Victory	  
Links	  to	  policy	  success	   Economic	  stability	  
Relationship	  with	  Treasury	   Weak	  opposition	  







Thatcher’s	   leadership	   style,	   dogmatic	   approach	   and	   domination	   over	   policy	   drastically	  
altered	   the	  balance	  of	  power	  within	   the	  core	  executive.	   Frequently	  her	  approach	  undermined	   the	  
Cabinet’s	  role	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that	  she	  voided	   it	  of	  power,	   removed	   its	  role	   in	  policy-­‐making	  and	  
turned	  it	  into	  a	  rubber-­‐stamping	  process	  (Smith,	  1999,	  76).	  As	  Thatcher	  herself	  confessed,	  she	  was	  a	  
‘conviction	  politician’,	  therefore	  opposed	  to	  consensus.	  Thatcher	  maintained	  this	  attitude	  inside	  her	  
Cabinet,	   undermining	   its	   checks	   and	   balances	   in	   order	   to	   enforce	   her	   own	   agenda	   onto	   a	   policy,	  
even	   if	   it	   was	   unsuitable.	  Whilst	   in	   opposition,	   Thatcher	   had	   indicated	   her	   intention	   to	   not	   treat	  
Cabinet	   as	   a	  discussion	   forum.	  As	  Gilmour	  noted,	   ‘the	  normal	   conventions	  of	   cabinet	   government	  
were	   disregarded…	   to	   facilitate	   the	   transaction	   of	   her	   monetarist	   and	   neo-­‐liberal	   ideology	   into	  
government	  policy’	  (1992,	  33).	  However	  to	  achieve	  this	  level	  of	  dominance,	  Thatcher	  had	  to	  skilfully	  
and	  strategically	  utilise	  both	  her	   ‘personal’	  and	   ‘institutional’	  power	  resources	   in	  a	  direct,	   indirect,	  
and	  misdirected	  manner.	  The	  below	  section	  will	  demonstrate	  these	  three	  manifestations	  of	  power.	  
In	  Thatcher’s	  later	  years,	  her	  use	  of	  direct	  power	  became	  more	  prominent.	  She	  increasingly	  
took	   a	   dictatorial	   approach	   towards	  Ministers,	   directing	   policy,	   refusing	   to	   listen	   or	   consult,	   and	  
undertaking	  stern	  disciplinary	  action	  in	  the	  face	  of	  any	  opposition;	  ‘if	  Ministers	  continued	  to	  protest	  
she	   sacked	   them’	   (James,	   1992,	   98).	   Thatcher	   also	   removed	   discussion	   from	   the	   Cabinet,	   instead	  
holding	  meetings	  regarding	  policies	  with	  Ministers	  (bilaterals)	   in	  her	  study	  (Smith,	  1999,	  144).	  This	  
decreased	   the	   chance	  of	  ministerial	   solidarity	   in	   resisting	  her	  demands,	   a	  method	  of	   undermining	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  Cabinet.	  Gilmour	  noted	  that	  Ministers	  often	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  accept	  the	  wishes	  
of	   Thatcher.	   She	   was	   a	   formidable	   Prime	   Minister,	   who	   frequently	   exerted	   power	   by	   hectoring,	  
cajoling,	   threatening,	   bullying,	   embarrassing	   and	   even	   humiliating	   ministers	   and	   officials	   (Butler,	  
1988,	   58).	   Her	   dominance	   and	   arrogance	   often	   meant	   that	   the	   only	   ultimatum	   Ministers	   could	  
present	  was	  to	  threaten	  to	  resign	  if	  she	  did	  not	  alter	  her	  decisions.	  Yet,	  as	  such	  an	  act	  may	  have	  led	  
to	   wider	   problems	   for	   the	   Party	   itself,	   Ministers	   typically	   chose	   to	   accept	   her	   intentions,	   albeit	  
reluctantly	   (James,	   1992,	   33).	   Alongside	   this	   is	   also	   a	   Prime	  Minister’s	   power	   to	   promote	   or	   exile	  
colleagues.	  During	  this	  period	  we	  saw	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  ‘career	  politician’,	  those	  that	  viewed	  
politics	  as	  their	  ambition	  and	  realm	  to	  succeed	  in.	  Their	  ambition	  and	  desire	  is	  to	  become,	  and	  then	  
remain,	   a	  Government	  Minister,	   rising	  up	   the	  ministerial	  hierarchy	   to	  posts	  of	   increasing	   seniority	  
(Butler,	  1988,	  58).	  Achieving	   this	  desire	   is	  entirely	  dependent	  upon	  the	  Prime	  Minister;	   ‘the	  Prime	  
Minister	  can	  raise	  them	  to	  heaven	  or	  cast	  them	  out	  to	  the	  darkness’	   (Butler,	  1988,	  58).	  Crossman,	  
speaking	   in	   1972	   but	   his	   words	   appropriate	   under	   Thatcher	   and	   today,	   stated	   that	   department	  
ministers	  are	  highly	  dependent	  on	  the	  Prime	  Minister:	  ‘each	  minister	  fighting	  in	  the	  Cabinet	  for	  his	  
Department	   can	  be	   sacked	  by	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   any	  day,	  we	  must	  be	   constantly	   aware	   that	  our	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tenure	   in	  office	  depends	  on	  his	   [or	  her]	  personal	  decision’.	   (Crossman,	  1972,	  63).	  Thatcher	  utilised	  
this	   dependence,	   as	   Butler	   stated,	   ‘she	   has	   used	   the	   fear	   of	   not	   being	   appointed,	   and	   the	   fear,	  
having	   been	   appointed,	   of	   being	   sacked,	   to	   discipline	   the	   scores	   of	   ambitious	   young	  men	   of	   the	  
Conservative	  back	  benches	  and	  also	  the	  existing	  members	  of	  her	  administration.’	  (Butler,	  1988,	  59).	  	  
Towards	  the	  end	  of	  her	  Premiership,	  Thatcher’s	  leadership	  style	  meant	  that	  she	  increasingly	  
ignored	  her	  dependence	  on	  other	  colleagues.	  This	  unbound	  her	  of	  many	  resource	  dependencies	  that	  
typically	   constrain	   Prime	   Ministers.	   For	   example,	   the	   constraints	   of	   lack	   of	   expertise,	   working	  
relations	   with	   external	   organisations,	   and	   lack	   of	   time	   did	   not	   prevent	   Thatcher’s	   dictatorial	  
approach	  to	  policy-­‐making	  in	  areas	  of	  her	  interest.	  	  By	  placing	  ideology	  above	  expertise,	  and	  holding	  
a	   disregard	   for	   pressure	   groups,	   Thatcher’s	   involvement	   in	   policy-­‐making	   was	   often	   from	   a	   half	  
informed	  position,	   as	   demonstrated	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   Chapter	   Four	   (Young,	   1989,	   62).	  Not	  
only	   was	   Thatcher’s	   ideological	   dominance	   harmful	   to	   polices,	   but	   when	   coupled	   with	   dogmatic	  
leadership,	   poor	   management,	   and	   a	   void	   of	   dependency	   relationships,	   ‘ministers’	   freedom	   of	  
manoeuvre	  was	  constrained,	  making	  them	  simple	  agents	  of	  the	  premier’s	  will’	  (Rhodes,	  1995,	  15).	  
As	  well	  as	  exerting	  direct	  power	  Thatcher	  also	  held	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  indirect	  power.	  
The	   fact	   that	   she	   held	   the	   potential	   to	   exert	   certain	   resources	   was	   in	   itself	   powerful	   enough,	   as	  
Butler	  states	  ‘of	  course,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  use	  this	  particular	  weapon	  very	  often:	  fear	  of	  being	  on	  
the	  receiving	  end	  of	  a	  Prime	  Ministerial	   tongue-­‐lashing	  –	  or	  even	  a	  Prime	  Ministerial	   froideur	   	  –	   is	  
usually	   adequate	   to	   the	   purpose’	   (Butler,	   1988,	   58).	   This	   fits	   directly	   with	   second	   face	   of	   power	  
(Bachrach	   and	   Baratz,	   1962;	   Lukes,	   1974)	   and	   Crenson’s	   study	   of	   Gary,	   Indiana	   (1971).	   Crenson’s	  
study	  of	  US	  air	  pollution	   found	   that	   regulations	  were	   relatively	   low	   in	  Gary,	   a	   city	   that	  was	  highly	  
dependent	  on	  US	  Steel	   for	  employment.	  The	   low	   level	  of	  regulation	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  result	  of	  
the	  influence	  of	  indirect	  power.	  An	  imbalance	  of	  power	  exists	  but	  the	  power	  that	  US	  Steel	  held	  was	  
invisible.	  US	  Steel	  was	  powerful	  without	  having	  to	  act,	  and	  policy	  legislators	  were	  powerless	  because	  
they	  felt	  unable	  to	  act	  due	  to	  fear	  of	  a	  negative	  reaction	  on	  US	  Steel’s	  part	  (the	  ‘anticipated	  reaction’	  
of	  moving	  from	  the	  area,	  thus	  resulting	   in	  a	   loss	  of	   jobs).	  Similarly,	  this	  fear	  of	   ‘possible	  action’,	  or	  
‘anticipated	  reaction’,	  was	  a	  strong	  power	  resource	  for	  Thatcher.	  Frequently	  she	  would	  not	  have	  to	  
exert	  power,	  her	  image	  of	  ruling	  with	  a	  strong	  fist	  and	  her	  often	  intimidating	  nature	  made	  Ministers	  
feel	  as	   if	  they	  could	  not	  step	  out	  of	   line	  and	  oppose	  her	  will,	   for	  fear	  of	  being	  ignored,	   losing	  their	  
post,	  appearing	  (or	  be	  depicted)	  as	  disloyal,	  or	  being	  exiled	  to	  the	  back	  benches.	  
Another	   source	   of	   power	   was	   Thatcher’s	   ability	   to	   obstruct	   departmental	   policies	   or	  
initiatives.	   Newton	   held	   a	   particular	   concern	   regarding	   disability	   policy.	   The	   power	   that	   Thatcher	  
(and	   indeed	   the	   Treasury)	   held	   was	   the	   ability	   to	   veto	   or	   stall	   policies	   –	   if	   Newton	   had	   created	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difficulties	  regarding	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  it	  could	  have	  led	  to	  the	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  
reacting	  by	  creating	  difficulty/problems	  when	  Newton	  wished	  to	   introduced	  a	  policy	  that	  was	  high	  
on	  his	  agenda	  and	  he	  was	  passionate	  about.	  The	  potential	   to	  deprive	  him	  of	  the	  funds	  needed	  for	  
the	  policy	  was	   a	   source	  of	   indirect	  power	   that	  both	  Thatcher	   and	   the	  Treasury	  held6,	   yet	  without	  
necessarily	  being	   stated	  openly.	  As	  a	   result,	  Newton	   felt	  more	   reluctant	   to	  oppose	   their	  demands	  
regarding	  the	  policy.	  
Whilst	  the	  above	  is	  certainly	  an	  accurate	  description	  of	  Thatcher’s	  approach	  to	  leadership,	  it	  
does	   not	   fully	   engage	  with	   all	   of	   Thatcher’s	   power	   resources,	   tactics	   and	   the	  methods	  which	   she	  
deployed	   to	   and	   exert	   her	   influence,	   and	   thereby	   achieve	   her	   goals.	   Above	   discussed	   the	   typical	  
image	  associated	  with	  Thatcher;	  the	  use	  of	  ‘direct	  power’	  that	  can	  readily	  observed,	  ruling	  with	  clear	  
and	   firm	   authority,	   and	   the	   indirect	   power	   she	   wielded.	   However	   Thatcher’s	   leadership	   was	   also	  
marked	  by	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  covert,	  or	  ‘misdirected	  power’.	  Much	  was	  hidden	  by	  strategy,	  to	  
the	  extent	  that	  those	  subject	  to	  this	  power	  were	  often	  unaware	  of	  its	  exercise.	  As	  Chapter	  Three	  on	  
problem	  definition,	   and	   Chapter	   Five	   on	   policy	   transfer	   demonstrated,	   it	   could	   be	   suggested	   that	  
Thatcher	  allowed	  the	  DSS	  and	  LCO	  to	  believe	  their	  policy	  was	  born	  from	  their	  specific	  definition	  of	  
the	  problem,	  and	  that	  the	  solution	  was	  based	  on	  policy	  transfer	  from	  Australia	  as	  well	  as	  America.	  	  
As	  James	  notes,	  ‘[t]he	  dynamics	  of	  Whitehall	  are	  such	  that	  any	  policy	  initiative	  that	  is	  to	  last	  
the	  course	  has	   to	  come	   from	  a	  departmental	  minister’	   (1995,	  76).	  Thatcher	  and	   the	  Treasury	  may	  
have	   realised	   this,	   and	   therefore	   potentially	   used	   the	   tactic	   of	   allowing	   Newton	   and	   Mackay	   to	  
introduce	   the	  policy.	  Thatcher	  and	   the	  Treasury	   calculated	   that	   this	  was	  a	  more	  effective	   strategy	  
than	   simply	   imposing	   a	   policy	   onto	   an	   unwilling	   Department.	   Here	   Thatcher	   was	   exploiting	   the	  
desires	  and	  objectives	  in	  a	  concealed	  manner.	  	  Thatcher	  was	  using	  Newton	  and	  Mackay	  as	  a	  screen,	  
behind	  which	   she	  was	   carrying	  out	  her	  designs,	   letting	   the	   screen	  distract	  or	  misdirect	   those	  who	  
may	  object.	   It	  was	   not	   simply	   that	   Thatcher	  was	   directly	   commanding	   her	   cabinet	   (direct-­‐power),	  
nor	  was	  it	  that	  her	  cabinet	  was	  succumbing	  to	  her	  will	  over	  fear	  of	  repercussions	  (indirect-­‐power).	  
Rather	   it	  was	  often	  a	   case	  of	  her	  exploiting	   their	  objectives	  and	   intentions	   to	  achieve	  her	  desired	  
outcomes,	   undermining	   them	   behind	   closed	   doors	   or	   manipulating	   them	   with	   the	   tactics	   and	  
strategies	  she	  deployed	  (misdirected	  power).	  Thatcher	  fully	  engaged	  with	  all	   three	  arms	  of	  power:	  
direct,	   indirect,	   and	  misdirected.	   This	  will	   be	   assessed	   in	  more	  detail	   later	   in	   the	  Chapter	  when	   it	  
assesses	  the	  disagreements	  that	  occurred	  between	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury,	  and	  the	  DSS	  and	  LCO.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  in	  more	  depth	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	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5.4.2	  The	  Role	  and	  Power	  of	  the	  Cabinet	  
The	   role	  of	   the	  Cabinet	   in	   policy-­‐making	   is	   limited	   (Marsh	  et	   al,	   1995;	   see	   also	  Crossman,	  
1972;	  Headey,	  1974;	  Mackintosh,	  1977;	  Hennessy,	  1986).	  However	  the	  criticism	  of	  the	  Cabinet	  can	  
go	  further,	  not	  only	  is	  it	  limited	  in	  its	  role	  in	  policy	  making	  but	  it	  is	  also	  an	  ineffective	  tool	  of	  scrutiny.	  
Cabinet’s	  influence	  and	  ability	  is	  limited	  by	  its	  structure.	  Ministers	  simply	  cannot	  undertake	  the	  work	  
load	  required	  of	  them	  to	  make	  an	  assessed	  and	  informed	  decision.	  Cabinet	  Ministers	  are	  overloaded	  
with	   papers	   and	   information	   and	   Cabinet	  meetings	   are	   too	   short	   for	   anything	  more	   than	   a	   brief	  
overview	  of	  the	  principle	  and	  a	  head	  nod	  or	  shake	  in	  reaction	  (Smith,	  1995,	  55).	  	  As	  Burch	  concluded,	  
‘the	  infrequency	  and	  short	  duration	  of	  Cabinet	  meetings	  limits	  the	  amount	  of	  business	  that	  can	  be	  
sensibly	  discussed’	  (Burch,	  1988,	  41).	  	  
The	   power	   of	   the	   Cabinet	   is	   also	   significantly	   eroded	   by	   the	   phenomenon	   of	  
departmentalism.	  If	  a	  Senior	  Minister	  is	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  policy	  proposal,	  or	  insists	  on	  the	  introduction	  
of	  a	  particular	  element,	   it	   is	  unlikely	  that	  other	  Ministers	   (those	  with	   less	  resources	  and	  authority)	  
will	  be	  able	   to	   resist	   those	  pressures	  or	  prevent	   it	   from	  being	   ratified.	  As	  Nigel	   Lawson	   recalls,	   ‘[a	  
minister]	  may	  well	  feel	  reluctant	  to	  spend	  too	  much	  of	  his	  [sic]	  political	  capital,	  arguing	  against	  the	  
Prime	  Minister	   in	   a	   field	  which	   is	   totally	   outside	   his	   departmental	   responsibility.	   It	   is	   some	   other	  
minister’s	   baby	   and	   some	   other	   minister’s	   responsibility’	   (Lawson,	   1994,	   443).	   The	   nature	   of	  
dependency	   relationships	  between	  a	  Department	  and	   the	  Treasury	  means	   that	  Ministers	  who	  are	  
aware	   of	   policy	   problems	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   government	  may	   choose	   to	   remain	   silent	   in	   order	   to	  
safeguard	   their	   own	   interests.	   As	   Kaufman	   explained,	   ‘you	   will	   ruthlessly	   pursue	   your	   own	  
department’s	  interests,	  even	  if	  another	  department	  has	  a	  better	  case’	  (1980,	  15).	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  
be	  particularly	  true	   in	  the	  1980s	  when	  all	  departments	  were	  fearful	  of	  budget	  cuts.	  The	  Treasury’s	  
targeting	  of	  the	  DSS	  meant	  that	  other	  departments	  and	  policies	  were	  not	  targeted	  as	  significantly.	  
As	   Deakin	   and	   Parry	   note	   ‘ministers	   developed	   a	   sense	   that	   social	   security	   could	   be	   an	   easy	  
pushover…	  a	  source	  of	  cuts	  that	  would	  protect	  their	  own	  budget’	  (1994,	  115).	  	  
Even	  if	  a	  Minister	  identified	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  as	  flawed,	  it	  is	  doubtful	  whether	  they	  
would	  have	  raised	  concerns	  because	   it	  would	   increase	  the	  risk	  of	   their	  department	  being	  targeted	  
for	   budget	   cuts.	   Departmentalism	   means	   that	   a	   Minister’s	   primary	   concern	   is	   not	   with	   ensuring	  
policy	  success	  across	  the	  Government,	  but	  rather	  with	  fighting	  their	  own	  corner	  –	  this	  empowered	  
Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury,	  allowing	  them	  to	  play	  departments	  off	  against	  one	  another	  (divide-­‐and-­‐
rule)	  in	  order	  to	  further	  its	  own	  agenda.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Bill,	  the	  Cabinet	  was	  not	  
willing	  to	  voice,	  or	  even	  echo,	  the	  concerns	  that	  Newton	  and	  the	  DSS	  was	  raising.	  This	  empowered	  
Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury,	   and	   weakened	   the	   DSS.	   As	   Newton	   himself	   stated,	   ‘there	   wasn’t	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sufficient	   support	   amongst	   colleagues	   to	  overcome	   their	   [Thatcher	   and	   the	  Treasury’s]	   resistance’	  
(Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  Pay,	  1999).	  	  
5.4.3	  The	  Power	  Resources	  of	  a	  Departmental	  Minister	  
The	   power	   resources	   available	   to	   a	   Departmental	  Minister	   are	   also	   fluid.	  While	   there	   are	  
certain	  ‘institutional’	  and	  ‘structural’	  resources	  that	  come	  with	  the	  post,	  ‘personal’	  power	  resources	  
are	   also	   important	   when	   understanding	   the	   degree	   of	   influence	   a	  Minister	   can	   exert.	   	   Similar	   to	  
Figure	  5.1,	  Figure	  5.2	  is	  a	  list	  of	  ‘personal’	  and	  ‘institutional’	  power	  resources	  available	  to	  a	  Minister.	  
Figure	  5.2	  Power	  Resources	  of	  a	  Minister	  
Personal	  Power	  Resources	   Institutional	  Power	  Resources	  
Personal	  prestige	   Civil	  Service	  Support	  
Personal	  Approach/Image	   Time	  
Supportive	  Media	   Knowledge	  and	  Expertise	  
Skill	  and	  ability	   Policy	  Success	  
Communication	   Party	  Support	  
Cabinet	  Support	   Political/Media	  Support	  
Backbench	  Support	   Policy	  Networks	  
Reputation	   	  
Links	  to	  policy	  success	   	  
Relationship	  with	  Treasury	   	  
Relationship	  with	  Prime	  Minister	   	  
	  
5.4.3.1	  The	  Power	  of	  Newton	  and	  Mackay	  
Tony	  Newton	  and	  Lord	  Mackay	  did	  not	  have	   the	  power	   to	   resist	   the	  pressure	  of	  Thatcher	  
and	   the	   Treasury,	   but	   they	   also	   frequently	   failed	   to	   recognise	   the	   power	   of	   Thatcher	   and	   the	  
Treasury	   when	   it	   was	   being	   exercised;	   and	   when	   they	   did	   recognise	   the	   exercise	   of	   power	   they	  
decided	  that	  resisting	  the	  combined	  force	  of	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  was	  futile.	  Instead,	  as	  we	  will	  
see	  was	  the	  case	  for	  other	  MPs	  and	  Peers	  in	  Parliament,	  they	  quietly	  acquiesced.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  
that	   Newton	   and	   Mackay	   did	   not	   have	   any	   resources	   which	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   needed.	  
Newton	   and	  Mackay	   did	   indeed	  hold	   resources	   that	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   needed	   to	   utilise;	  
they	  needed	  Newton	  to	  get	  the	  policy	  approved	  in	  Cabinet,	  and	  they	  needed	  Newton	  and	  Mackay	  to	  
get	  the	  policy	  through	  Parliament	  and	  to	  obtain	  favourable	  media	  coverage	  and	  public	  support.	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Newton’s	   public	   image	   and	   reputation	   was	   a	   resource	   that	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	  
required.	  It	  is	  often	  recognised	  that	  in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  policy	  approved	  by	  Houses	  of	  Parliament,	  and	  
to	   attain	   support	   of	   the	   British	  media	   and	   British	   public,	   a	   policy	   needs	   an	   acceptable	   image	   (As	  
demonstrated	   in	   Chapter	   Three,	   a	   favourable	   ‘representation’	   of	   a	   ‘problem’.	   As	   highlighted	   in	   a	  
Chapter	   Four,	   the	   issue	   of	   child	  maintenance	   had	   been	  previously	   acknowledged	   by	   the	   Thatcher	  
Government.	   In	   1986,	   while	   at	   the	   Downing	   Street	   Policy	   Unit,	   David	   Willetts	   prepared	   a	   paper	  
highlighting	   the	  growth	  of	  welfare	  dependent	   lone	  parents	   (Wikeley,	  2006,	  120).	  As	  highlighted	   in	  
Chapter	  Three,	  this	  agenda	  was	  propelled	  by	  John	  Moore	  in	  June	  1989,	  the	  then	  Secretary	  of	  State	  
for	  Social	  Security,	  when	  he	  informed	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  Social	  Services	  Committee	  that	  he	  was	  
determined	   to	   change	   the	   system,	   and	   that	   a	   government	   statement	   on	   policy	   towards	   single	  
parents	  would	  be	  made	   ‘in	   the	  not	  so	  distant	   future’	   (Social	  Services	  Committee,	  Session	  1988-­‐89,	  
HC	  437-­‐11,	  Minutes	  86,	  Q	  289,).	   In	   the	   late	  1980s	  Moore	  had	  been	  propagating	   the	  arguments	  of	  
Charles	  Murray,	   that	  our	  welfare	   state	  had	  created	  a	   culture	  of	  dependency,	  particularly	  amongst	  
lone	  parents,	  and	  a	  review	  of	  the	  system	  was	  needed.	  Moore	  therefore	  planned	  an	  avowedly	  radical	  
new	  policy	   initiative	   to	   deal	  with	   the	   ‘problem’,	   yet	   before	   he	   could	   enact	   his	   ‘remedy’	   he	   found	  
himself	  quickly	  ushered	  to	  the	  back-­‐benches.	  However	  the	  policy	  proposal	  and	   ideas	  generated	  by	  
Moore	   bear	   remarkable	   similarity	   to	   those	   contained	   within	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act.	   For	  
example,	  Moore	  was	  reportedly	  determined	  to	  include	  a	  punitive	  approach	  towards	  single	  parents,	  
including	  an	  obligation	  to	  identify	  the	  absent	  parent	  (Davis	  et	  al,	  1998,	  5).	  
	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  recognised	  that	  Moore,	  an	  openly	  harsh	  right-­‐wing	  Tory,	  would	  
not	  achieve	  the	  political	  support	  needed	  to	  enact	  the	  policy,	  whereas	  a	  moderate	  Conservative	  like	  
Newton	  would	   be	  much	  more	   likely	   to	   achieve	   such	   endorsement.	   Thatcher	   herself	   declared,	   ‘in	  
John	  Moore…	   I	  had	  another	   radical’	   (1993,	  589),	   ‘at	  Social	  Security…	  he	  had	  been	  courageous	  and	  
radical	   in	   his	   thinking	   about	   dependency	   and	   poverty	   (1993,	   756).	   When	   discussing	   Moore’s	  
replacement	   she	   stated:	   ‘I	   asked	  him	   [Moore]	   to	  make	  way	  and	  appointed	  Tony	  Newton,	  a	   stolid,	  
left-­‐wing	  figure	  but	  with	  good	  command	  of	  the	  House’	  (1993,	  756).	  Newton	  was	  a	  noted	  moderate	  
who	  had	  the	  respect	  of	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  House,	  and	  was	  renowned	  for	  his	  compassionate	  manner	  
and	  concern	  for	  social	  justice.	  Newton	  was	  a	  committed	  One-­‐Nation	  Tory	  that	  throughout	  his	  career	  
fought	  on	  issues	  social	  justice	  and	  equality:	  as	  recent	  obituaries	  eloquently	  describe	  him,	  ‘a	  beacon	  
of	  compassion	  in	  a	  harsh	  government’7	  (Ruth	  Lister	  in	  The	  Guardian,	  3	  April	  2012).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	   it	   can	  be	  argued	   that	  Newton	  provided	   the	  ability	   to	  change	   the	  outward	  
emphasis,	   and	  public	   representation,	  of	  both	   the	  problem	  and	   the	  policy,	   a	   resource	  and	   strategy	  
that	  was	  used	  to	  alter	  the	  rhetoric	  and	  image	  surrounding	  the	  issue	  and	  to	  mask	  the	  true	  motives	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  See	  also	  Hugo	  Young	  in	  The	  Guardian,	  26	  March,	  2012.	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the	  policy.	  Yet	  although	  this	  was	  a	  resource	  that	  Newton	  held,	  it	  did	  not	  imbue	  him	  with	  any	  power	  
due	  to	  the	  way	  Thatcher	  was	  able	  to	  obtain	  this	  resource	  from	  him.	  
5.4.4	  The	  Power	  Resources	  of	  the	  Treasury	  
The	  scope	  of	  the	  Treasury’s	  influence	  is	  significant.	  The	  Treasury	  holds	  a	  prominent	  position	  
within	   each	   department,	   allocating	   spending	   and	   often	   influencing	   its	   agenda.	   The	   Treasury’s	  
functional	  responsibilities	  provide	  it	  with	  considerable	  power	  and	  control	  over	  each	  department	  and	  
its	  ministers.	  Each	  department	  is	  reliant	  on	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Treasury;	  the	  dependency	  relationship	  
is	  high	  in	  the	  Treasury’s	  favour.	  Below,	  Figure	  5.3	  is	  a	  list	  of	  the	  resources	  that	  increase	  the	  power	  of	  
the	  Treasury.	  
Figure	  5.3	  Power	  Resources	  of	  the	  Treasury	  
Power	  Resources	  of	  the	  Treasury	  
Public	  expenditure	  (planning	  and	  control)	  
Overall	  economic	  strategy	  
Proximity/relationship	  with	  Prime	  Minister	  
Divide	  and	  rule	  
De	  Facto	  Veto	  
Economic	  climate	  
Technical	  expertise/Specialised	  knowledge	  
Access	  to	  monetary	  details	  
	  
The	  Thatcher	  Government’s	  move	  towards	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  economic	  paradigm	  enhanced	  the	  
power	  of	   the	  Treasury	   (Middlemas,	   1991,	   45).	   By	  placing	  public	   expenditure	   savings	  high	  on	   their	  
agenda,	   they	   increased	   the	   Treasury’s	   involvement	   and	   authority	   within	   the	   policy-­‐making	   and	  
drafting	  process	  of	   other	  departments.	   This	   is	   particularly	   true	   for	   social	   security,	   for	   as	   the	  most	  
expensive	   area	   of	   Government	   expenditure	   it	   was	   a	   prime	   target	   for	   attack.	   This	   allowed	   the	  
Treasury	   to	   take	  an	  authoritarian	  approach	  towards	   the	  Department	  of	  Social	  Security,	   influencing	  
the	   detail	   of	   its	   policies	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   expenditure	   savings.	   However,	   not	   only	   did	   this	   neo-­‐
liberal	   paradigm	   increase	   the	   Treasury’s	   ability	   to	   influence	   policies	   directly,	   it	   also	   increased	   its	  
power	   to	   influence	   indirectly.	   The	   role	   of	   ‘anticipated	   reaction’	   increased	   Departments’	  
subordination	  to	  the	  Treasury;	  the	  fear	  of	  ‘falling	  out	  of	  favour’	  with	  the	  Treasury,	  especially	  in	  times	  
of	  public	  expenditure	  cuts,	  is	  a	  significant	  power	  resource	  the	  Treasury	  has	  at	  its	  disposal	  (Heclo	  and	  
Wildavsky,	  1981;	  Thain	  and	  Wright,	  1990,	  1992).	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In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Child	   Support	   Bill,	   Newton	   was	   often	   cautious	   in	   his	   resistance	   to	   the	  
demands	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  due	  to	  his	  fear	  that	  they	  would	  remove	  funding	  he	  had	  earmarked	  for	  the	  
introduction	  of	  Disability	  Living	  Allowance;	  his	   flagship,	  and	  warmly	  received,	  disability	  policy.	  As	  a	  
Minster	  in	  the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet	  stated:	  
…there	  were	  all	  sorts	  of	  things	  [Newton]	  was	  interested	  in	  at	  the	  time,	  one	  of	  them	  
disability	   living	  allowance,	  all	   for	  which	  [he]	  needed	  money	  and	  so	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  
public	   expenditure	   round	   it’s	   a	   negotiation	   with	   the	   Treasury	   across	   the	   whole	  
front…	   You	   have	   to	   think	   about	   the	   priorities	   and	   the	   balance	   between	   different	  
objects.	  (Interviewed	  by	  Author,	  19	  July	  2011,	  Minister	  A)	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  Treasury	  was	  able	  to	   impose	  its	  demands	  upon	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill.	  Newton	  was	  
not	  only	  cautious	  in	  his	  resistance	  due	  to	  the	  direct	  pressure	  the	  Treasury	  could	  have	  upon	  him,	  but	  
also	  because	  he	  recognised	  that	  few	  Cabinet	  colleagues	  would	  support	  him.	  The	  fear	  of	  challenging	  
the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Chancellor	  was	  too	  great,	  and	  often	  futile.	  	  	  
5.5.	  Core	  Executive	  Battles	  
5.5.1	  DSS	  vs.	  The	  Treasury	  
The	   Treasury’s	   role	   in	   the	   policy	   making	   process	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   was	   the	  
underlying	  cause	  of	  the	  policy’s	  failure.	  As	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  and	  as	  King	  and	  Crewe	  remark,	  
‘”Doing	  good”	  was	  definitely	  what	  Newton	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Social	  Security	  had	  in	  mind.	  It	  was	  
not,	  however,	  what	  the	  Treasury	  had	  in	  mind’	  (2013,	  82).	  The	  power	  of	  the	  Treasury	  to	  insert	  their	  
elements	   and	   objectives	   into	   the	   Act,	   and	   to	   override	   the	   decisions	   and	   objectives	   of	   the	  
Department	   of	   Social	   Security,	   effectively	   altered	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   policy	   and	   condemned	   it	   to	  
failure.	  The	  main	  problems	  subsequently	  suffered	  by	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  were	  inherent	  in	  the	  
policy,	  and	  can	  be	  largely	  attributed	  to	  Thatcher’s	  intervention,	  in	  tandem	  with	  that	  of	  the	  Treasury.	  
Specifically,	  these	  were:	  an	  inappropriate	  and	  unworkable	  formula;	  a	  disregard	  of	  ‘clean-­‐breaks’;	  no	  
financial	   disregard	   for	   those	   on	   Income	   Support;	   the	   application	   of	   the	   policy	   in	   retrospect;	   a	  
disregard	   of	   the	   administrative	   complexity	   of	   the	   policy;	   inconsistency	   of	   objectives	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
unworkable	  targets;	  a	  refusal	  to	  introduce	  a	  50	  per	  cent	  maintenance	  disregard;	  insistence	  that	  the	  
policy	   be	   introduced	   in	   its	   entirety	   rather	   than	   in	   stages;	   and	   as	   a	   result,	   the	   degree	   of	   non-­‐
compliance	  and	  negative	  media	  attention.	  These	  all	  derived	  from	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  placing	  
their	   aims	   above	   that	   of	   having	   an	   effective,	   socially	   just,	   child	  maintenance	   system.	  As	  Garnham	  
and	   Knights	   claim,	   this	   was	   a	   policy	   that	   put	   the	   Treasury	   first	   (1994,	   1).	   This	   had	   not	   been	   the	  
objective	  of	  the	  DSS,	  yet	  the	  power	  vested	  in	  the	  Treasury	  meant	  that	  it	  could	  override	  the	  DSS	  and	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the	  original	  objective	  of	  the	  policy,	  and	  impose	  their	  own	  priorities	  before	  the	  interests	  of	  children	  –	  
placing	  their	  Departmental	  objectives	  first.	  	  There	  were	  deep	  tensions	  within	  the	  core	  executive	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  these	  incompatible	  objectives,	  which	  ended	  in	  the	  Child	  Support	  Act	  being	  hijacked	  by	  the	  
Treasury.	  
The	  DSS	  and	  the	  Treasury	  (with	  Thatcher's	  backing)	  fought	  on	  many	  issues,	  yet	  each	  time	  the	  
DSS	  and	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  policy	  were	  defeated;	  ‘the	  Treasury	  went	  on	  winning	  battles’	  (King	  
and	  Crewe,	  2013,	  83).	   Even	  before	   the	  1990	  White	  Paper,	  Children	  Come	  First,	  was	  published	   the	  
Treasury	  won	  a	  crucial	  victory.	  In	  the	  early	  summer	  of	  1990,	  officials	  from	  the	  DSS	  and	  the	  Treasury	  
gathered	  to	  negotiate	  the	  details	  of	  the	  policy.	  The	  first	  battle	  to	  occur	  was	  over	  the	  inclusion	  of	  an	  
income	   disregard.	   The	   DSS	   was	   in	   favour	   of	   an	   income	   disregard,	   so	   that	   lone	   parents	   and,	   by	  
implication	  their	  children,	  could	  keep	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  money	  collected	  from	  the	  absent	  parent.	  
As	  Michael	  Partridge	  stated,	  ‘we	  were	  very	  keen	  on	  a	  50	  per	  cent	  disregard,	  but	  our	  bottom	  line	  was	  
20	  per	  cent,	  but	  the	  Treasury	  wouldn’t	  agree’	  (Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  Pay,	  1999).	  The	  Treasury	  fought	  for	  
hard	   for	  a	  penny	   for	  penny	  deduction,	  consequently	   leading	   to	   the	  decision	  having	   to	  be	  made	  at	  
Cabinet	  Committee,	  which	  as	  Partridge	  recalls,	  ‘it	  became	  the	  decision	  of	  Mrs	  Thatcher,	  who	  decided	  
in	   favour	   of	   the	   Treasury’,	   leaving	   the	   Treasury	   	   to	   get	   ‘their	   hands	   on	   the	  whole	   lot’	   (Can’t	   Pay,	  
Won’t	  Pay,	  1999).	  At	  the	  time,	  concerns	  regarding	  this	  decision	  were	  raised;	  they	  argued	  that	  a	  lack	  
of	  disregard	  would	  affect	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Agency	  to	  run	  smoothly,	  yet	  the	  concern	  was	  dismissed.	  
Conflict	   also	   occurred	   over	   the	   retrospective	   and	   ‘clean-­‐break’	   application	   of	   the	   policy.	  
Contrary	   to	   the	  DSS’s	   advice	  and	   concerns,	   the	  Treasury	  ensured	   that	   the	   scope	  of	   the	   legislation	  
was	   expanded	   to	   all	   cases,	   overriding	   ‘clean-­‐break’	   and	   court	   settlements:	   ‘all	   separated	   couples	  
with	  children,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  circumstances,	  were	  caught	  in	  the	  Treasury’s	  fiscal	  net’	  (King	  and	  
Crewe,	   2013,	   83).	   As	   demonstrated	   in	   Chapter	   Four,	   ideology	   was	   placed	   over	   effective	   policy-­‐
making	  and	  economic	  objectives	  triumphed	  over	  social	  justice.	  	  	  
The	  major	  battle	   that	  arose	  between	   the	  DSS	  and	   the	  Treasury	  was	  over	   the	  detail	  of	   the	  
formula.	   According	   to	   a	   former	  Minister	   in	   the	   Thatcher	   Cabinet,	   the	   Treasury’s	   objective	  was	   to	  
reap	   the	   biggest	   revenue	   from	   the	   formula,	   whilst	   the	   DSS	   aimed	   to	   achieve	   a	   formula	   that	   was	  
based	  on	  accuracy	  and	  fairness.	  Intense	  negotiations	  took	  place	  between	  the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  DSS	  
which	  the	  former	  won,	  resulting	  in	  their	  objectives	  becoming	  dominant.	  The	  DSS’s	  concerns	  and	  the	  
goal	  of	  achieving	  accuracy	  were	  secondary	  to	  the	  desires	  of	  the	  Treasury	  (Interview	  with	  author,	  19	  
July	  2011,	  Minister	  A).	  Consequently	  the	  Treasury	  became	  the	  main	  architect	  of	  the	  formula,	  which	  
determined	   the	   level	   of	   child	   maintenance	   that	   applicants	   should	   receive.	   This	   highlights	   the	  
approach	   that	   the	   Conservative	   Government	   took	   towards	   child	   maintenance	   –	   an	   economic	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approach	  rather	  than	  a	  social	  approach	  –	  and	  emphasises	  the	  uneven	  distribution	  of	  power	  within	  
the	  core	  executive	  which	  was	  weighted	  towards	   the	  Treasury.	  Although	  the	  Treasury	  did	  not	  have	  
the	  expertise	  to	  create	  a	  formula	  for	  child	  maintenance	  payments,	  it	  did	  have	  the	  power	  to	  take	  this	  
responsibility	  away	  from	  the	  rightful	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  DSS	  and	  place	  it	  in	  their	  own	  hands.	  This	  is	  a	  
clear	  example	  of	  how	  power	  and	  ideology	  was	  prioritised	  over	  expertise	  and	  social	  justice.	  	  
Newton	  and	  Lord	  Mackay	  voiced	  concerns	  over	  the	  detail	  of	  the	  formula	  and	  its	  disregard	  of	  
crucial	  elements,	  but	  their	  pleas	  were	  ignored.	  The	  Treasury	  looked	  at	  it	  primarily	  in	  terms	  of	  benefit	  
savings,	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  maintenance	  payments.	  As	  Davis	  et	  al	  noted,	  ‘the	  formula	  took	  no	  account	  
of	   their	   actual	   living	   costs’	   (1998,	   26),	   there	  was	   no	   regard	   for	   property	   settlements,	   traveling	   to	  
work	  expenses,	  second	  families,	  existing	  debt	  payments,	  or	  costs	  incurred	  to	  maintain	  contact	  with	  
the	   children.	   This	   resulted	   in	   a	   formula	   that	   was	   unfair,	   and	   bound	   to	   cause	   problems	   and	   thus	  
complaints.	  The	  need	  to	  include	  these	  elements	  was	  not	  only	  voiced	  by	  the	  DSS	  in	  negotiations	  with	  
the	   Treasury,	   but	   as	   Chapter	   Six	   will	   show,	   it	   was	   also	   voiced	   by	   pressure	   groups	   and	   some	  
parliamentarians	   during	   the	   legislative	   process	   of	   the	   Bill.	   However	   as	   Chapter	   Six	   will	   also	  
demonstrate,	   the	  detail	  of	   the	   formula	  was	  not	  subject	   to	  effective	  parliamentary	  scrutiny,	   in	  part	  
because	  it	  was	  placed	  within	  the	  regulations.	  Consequently,	  despite	  the	  concerns	  raised,	  the	  formula	  
passed	  through	  Parliament,	  meaning	   that	   the	  Treasury	  version	  had	  prevailed	  over	   the	  DSS’s	  vision	  
over	  child	  maintenance.	  	  
	  	   It	  cannot	  be	  denied	  that	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  formula	  created	  administrative	  problems,	  nor	  
can	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  formula	  be	  blamed	  entirely	  on	  the	  Treasury.	  But	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  formula	  
was	  complex	  should	  not	  in	  itself	  have	  been	  a	  reason	  for	  failure.	  The	  nature	  of	  social	  security	  means	  
that	   frameworks	  have	  to	  be	  complex	   in	  order	   to	  be	  effective	  and	  allow	  for	  discretion	   in	   individual	  
cases	   and	   circumstances.	   The	   more	   variables	   included	   in	   the	   formula,	   the	   greater	   the	   potential	  
accuracy	   of	   the	   result,	   yet	   more	   variables	   also	   increased	   both	   its	   complexity	   and	   difficultly	   to	  
administer,	   thereby	   also	   increasing	   the	   scope	   or	   potential	   for	   errors.	   This	   in	   itself	   was	   an	  
unavoidable	   problem;	   yet	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   Treasury	   influenced	   the	   formula	   exacerbated	   the	  
problem.	   The	   Treasury	   rejected	   elements	   that	   should	   have	   been	   included	   in	   the	   formula,	   such	   as	  
taking	   second	   families	   into	  account,	  which	   in	   turn	  made	   the	  CSA	  maintenance	  assessment	   system	  
unpopular	  with	  many	   of	   those	   to	  who	   it	  was	   applied.	   This	   in	   turn	   decreased	   the	   co-­‐operation	   of	  
parents,	   which	  made	   calculations	   of	   payments	   difficult,	   because	   CSA	  Officers	   did	   not	   acquire	   the	  




The	   impact	   of	   the	   Treasury	   on	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   policy	   also	  magnified	   the	   effects	   of	   the	  
already	  complex	   formula.	  The	  Treasury’s	   insistence	   that	   the	  policy	  be	   implemented	   in	  a	   ‘big	  bang’	  
approach,	   rather	   than	   in	   stages,	   and	   that	   it	   should	   be	   applied	   retrospectively,	   meant	   that	   the	  
difficulties	  of	  the	  formula	  were	  magnified	  because	  of	  the	  sheer	  numbers	  of	  cases	  which	  needed	  to	  
be	  processed	  simultaneously.	  Hence,	  although	  the	  formula	  was	  complex,	  it	  was	  not	  the	  complexity	  
itself	  which	  partially	  precipitated	  its	  failure.	  Rather,	  it	  was	  the	  Treasury’s	  rejection	  of	  what	  were	  seen	  
as	   key	   elements	   in	   the	   original	   version	   that	   caused	   the	   formula	   to	   become	   a	   factor	   in	   the	   CSA’s	  
failure.	  	  
Another	   battle	   that	   was	   fought	   between	   the	   Treasury	   and	   the	   DSS	   was	   over	   the	  
retrospective	  application	  of	  the	  policy.	  The	  Treasury’s	  ability	  to	  overrule	  the	  DSS	  and	  order	  that	  the	  
formula	  be	  introduced	  to	  all	  cases	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  damning	  and	  damaging	  features	  
of	   the	   policy.	   It	   massively	   increased	   the	   workload	   of	   an	   already	   overworked,	   undertrained	   and	  
under-­‐staffed	   Agency,	   and	   upset	   many	   parents	   whose	   previous	   child	   maintenance	   agreements	   it	  
overturned.	  The	  decision	  to	  apply	  the	  formula	  in	  retrospect	  was	  another	  attempt	  by	  the	  Treasury	  to	  
maximise	   revenue,	   yet	   it	  merely	  weakened	   further	   the	   legitimacy	   and	   success	   of	   the	   policy,	   as	   it	  
totally	  disregarded	  the	  best	   interests	  of	  the	  families	  which	  had	  already	  reached	  mutual	  agreement	  
over	   maintenance	   arrangements.	   As	   Frank	   Field	   stated,	   the	   decision	   to	   introduce	   the	   policy	   in	  
retrospect	   ‘struck	  me	   as	   not	   only	   unjust,	   but	   suicidal	   in	   terms	   of	   getting	   a	   new	   approach	   up	   and	  
running.	  And	  so	  it	  proved’	  (Field,	  2011,	  personal	  communication	  with	  author).	  This	  view	  is	  echoed	  by	  
a	  DSS	  official	  who	  said	  that	  ‘[clean	  breaks]	  politically	  was	  very	  difficult;	  it	  nearly	  broke	  it’	  (Deakin	  and	  
Parry,	  1999,	  120).	  The	  greed	  of	   the	  Treasury	  was	  prioritised	  over	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  policy.	   	  As	  a	  
former	  Cabinet	  Minister	  stated,	  ‘the	  primary	  goal	  of	  the	  CSA	  for	  [the	  Treasury]	  was	  to	  save	  money…	  
sadly	   it	  became	  the	  objective	  of	   the	  policy’	   (Interviewed	  by	  Author,	  19	   July	  2011,	  Minister	  A).	  This	  
altered	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  policy	  and	  again	  contributed	  to	  its	  failure;	  not	  only	  did	  public	  and	  media	  
opposition	   of	   the	   policy	   increase8	   but	   the	   Treasury’s	   interjection	   had	   a	   grave	   impact	   of	   the	  
administration	  on	  the	  policy,	  severely	  increasing	  the	  workload	  of	  the	  Agency’s	  staff.	  
A	   further	   source	   of	   tension	   within	   the	   Core	   Executive	   concerned	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	  
‘maintenance	  disregard’	  for	  people	  on	  Income	  Support.	  Lord	  Mackay	  proposed	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  
50	   per	   cent	   disregard,	   allowing	   lone	   parents	   to	   keep	   50	   per	   cent	   of	   maintenance	   before	   it	   was	  
deducted	  pound	  for	  pound	  from	  their	  benefit.	  Whilst	  Newton	  approved	  of	  a	  50	  per	  cent	  disregard	  in	  
principle,	  the	  constraints	  placed	  upon	  him	  by	  the	  Treasury	  meant	  that	  he	  could	  not	  actively	  support	  
this	  aspect.	  The	  heavy	  demands	  placed	  on	  the	  DSS	  to	  reduce	  its	  expenditure	  meant	  that	  introducing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




a	   disregard	   was	   not,	   economically,	   an	   option.	   This	   clearly	   shows	   how	   the	   Treasury	   can	   use	   the	  
budget	  assigned	  to	  a	  Department	  as	  a	  power	  resource.	  Child	  maintenance	  was	  not	  the	  only	  area	  the	  
DSS	   was	   concerned	   with	   at	   the	   time.	   As	   stated	   above,	   Newton	   was	   deeply	   engaged	   with	   the	  
Disability	  Lobby	  and	  had	  earmarked	  money	  for	  disability	  policy,	  something	  which	  he	  had	  to	  take	  into	  
account	   when	   negotiating	   the	   Department’s	   budget	   with	   the	   Treasury.	   	   The	   external	   pressures	  
placed	  upon	  the	  DSS	  by	  the	  Treasury	  had	  a	  serious	  impact	  on	  the	  success	  of	  the	  policy.	  In	  principle,	  
Newton	  would	  have	  supported	  a	  50	  per	  cent	  disregard	  (personal	  communication	  with	  author,	  19	  July	  
2011),	  but	  the	  pressure	  of	  the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  limitations	  it	  placed	  on	  him	  meant	  that	  he	  could	  not	  
insist	  on	  something	  which	  he	  identified	  as	  being	  beneficial	  to	  the	  policy.	  By	  introducing	  a	  50	  per	  cent	  
disregard	   lone	   parents	   would	   have	   felt	   that	   they	   had	   something	   to	   gain	   from	   the	   policy	   and	   the	  
absent	   parent	  would	   also	   have	   been	  more	  willing	   to	   contribute	   if	   they	   knew	  more	   of	   the	  money	  
would	  go	  to	  the	  children	  rather	   than	  the	  state.	  The	  policy	  was	  not	  assigned	  appropriate	  resources	  
from	  the	  start	  –	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  money	  assigned	  to	  the	  policy	  or	  the	  Department	  to	  finance	  a	  
50	  per	  cent	  maintenance	  disregard.	  	   	  
The	  inconsistent	  priorities	  of	  the	  CSA	  were	  also	  the	  result	  of	  Treasury	  interference.	  Initially,	  
the	   intention	   of	   the	   DSS,	   and	   the	   outward	   intention	   of	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury,	  was	   to	   target	  
absent	  parents	  who	  paid	  no	  maintenance	   towards	   the	   lone	  parent.	   This	   approach	   received	  praise	  
from	  the	  media	  and	  cross-­‐party	  support.	  Had	  the	  CSA	  operated	  as	  it	  was	  originally	  intended	  by	  the	  
DSS,	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  more	  successful,	  as	  it	  would	  have	  maintained	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  
the	  public	  and	   lone	  parents	   themselves.	  However,	   the	  Treasury’s	   involvement	  meant	   that	   the	  CSA	  
did	  not	  or	  could	  not	  maintain	  ‘non-­‐taxpayers’	  as	  their	  main	  targets.	  The	  Treasury	  enforced	  revenue	  
targets	  on	  the	  CSA	  that	  made	   its	  objectives	  unworkable	  and	  meant	   that	   they	  had	  to	  deviate	  away	  
from	   their	   original	   aims.	  Not	   surprisingly	   this	  meant	   that	   CSA	   staff	   concentrated	   on	   those	   absent	  
parents	   that	  were	   already	   paying	  maintenance,	   but	  who	  were	   now	   required	   to	   pay	  more	   -­‐	   often	  
considerably	  more.	  Indeed	  an	  internal	  memo	  leaked	  to	  The	  Guardian	  confirmed	  that	  the	  CSA	  were	  
targeting	  middle	   class	  men	   (The	  Guardian,	   13	   September	  1993).	  But	   this	  was	  not	   the	   fault	  of	  CSA	  
managers;	   their	   Treasury-­‐inspired	   remit	   prescribed	   this	   course	   of	   action,	   albeit	   indirectly.	   Even	  
before	   the	  CSA	  was	   in	  operation,	   the	   targets	  were	  criticised	  by	   the	  DSS,	  who	  deemed	   them	  to	  be	  
unworkable	   (Minister	   (A)	   in	   the	   Thatcher	   Cabinet,	   Interviewed	   by	   Author,	   19	   July	   2011),	   but	   the	  
dominance	  of	  the	  Treasury	  persisted,	  as	  did	  the	  harsh	  targets	  enforced	  upon	  the	  CSA.	  	  
Faced	  with	   these	   targets,	   it	   is	  not	   surprising	   that	  way	   the	  CSA	  operated	   in	   this	  manner.	   It	  
targeted	  middle	  class	  men,	  those	  in	  regular	  contact,	  and	  those	  already	  paying	  maintenance	  as	  they	  
were	  easier	  to	  track.	  As	  Peter	  Lilley	  confessed	  when	  asked	  about	  the	  CSA’s	  targeting	  of	  middle-­‐class	  
men,	   ‘this	   was	   of	   course	   wrong,	   it	   was	   prioritisation.	   But	   they	   needed	   to	   meet	   their	   targets’	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(interview	  with	  author,	  11	  July	  2011).	  This	  resulted	  in	  the	  CSA,	  again	  not	  surprisingly,	  becoming	  very	  
unpopular.	  By	  prioritising	   ‘soft	   targets’,	   the	  CSA	  was	  antagonising	  middle	  class	  men,	  traditionally	  a	  
strong	  support	  base	   for	   the	  Conservatives.	  Conservative	  constituency	  surgeries	  and	  MPs’	  postbags	  
began	  to	  fill	  up	  with	  letters	  from	  middle	  class	  men	  who	  felt	  alienated	  and	  discriminated	  against	  for	  
already	  meeting	   their	  obligations.	  These	  problems	  were	   the	   fault	  of	   the	  Treasury.	   Something	   they	  
inserted	  at	  the	  policy	  making	  stage	  caused	  major	  problems	  for	  the	  policy	  when	  in	  operation,	  making	  
the	   policy	   unpopular	   with	   its	   ‘recipients’	   or	   target	   clientele.	   As	   Deakin	   and	   Parry	   argue,	   ‘[a]	  
potentially	  progressive	  policy	  had	  been	  undermined	  by	  an	  unrealistic	  Treasury	  insistence	  that	  it	  had	  
to	  deliver	  savings.	  [The	  CSA]	  entered	  folklore	  as	  a	  short	  hand	  for	  what	  happens	  when	  social	  security	  
reform	  gets	  caught	  up	  with	  cost	  savings.’	  (1999,	  120)	  
What	   appears	   most	   remarkable	   is	   that	   inside	   the	   Treasury,	   officials	   were	   aware	   of	   the	  
impact	  they	  were	  having	  on	  the	  policy	  and	  how	  it	  would	  lead	  to	  problems	  and	  opposition.	  As	  Peter	  
Lilley	  admitted	  when	  asked	  his	  view	  of	  the	  CSA	  upon	  becoming	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Social	  Security:	  
‘I	  realised	  it	  was	  going	  to	  lead	  to	  problems,	  immense	  problems…	  	  I	  expected	  outrage’	  (Interview	  with	  
Author,	  11	  July	  2011).	  What	  is	  interesting	  is	  that	  Lilley	  came	  to	  the	  DSS	  from	  the	  Treasury,	  but	  it	  was	  
only	  when	  he	  was	  in	  the	  DSS	  that	  the	  problems	  implanted	  by	  the	  Treasury	  were	  actually	  perceived	  
as	  problems	  by	  him.	  Lilley	  was	  so	  aware	  of	  the	  level	  of	  problems	  that	  were	  going	  to	  arise	  from	  the	  
CSA	  that	  he	   invited	  back	  benchers	   into	  his	  office	   in	  groups	  of	  ten	  and	  gave	  them	  presentations	  on	  
the	  CSA	  and	  briefed	  them	  about	  the	  potential	  problems	  that	  might	  arise.	  Surely	  then	  the	  Treasury	  
must	   have	   been	   aware	   of	   the	   detrimental	   effect	   it	   was	   having?	   This	   can	   be	   linked	   to	  
‘departmentalism’,	   in	  that	  a	  problem	  is	  only	  perceived	  as	  a	  problem	  when	  it	   is	   in	  a	  Minister’s	  own	  
Department.	  The	  problems	  experienced	  by	  the	  CSA	  were	  widely	  predicted	  throughout	  the	  legislative	  
process,	   by	   pressure	   groups,	   and	   even	   by	   the	   Department	   of	   Social	   Security.	   But	   the	   Treasury	  
disregarded	   them	   all:	   their	   purely	   economic	   motives,	   and	   arrogance	   in	   ignoring	   the	   warnings	   of	  
those	  with	  expertise,	  undermined	  the	  policy	  from	  its	  outset.	  
5.5.2.	  DSS	  vs.	  Inland	  Revenue	  	  	  
Not	  only	  did	  the	  Treasury	  insert	  elements	  into	  the	  policy	  which	  effectively	  transformed	  the	  
policy’s	  objectives,	  it	  also	  had	  a	  detrimental	  impact	  on	  how	  the	  policy	  was	  administered.	  The	  issue	  of	  
who	  should	  be	  politically	  responsible	  for	  the	  CSA	  led	  to	  inter-­‐departmental	  conflict	  between	  the	  DSS	  
and	  the	  Inland	  Revenue	  (part	  of	  the	  Treasury),	  as	  Michael	  Partridge	  Permanent	  Secretary	  to	  the	  DSS	  
1988-­‐1995,	  stated:	  ‘There	  were	  considerable	  arguments	  over	  who	  should	  take	  responsibility	  of	  this	  
scheme’.	   (Can’t	   Pay,	  Won’t	   Pay,	   1999).	   The	   CSA	   would	   have	   been	  more	   effectively	   administered	  
through	  the	  Inland	  Revenue,	  for	  it	  held	  both	  the	  expertise	  and	  the	  level	  of	  authority	  successfully	  to	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administer	  the	  policy.	  Yet,	  the	  CSA	  became	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  DSS	  instead.	  This	  was	  the	  result	  
of	   an	   uneven	   distribution	   of	   power	   in	   the	   core	   executive	   that	   favoured	   the	   Treasury,	   and	   so	   yet	  
again,	  the	  demands	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  Department	  triumphed	  the	  needs	  and	  interest	  of	  the	  policy	  
and	  the	  lone-­‐parents	  it	  was	  meant	  to	  benefit.	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  system	  and	  the	  great	  potential	  
for	   problems	  were	   quickly	   identified.	   The	   Treasury,	   through	   the	   Inland	   Revenue,	   did	   not	  want	   to	  
take	   responsibility	   for	   an	   institution	   that	   they	   predicted	   would	   have	   problems.	   While	   the	   DSS	  
wanted	  the	  CSA	  to	  operate	  through	  the	  Inland	  Revenue,	  as	  they	  attempted	  to	  base	  their	  policy	  on	  
the	  success	  of	  the	  Australian	  system	  (shown	  in	  Chapter	  Four),	  the	  Treasury	  looked	  at	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  
own	  interests	  rather	  than	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  policy.	  Due	  to	  the	  Treasury’s	  interests	  prevailing,	  the	  
policy	  was	  again	  hindered	  even	  before	  it	  started.	  	  
For	   the	   DSS,	   it	   was	   not	   simply	   a	   case	   of	   trying	   to	   ‘pass	   the	   buck’.	   Tony	   Newton	   was	  
extremely	   concerned	   about	   the	   problems	   that	  were	   likely	   to	   occur	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   policy	   being	  
inappropriately	  administered	   (Minister	   (A)	   in	   the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet,	   Interviewed	  by	  Author,	  19	   July	  
2011).	  The	   Inland	  Revenue,	   collecting	  child	   support	  payments	   in	   the	  same	  manner	  as	   Income	  Tax,	  
would	   have	   led	   to	   a	   clearer	   and	   more	   effective	   system.	   	   Arguably,	   it	   would	   have	   met	   with	   less	  
resistance	  as	   it	  would	  have	  been	  harder	   for	  people	  not	   to	   comply.	   The	  degree	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  
within	   the	   tax	   system	   is	   relatively	   low	   amongst	   the	   average	   person	   (although	   people	   dislike	   tax,	  
paying	  it	  is	  something	  that	  is	  largely	  taken	  as	  inevitable).	  The	  policy	  would	  have	  been	  unpopular	  but	  
non-­‐compliance	  would	  have	  been	  low.	  However,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  the	  Inland	  Revenue,	  
Sir	   Anthony	   Battishill,	   did	   not	   want	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   CSA	   (Dorey,	   2000,	   160).	   The	   Inland	  
Revenue	   suggested	   that	   they	   could	   not	   or	   should	   not	   interfere	   with	   family	   policy	   and	   that	   child	  
support	  payments	  should	  not	  be	  portrayed	  as	  a	  form	  of	  taxation.	  They	  argued	  that	  by	  administering	  
the	   CSA	   through	   the	   Inland	  Revenue,	   it	  would	   have	   been	  met	  with	   non-­‐compliance	   and	   resented	  
from	   the	   outset.	   This	   was	   simply	   an	   excuse;	   the	   Treasury	   did	   not	   want	   the	   responsibility	   of	  
something	  it	  anticipated	  would	  be	  problematic.	  They	  were	  more	  than	  willing	  to	  mould	  the	  policy	  to	  
suit	   their	   economic	   priorities,	   but	   they	   were	   not	   willing	   to	   take	   on	   the	   responsibility	   for	  
implementing	  it.	  This	  was	  left	  to	  the	  DSS.	  
	  The	  Treasury	  was	  aware	  that	  the	  DSS	  was	  not	  suited	  to	  administer	  the	  CSA;	  as	  Peter	  Lilley	  
confessed	  ‘it	  wasn’t	  their	  area	  of	  expertise,’	  yet	  the	  Treasury’s	  desire	  to	  keep	  a	  problematic	  policy	  at	  
arm’s	   length	  prevailed.	   The	  Treasury’s	  desire	   to	   shift	   the	   responsibility	  of	   the	  policy	  onto	   the	  DSS	  
took	   precedence	   over	   the	   success	   of	   the	   policy	   in	   terms	   of	  what	   the	  DSS	   intended.	   The	   Treasury	  
acknowledged	  the	  Child	  Support	  Act	  as	  a	  family	  policy	  only	  when	  it	  benefited	  them.	  What	  appears	  
rather	  ironic	  was	  the	  Peter	  Lilley,	  when	  he	  was	  a	  Junior	  Minister	  in	  the	  Treasury,	  was	  amongst	  those	  
firmly	  against	  the	  Treasury	  taking	  on	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  CSA,	  but	  then	  he	  ended	  up	  in	  the	  DSS	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with	   responsibility	   for	   it.	   As	   he	   stated:	   ‘I	   fought	   hard	   against	   it	   coming	   to	   the	   Inland	   Revenue	  
because	  I	  could	  see	  even	  then	  that	  it	  would	  cause	  problems,	  but	  I	  didn’t	  know	  I	  was	  pushing	  towards	  
my	   own	   responsibility…	   I	   got	  my	   comeuppance	  when	   I	   came	   to	   the	   department!’	   (Interview	  with	  
Author,	  11	  July	  2011).	  	  
The	  view	  that	  the	  CSA	  should	  be	  administered	  through	  the	  Inland	  Revenue	  was	  not	  confined	  
to	  the	  DSS.	  Think	  Tanks	  (for	  example,	  the	  Family	  Policy	  Studies	  Centre),	  Pressure	  Groups	  (such	  as	  the	  
National	  Council	  for	  One	  Parent	  Families),	  academic	  and	  social	  policy	  experts,	  and	  the	  Social	  Security	  
Select	  Committee,	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  policy	  would	  have	  been	  more	  appropriately	  administered	  by	  
the	   Inland	   Revenue.	   As	   the	   next	   chapter,	   Chapter	   Six,	   will	   highlight	   the	   Social	   Security	   Select	  
Committee,	   which	   met	   to	   discuss	   the	   Child	   Support	   Bill	   as	   it	   progressed	   through	   the	   House	   of	  
Commons,	  suggested	  that	  the	  Government	  should	  undertake	  further	  investigation	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  
operating	   the	   system	   through	   the	   Inland	   Revenue	   before	   it	   finally	   dismissed	   the	   option	   (Social	  
Security	  Committee,	  1991,	  17)	  The	  chairman,	  Frank	  Field,	  also	  stated	  that	  ‘it	  seemed	  to	  me	  the	  most	  
obvious	  place	  or	  body	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  establishing	  this	  new	  organisation	  is	  the	  Inland	  Revenue’	  
(SSC,	  1991,	  35).	  Yet	  again,	  though,	  the	  views	  of	  critics	  were	  rejected.	  This	  was	  a	  recipe	  for	  disaster	  
for	   the	   CSA,	   as	   it	   meant	   that	   the	   policy	   was	   administered	   by	   a	   Department	   which	   lacked	   the	  
expertise	  needed	  for	  its	  successful	  administration.	  
The	  Social	  Security	  Committee	  took	  evidence	  from	  Malcolm	  Wicks,	  Director	  of	  Family	  Policy	  
Studies	  Centre	   (and	  subsequently	  a	  Labour	  MP	  and	  Minister	   in	   the	  1997-­‐2010	  Governments),	  who	  
himself	   visited	   America	   and	   Australia	   to	   investigate	   their	   child	   maintenance	   systems.	   Wicks	  
highlighted	  that	  the	  Government	  had	  not	  undertaken	  proper	  consideration	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  using	  
the	  Inland	  Revenue,	  nor	  fully	  appreciated	  the	  problems	  of	  deviating	  from	  the	  Australian	  model	  (SSC,	  
1991,	  194).	  As	  a	  Minister	  in	  the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet	  stated,	  ‘the	  Inland	  Revenue	  just	  didn’t	  want	  it	  and	  
they	  weren’t	  even	  prepared	  to	  even	  look	  at	  administering	  it’	  (interviewed	  by	  Author,	  19	  July	  2011,	  
Minister	  B).	  This	  highlights	  a	   fundamental	  problem	  of	   the	  Conservative	  Government’s	  approach	  to	  
policy-­‐making	   on	   this	   issue	   (and	   others).	   Whilst	   there	   was	   reluctance	   present	   in	   the	   Australian	  
system	   (their	   Tax	   Office	   was	   also	   hesitant	   to	   take	   on	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   child	  maintenance	  
collection),	  a	  judgement	  was	  made	  that	  the	  policy	  would	  be	  more	  effectively	  administered	  through	  
the	  Tax	  Office.	  This	   is	  how	  policy-­‐making	  should	   take	  place;	   the	  needs	  of	   the	  policy	  should	  not	  be	  
subordinate	   to	   the	  power	   resources	  of	   the	  Department.	   In	  Australia	   the	  needs	  of	   the	  policy	   came	  
before	   the	   wishes	   of	   the	   Department;	   in	   the	   UK	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   policy	   were	   secondary	   to	   the	  
demands	  of	  the	  department,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  Treasury.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  was	  permitted	  was	  largely	  
due	  to	  the	  power	  that	  the	  Treasury	  possessed	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Core	  Executive.	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At	   the	   time	   that	   negotiations	   were	   being	   conducted	   over	   which	   Department	   should	  
administer	  the	  policy,	  Thatcher	  was	  still	  Prime	  Minister,	  and	  she	  continued	  to	  support	  the	  approach	  
of	   the	   Treasury.	   She	   therefore	   dismissed	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   Inland	   Revenue	   administering	   the	   CSA,	  
instead	  allocating	   it	   to	   the	  DSS.	  Whilst	   this	  was	   a	   ‘battle’	   that	  occurred	  between	   the	  DSS	  and	   the	  
Treasury,	  Michael	  Partridge	  recalled	  that,	  ‘ultimately	  it	  was	  Thatcher’s	  decision	  for	  it	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  
the	  DSS’	  (Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  Pay).	  It	  was	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  it	  would	  be	  better	  operated	  under	  
the	   Inland	  Revenue,	  as	   this	  was	   the	  system	  that	  had	  proven	  to	  be	  successful	   in	  Australia,	  and	   this	  
method	  was	  supported	  by	  many	  experts,	  but	  the	  Treasury	  –	  with	  the	  backing	  of	  Thatcher	  –	  had	  the	  
power	  to	  say	  no.	  How	  power	  is	  distributed	  amongst	  the	  core	  executive	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  success	  
of	  policies.	  Despite	  a	  wealth	  of	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  CSA	  would	  have	  been	  more	  successful	  
had	   the	   Inland	   Revenue	   administered	   it,	   the	   power	   the	   Treasury	   possessed	   allowed	   it	   to	   simply	  
refuse	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  what	   it	  saw	  to	  be	  a	  burdensome	  policy.	   Instead	  it	  was	   left	  to	  the	  DSS,	  
who	   even	   the	   Treasury	   had	   admitted	   lacked	   the	   expertise,	   to	   shoulder	   the	   administrative	  
responsibility.	  
5.6.	  The	  Imbalance	  of	  Power	  -­‐	  Links	  to	  Policy	  Failure	  
This	   chapter	   has	   shown	   that	   Thatcher’s	   power	   was	   intensified	   by	   an	   ineffective	   core	  
executive.	   	  Dunleavy,	   in	   his	   seminal	   article	   on	  policy	   disasters,	   cites	   ‘poor	   checks-­‐and-­‐balances’	   in	  
the	  core	  executive	  as	  one	  on	  the	  contributing	  cause	  of	  policy	  failure	  (1995,	  64).	  What	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  
the	   policy	   formulation	   stage	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   was	   significant	   overt	   and	   covert	  
dominance	  of	  Thatcher	  and	   the	  Treasury,	  as	  well	  as	   the	   reduction	   in	  scope	  and	   influence	  of	  other	  
actors	  within	   the	   core	  executive.	  As	  Howell	   stated,	   ‘under	   this	   government	   and	  under	   the	   regime	  
that	   emerged	   after	   1979,	  which	  wasn’t	   quite	   the	  one	   that	  we	  planned	   for	   before	   ’79…	   the	  nexus	  
between	  Number	  10	  and	  the	  Treasury	   is	  decisive,	   it	  overrules,	   it’s	  everything,	   the	  Treasury	  always	  
knows	   they	  can	  win’	   (Howell	  quoted	   in	  Hennessy,	  1986,	  103).	  As	  well	  as	   the	   increased	   role	  of	   the	  
Treasury,	  we	   also	   saw	  a	   ‘Prime	  Minister	   [that]	   had	   a	   habit	   of	   annoying	  ministers	   by	   interfering	   in	  
departmental	   policy	   process	   and	   imposing	   policies	   –	   from	   a	   half	   informed	   position	   –	   on	  
departments’	  (Smith,	  1995,	  117).	  	  
It	  can	  be	  argue	  that	  there	  has	  been	  an	  over-­‐emphasis	  on	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  policy-­‐making	  
role,	  which	  in	  turn	  has	  understated	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Department.	  As	  Smith	  et	  al	  state,	  ‘The	  central	  unit	  
of	  analysis	   is	  not	   the	  Prime	  Minister,	   the	  Cabinet,	  Civil	   servants,	  Ministers	  or	   interest	  groups…	  but	  
Departments’	   (1995,	   41).	   Whilst	   this	   is	   true,	   and	   most	   policy	   making	   does	   take	   place	   inside	   the	  
Departments,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Treasury	  cannot,	  at	  times,	  exert	  
significant	   pressure	   over	   the	   policy	   and	   workings	   of	   individual	   Departments.	   As	   such,	   the	   focus	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needs	   to	  be	  placed	  on	  all	   actors,	   focusing	  more	  specifically	  on	  some	   individuals	  depending	  on	   the	  
policy	  itself.	  The	  problem	  is	  not	  the	  apparent	  over-­‐emphasis	  on	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  but	  instead	  how	  
analysis	  focuses	  on	  his/her	  exertion	  of	  power.	  	  As	  Marsh	  et	  al	  claim,	  ‘much	  of	  the	  popular	  analysis	  of	  
the	   last	  decade	  sees	  Margaret	  Thatcher	  dominating	  government	  and	   ‘hand	  bagging’	  departments’.	  
He	   goes	   on	   to	   claim	   that	   ‘the	   reality	   was	   that	   she	   was	   limited	   in	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   she	   could	  
intervene	  in	  particular	  departments’	  (1995,	  59).	  Whilst	  this	  is	  certainly	  true,	  Thatcher	  was	  limited	  in	  
the	  amount	  that	  she	  could	  ‘hand	  bag’	  ministers	  and	  directly/overtly	  intervene,	  this	  was	  not	  her	  only	  
source	   of	   power,	   as	   we	   have	   demonstrated	   through	   this	   chapter9.	  Many	   political	   scientists	   over-­‐
emphasise	   Thatcher’s	   use	   of	   direct	   power	   and	   as	   a	   result	   fail	   to	   undertake	   a	   full	   analysis	   by	   not	  
taking	   into	  account	  the	  full	   range	  of	  her	  tactics.	   James	  states	  that	  Thatcher’s	  approach	  was	  one	  of	  
directness	  and	  openness,	  whilst	  others	  such	  as	  Heath,	  Callaghan	  and	  Wilson	  manipulated	  the	  system	  
subtly;	  claiming	  that	  whilst	  they	  were	  oblique	  in	  their	  use	  of	  power	  Thatcher	  was	  overt	  (James,	  199,	  
63-­‐64).	  	  
However,	   this	   is	  only	  partially	   true,	   for	  while	  much	  of	  Thatcher’s	  power,	   and	  certainly	  her	  
leadership	  style,	  were	  overt,	  she	  also	  operated	  obliquely	  –	  exerting	  significant	  influence	  covertly	  in	  
order	  to	  obtain	  (or	  deploy)	  the	  resources	  she	  needed	  to	  achieve	  her	  agenda.	  It	  was	  not	  an	  either-­‐or	  
situation	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  approach	  to	  take,	  Thatcher	  also	  used	  indirect	  power	  making	  full	  use	  of	  the	  
tactics	  and	  strategies	  available	  to	  her.	  In	  conjunction	  with	  her	  ability	  to	  exploit	  the	  positive	  image	  of	  
Newton	   and	  Mackay,	   as	   well	   as	   her	   ‘hijacking’	   their	   ‘problem’	   and	   	   ‘policy’	   (misdirected	   power),	  
Thatcher	  was	  able	  to	  enforce	  her	  fundamentally	  flawed	  policy	  upon	  that	  of	  the	  DSS.	  By	  the	  time	  that	  
the	  policy	  was	  drafted,	  nobody	  apart	  from	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  was	  in	  favour	  of	   it.	  As	  Mavis	  
MacLean,	  policy	  adviser	   to	   the	  DDS,	   recalled:	   ‘There	  was	  certainly	  no	  enthusiasm	  for	   the	  project…	  
No	  Department	  wanted	  it	  to	  go	  ahead,	  but	  in	  Mrs	  Thatcher’s	  world	  nothing	  is	  impossible,	  you	  find	  a	  
way’	  (Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  Pay,	  1999).	  In	  her	  memoirs,	  Thatcher	  acknowledged	  that	  both	  Tony	  Newton	  
and	   the	   LCO	   displayed	   resistance	   over	   the	   CSA	   (1993,	   630).	   Yet	   both	   Newton	   and	   Lord	   Mackay	  
dutifully	   brought	   the	   Bill	   through	   Parliament.	   Although	   they	   were	   deeply	   concerned	   about	   the	  
impact	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   had	   on	   the	   detail	   of	   the	   policy,	   they	   held	   inadequate	   power	  
resources	  to	  resist;	  subsequently	   leading	  them	  to	   introduce	  a	  Bill	   that,	  although	  they	  supported	   in	  
principle,	  they	  did	  not	  support	  in	  detail.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  ‘downfall	  of	  Thatcher’	  came	  as	  a	  result	  of	  her	  changing	  which	  power	  resources	  she	  
used,	  and	  the	  strategy	   in	  which	  she	  deployed	  those	  resources.	  She	  moved	  from	  misdirected	  power	  to	  direct	  
power	  (direct	  power	  was	  actually	  less	  powerful	  and	  easier	  for	  ministers	  to	  resist	  and	  denounce).	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5.7.	  Kingdon’s	  Policy	  Streams	  
To	  advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  formation	  and	  origins	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  enrich	  
our	   insight	   into	   the	   policy-­‐making	   process	   and	   understand	   how	   and	   why	   Newton	   and	   Mackay	  
brought	   in	   a	   policy	   in	  which	   they	   did	   not	   necessarily	   support,	  we	   can	   introduce	   Kingdon’s	   ‘Policy	  
Streams’	   model	   (1995).	   Kingdon’s	   idea	   of	   ‘policy	   streams’	   can	   work	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	  
framework	  of	   policy	   transfer,	   and	   in	   this	   case,	   allow	  us	   to	  demonstrate	  how	   ‘dual	   policy	   transfer’	  
worked	  with	  the	  multiple	  problem	  definitions	  (as	  identified	  in	  the	  Chapter	  Three)	  to	  open	  the	  ‘policy	  
window’	  and	  lead	  to	  change.	  This	  section	  will	  first	  outline	  what	  Kingdon’s	  ‘policy	  streams’	  model	  is	  
before	   then	   applying	   it	   to	   the	   policy-­‐making	   process	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act,	   and	   then	  
incorporating	  it	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  ‘dual	  policy	  transfer’.	  	  	  	  
The	   identification	  of	  a	  problem	  which	   leads	   to	   the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  policy	   can	  partly	  be	  
explained	  by	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  policy	  agendas	  and	  Kingdon’s	  ‘Policy	  Streams’.	  	  Kingdon	  
(1995)	  argued	  that	  to	  get	  issues	  onto	  the	  policy	  agenda,	  and	  bring	  about	  change,	  potential	  policies	  
need	  to	  be	  accompanied	  by	  two	  other	   ‘streams’,	  namely	  the	   identification	  of	  a	  problem	  for	  which	  
the	   proposed	   policy	   is	   a	   solution,	   and	   appropriate	   circumstances	   to	   implement	   those	   policies.	  
Kingdon	   identifies	   the	   three	   ‘streams’	   as:	   the	   ‘problem	   stream’,	   ‘policy	   stream’,	   and	   the	   ‘political	  
stream’,	  and	  explains	  that	  these	  three	  ‘streams’	  need	  to	  flow	  together	  in	  order	  for	  ideas	  to	  ‘open	  the	  
policy	  window’	  translate	  into	  public	  policy.	  	  
• ‘Problem	   Stream’	   –	   Whether	   an	   issue	   is	   defined	   as	   a	   problem	   and	   enters	   the	   ‘problem	  
stream’	   depends	   largely	   on	   statistical	   indicators,	   moral	   beliefs,	   values,	   normative	  
assumptions,	  and	  ideology.	  
• ‘Policy	   Stream’	   -­‐	   Kingdon’s	   ‘policy	   stream’	   refers	   to	   an	   identification	   of	   a	   policy	   which	   is	  
deemed	  a	  solution	  to	  a	  particular	  problem.	  	  
• ‘Political	  Stream’	  –	  Kingdon	  argued	  suitable	  political	  circumstances	  are	  needed	  to	  introduce	  
new	  policies.	  	  
Kingdon	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  only	  when	  these	  three	  ‘streams'	  flow	  together	  that	  a	  ‘policy	  window’	  
















We	   can	   utilise	   Kingdon’s	   conceptual	   approach	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   flawed	   Child	   Support	   Bill	  
managed	  to	  get	  through	  the	  ‘policy	  window’	  and	  become	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  By	  assessing	  
the	  political,	  social,	  economic	  and	  international	  circumstances,	  as	  well	  as	  looking	  at	  the	  problems	  of	  
the	   erstwhile	   child	  maintenance	   system,	  we	   are	   able	   to	   identify	   how	   these	   ‘three	   streams’	   came	  
together	  to	  open	  a	  ‘policy	  window’,	  which	  subsequently	  resulted	  in	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  
5.7.1.	  Conflicting	  Origins:	  Five	  Streams,	  One	  Window	  
Although	   it	   appears	   that	   developments	   the	   late	   1980s	   saw	  Kingdon’s	   three	   ‘streams’	   flow	  
together	  to	  open	  a	  policy	  ‘window’,	  the	  actual	  origins	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  are	  somewhat	  
more	  complex.	  There	  were	  in	  fact	  two	  ‘problem	  streams’	  (shown	  in	  Chapter	  Three)	  and	  two	  ‘policy	  
streams’	  (shown	  in	  Chapter	  Four,	  and	  above).	  Whilst	  Thatcher’s	  origins	  for	  reform	  lay	  in	  a	  desire	  to	  
instil	  her	  New-­‐Right	  agenda	  and	  therefore	  adopt	  the	  Wisconsin	  model,	  the	  DSS	  and	  LCO’s	  origins	  for	  
reform	   lay	   in	   a	   desire	   to	   create	   a	   reliable	   system	   of	   child	   maintenance	   and	   therefore	   adopt	   the	  
Australia	  model.	  	  
As	  identified	  in	  both	  Chapter	  Three	  and	  previously	  in	  this	  Chapter,	  an	  attempt	  was	  made	  to	  
introduce	  change	  by	  John	  Moore	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	  when	  he	  was	  Secretary	  of	  State	   for	  Health	  and	  
Social	   Services	   (DHSS).	  Moore	  had	   labelled	   the	   increase	   in	   the	  number	  of	   lone	  parents	  as	  both	  an	  
economic	   and	   moral	   concern	   and	   declared	   that	   punitive	   measures	   were	   needed	   in	   order	   to	  
eradicate	  this	  strain	  on	  the	  state.	  Throughout	  his	  time	  at	  the	  DHSS,	  Moore	  made	  several	  speeches	  
whereby	   he	   expressed	   concerns	   regarding	   state	   provision	   encouraging	   irresponsibility	   and	   lone-­‐
parents	  families.	  However,	  both	  Moore’s	  proposals	  and	  his	  approach	  were	  deemed	  too	  radical	  and	  















political	  support	  needed	  to	  ensure	  the	  successful	  passage	  of	  the	  policy.	  Moore	  failed	  to	  provide	  the	  
‘political	  stream’	  which	  in	  turn	  obstructed	  the	  other	  ‘streams’,	  as	  Figure	  5.5	  demonstrates:	  








However,	  whilst	   Thatcher	   failed	   to	   achieve	   the	   ‘political	   stream’	   necessary	   for	   her	   policy	   through	  
Moore,	  Newton’s	  approach	  achieved	  the	  ‘political	  stream’.	  This	  resulted	  in	  Thatcher	  skilfully	  pushing	  
her	  policy	   through	   the	   ‘window’	   that	  Newton	  had	  opened;	   ‘the	  proposed	   legislation	   ceased	   to	  be	  
welfare	   legislation	   and	   become,	   in	   essence,	   fiscal	   legislation’	   (King	   and	   Crewe,	   2013,	   82).	   It	   was	  
easier	  for	  Thatcher	  to	  manipulate	  and	  undermine	  Newton’s	  policy	  than	  to	  gain	  support	  for	  the	  policy	  
sought	  by	  her	  and	  the	  Treasury.	  Below,	  Figure	  5.6	  demonstrates	  how	  Thatcher	  and	  Treasury	  pushed	  
their	   policy	   through	   the	  window	  by	   covertly	   attaching,	   and	   submerging,	   their	   problem	   and	   policy	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Newton’s	  idea	  of	  creating	  a	  new	  child	  maintenance	  system	  based	  on	  a	  formula	  was	  arrived	  
at	  independently	  of	  Thatcher.	  It	  was	  a	  product	  of	  interdepartmental	  conversations	  between	  the	  DSS	  
and	   the	   LCO,	   both	   aiming	   to	   remove	   a	   failing	   and	   corrupt	   system.	   Their	   intentions	   for	   the	   Child	  
Support	  Act	  derived	  from	  humble	  yet	  noble	  origins;	  from	  the	  desire	  to	  alter	  a	  failing	  system	  and	  to	  
produce	  an	  agency	  that	  would	   improve	  child	  maintenance	  to	  the	  advantage	  of	  all	  parties.	  The	  DSS	  
and	  the	  LCO	  looked	  closely	  at	  the	  Australian	  system	  with	  the	  main	  objective	  being	  that	  of	  creating	  a	  
fair	  child	  maintenance	  system.	  	  
Simultaneous	   to	   child	  maintenance	   reaching	   the	  agenda	  of	  Newton	  and	  Mackay,	  Thatcher	  
was	   continuing	   to	   identify	   lone	   parents	   as	   a	   problem.	   As	  Michael	  Whippan,	   Policy	   Director,	   DSS,	  
1994-­‐1988,	   recalled:	   ‘She	   [Thatcher]	   came	   into	   Parliament	   one	   day	   and	   said,	   “lone	   parents	   are	   a	  
problem,	  what	  are	  we	  going	  to	  do	  about	  it?”	  (Can't	  Pay	  Won’t	  Pay,	  1999).Therefore,	  once	  Thatcher	  
and	  the	  Treasury	  became	  aware	  of	  the	  DSS	  and	  the	  LCO	  interest	  in	  reforming	  the	  child	  maintenance	  
system,	   they	   became	   very	   keen	   to	   utilise	   the	   opportunity	   to	   covertly	   attach	   their	   ‘policy	   stream’.	  
Although	  still	  concentrating	  on	  child	  maintenance,	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  viewed	  it	   in	  terms	  of	  
their	  ‘problem	  stream’	  and	  were	  therefore	  in	  search	  of	  a	  different	  solution.	  Therefore	  what	  we	  see	  
are	   two	   separate	   agenda	   being	   pursued,	   that	   of	   social	   change,	   and	   that	   of	   economic	   reward,	   as	  
Newton	   stated,	   ‘My	   concern	   was	   social	   policy,	   to	   get	   a	   useful	   change	   in	   social	   policy…	   however,	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money	  that	  was	  charged’	  (Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  Pay,	  1999).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  latter	  object,	  Thatcher	  and	  
the	  Treasury	  looked	  towards	  the	  Wisconsin	  model	  with	  the	  desire	  to	  cut	  social	  security	  expenditure	  
and	  to	  tackle	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  emerging	  ‘underclass’	  rather	  than	  simply	  create	  a	  fair	  and	  reliable	  
system	   of	   child	   maintenance.	   As	   a	   Minister	   in	   Thatcher’s	   cabinet	   stated,	   ‘to	   put	   it	   mildly	   it	   was	  
warmly	  supported	  by	  our	  Prime	  Minister.	  But	  our	  then	  Prime	  Minister	  had	  a	  rather	  peculiar	  view	  of	  
what	  this	  policy	  should	  be	  and	  what	  it	  could	  achieve,	  she	  was	  pretty	  harsh’	  (Minister	  in	  the	  Thatcher	  
Cabinet	  B,	   interview	  by	  author	  on	  19	  July	  2011).	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury’s	   ideological	  objectives	  
were	   injected	   into	   the	  proposals	  of	  Newton	  and	  Lord	  Mackay.	   It	  was	   through	  doing	   this	   that	   they	  
were	  able	  to	  get	  their	  controversial	  objectives	  through	  the	  ‘policy	  window’.	  
	  The	  objectives	  of	  the	  policy	  moved	  from	  that	  of	  creating	  a	  fairer	  system	  of	  maintenance	  to	  
that	   of	   a	   tool	   to	   reduce	   the	   social	   security	   budget	   and	   to	   attempt	   to	   tackle	   Britain’s	   growing	  
‘underclass’.	   New	   Right	   ideals	   had	   been	   quickly	   embedded	   into	   the	   policy,	   subverting	   its	   original	  
objectives	   and	   supplanting	   them	   with	   those	   which	   inevitably	   led	   to	   failure.	   As	   Malcolm	   Wicks,	  
Director	   of	   the	   Family	   Policy	   Studies	   Centre,	   astutely	   highlighted	   in	   his	   evidence	   to	   the	   Social	  
Security	  Committee:	  
I	  am	  really	  very	  worried	  that	  a	  very	  good	  piece	  of	  policy	  will	  be	  knocked	  off	  course	  
by	  the	  Treasury’s	  concern	  to	  reduce	  public	  expenditure.	  (Para	  12,	  Second	  Report,	  
Changes	  in	  Maintenance	  Arrangements,	  Social	  Security	  Committee,	  Session	  1990-­‐
91,	  30	  April	  1991).	  	  	  	  
The	  economic	  objectives	  that	  had	  been	  embedded	  into	  the	  policy,	  had	  in	  effect,	  prescribed	  the	  policy	  
to	   failure.	  This	  was	  acknowledged	  by	   the	  DSS,	  as	  well	  as	  by	   the	  Senior	  Civil	  Servants	   that	  Thatcher	  
had	  entrusted	  with	   creating	   the	   system,	   yet	   ‘Mrs	  Thatcher	   rejected	  all	  misgivings	   and	  assisted	   the	  
project	  proceed’	  (Polly	  Toynbee,	  Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  Pay,	  1999).	  While	  the	  fundamental	  policy	  proposal	  
of	  Newton	  and	  Lord	  Mackay	  was	  maintained,	  the	  detail	   inside	  the	  Bill	  was	  controversial,	   ill-­‐judged,	  
and	  contradictory	  to	  the	  original	  aims,	  due	  to	  Thatcher’s	  injection	  of	  her	  ‘problem	  stream’	  and	  ‘policy	  
stream’.	  Aware	  that	   their	  approach	  would	  be	  unlikely	   to	  obtain	  support	  and	   lead	  to	  policy	  change,	  
they	  successfully	  camouflaged	  their	  ‘problem’	  and	  ‘policy’.	  The	  subsequent	  problems	  experienced	  by	  
the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   can	   largely	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   policy	   itself	   and	   its	   contradictory	   and	  
conflicting	  origins;	  understanding	  how	  the	  policy	  was	  developed	  can	  help	  explain	  some	  of	  the	  CSA’s	  
subsequent	  problems.	  By	  examining	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  policy	  we	  can	  clearly	  identify	  the	  separate	  
policy	   and	   problem	   streams	   that	   ran	   through	   its	   formation,	   and	   highlight	   how	   this	   prescribed	   the	  




5.8.	  Conclusion:	  The	  Imbalance	  of	  Power,	  Conflicting	  Formation	  -­‐	  Two	  Policies,	  One	  Bill	  
It	   is	   clear	   that	   in	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Bill,	   there	   were	   two	   strands	   of	  
thought,	   and	   that	   these	   conflicting	   perspectives	   reflected	   the	   concerns	   of	   different	   Government	  
Departments	  and	  Ministers	  (hence,	  division	  in	  the	  core	  executive	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  joint	  up	  government	  
which	  we	   looked	   at	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter).	  While	   the	  DSS	   approached	   child	  maintenance	   reform	  
from	  a	  departmental	  view,	  Thatcher	  looked	  to	  instil	  her	  ideology	  and	  achieve	  her	  agenda	  across	  all	  
departments;	   both	   pursued	   differing	   agendas	   therefore	   sought	   different	   objectives.	   Thatcher’s	  
objectives,	  and	  the	  Treasury’s	  remit,	  were	  larger	  than	  that	  of	  child	  maintenance	  and	  social	  security	  
reform.	   	   Therefore,	   while	   Thatcher	   sought	   a	   policy	   that	   would	   reflect	   her	   ideology	   and	   thereby	  
advance	  her	  neo-­‐liberal	  agenda,	  the	  DSS	  simply	  sought	  a	  policy	  that	  would	  create	  a	  fairer	  and	  more	  
effective	  system	  of	  child	  maintenance.	  The	  DSS	  did	  not	   look	  at	   it	   in	  terms	  of	   family	  values,	  cutting	  
the	  Civil	  Service,	  or	  as	  a	  means	  to	  achieve	  a	  wider	  economic	  agenda.	  Whilst	  it	  cannot	  claim	  that	  the	  
DSS	  did	  not	  consider	   the	  expenditure	  savings	  opportunity	  of	  enforcing	  such	  as	  policy,	   it	   should	  be	  
noted	  that	  it	  was	  considered	  in	  a	  different	  manner.	  Whilst	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  took	  a	  macro	  
view	  and	   looked	  at	   it	   as	   a	   tool	   to	  achieve	  government	  public	   expenditure	   savings,	   the	  DSS	   took	  a	  
micro	  view	  and	   looked	  at	   it	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  departmental	  budget	  and	   the	  need	   to	  allocate	  money	  
elsewhere.	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  adopted	  an	  economic	  perspective,	  whereas	  the	  DSS	  viewed	  it	  
as	  a	  social	  policy	  objective.	  	  
As	   a	   result	   of	   the	   conflicting	   objectives	   from	   these	   two	   strands,	   policy	   transfer	   was	   very	  
complex.	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  CSA	  derived	  from	  two	  sets	  of	  concerns,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  
detail	  of	  the	  policy	  also	  arose	  from	  two	  modes	  of	  policy	  transfer.	  Dolowitz’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  CSA	  in	  
terms	   of	   Policy	   Transfer	   fails	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   significant	   influence	   of	   Australia	   and	   that	   there	  
were	   two	   separate	   strands	   of	   policy	   transfer.	  Whilst	   his	   work	   explains	   the	   failure	   of	   one	   strand,	  
America,	   it	   does	   not	   account	   for	   the	   other	   strand	   and	   therefore	   does	   not	   adequately	   explain	   the	  
failure	  of	  the	  CSA	  from	  a	  Policy	  Transfer	  standpoint.	  	  What	  occurred	  was	  not	  a	  simple	  case	  of	  policy	  
transfer	   from	  one	   country	   to	   another,	   or	   a	   problematic	   transfer	   from	  one	   country	   to	   another,	   or	  
even	  a	  disagreement	  over	  which	  model	  Britain	  should	  pursue.	  Rather,	  what	  transpired	  was	  a	  grand	  
misconception	  of	   the	  American	  system	  which	  was	   then	   forced	  onto	  policy	   transfer	   from	  Australia.	  
Consequently	   the	   ensuing	   system	   was	   an	   inconsistent	   mix	   of	   the	   DSS’s	   attempt	   to	   introduce	   an	  
appropriate,	  complete,	  and	  informed	  policy	  transfer	  from	  Australia,	  and	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury’s	  
determination	   to	   introduce	   a	   scheme	   based	   on	   their	   incomplete,	   inappropriate,	   and	   uniformed	  
transfer	  from	  America.	  	  
106	  
	  
These	   incompatible	   streams	   are	   present	   throughout	   the	   creation	   and	  development	   of	   the	  
policy	  and	  are	  the	  key	  components	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  Thatcher	  could	  not	  simply	  
enforce	  her	  version	  of	  the	  policy	  as	  she	  did	  not	  open	  the	  ‘policy	  window’.	  Yet	  Thatcher’s	  leadership	  
style	  and	  the	  use	  of	  resources,	  allowed	  her	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  policy	  transfer	  process	  from	  Australia	  
to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  the	  eventual	  Bill	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  failed	  attempt	  by	  the	  DSS	  to	  transfer	  policy	  
from	  America.	  The	  roots	  of	  the	  operational	  problems	  suffered	  by	  the	  CSA	  stem	  from	  its	  dual	  origins	  
onto	   the	   institutional	   agenda,	   its	   two	   sets	   of	   objectives,	   and	   its	   two	   forms	   of	   policy	   transfer.	  
Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   effectively	   inserted	   their	   ‘problem’	   and	   objectives	   onto	   the	   policy	  
pursued	  by	  Newton	  and	  Mackay,	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that	  it	  no	  longer	  resembled	  the	  initial	  policy	  idea.	  
In	  so	  doing,	  they	  had	  mired	  the	  policy	  in	  failure,	  leaving	  it	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  meet	  eithers	  objectives	  and	  
vision.	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Chapter	  Six	  -­‐	  The	  Flawed	  Legislative	  Process	  
6.1.	  Introduction	  
As	  Dunleavy	  notes,	  ‘decision-­‐makers	  systematically	  choose	  to	  ignore	  an	  abundance	  of	  critical	  
or	  warning	   voices	   in	   order	   to	   persevere	  with	   their	   chosen	   policy’	   (1995,	   52).	   	   This	   arrogance	  was	  
certainly	   present	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act.	   Criticisms	   by	   pressure	   groups,	  
concerns	  raised	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  apprehension	  shown	  by	  the	  Social	  Security	  Select	  Committee,	  
and	   hesitation	   within	   the	   DSS	   itself	   were	   ignored	   in	   order	   to	   persevere	   with	   the	   policy	   version	  
sought	  after	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury.	  By	  examining	  the	  legislative	  process	  we	  can	  assess	  it	  as	  
contributory	   factors	   in	   policy	   failure.	   The	   CSA	   experienced	   a	   plethora	   of	   administrative	   and	  
implementation	  problems,	  all	  of	  which	  can	  be	  accredited	   to	   the	  policy	   itself,	  but	  which	  were	   then	  
compounded	  during	   the	   implementation	   stage	  when	   the	   inherent	   flaws	  of	   the	  CSA	  became	  more	  
fully	  apparent.	  An	  examination	  of	  the	  legislative	  process	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  identify	  Dunleavy’s	  criteria	  
for	  policy	  disaster	  (1995)	  and	  understand	  how	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  CSA’s	  failure	  were	  embedded	  in	  the	  
policy,	  even	  prior	  to	  implementation.	  
This	   Chapter	   will	   firstly	   examine	   the	   inadequate	   consultation	   process,	   highlighting	   the	  
concerns	  raised	  by	  several	  pressure	  groups	  and	  then	  the	  disdain	  with	  which	  they	  were	  received	  by	  
policy	  makers.	  It	  will	  then	  move	  to	  examine	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  Stage,	  again	  highlighting	  the	  number	  
of	  concerns	  that	  were	  raised.	  	  It	  will	  show	  that	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  CSA	  were	  foreseeable	  
and	  indeed	  foreseen.	  	  This	  Chapter	  will	  then	  highlight	  how	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  
ineffective	  source	  of	  checks-­‐and-­‐balances,	  by	   in	  effect	  allowing	  a	   flawed	  policy	   to	  pass	   through	   its	  
chamber.	   	   It	   will	   end	   by	   stating	   that	   it	   was	   an	   inadequate	   consultation	   and	   a	   flawed	   and	   futile	  
legislative	  process	  that	  paved	  a	  path	  to	  policy	  failure.	  	  
6.2	  The	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  
The	   Child	   Support	   Bill,	   which	   created	   the	   Child	   Support	   Agency,	  was	   published	   on	   the	   14	  
February	   1991,	   and	   received	   the	   Royal	   Assent	   by	   25	   July	   1991.	   	   The	   speed	  with	   which	  Ministers	  
planned	  to	  legislate,	  to	  put	  the	  White	  Paper	  proposals	  into	  effect,	  was	  acknowledged	  and	  criticised	  
by	   those	   inside	   and	   outside	   of	   Parliament	   (see,	   for	   example,	   Brindle,	   D,	   Social	   Services	  
Correspondent,	   The	   Guardian,	   30th	   October,	   1990).	   The	   entire	   process,	   from	   Thatcher’s	   initial	  
announcement	  in	  July	  1990,	  to	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  Bill	  through	  to	  it	  receiving	  the	  Royal	  Assent,	  took	  
less	   than	   a	   year.	   	   As	   Bird	   claims,	   this	   is	   ‘a	   tribute	   to	   the	   commitment	   of	   the	   proponents	   of	   the	  
legislation’	   (Bird,	   1993,	   24).	   	   Once	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   Child	   Support	   Agency	   reached	   the	   institutional	  
agenda	   of	   the	   DSS,	   Thatcher	   quickly	   discerned	   it	   as	   an	   opportunity	   to	   instil	   her	  wider	   New	   Right	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agenda	  and	  push	  through	  her	  policy	  version.	  	  That	  Thatcher	  was	  impatient	  to	  ‘hurry	  through’	  reform	  
is	  confirmed	  by	  one	  of	  her	  Cabinet	  colleagues,	  who	  stated:	  ‘once	  Number	  Ten	  picked	  up	  wind	  of	  all	  
this…	  she	  was	  very	  keen	  to	  get	  this	  on	  the	  statue	  book,	  to	  hurry	  it	  through’	  	  (Interviewed	  by	  Author,	  
19	  July	  2011,	  Minister	  A).	  	  
	   Just	  as	   the	  policy	   formation	  and	  policy	   transfer	  process	  were	  affected	  by	  Thatcher,	   so	   too	  
was	  the	  legislative	  process.	  	  Although	  Thatcher	  left	  office	  on	  28	  November	  1990	  and	  was	  no	  longer	  
Prime	  Minister	  during	  the	  Parliamentary	  passage	  of	  the	  Bill,	  her	  influence	  was	  still	  felt.	  	  The	  course	  
paved	  by	  Thatcher	  was	  not	  altered	  by	  Major	  but	   instead	  followed.	   	  Her	   image	  was	  fully	   integrated	  
into	  the	  design	  of	  the	  policy	  and	  her	  influence	  remained	  during	  its	  passage.	  	  First,	  it	  led	  to	  a	  hurried	  
Bill	   that	   was	   flawed,	   loosely	   worded,	   incomplete	   and	   contradictory	   to	   the	   principles	   originally	  
pursued	  by	  Tony	  Newton	  and	  Lord	  Mackay.	  	  Second,	  the	  haste	  of	  the	  legislative	  process	  undermined	  
the	  level	  of	  scrutiny	  which	  the	  Bill	  received.	  	  As	  Hall	  exclaimed,	  when	  assessing	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  
policy	  we	  need	  to	  look	  at	  whose	  interests	  were	  propelled,	  whose	  voices	  were	  ignored,	  and	  who	  held	  
enough	  power	   to	  obtain	   reluctant	  consent	   (1975,	  9).	   	  As	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	   legislative	  stage	  of	   the	  
1991	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  will	  demonstrate,	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  commanded	  enough	  power	  and	  
skill	  to	  obtain	  support	  from	  an	  unenthusiastic	  Parliament	  for	  an	  unconvincing	  Bill.	  	  
Figure	  6.1	  The	  Passage	  of	  the	  Bill	  
The	  Child	  Support	  Act	  1991	   	  
29th	  October	  1990	   The	  White	  Paper,	  Children	  Come	  First,	  published.	  
14th	  February	  1991	   Child	  Support	  Bill	  published.	  
HOUSE	  OF	  LORDS	   	  
14th	  February	   First	  Reading.	  
25th	  February	   Second	  Reading.	  
14th-­‐19th	  March	   Committee	  Stage.	  
25th	  and	  29th	  April	   Report	  Stage.	  
April	  and	  June	   House	  of	  Commons	  Social	  Security	  Committee	  
15th	  May	  	   Third	  Reading.	  
HOUSE	  OF	  COMMONS	   	  
4th	  June	   Second	  Reading.	  
11th	  to	  2nd	  July	   Committee	  Stage.	  
18th	  July	   Report	  Stage	  and	  Third	  Reading.	  
HOUSE	  OF	  LORDS	   	  
22nd	  July	   Debate	  to	  consider	  Commons’	  amendments.	  





6.3	  Inadequate	  Consultation	  -­‐	  Children	  Come	  First	  White	  Paper	  and	  Responses	  
	   The	  White	  Paper	  Children	  Come	  First	  was	  published	  on	  the	  29	  October	  1990,	  albeit	   in	  	  two	  
volumes;	  the	  first	  set	  out	  the	  Government’s	  proposals,	  and	  the	  second	  contained	  statistical	  data	  in	  
which	  the	  proposals	  were	  set	  (such	  as,	  increase	  in	  number	  of	  lone	  parents,	  degree	  of	  inconsistency	  
in	   the	  courts,	   lone	  parent	  dependence	  on	  the	  state).	  The	  White	  Paper	  proposed	  a	  new	  system	  for	  
child	  maintenance.	  The	  proposals	  called	  for:	  
• Creation	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  under	  a	  ‘Next	  Steps	  Agency’.	  
• Maintenance	  assessments	  based	  on	  a	  standard	  formula.	  
• Courts	  would	  no	  longer	  deal	  with	  maintenance	  cases.	  
• Court	  orders	  and	  clean-­‐break	  settlements	  would	  be	  overridden.	  
• There	  was	  requirement	  to	  cooperate.	  
• A	  benefit	  penalty	  would	  be	  imposed	  on	  those	  who	  did	  not	  cooperate	  and	  did	  not	  have	  ‘good	  
cause’.	  
The	  justification	  for	  reform	  was	  presented	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  need	  to	  replace	  a	  failing	  system.	  
As	  Garham	  and	  Knights	  state,	   ‘the	  proposals	  were	  billed	  as	  the	  remedy	  to	  the	  combined	  failure	  of	  
the	  courts	  and	  the	  social	   security	   liable	   relatives	   rules	   to	  secure	  adequate	  and	  regular	  amounts	  of	  
maintenance’	   (1994,	  31).	  Little	  or	  no	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  on	   the	  wider	  social	  and	  economic	  aims	  
that	  were	  being	  pursued	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  (Davis	  et	  al,	  1998,	  8).	  	  As	  one	  former	  Minister	  
in	  the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet	  stated:	  
[The	  DSS]	  wanted	   a	   system	   in	   place	  which	  was	   effective…	  Thatcher	  wanted	   to	  
reduce	   the	  social	   security	  budget,	  and	  rid	  society	  of	  what	  she	  saw	  as	  negligent	  
young	  men	  who	   [would	  have]	  a	  one	  night	  stand	  and	  then	  scarper	   (Interviewed	  
by	  author	  on	  19	  July	  2011,	  Minister	  A).	  	  
The	   apparent	   principles	   and	   objectives	   which	   Children	   Come	   First	   emphasised	   were	   that	  
parents	  should	  honour	  their	  responsibility	  to	  their	  children	  when	  they	  could	  afford	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  that	  
dependence	  on	  the	  state	  should	  be	  reduced	  when	  possible.	  Yet	  a	  closer	  examination	  highlighted	  the	  
controversial	  details	  within	  this	  ostensibly	  reasonable	  purpose.	  	  
	   Although	   the	  White	  Paper	  officially	   invited	   feedback	  –	   something	   typically	  associated	  with	  
Green	  Papers	  –	  the	  process	  was	  rushed	  and	  downgraded	  in	  importance.	  	  Feedback	  was	  only	  invited	  
on	  sections	  of	  the	  proposals	  that	  were	  ‘still	  under	  consideration’,	   for	  the	  White	  Paper	  categorically	  
stated	   that	   ‘the	   main	   shape	   of	   the	   new	   system	   is	   decided’	   and	   therefore	   comments	   were	   not	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required	  and	  discussion	  was	  not	  welcomed.	   	  As	   the	   response	   from	  the	  Child	  Poverty	  Acton	  Group	  
(CPAG)	  stated:	  
There	  are	  some	  areas	  of	  the	  White	  Paper’s	  proposals	  –	  apparently	  not	  subject	  to	  
consultation	   –	   whose	   implication,	   we	   believe,	   have	   not	   been	   fully	   thought	  
through...	   CPAG	   has	   much	   experience	   of	   the	   problems	   caused	   by	   legislation	  
drafted	  without	  sufficient	  consultation	  or	  consideration	  and	  would	  always	  hope	  to	  
prevent	   these	   problems	   where	   possible.’	   (CPAG	   response	   to	   the	   White	   Paper	  
‘Children	  Come	  First’	  December	  1990,	  2)	  
Considerable	  doubt	  can	  be	  raised	  over	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  consultation	  period	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	   the	   Government	   acknowledged	   the	   concerns	   and	   criticisms	   expressed.	   	   A	   total	   of	   86	  
responses	  were	   received	   from	   various	   organisation	   and	   individuals	   (see	   Appendix	   A)10.	   	   As	   noted	  
above,	   the	   consultation	   responses	   were	   not	   published	   by	   the	   Government.	   Therefore	   this	  
information	  was	  accessed	  by	  contacting	  each	  organisation	  that	  had	  submitted	  a	  written	  response	  to	  
the	   white	   paper	   Children	   Come	   First,	   to	   request	   copies	   of	   their	   written	   responses.	   All	   86	  
organisations	  were	   contacted	   via	   email	   and	  by	  post.	   Several	   organisations	  did	  not	   respond.	  Many	  
organisations	  no	   longer	  held	  a	  copy	  of	   their	   consultation	   response.	  However,	  52	  copies	  of	  written	  
consultation	   responses	   were	   obtained	   organisations,	   and	   this	   included	   most	   of	   the	   leading	  
organisations11.	  	  
Several	   responses	  prophesised	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  CSA	  and	  warned	   the	  Government	  against	  
several	  of	   its	  features.	  An	  analysis	  of	  several	  responses	  revealed	  a	  significant	  unanimity	   in	  opinion.	  	  
Furthermore,	  while	   there	  was	  widespread	   support	   for	   the	   principles	   behind	   the	   policy,	   the	   detail	  
regarding	   many	   of	   its	   features	   and	   the	   motives	   for	   reform	   was	   met	   with	   scepticism.	   	   While	   the	  
Government	   invited	   comments	  on	   sections	  of	   the	  proposals,	   these	   responses	  were	  not	  published,	  
produced	   in	  a	  report,	  or,	  apparently,	  considered	   in	  any	  depth.	   In	  these	  respects,	  the	   ‘consultation’	  
period	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  façade.	  
This	   is	   typical	  of	   the	  Thatcher	  Government’s	   approach	   towards	  pressure	  groups	  which	  did	  
not	  share	  her	  Government’s	  ideological	  stance	  and	  objectives.	  The	  1980s	  witnessed	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  
philosophy	   of	   consultation	   as	   the	   Government	   adopted	   an	   aggressive	   style	   of	   policy-­‐making	  
(Baggott,	   1995,	   484).	   Thatcher	   shifted	   policy	   making	   away	   from	   consultation	   and	   towards	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  List	  was	  located	  from	  a	  written	  answer	  from	  	  Alistair	  Burt	  MP	  on	  26	  May	  1994	  in	  response	  to	  a	  question	  by	  
Dr	  Tony	  Wright	  MP	  (Cannock	  and	  Burntwood)	  requesting	  a	  list	  of	  all	  organisations	  which	  made	  submissions	  to	  
the	  child	  support	  proposals	  following	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  1990	  White	  Paper	  Children	  Come	  First.	  
11	  Copies	  of	  several	  consultation	  responses	  by	  organisations	  were	  also	  received	  from	  Prof.	  Nick	  Wikeley.	  Prof.	  
Wikeley	  had	  obtained	  these	  when	  undertaking	  research	  for	  a	  book	  he	  co-­‐authored,	  Child	  Support	  in	  Action.	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confrontation.	  This	  was	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  downgrading	  or	  dismantling	  of	  policy	  communities	  and	  the	  
previous	  ‘logic	  of	  negotiation’.	  This	  approach	  was	  justified	  through	  their	  New	  Right	  ideology,	  which	  
argued	   that	   most	   pressure	   groups	   were	   detrimental	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   public	   and	   the	  
government,	  and	  also	   impeded	  the	  autonomy	  and	  authority	  of	  government	  and	  the	  state.	   	  During	  
the	   Thatcher	   Premiership,	   the	   role	   of	   many	   pressure	   groups	   declined	   considerably,	   with	   their	  
concerns	  and	  criticism	  being	  largely	  disregarded.	  	  As	  Baggott	  notes,	  ‘the	  Thatcher	  Governments	  had	  
the	  resources	  to	  bolster	  this	  approach:	  large	  majorities	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons,	  de	  facto	  control	  of	  
the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  a	  divided	  and	  weak	  Opposition,	  and	  support	   from	  much	  of	   the	  popular	  press’	  
(1995,	  485).	  	  Due	  to	  these	  political	  resources	  (which	  we	  discussed	  at	  some	  length	  in	  the	  proceeding	  
chapter,	  Chapter	  Five)	  Thatcher	  felt	  immune	  to	  the	  disapproval	  of	  aggrieved	  pressure	  groups.	  	  	  
However,	   she	   did	   not	   dismiss	   the	   consultation	   process	   entirely,	   retaining	   its	   procedural	  
formalities	  but	  purging	  it	  of	  any	  significant	  influence.	  	  	  Many	  pressure	  groups	  complained	  that	  during	  
the	  Thatcher	  Premiership	  there	  was	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  consultation.	  	  Rarely	  was	  the	  process	  seriously	  
or	  sincerely	  used	  to	  gather	  views	  or	  expertise	  on	  a	  particular	  idea	  or	  problem,	  rather	  it	  was	  utilised	  
as	   a	   tool	   to	   deliver	   as	   statements	   of	   intent.	   Although	   the	   Thatcher	   Governments	   ostensibly	  
continued	  to	  undertake	  ‘consultation’,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  allowed	  Ministers	  to	  
absorb	   these	  comments	  was	  very	   limited.	   It	   can	  be	  suggested	   that	   the	   façade	  of	  consultation	  was	  
undertaken	  to	  imbue	  the	  policy	  with	  an	  image	  of	  greater	  legitimacy.	  	  
As	  stated	  above,	  there	  were	  major	  concerns	  voiced	  by	  pressure	  groups	  and	  charities	  during	  
the	   consultation	   process	   of	   the	   white	   paper	   Children	   Come	   First.	   	   These	   can	   be	   summarised	   as	  
follows:	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Figure	  6.2	  Anticipated	  Problems	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  
Anticipated	  Problems/Concerns	  With	  Proposal	  
Failure	  to	  recognise	  that	  parental	  responsibility	  goes	  beyond	  that	  of	  financial	  contributions	  
Lack	  of	  consideration	  of	  previous	  property	  or	  financial	  settlements	  and	  arrangements	  
Inflexibility	  and	  inadequacy	  within	  the	  formula	  
Did	  not	   fully	  acknowledge	  the	  outgoings	  of	  the	  absent	  parents	   (such	  as,	   travel	  expenses	  or	  money	  
needed	  to	  maintain	  contact	  with	  the	  children)	  
Lack	  of	  integration	  of	  childcare,	  training,	  employment,	  education	  support	  for	  parent	  with	  care	  
Issues	  regarding	  enforcing	  co-­‐operation	  	  
Benefit	  penalty	  for	  non-­‐co-­‐operation	  making	  families	  poorer	  
Lack	  of	  consideration	  for	  second	  families	  
Lack	  of	  a	  financial	  disregard	  for	  maintenance	  from	  Income	  Support	  
Administrative	  problems,	  problems	  if	  under	  resourced	  
Lack	  of	  consideration	  for	  passported	  benefits	  which	  would	  be	   lost	  by	  the	  parent	  with	  care	   in	   their	  
move	  from	  Income	  Support	  to	  Family	  Credit	  
Intrusion	  of	  privacy	  
Problem	  of	  including	  retrospective	  cases	  
Possible	  loss	  of	  marital	  home	  
Access	  related	  issues	  likely	  to	  be	  escalated	  as	  a	  result/	  strain	  on	  current	  family	  relations	  
Potential	  impact	  on	  the	  1989	  Children	  Act/fragmentation	  of	  policy	  area	  
High	  set	  up	  and	  running	  costs	  
	  
Those	  expressing	   robust	   concerns	  or	  opposition	   to	   the	  details	  of	   the	  policy,	   and	  highlighting	   clear	  
deficiencies	  or	   inconsistencies	  included:	  the	  Child	  Poverty	  Action	  Group,	  the	  Law	  Society,	  the	  Legal	  
Action	  Group,	   the	  National	  Association	  of	  Citizens	  Advice	  Bureaux,	  Families	  Need	  Fathers,	  Welfare	  
Benefits	  Unit,	  Barnado’s,	  Women’s	  Aid,	  Church	  Action	  on	  Poverty,	  the	  National	  Children’s	  Bureaux,	  
the	  NSPCC,	   the	   Save	   the	   Children	   Fund	   and	   the	   Children’s	   Society.	   	  Whilst	   the	   policy	  was	   initially	  
supported	  by	  the	  National	  Council	  for	  One	  Parent	  Families,	  they	  too	  went	  on	  to	  say:	  	  
	  We	   are	   very	   disappointed	   that	   government	   has	   not	   reconsidered	   its	   intention	   to	  
remove	   benefit	   payments	   from	   families	   in	   which	   mothers	   do	   not	   wish	   to	   name	  
fathers	   as	   we	   believe	   this	   will	   cause	   great	   hardship	   to	   vulnerable	   children.	   (The	  
Times,	  16	  February,	  1991).	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Therefore,	  this	  policy	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  one	  that	  was	  largely	  unsupported	  by	  pressure	  groups,	  
charity	  organisations,	  and	  area	  experts,	  each	  bringing	  a	  vast	  knowledge	  of	  particular	  aspects	  of	  the	  
White	   Paper	   to	   the	   consultation	   process.	   	   Below	   will	   explore	   some	   of	   the	   concerns	   voiced	   and	  
predicted	   problems	  with	   the	   policy,	   highlighting	   that	   the	   problems	   suffered	   by,	   and	   the	   eventual	  
failure	   of,	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   were	   predicted.	   	   The	   failure	   of	   the	   policy	   was	   not	   one	   of	  
implementation	  but	  one	  of	  design.	  
6.3.1.	  Consultation	  Process:	  Foreseeable	  and	  Foreseen	  Failure	  
Several	  organisations	  expressed	  concerns	  about	  likely	  inflexibility	  and	  inadequacy	  within	  the	  
formula.	   	   It	   was	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   proposed	   formula	   did	   not	   take	   into	   account	   previous	  
property	   transfers	   or	   financial	   settlements,	   nor	   did	   it	   acknowledge	   other	   factors	   such	   as	   travel	  
expenses,	  loan	  repayments,	  or	  money	  needed	  to	  maintain	  contact	  with	  the	  children.	  	  On	  the	  point	  of	  
the	   formula	   not	   including	   an	   allowance	   for	  maintaining	   contact,	   a	   joint	   response	   by	   Gingerbread	  
Scotland,	  One-­‐Plus	  and	  Scottish	  Council	  for	  Single	  Parents	  emphasised	  that:	  
Ability	  to	  meet	  the	  expenses	  of	  access	  can	  be	  a	  very	  important	  factor	  in	  determining	  
whether	  an	  “absent”	  parent	  can	  meet	  his	  or	  her	  responsibilities	  to	  maintain	  contact	  
with	   the	   children.	   Parental	   responsibility	   is	   not	   only	   about	   financially	  maintaining	  
the	   children	   but	   also	   about	   ensuring	   the	   children	   go	   on	   having	   contact	  with	   both	  
their	  parents.	  Research	  clearly	  shows	  that	  this	  is	  vital	  to	  their	  future	  well-­‐being.	  It	  is	  
unfortunate	   that	   the	   complex	   relationship	   between	   contact	   and	   maintenance	   is	  
dismissed.	  (Consultation	  response,	  December	  1990,	  1).	  	  
This	  shows	  that	  the	  welfare	  of	  children	  was	  not	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  policy,	  nor	  was	  instilling	  parental	  
responsibility	  and	  family	  values;	  instead,	  as	  stated	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  the	  policy	  was	  designed	  to	  reap	  
the	   largest	   economic	   return.	   	   The	   greed	  of	   the	   Treasury	  was	   put	   before	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   child;	  
‘children	   were	   not	   put	   first’.	   	   Many	   of	   these	   shortcomings	   within	   the	   formula	   were	   eventually	  
addressed	   through	   amendments	   made	   in	   the	   first	   few	   years	   that	   the	   CSA	   was	   in	   operation.	  	  
However,	  if	  policy	  makers	  (and	  indeed	  all	  Parliamentarians)	  had	  given	  more	  serious	  consideration	  to	  
such	  issues	  when	  they	  were	  highlighted	  during	  the	  consultation	  process,	  the	  ensuing	  problems	  could	  
have	  been	  avoided	  and	  such	  amendments	  would	  not	  have	  been	  needed.	  
	  	   Several	   responses	   also	   highlighted	   the	   negative	   impact	   the	   CSA	   would	   have	   on	   second	  
families,	  which	  were	  not	  accounted	  for	   in	  the	  formula.	   	  A	  submission	  by	  the	  Association	  of	  County	  
Court	  and	  District	  Registrars	  (ACCDR)	  stressed	  the	  need	  for	  the	  Government	  to	  consider	  the	  impact	  
the	   policy	  would	   have	   on	   step-­‐children:	   ‘The	   second	   family	  will	   be	   reduced	   to	   subsistence	   level…	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these	  proposals	  will	  cause	  poverty	  and	  bitterness	  among	  many	  people	  who	  do	  not	  deserve	  it’	  (1990,	  
3).	   	  The	  expertise	  of	  the	  ACCDR	  was	   ignored,	   in	  spite	  of	   its	  vast	  experience	   in	  ancillary	  relief	  work.	  	  
When	  in	  operation,	  the	  CSA	  did	  indeed	  encounter	  opposition	  over	  the	  lack	  of	  consideration	  given	  to	  
second	   families,	   and	   as	   a	   result,	   further	   amendments	  were	   subsequently	   enacted.	   	   Again,	   if	   such	  
expertise	  had	  been	  heeded	  at	  formulation	  and	  drafting	  stage,	  it	  would	  have	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  
more	  coherent	  and	  less	  flawed	  policy	  and	  associated	  legislation.	  	  
Many	   pressure	   groups	   highlighted	   the	   degree	   of	   non-­‐compliance	   and	   public	   anger	   that	  
would	  arise	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  The	  Welfare	  Benefits	  Unit	  (WBU)	  warned	  policy	  makers	  that	  
without	   a	   disregard	   for	   maintenance	   from	   Income	   Support	   (Income	   Support	   would	   be	   reduced	  
pound-­‐for-­‐pound	  by	   the	   amount	  of	  maintenance	   received)	   there	  would	  be	  no	   incentive	   to	  pay	  or	  
name	  the	  absent	  parent.	   	  They	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  measure	  was	  punitive,	  as	  the	  majority	  of	   lone	  
parents	   on	   Income	   Support	   would	   not	   benefit	   under	   the	   scheme,	   therefore	   failing	   to	   tackle	   the	  
problem	  of	  lone-­‐parent	  poverty.	  	  The	  WBU	  noted	  that	  the	  policy	  would	  contradict	  its	  stated	  aim	  of	  
‘putting	  children	  first’	  and	  instead	  put	  ‘the	  DSS	  first’	  (WBU	  response	  to	  Children	  Come	  First,	  1990,	  2).	  	  
Similarly,	  the	  Convention	  of	  Scottish	  Local	  Authorities	  (COSLA)	  bluntly	  stated:	  	  
The	  proposals	   as	   outlined	   in	   the	  White	   Paper	   do	  not	   contain	  measures	  which	  will	  
help	  to	  alleviate	  poverty	  experienced	  by	  single	  parent	  households…	  The	  prominence	  
of	   the	  welfare	   of	   the	   child	   throughout	   this	   document	   [the	  White	   Paper]	  masks	   its	  
prime	  motive	  of	  cost	  cutting	  rather	  than	  remedying	  child	  poverty.	  All	  too	  often	  it	  is	  
apparent	   throughout	   that	   the	  net	   financial	  gain	   to	   the	  parent	  and	  child	   is	   little	  or	  
nothing	   while	   the	   Government	   stands	   to	   gain,	   often	   at	   some	   cost	   to	   the	  
relationships	   between	   the	   caring	   parent	   and	   absent	   parents	   and	   their	   children.	  
There	  is	  little	  confidence	  that	  the	  values	  and	  principles,	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  base	  of	  
the	   Child	   Support	   Agency,	   within	   the	   Department	   of	   Social	   Security,	   can	  
appropriately	   and	   sensitively	   assess	   and	  pursue	   the	   best	   interested	   of	   the	   child	   in	  
these	  circumstances.	  (Convention	  of	  Scottish	  Local	  Authorities	  response	  to	  Children	  
Come	  First,	  1990,	  4).	  	  	  
Numerous	  organisations	   argued	   that	   if	   the	  Government	  was	   committed	   to	   cutting	  poverty	   and	   to	  
‘putting	  children	  first’,	  then	  they	  should	  allow	  lone-­‐parents	  on	  Income	  Support	  to	  keep	  a	  proportion	  
of	  the	  maintenance	  over	  and	  above	  their	  benefits	  (just	  as	  those	  receiving	  Family	  Credit	  or	  Disability	  
Working	  Allowance	  did).	  	  The	  TUC	  stated	  that	  ‘it	  is	  unfair	  that	  the	  benefit	  disregard	  for	  recipients	  of	  
Family	   Credit	   is	   not	   to	   be	   extended	   to	   those	   in	   recipient	   of	   Income	   Support’	   (TUC	   response	   to	  
Children	  Come	  First,	  1990,	  2).	  They	  went	  on	  to	  recommend	  that	  the	  £15	  disregard	  be	  extended	  to	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recipients	  of	  Income	  Support.	  	  Policy-­‐makers	  again	  dismissed	  the	  warnings	  and	  concerns	  by	  pressure	  
groups	  and	  continued	  their	  pursuit	  of	  a	  flawed	  and	  punitive	  policy.	  	  
Several	  organisations	  also	  raised	  concerns	  over	  the	  proposed	  benefit	  penalty,	  20	  per	  cent	  or	  
£7.35	  per	  week,	  for	  those	  who	  did	  not	  name	  the	  absent	  parent.	  For	  example,	  the	  CSLA	  pointed	  out	  
to	  the	  DSS	  that:	  
	  	  The	  implications	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  such	  a	  household	  are	  extremely	  serious.	  A	  direct	  
deduction	   of	   this	   magnitude	   from	   an	   income	   level	   based	   on	   the	   Government’s	  
assessment	   of	   a	  minimal	   subsistence	   level	   is	   punitive	   to	   the	  women	   concerned	  and	  
places	  the	  children	  in	  an	  even	  more	  vulnerable	  situation	  than	  previously’.	  (Convention	  
of	  Scottish	  Local	  Authorities	  response	  to	  Children	  Come	  First,	  1990,	  1)	  
The	  concern	  was	  also	  voiced	  by	  One	  Parent	  Families	  (York)	  who	  stated:	  
It	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   any	   proposal	   that	   a	   deduction	   should	   be	   made	   from	   Income	  
Support	  thus	  requiring	  the	  whole	  family	  to	  live	  at	  below	  Income	  Support	  level	  must	  be	  
placing	   some	   other	   principle	   before	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   child(ren).’	   (One	   Parent	  
Families	  -­‐	  York	  response	  to	  Children	  Come	  First,	  1990,	  1)	  
Various	  organisations	  highlighted	   the	  need	   to	   include	   further	   exemptions,	   and	  more	   clarity,	  
regarding	  individuals	  required	  to	  name	  the	  absent	  parent.	  	  Organisations	  such	  as	  Scottish	  Women’s	  
Aid	  argued	  that	  ‘domestic	  violence’	  should	  be	  written	  into	  the	  legislation,	  along	  with	  rape	  and	  incest	  
as	  “good	  cause”	  for	  not	  naming	  the	  absent	  parent.	  	  They	  claimed	  that	  naming	  an	  absent	  parent	  that	  
had	   a	   history	   of	   violence	   could	   provoke	   further	   violence	   towards	   parent	   and/or	   child	   (Scottish	  
Women’s	  Aid	   response	   to	  Children	  Come	  First,	   1990,	   1).	   	   The	  potential	   harm	  of	  being	   required	   to	  
name	  a	  violent	  absent	  parent	  was	  also	  voiced	  by	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Citizens	  Advice	  Bureaux:	  
	  Many	  women	   have	   experienced	   violence,	   harassment	   and	   intimidation	   from	   their	  
partners.	  This	  violence	  often	  extends	   to	  children.	  For	  such	  women,	   the	  prospect	  of	  
the	  man	  being	  pursued	   for	  maintenance	   can	  bring	  with	   it	   renewed	  and	   increased	  
fears	   for	   their	  own	  and	  their	  children’s	  safety.	  The	  woman	   is	  often	  blamed	  for	   the	  
demand	  for	  money	  even	  where	  it	  is	  the	  DSS	  who	  are	  pursuing	  it.	  Many	  women	  who	  
have	  been	  in	  violent	  or	  other	  unhappy	  relationships	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  forced	  into	  a	  
position	   of	   continued	   financial	   dependency	   on	   someone	  who	   has	   caused	   so	  much	  
suffering.	   They	   need	   the	   opportunity	   to	   separate	   not	   only	   physically	   but	   also	  
emotionally	   and	   economically	   in	   order	   to	   reconstruct	   their	   lives.	   (National	  
Association	  of	  Citizens	  Advice	  Bureaux	  response	  to	  Children	  Come	  First,	  1990,	  3).	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At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  consultation	  process,	  the	  Department	  of	  Social	  Security	  did	  agree	  to	  take	  ‘fear	  of	  
violence’	   as	   grounds	   for	   refusing	   to	   name	   the	   absent	   parent.	   	   However	   the	   detail	   regarding	   this	  
remained	   vague	   and	   ambiguous	   in	   the	   writing	   of	   the	   policy	   itself,	   as	   well	   as	   requiring	   proof	   of	  
violence	   which	   is	   often	   difficult	   to	   attain.	   	   Therefore	   whilst	   improvement	   appeared	   to	   be	   made,	  
uncertainty	  and	  concern	  remained.	  	  
Several	   organisations	   also	   stressed	   the	   clear	   lack	   of	   integrated	   programmes	   that	   were	  
needed	  to	  lift	  many	  lone-­‐parent	  families	  out	  of	  poverty.	  	  Many	  insisted	  that	  what	  was	  needed	  was	  a	  
far	  more	  comprehensive	  initiative	  which	  included	  access	  to	  flexible	  and	  affordable	  childcare,	  training	  
and	   education	   opportunities,	   and	   employment	   support.	   	   The	   Child	   Poverty	   Action	   Group	   (CPAG),	  
while	   supportive	   of	   the	   principle	   behind	   the	   policy,	   highlighted	   that	   it	   was	   lacking	   fundamental	  
elements	  that	  were	  present	  in	  the	  Australian	  system:	  
CPAG	  supports	  the	  principle	  that	  absent	  parents	  should	  contribute	  to	  their	  children’s	  
maintenance	   where	   they	   are	   able	   to	   do	   so.	   But	   we	   believe	   that	   a	   policy	   on	  
maintenance	  can	  only	  be	  a	  small	  part	  of	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  policy	  to	  tackle	  the	  urgent	  
problem	  of	  poverty	  among	  lone	  parent	  families…	  the	  new	  Australian	  system	  of	  child	  
maintenance…	  forms	  only	  one	  part	  of	  a	  programme	  of	  reforms	  to	  try	  to	  ensure	  to	  
child	  need	  live	  in	  poverty	  by	  the	  year	  2000.	  There	  has	  been	  no	  analogous	  pledge	  by	  
the	  UK	  Government.	  (Child	  Poverty	  Action	  Group,	  response	  to	  Children	  Come	  First,	  
December	  1990).	  
This	  links	  back	  to	  chapter	  on	  policy	  transfer	  (Chapter	  Four)	  and	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  inadequate	  and	  
uninformed	   dual	   policy	   transfer	   that	   took	   place.	   	   It	   indicates	   that	   the	   objectives	   instilled	   in	   this	  
particular	  policy	  were	  not	  the	  same	  as	  those	  pursued	  by	  the	  Australian	  and	  American	  systems.	  	  The	  
absence	  of	  such	  programmes	  shows	  that	  financial,	  or	  rather	  Treasury	  concerns	  and	  considerations	  
were	  prioritised	  over	  social	  (anti-­‐poverty)	  objectives.	  	  Even	  though	  several	  organisations	  raised	  this	  
apprehension	  and	  anxiety,	  their	  concern	  was	  ignored	  and	  a	  Treasury	  focused	  policy	  was	  pursued.	  	  
There	  were	  also	  several	  warnings	  submitted	  over	  both	  the	  machinery	  and	  the	  administration	  
of	  the	  policy,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  policy	  was	  adequately	  resourced,	  and	  staff	  sufficiently	  
trained,	  from	  the	  outset.	  One	  group	  presciently	  prophesied	  that:	  
Substantial	  caseload...is	  likely	  to	  become	  unmanageable…	  one	  slow-­‐moving	  agency	  –	  
the	   courts	   –	   will	   be	   exchanged	   for	   another	   –	   the	   CSA	   –	   at	   much	   greater	   public	  
expense.	  (Legal	  Action	  Group,	  response	  to	  Children	  Come	  First,	  1990,	  3).	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Professor	   Lister	   in	   her	   consultation	   response	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Department	   of	   Social	   Sciences,	   at	  
Loughborough	  University,	  emphasised	  the	  need	  to	  ensure	  that	  officers	  dealing	  with	  sensitive	  issues	  
are	  sufficiently	  trained	  and	  not	  presented	  with	  unrealistic	  targets:	  
Great	  confidence	  is	  being	  placed	  in	  ‘well-­‐trained	  officers’	  to	  assess	  the	  situation;	  the	  
same	   officers	   who	   are	   now	   subject	   to	   increasingly	   ‘challenging’	   targets	   for	   the	  
amount	   of	   maintenance	   secured.	   Forgive	   me,	   if	   I	   remain	   sceptical	   about	   the	  
sensitivity	   of	   officers	   whose	   performance	   is	   judged	   by	   how	   well	   they	   meet	   those	  
targets	  and	  whose	  training	   is	  unlikely	   to	  equip	  them	  to	  be	  able	  to	  assess	  whether	  a	  
threat	   of	   violence	   is	   genuine.	   (Loughborough	  University	   response	   to	  Children	   Come	  
First,	  1990,	  3).	  	  	  
Others	   recognised	   that	   the	   targets	   set	   for	   the	   CSA	   were	   unrealistic,	   with	   The	   Family	   Law	   Bar	  
Association	  commenting	  that:	  	  
[The	  White	  Paper]	  suggests	  that	  the	  Agency	  would	  be	  able	  to	  carry	  out	  reassessment	  
on	  an	  annual	  basis	  to	  take	  account	  of	  changes	  in	  income	  and	  liabilities.	  We	  think	  this	  
statement	   is	   staggeringly	   naive.	   There	   are	   nearly	   150,000	   divorces	   annually	   in	  
England	  and	  Wales	  and	   in	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	   them	  there	  are	  children	   involved.	  To	  
suggest	   that	   the	   Agency	   is	   going	   to	   be	   able	   to	   review	   each	   individual	   case	   on	   an	  
annual	  basis,	   in	  addition	  to	  dealing	  with	  the	  workload	  involved	  in	  assessing	  the	  new	  
ones,	   seems	   to	   us	   completely	   fanciful.	   (Family	   Law	   Bar	   Association,	   response	   to	  
Children	  Come	  First,	  1990,	  5-­‐6.).	  	  
The	  Association	  of	  County	  Court	  and	  District	  Registrars	  also	  cited	  its	  own	  ‘experience	  of	  working	  in	  an	  
organisation	   which	   is	   underfunded	   and	   understaffed	   and	   whose	   staff	   are	   demoralised	   and	  
inadequately	   trained.’	   (ACCDR,	   response	   to	  Children	  Come	  First,	  1990,	  6.).	   	  The	  Legal	  Action	  Group	  
(LAG)	  also	  warned	  that	  the	  Agency	  was	  likely	  to	  experience	  substantial	  administrative	  problems,	  ‘the	  
substantial	  caseload	  envisaged	  for	   the	  agency	   is	   likely	   to	  become	  unmanageable’	   (LAG	  response	  to	  
Children	  Come	  First,	  1990,	  6.).	  	  	  
When	   in	   operation,	   the	   CSA	   was	   indeed	   overwhelmed	   with	   administrative	   problems	   and	  
unworkable	   targets	   that	   crippled	   the	   running	  of	   the	  organisation.	   	  Agency	   staff	  were	   inadequately	  
and	  inappropriately	  trained	  and	  resourced,	  depression	  amongst	  agency	  staff	  was	  high,	  and	  they	  were	  
presented	  with	   targets	   that	  hindered	  their	  ability	   to	  undertake	  sufficient	  work	  on	  each	  case.	  Again	  
the	  concerns	  raised	  by	  external	  organisations,	  which	  could	  have	  helped	  develop	  a	  successful	  policy,	  
were	  ignored,	  as	  Thatcherite	  ideology	  and	  the	  Treasury’s	  economic	  priorities	  prevailed.	  	  The	  CSA	  has	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been	  portrayed	  largely	  as	  an	  operational	  or	  implementation	  failure,	  emphasis	  has	  been	  placed	  on	  the	  
Agency’s	  underperformance	   rather	   than	   the	  policy’s	   inability	   to	   create	  an	  effective	  Agency.	   	  While	  
the	  Agency	  certainly	  experienced	  vast	  problems	  at	  the	  implementation	  stage	  and	  when	  in	  operation,	  
this	  Chapter	  is	  demonstrating	  that	  many	  of	  these	  problems	  were	  predicted,	  and	  in	  fact	  embedded	  in	  
the	  design	  of	  the	  policy.	  It	  was	  not	  the	  case	  that	  Ros	  Hepplewhite	  failed	  to	  implement	  a	  policy;	  rather	  
she	  was	  given	  the	  task	  of	  implementing	  a	  failed,	  or	  fatally	  flawed,	  policy.	  	  
As	   reiterated	   throughout,	   the	   underlying	   imperative	   for	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   was	  
expenditure	  savings.	  	  Whilst	  this	  was	  a	  hidden	  objective,	  organisations	  did	  highlight	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  
creating	  an	  Agency	  and	  doubted	  whether	  expenditure	  savings	  could	  be	  made.	   	  The	  Justices’	  Clerks’	  
Society	  stated:	  ‘It	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  expensive	  to	  set	  up	  and	  run…	  No	  savings	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  offset	  
the	  cost’	  (Justices’	  Clerks’	  Society,	  response	  to	  Children	  Come	  First,	  1990,	  5).	  	  This	  was	  also	  suggested	  
by	   The	   Family	   Law	   Bar	   Association:	   ‘the	   Government	   is	   seriously	   underestimating	   the	   cost	   of	  
implementing	   these	   proposals’	   (The	   Family	   Law	   Bar	   Association,	   response	   to	   Children	   Come	   First,	  
1990,	  1).	  	  Therefore,	  not	  only	  did	  the	  consultation	  process	  indicate	  that	  the	  policy	  was	  highly	  likely	  to	  
fail	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  stated	  objectives,	  it	  also	  implied	  that	  it	  would	  fail	  to	  meet	  its	  concealed	  objectives.	  	  
Therefore	  on	  each	  level	  consultation	  was	  ignored,	  even	  when	  it	  was	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  policy-­‐makers’	  
concealed	  motives.	  	  
This	   disregard	   of	   expertise	   can	   be	   linked	   to	   Dunleavy’s	   ‘arrogance	   of	   Whitehall’	   factor.	  	  
Whilst	  Dunleavy	  focuses	  on	  the	  senior	  Civil	  Servants	  who	  are	  ‘dismissive	  of	  outside	  organisations	  and	  
centres	  of	  expertise’	  (1995,	  62)	  it	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  politicians.	  	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  Thatcher	  
changed	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Civil	  Service,	  reflecting	  her	  deep	  distrust	  of	  civil	  servants	  in	  general,	  meant	  
that	  mandarins’	  own	  policy-­‐making	  role	  was	  diminished.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  CSA,	  the	  arrogance	  was	  
not	  coming	  from	  Whitehall,	  but	  from	  the	  Government	  itself	  –	  or	  part	  of	  it	  –	  from	  where	  intellectual	  
self-­‐confidence	  and	  disregard	  for	  genuine	  expertise	  led	  to	  hubris.	  	  
The	  quality	  of	  the	  consultation	  responses	  were	  commendable	  but	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  
were	   received	   was	   poor;	   the	   Thatcher	   Government	   proved	   strongly	   resistant	   to	   criticism,	   which	  
ultimately	   contributed	   to	   flawed	   policies.	   	   The	   degree	   to	   which	   the	   Thatcherite	   brand	   of	   policy-­‐
makers	   genuinely	   valued	   the	   consultation	   process	   was	   evidently	   very	   limited.	   	   As	   one	   Minister	  
replied	  when	   asked	  whether	   there	  was	   an	   adequate	   consultation	   process	   regarding	   the	   CSA:	   ‘the	  
idea	   that	  consultation	  solves	  everything	   is	  a	  modern	  notion’	   (Minister	   (B)	   in	   the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet,	  
interviewed	  by	   author,	   19	   July	   2011).	   	   Yet	   in	   this	   case,	   it	   appears	   that	   treating	   consultation	  more	  
seriously	   would	   have	   solved	   several	   of	   the	   problems	   that	   the	   CSA	   faced.	   The	   formulation	   of	   the	  
policy	   did	   not	   utilise	   the	   expertise	   that	   was	   available,	   and	   ignored	   the	   concerns	   that	   many	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organisations	  presciently	  articulated.	  	  This	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  policy	  making	  process	  was	  strongly	  
dominated	   by	   ideology	   and	   Treasury	   objectives,	   rather	   than	   a	   genuine	   desire	   to	   establish	   a	  
successful	  policy:	  an	  idea	  was	  established	  and	  consultation	  was	  rejected.	  	  
The	   unwillingness	   of	   the	   government	   to	   consider	   the	   expertise	   offered	   in	   many	   of	   the	  
responses	  to	  the	  White	  Paper	  was	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  The	  arrogance	  of	  particular	  policy-­‐
makers	  played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  the	  subsequent	  failure	  of	  the	  CSA.	  	  The	  Conservative	  Government	  was	  
very	  dismissive	  of	  expert	  organisations	  and	  pressure	  groups,	  and	  very	  reluctant	  to	  modify	  the	  policy	  
to	   take	   into	  account	   the	  comments	  of	  others.	   	  Although	   it	  was	  evident	   to	  many	   interested	  parties	  
that	  the	  policy	  process	  needed	  to	  be	  slowed	  down	  in	  order	  to	  gather	  sufficient	  understanding	  and	  
modify	   the	  policy	  appropriately,	   this	  did	  not	  happen.	   	   Instead,	   the	  haste	  and	  arrogance	  continued	  
into	  the	  policy’s	  next	  stage.	  Just	  as	  the	  ‘consultation’	  process	  was	  rushed	  and	  deficient,	  so	  too	  was	  
the	  parliamentary	  process.	  	  
6.4	  The	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  in	  Parliament	  
	   This	   section	   will	   assess	   the	   Bill’s	   passage	   through	   Parliament.	   	   Extracts	   of	   speeches	   and	  
debates	  will	  be	  set	  out	  and	  assessed.	  Given	  the	  degree	  of	  concern	  which	  the	  White	  Paper	  aroused	  in	  
many	   quarters,	   we	   would	   expect	   to	   see	   heated	   Parliamentary	   debates	   and	   a	   difficult	   legislative	  
passage.	   Heated	   debate	   was	   indeed	   present	   during	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   stage	   yet	   it	   was	   notably	  
absent	   during	   the	   Commons	   stage.	   	   Despite	   many	   of	   the	   concerns	   voiced	   by	   organisations	   and	  
individuals	   during	   the	   consultation	   process	   being	   echoed	   in	   the	   House	   of	   Lords,	   and	   also	   by	   the	  
Social	   Security	   Select	   Committee,	   and	   attempts	   being	   made	   by	   them	   to	   ‘soften’	   the	   policy,	   the	  
Commons’	  stage	  failed	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  check-­‐and-­‐balance	  on	  the	  Government.	   Instead	  the	  Child	  
Support	  Bill,	  a	  controversial	  and	  flawed	  policy	  was	  passed	  with	  cross-­‐party	  support	  and	  relative	  ease.	  
6.4.1	  The	  House	  of	  Lords	  
The	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  was	  published	  on	  14	  February	  1991,	  just	  two	  months	  after	  the	  closing	  
date	  for	  responses	  to	  the	  White	  Paper	  Children	  Come	  First	  (a	  short	  time-­‐frame	  which	  itself	  indicated	  
the	  Government’s	  haste).	  	  The	  Bill	  was	  first	  introduced	  into	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  which	  departed	  from	  
convention	   that	   controversial	   legislation	   is	   ordinarily	   considered	   in	   the	   Commons	   first.	   The	  
Government’s	  ability	  to	  choose	  where	  a	  bill	  is	  introduced	  is	  a	  power	  resource	  at	  their	  disposal.	  It	  can	  
be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  down-­‐grade	  the	  Bill’s	  apparent	   importance	  and	  make	  its	  passage	  as	   low-­‐
key	  as	  possible.	  	  From	  the	  outset	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  policy	  was	  presented	  overemphasised	  the	  
principles	  underpinning	  the	  policy,	  while	  concealing	  the	  controversial	  character	  that	  was	  hidden	   in	  
its	   detail.	   	   The	   introduction	   of	   the	   Bill	   into	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   first,	   rather	   than	   the	   House	   of	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Commons,	   implied	   that	   it	   was	  merely	   a	   technical	   piece	   of	   legislation,	   based	   on	   traditional	   family	  
values,	   which	   would	   enact	   an	   uncontroversial	   policy	   which	   all	   sides	   within	   Parliament	   would	  
support.	  	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  conceal	  its	  underlying	  purpose	  and	  true	  objectives.	  	  As	  
stated	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  which	  looked	  at	  problem	  definition,	  identification,	  and	  representation,	  the	  
way	   a	   problem	   is	   represented	   externally	   is	   often	   used	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   mask	   how	   the	   problem	   is	  
identified	  internally	  by	  policy	  makers.	  	  
However,	   some	   peers	   quickly	   discerned	   the	   Bill’s	   controversial	   financial	   and	   ideological	  
motives.	   	   As	   Lord	   Houghton	   of	   Sowerby	   (Labour	   Party)	   observed	   in	   one	   of	   his	   (several)	   critical	  
contributions:	  	  
This	  Bill	  is	  not	  a	  Child	  Support	  Bill;	  it	  is	  a	  taxing	  Bill.	  I	  am	  surprised	  that	  the	  Chancellor	  
of	  the	  Exchequer	  has	  not	  certified	  it	  as	  a	  Money	  Bill	  and	  included	  it	  as	  a	  schedule	  in	  
the	   Finance	   Bill.	   It	   imposes	   a	   form	   of	   taxation	   upon	   an	   identifiable	   section	   of	   the	  
community	  who	  will	  be	  mostly	  men;	  there	  are	  to	  be	  inspectors	  who	  will	  assess	  what	  
they	   shall	   pay,	   determine	   the	  method	  and	   the	  order	   in	  which	   they	   shall	   pay	   it,	   and	  
they	  have	  the	  power	  to	  enforce	  it.	  In	  short	  this	  tax	  is	  PAYT,	  ‘pay	  as	  you	  are	  told’...	  The	  
Bill	  reflects	  the	  outburst	  of	  the	  former	  Prime	  Minister,	  Mrs.	  Thatcher,	  whose	  concern	  
for	   children	   came	   second	   to	   not	   allowing	   absentee	   fathers	   to	   get	   away	   with	   non-­‐
payment	  of	  maintenance.	  (HL	  Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	  526,	  col.	  807-­‐808).	  	  
Lord	   Houghton	   confirmed	   what	   we	   suggested	   earlier,	   that	   the	   Bill	   and	   its	   passage	   reflected	   the	  
outburst	   of	   the	   former	   Prime	   Minister.	   Although	   several	   Peers	   were	   aware,	   and	   critical,	   of	   the	  
underlying	   ideological	   and	   economic	   motives	   of	   the	   Bill,	   it	   passed	   through	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	  
relatively	   unscathed.	   This	   is	   largely	   due	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   Government	   was	   able	   to	  
manipulate	  its	  Parliamentary	  resources.	  	  The	  Government’s	  presentation	  of	  the	  Bill,	  its	  control	  of	  the	  
statutory	  process,	  and	  its	  dismissive	  attitude	  towards	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  undermined	  the	  legislative	  
process	  and	  led	  to	  poor	  and	  ineffective	  scrutiny.	  	  As	  Lord	  Simon	  of	  Glaisdale	  argued,	  the	  manner	  in	  
which	   the	  Bill	  was	  structured	  was	   ‘gravely	  derogatory	  of	  parliamentary	  control’	   (HL	  Deb	   (1990-­‐91)	  
Vol.	  526,	  col.	  813).	  	  The	  inadequacies	  in	  the	  Parliamentary	  process	  are	  present	  for	  all	  Bills,	  but	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill,	  an	  inherently	  flawed	  policy	  combined	  with	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Treasury	  
to	  manipulate	  these	  inadequacies	  saw	  the	  negatives	  consequences	  of	  an	  inadequate	  parliamentary	  
process	  exacerbated.	  
Undoubtedly,	  peers'	   ability	   to	   scrutinise	   the	  policy	  was	   impeded.	   	  One	  of	   the	   first	   criticisms	  
raised	  was	  by	  Lord	  Mishcon	  who	  highlighted	  this	  abuse	  of	  the	  system	  by	  stating:	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The	  Bill	  amounts	  to	  a	  piece	  of	  skeleton	  legislation…	  under	  the	  Bill	  there	  will	  fall	  to	  be	  
made	  94	  regulations.	  Of	  that	  figure…	  12	  only	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  affirmative	  resolution	  
of	  Parliament.	  That	  is	  very	  distressing;	  it	  is	  constitutionally	  objectionable…	  it	  is	  a	  little	  
offensive.	  (HL	  Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	  526,	  col	  769).	  
The	   Bill	   only	   contained	   the	   bare	   bones	   of	   the	   policy;	   the	   detail	  was	   to	   be	   provided	   subsequently	  
through	  regulations	  published	  at	  a	  later	  date	  which	  were	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  scrutiny	  
and	   parliamentary	   approval.	   This	  weakened	   Parliament’s	   role	   by	   removing	   its	   ability	   to	   scrutinise	  
large	  sections	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  
The	  Government’s	  stance	  was	  that	  regulations	  were	  needed	  for	  flexibility	  and	  adjustments	  
in	  light	  of	  operational	  experience,	  and	  hence	  it	  dismissed	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  was	  preventing	  Parliament	  
from	  scrutinising	  effectively.	  	  However	  a	  Minister	  in	  the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet	  conceded	  that	  the	  volume	  
of	  regulations	  was	  due	  to	  the	  pressure	  to	  get	  the	  Bill	  enacted	  quickly:	  
Thinking	  through	  the	  detail	  was	  a	  lengthy	  process	  and	  the	  result	  was	  that	  the	  Bill	  was	  
to	  significant	  extent	  an	  aircraft	  carrier	   full	  of	   regulation	  making	  powers…	  the	  policy	  
wasn’t	  available	  in	  full	  detail	  at	  the	  time,	  we	  simply	  didn’t	  have	  the	  detail	  -­‐	  we	  didn’t	  
have	  the	  time	  to	  think	  it	  all	  through,	  the	  emphasis	  was	  on	  getting	  it	  onto	  the	  statute	  
books.	  (Minister	  B	  in	  the	  Thatcher	  Cabinet,	  interviewed	  by	  author	  19	  July	  2011).	  	  	  
This	  shows	  that	  the	  Government	  not	  only	  used	  its	  resources	  to	  undermine	  the	  scrutiny	  process,	  but	  
also	  to	  enact	  a	  policy	  which	  they	  had	  not	  thought	  out	  properly.	  	  The	  Government	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  
devise	   a	   coherent	   policy;	   it	   simply	   aimed	   to	   hurriedly	   enact	   an	   idea.	   	   Speed	   was	   favoured	   over	  
quality	  and	  ideological	  purity	  and	  economic	  imperatives	  prevailed	  over	  parliamentary	  scrutiny,	  both	  
of	  which	  damaged	  the	  final	  policy.	  	  
From	  the	  outset,	  concerns	  were	  also	  raised	  over	   the	  degree	  of	  ambiguity	  enshrined	   in	   the	  
Bill.	   Lord	  Mischon	   complained	   that	   several	   of	   the	   clauses	   contained	   in	   the	   Bill	   were	   ‘very	   loosely	  
worded’	   adding	   that	   ‘one	   may	   think	   that	   the	   noble	   and	   learned	   Lord	   would	   not	   wish	   to	   excuse	  
himself	  for	  any	  vagueness	  of	  language	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  being	  flexible	  or	  because	  it	  is	  too	  technical’	  
(HL	  Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	  526,	  col.	  778).	  	  A	  serious	  problem	  with	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  was	  the	  degree	  
of	   complexity	   that	   led	   to	   ambiguity.	   As	   Lord	   Mischon	   noted	   (previous	   page),	   Parliament	   was	  
presented	  with	  a	  Bill	  that	  enshrined	  94	  regulation	  making	  powers,	  and	  was	  riddled	  with	  ambiguity.	  	  
One	  Minister	   in	   the	   Thatcher	   Cabinet	   suggested	   that	   this	   stemmed	   from	   the	   often	   contradictory	  
messages	  that	  were	  being	  given	  to	  the	  Parliamentary	  Counsel	  during	  the	  drafting	  process:	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  It	   got	   to	   the	   point	   of	   insisting	   that	   Parliamentary	   Counsel	   be	   present	   at	   all	  
meetings,	   because	   it	   became	   clear…	   that	   they	   weren’t	   getting	   clear	   instructions	  
from	  the	  department	  in	  order	  to	  know	  what	  to	  draft.	  They	  didn’t	  know	  what	  to	  put	  
in	  it.	  (Minister	  in	  Thatcher	  Cabinet	  A,	  interviewed	  by	  author	  19	  July	  2011).	  	  
This	  was	  again	  a	  result	  of	  the	  two	  competing	  policy	  paths:	  that	  of	  the	  DSS	  and	  LCO	  on	  one	  side	  and	  
that	  of	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  on	  another.	  	  The	  conflict	  of	  objectives	  between	  the	  DSS	  and	  the	  
Treasury	   created	   uncertainty	   for	   the	   Parliamentary	   Counsel	   as	   to	   what	   to	   actually	   include	   in	   the	  
draft	  Bill,	  which	  then	  led	  to	  ambiguity	  manifesting	  itself	  in	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  proper.	  	  Not	  only	  did	  
this	   hinder	   Parliament’s	   ability	   to	   scrutinise	   the	   Bill,	   it	   also	   led	   to	   major	   problems	   in	   the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  policy,	  due	  to	  its	  unclear	  objectives.	  	  
While	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	   like	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  relevant	  pressure	  groups,	  endorsed	  the	  
philosophy	  and	  principle	  underpinning	  the	  Bill	  and	  need	  for	  reform,	  it	  harboured	  deep	  concerns	  over	  
its	   structure,	  methods	  and	  details.	   	  On	   the	  19	  March	  1991,	  during	   the	  committee	  stage,	  exchange	  
became	  heated	  in	  House	  of	  Lords	  when	  peers	  debated	  Clause	  22	  (which	  stated	  that	  lone	  parents	  on	  
state	  benefits	  would	   face	   financial	   penalties	   for	   non-­‐cooperation).	   	  Moving	   an	   amendment	   to	   the	  
clause,	  Earl	  Russell	  stated:	  
[Income	  Support]	  is	  a	  subsistence	  benefit.	  I	  am	  not	  convinced	  by	  the	  argument	  that	  
it	  is	  possible	  to	  live	  on	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  it.	  The	  right	  social	  security	  benefit	  is	  part	  of	  the	  
nexus	  of	  obligations	  which	  make	  up	  citizenship.	   It	  goes	  with	   the	  obligation	   to	  pay	  
taxes	  and	  the	  right	  to	  vote.	  For	  a	   long	  time	  it	  has	  been	  a	  basic	  principle	  of	  English	  
law	  that	  allegiance	  carries	  with	  it	  the	  right	  to	  protection.	  In	  this	  day	  and	  age	  I	  do	  not	  
think	   that	  we	   can	   interpret	   the	   right	   to	  protection	  as	  meaning	   simply	   the	   right	   to	  
protection	  from	  violent	  crimes	  or	  external	  aggression.	  It	  also	  means	  protection	  from	  
deprivation.	   I	   do	   not	   see	   any	   good	   reason	   for	   depriving	   people	   of	   benefit	   to	   the	  
point	  where	  they	  get	  below	  subsistence	  level.	  (Earl	  Russell,	  col	  535).	  	  
The	   Lords	   voted	   against	   Clause	   22	   by	   a	  majority	   of	   110	   votes	   to	   106,	   resulting	   in	   a	   Government	  
defeat,	  whereupon	  Clause	  22	  was	  amended,	   thereby	  deleting	  the	   financial	  penalty.	   	  However,	   this	  
success	  was	  fleeting;	  the	  benefit	  penalty	  was	  reinstated	  during	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  committee	  
stage,	  and	  included	  in	  the	  Bill	  that	  received	  Royal	  Assent.	  
While	  only	  one	  clause	  was	  actually	  removed	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  this	  does	  not	  reflect	  the	  
degree	   of	   opposition	   which	   the	   Bill	   faced.	   	   As	   Lord	   Simon	   commented	   ‘no-­‐one	   except	   the	   two	  
Ministers	   in	   charge	  of	   the	  Bill	   had	  anything	  good	   to	   say	  about	   it’	   (HL	  Deb	   (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	   531,	   col.	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466).	  	  Throughout	  the	  process,	  attentive	  Peers	  continued	  to	  raise	  objections	  to	  the	  Bill,	  describing	  it	  
as	   ‘Orwellian’,	   ‘repulsive’,	   ‘with	   measures	   similar	   to	   the	   Gestapo’,	   ‘grubby’,	   ‘unprincipled’,	   and	  
‘abusive’.	  Yet	  they	  were	  unsuccessful	  in	  securing	  significant	  changes	  or	  concessions.	  	  
Those	  who	  did	   consider	   the	  Bill	   in	  detail	   correctly	  predicted	  many	  of	   the	  problems	   that	   the	  
CSA	  subsequently	  experienced,	  when	  enacted.	  As	  Lord	  Houghton	  trenchantly	  warned,	   ‘the	  Bill	  will	  
cause	  far	  more	  tears,	  anger,	  resentment	  and	  violence	  than	  its	  authors	  imagined’	  (HL	  Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  
Vol.	  526,	  col.	  808).	  	  While	  the	  original	  objectives	  of	  the	  DSS	  and	  LCO	  were	  supported	  by	  many	  peers,	  
the	  elements	  inserted	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  were	  criticised.	  As	  Baroness	  Faithful	  stated,	  	  
Those	  principles	  are	  surely	  right.	  However,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  accept	  that	  the	  structure,	  
procedure	  and	  methods	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Bill	  to	  implement	  those	  principles	  are	  wise,	  
practicable	  or,	  indeed,	  acceptable.	  (HL	  Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	  526,	  col.	  805).	  	  	  
Indeed,	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   opposed	   most	   elements	   of	   the	   Child	   Support	   Bill.	   	   The	   formula	   was	  
deemed	  ‘as	  incomprehensible	  as	  the	  Egyptian	  hieroglyphs	  must	  have	  been	  to	  an	  illiterate	  peasant	  in	  
the	  Nile	  delta’	  (HL	  Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	  526,	  col.	  812).	  	  Stern	  opposition	  and	  deep	  concern	  were	  also	  
expressed	   over	   the	   very	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   Bill,	   for	   it	   was	   suggested	   that	   several	   clauses	   were	  
draconian	  and	  not	   in	   line	  with	  democratic	   society	   (HL	  Deb	   (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	   526,	   col.	   817).	   	  Another	  
concern	   highlighted	  was	   the	   problematic	   nature	   of	   diverging	   from	   the	  Australian	  model	   (which	   is	  
administered	   through	   the	   taxation	   system)	   and	  which	  would	   thereby	   lead	   to	   severe	   problems	   of	  
enforcement.	   (HL	   Deb	   (1990-­‐91)	   Vol.	   526,	   col.	   805).	   	   Lord	   Stoddart	   commented	   on	   the	  
administrative	   and	   operational	   problems	   that	   were	   likely	   to	   occur	   under	   the	   Bill,	   and	   ominously	  
compared	  its	  future	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Poll	  Tax:	  ‘it	  will	  be	  an	  administrative	  nightmare’	  (HL	  Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  
Vol.	  526,	  col.	  817).	  	  	  
	  It	  appears	  that	  governmental	  control	  over	  Parliament	  was	  deployed	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  as	  
difficult	  as	  possible	  for	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  to	  scrutinise	  and	  influence	  the	  Bill	  effectively.	  	  Many	  peers	  
drew	  attention	  to	  the	  ‘devil	   in	  the	  detail’	  and	  purported	  to	  see	  the	  Bill	   in	  its	  true	  light:	  a	  Bill	  which	  
was	   ‘not	   conceived	   in	   a	   reasonable	  manner’	   or	   concerned	   about	   the	  welfare	   of	   children	   (HL	   Deb	  
(1990-­‐91)	   Vol.	   527,	   col.	   538),	   but	   from	   the	   ideological	   pursuit	   of	   the	   former	   Prime	   Minister	  
[Thatcher]	   (HL	   Deb	   (1990-­‐91)	   Vol.	   526,	   col.	   808),	   	   who	   was	   concerned	   with	   ‘money,	   nothing	   but	  
money’	   (HL	   Deb	   (1990-­‐91)	   Vol.	   527,	   col.	   579).	   	   Just	   as	   pressure	   groups	   warned	   the	   Government	  
about	  the	   inherit	  weakness	  of	  the	  policy,	  so	  too	  did	  many	  peers	   in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords.	   	  Yet	  again,	  
though,	  views	  which	  were	  critical	  of	  aspects	  of	  the	  Bill,	  and	  perspective	  of	  Treasury	  and	  the	  previous	  
Prime	  Minister,	  were	  rejected.	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6.4.2	  House	  of	  Commons	  
	   The	  Child	  Support	  Bill’s	  passage	  through	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  was	  markedly	  different	  to	  
its	  passage	  through	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  minimal	  opposition	  it	  faced.	  	  The	  Bill	  received	  
only	  cursory	  attention	  and	  ‘rubber-­‐stamp’	  approval.	  Just	  as	  the	  Bill’s	  passage	  through	  the	  House	  of	  
Lords	  was	  rushed,	  so	  too	  was	  its	  journey	  through	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  was	  rushed.	  	  The	  Standing	  
Committee	   (now	  the	  Public	  Bill	  Committee)	  Stage,	  which	   typically	  scrutinises	  each	  clause	   in	  detail,	  
was	   completed	   in	   just	   over	   17	   hours.	   	   For	   a	   policy	   noted	   for	   its	   complexity,	   this	   was	   highly	  
inadequate.	   	   The	   Third	   Reading	   also	   received	   inadequate	   attention,	   completed	   in	   just	   over	   three	  
hours	   (Davis	  et	  al,	   1998,	  10).	   	  Overall	   the	  process	  appeared	   ineffectual;	   there	  was	   limited	  debate,	  
external	  expertise	  seemed	  to	  be	  ignored,	  and	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  dismissed.	  	  The	  
process	  ended	  with	   the	  Opposition	  providing	  unenthusiastic	   support	  while	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  back-­‐
benchers	  quietly	  voiced	  significant	  concerns.	  
	   Not	  only	  was	  the	  parliamentary	  process	  rushed,	  it	  seemed	  that	  many	  MPs	  were	  unaware	  of	  
what	  they	  were	  actually	  endorsing.	  	  As	  one	  MP	  subsequently	  confessed,	  
Our	  scrutiny	  process	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  was	  defective.	  Many	  of	  us	  
simply	  did	  not	   realise	  what	  was	  to	   follow	   implementation…we	  did	  not	   realise	  how	  
drastic	  the	  change	  would	  be.	  (Quoted	  in	  Garnham	  and	  Knights,	  1994,	  73).	  	  
This	   is	   largely	   due	   to	   the	   fundamental	   flaws	   of	   the	   parliamentary	   system	  of	   scrutiny.	   It	  would	   be	  
naïve	  to	  suggest	   that	  every	  MP	  scrutinises	  the	  detail	  of	  each	  Bill	  before	  s/he	  decides	  how	  to	  vote.	  	  
The	  volume	  of	   legislation	  which	  MPs	  have	  to	  consider,	  coupled	  with	  parliamentary	  committee	  and	  
constituency	  work	  often	  means	  that	  details	  are	  ignored.	  	  However,	  while	  in	  many	  cases	  MPs	  can	  still	  
comprehend	   the	   purpose	   and	   principles	   of	   most	   Bills,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Child	   Support	   Bill,	   its	  
complexity	   and	   ambiguity	   meant	   that	   many	   MPs	   were	   unaware	   of	   its	   likely	   impact.	   The	   Child	  
Support	   Bill	   contained	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   complexity	   due	   to	   its	   formula	  which	   required	   over	   a	   100	  
pieces	  of	   information	   to	   calculate,	  but	   it	  was	  also	  very	  ambiguous,	  much	  of	   the	  detail	  was	   ‘at	   the	  
discretion	  of	   the	   Secretary	  of	   State	   for	   Social	   Security’	   or	   loosely	  worded,	   such	  as	  no	   clarity	   as	   to	  
what	  qualified	  as	  ‘good	  cause’.	  	  Garnham	  and	  Knights	  suggest	  that	  this	  also	  applies	  to	  those	  involved	  
in	   the	  Standing	  Committee;	   they	  were	  not	   ‘fully	   familiar	  with	  the	   intricacies	  of	   the	  Bill’	   (1994,	  37).	  	  
While	   the	  House	  of	   Lords	   scrutinised	   the	  detail	   of	   the	  Bill,	   the	  House	  of	   Commons	   focused	  on	   its	  
philosophy.	  	  	  
The	  problem	  with	  this	  was	  the	  apparent	  philosophy	  of	  the	  Bill	  was	  sound;	  it	  was	  the	  detail	  (or	  
lack	   of)	   that	   was	   controversial	   and	   ultimately	   led	   to	   policy	   failure.	   	   As	   Michael	   Meacher,	   then	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Shadow	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Social	  Security,	  stated,	  ‘the	  Bill	  has	  some	  fine	  qualities,	  but	  parts	  of	  it	  
make	  me	  shudder’	   (HC	  Deb	   (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	  192,	  col.	  227);	  however,	  he	  subsequently	  voted	  against	  
amendments	  and	   supported	   the	   reintroduction	  of	  Clause	  22	   (benefit	  penalty).	   	   The	  Government’s	  
tactic	  was	  to	  emphasise	  both	  the	  need	  for	  change	  and	  the	  DSS’s	  underlying	  principles,	  whilst	  trying	  
to	   mask	   its	   economic	   and	   ideological	   agenda.	   	   As	   Professor	   Freeman	   stated	   in	   his	   consultation	  
response	  on	  behalf	  of	  University	  College	  London:	  
The	   intention	   is	  not	   to	  put	   ‘children	   first’.	   The	  White	  Paper	  would	  have	  been	  better	  
called	   ‘Taxpayers	   Come	   First’.	   Although	   the	   language	   is	   couched	   in	   terms	   of	   family	  
responsibility	  and	  emphasises	  the	  needs	  of	  children	  (or	  does	  so	  at	  least	  in	  theory),	  it	  is	  
not	  difficult	  to	  detect	  that	  a	  concern	  to	  off-­‐load	  expenditure	  from	  the	  Exchequer	  is	  the	  
too	  motivating	  force.	  (Freeman,	  Faculty	  of	  Law,	  University	  College	  London,	  ‘Children	  
Come	  First’	  consultation	  response,	  December	  1990,	  1)	  
Indeed	  this	  agenda	  was	  apparent	  to	  many,	  for	  as	  Meacher	  added:	  
[The	  Bill]	   smacks	  more	  of	  Thatcherite	  dogmatism	   than	  of	  a	  workable	   social	  policy…	  
the	   Bill	   is	   not	   so	  much	   about	   ensuring	   that	   lone	   parents	   get	   their	  maintenance	   as	  
ensuring	  that	  the	  Treasury	  gets	  a	  reduction	  in	  public	  expenditure.	  (HC	  Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  
Vol.	  192,	  col.	  199-­‐200).	  	  	  
Yet	  although	  the	  Opposition	  was	  aware	  of	   this,	   the	  policy	  passed	  through	  Parliament	  with	  relative	  
ease	   partly	   due	   to	   cross-­‐party	   support.	   	   While	   some	   Labour	  MPs	   voiced	   concerns	   which	   echoed	  
those	  heard	   in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  the	  Commons	  only	  pushed	  three	  amendments	  to	  a	  vote,	  albeit	  
each	  time	  unsuccessfully.	  	  It	  can	  be	  suggested	  House	  of	  Commons	  passed	  the	  Bill	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  
philosophy,	  not	  its	  detail.	   	  However,	   if	  sufficient	  attention	  had	  been	  given	  to	  the	  Bill,	  and	  concerns	  
raised	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  and	  during	  consultation	  had	  been	   listened	  to,	  and	  resources	  utilised,	  
MPs	  would	  have	  realised	  that	   the	  detail	  was	  undermining	  the	  philosophy.	   Instead	  there	  was	  weak	  
Opposition	  and	  ineffectual	  scrutiny.	  	  
While	   the	   ability	   and	   willingness	   of	   the	   Opposition	   to	   utilise	   with	   this	   stage	   of	   the	  
parliamentary	  process	  appeared	  rather	  limited,	  the	  Government	  exploited	  the	  process	  effectively	  to	  
consolidate	   its	   ambition.	   	   The	   Standing	   Committee	   Stage	   saw	   an	   introduction	   of	   an	   additional	   47	  
amendments	  to	  the	  Bill	  by	  the	  Government.	  	  Although	  most	  of	  these	  amendments	  were	  technical	  or	  
for	   clarification,	   hidden	   amongst	   them	  was	   an	   amendment	  which	   re-­‐instated	   the	  benefit	   sanction	  
which	   had	   received	   significant	   criticism	   from	   numerous	   external	   organisations,	   and	   had	  
subsequently	  been	  removed	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  for	  being	  unreasonably	  punitive	  and	  damaging	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(Standing	   Committee	   A,	   cols.	   208-­‐236,	   2	   July,	   1991).	   	   The	   Third	   Reading	   was	   also	  met	   with	   little	  
enthusiasm	  by	   the	  Opposition;	   in	   less	   than	   four	  hours	   the	  government	   tabled	  six	  new	  clauses	  and	  
nearly	  one	  hundred	  new	  amendments;	  the	  stage	  was	  saturated	  with	  technical	  issues	  and	  lacked	  any	  
attempt	  by	  the	  Opposition	  to	  halt	  the	  Bill’s	  passage.	  Though	  the	  1987	  Thatcher	  Government	  held	  a	  
sizable	  majority	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons,	  this	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  Labour	  Party’s	  inaction.	  Whilst	  
preventing	   the	   passage	   of	   the	   Bill	   would	   have	   been	   unlikely,	   a	   strong	   Opposition	   voice,	   in	  
conjunction	  with	  the	  concerns	  rose	  during	  the	  consultation	  process	  and	  the	  criticisms	  at	  the	  House	  
of	  Lords’	  stage,	  might	  have	  tempered	  a	  flawed	  policy.	  
	  	   Nevertheless,	  while	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  attained	  cross-­‐party	  support	  there	  was	  a	  degree	  of	  
concern	  amongst	  the	  Opposition,	  although	  again	  this	  appears	  absent	  when	  we	  look	  at	  the	  amount	  of	  
proposed	   amendments	   and	   the	   voting	   outcome.	   While	   the	   Labour	   Party	   supported	   the	   Bill	   in	  
principle,	   their	   initial	   acceptance	   of	   the	   policy	   appeared	   hesitant.	   	   Labour	   appeared	   almost	   too	  
scared	  to	   reject	  or	  even	  criticise	   the	  policy;	   ‘the	  opposition	  was	  afraid	  of	  appearing	   to	  oppose	  the	  
principle	  of	  parental	   responsibility’	   (Garnham	  and	  Knights,	  1994,	  37).	   	  During	   the	  Second	  Reading,	  
Meacher	  declared	  that	  his	  Party	  supported	  the	  Bill,	  but	  he	  considered	  it	  to	  be	  ‘seriously	  flawed’	  (HC	  
Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	  192,	  col.	  201).	   	  While	  there	  was	  approval	  of	  the	  philosophy	  underpinning	  many	  
elements	   of	   the	   Bill,	   there	   was	   uncertainty	   about	   whether	   some	   of	   the	   clauses	   within	   it	   were	  
appropriate.	  	  As	  Archie	  Kirkwood,	  Liberal	  Democrat,	  noted:	  	  
The	  concept	  behind	  the	  Bill…	  is	  entirely	  unexceptionable…	  It	   is	  only	  right	  and	  proper	  
that	   we	   should	   support	   it...	   However,	   perhaps	   the	   Department	   has	   adopted	   a	  
somewhat	  knee-­‐jerk	  approach.	  (HC	  Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	  192,	  col.	  212).	  	  	  
The	   two	   origins	   and	   differing	   motives	   of	   the	   policy	   can	   be	   discerned	   in	   the	   House	   of	  
Commons’	   reading	   of	   the	   policy.	   	   Although	   unaware	   of	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury’s	   overriding	  
influence	  in	  the	  policy,	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  identified	  the	  ‘bad	  parts’	  of	  the	  Bill	  inserted	  by	  them,	  
to	   the	   detriment	   of	   the	   policy.	   	  Whilst	  MPs	   supported	  Newton	   and	   Lord	  Mackay’s	   proposal,	   they	  
were	  critical	  of	  the	  elements	  introduced	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury.	  	  
One	   of	   the	   main	   aspects	   which	   the	   House	   of	   Commons	   emphasised	   was	   the	   manner	   in	  
which	  the	  policy	  would	  be	  administered.	  	  Incomplete	  policy	  transfer	  from	  Australia	  -­‐	  which	  was	  the	  
fault	  of	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  and	  not	  the	  DSS	  -­‐	  meant	  that	  the	  proposed	  British	  system	  would	  
not	   operate	   through	   the	   Inland	   Revenue	   (which	  was	   discussed	   at	   greater	   length	   in	   the	   preceding	  
chapter,	  Chapter	  Five).	  	  Although	  this	  was	  recommended	  to	  the	  DSS	  and	  favoured	  by	  several	  of	  the	  
initial	   policy	  makers,	   it	  was	   rejected	   by	   the	   Treasury	   (Former	  Minister	   in	   the	   Thatcher	   Cabinet	   B,	  
interview	   with	   author,	   19	   July	   2011).	   	   Several	   MPs	   emphasized	   the	   desirability	   of	   it	   being	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administered	  by	   the	   Inland	  Revenue,	  yet	   the	  suggestion	  was	  still	  dismissed.	   	  The	  Government	  was	  
not	  open	  to	  persuasion,	  even	   if	   it	  would	  have	  benefited	   the	  policy.	   	  Meacher	   rightly	  believed	  that	  
the	  Government’s	   refusal	   to	   administer	   it	   through	   the	   Inland	   Revenue	   came	   from	   ‘the	   inveterate	  
intransigence	   of	   the	   Inland	   Revenue	   in	   refusing	   to	   become	   involved	   in	   what	   it	   always	   regards	   as	  
marginal	   and	   messy	   social	   policy’	   (HC	   Deb	   (1990-­‐91)	   Vol.	   192,	   col.	   200).	   	   Again	   this	   shows	   that	  
Labour	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  flaws	  within	  the	  policy,	  yet	  still	  offered	  its	  overall	  support.	  	  	  
While	   serious	   flaws	  were	   apparent	   in	   the	   Bill,	   the	  Government’s	   emphasis	   of	   the	   principles	  
underpinning	  the	  policy,	  and	  the	  Opposition’s	  lack	  of	  a	  viable	  alternative	  and	  its	  desire	  not	  to	  appear	  
against	  ‘family	  values’,	  meant	  that	  Opposition	  concerns	  were	  muted.	  This	  can	  be	  linked	  to	  Weaver’s	  
work	   on	   ‘blame	   avoidance’	   (1986).	   	  Weaver	   noted	   that	   politicians	   are	  motivated	   primarily	   by	   the	  
desire	  to	  avoid	  blame	  for	  unpopular	  actions	  rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  claim	  credit	  for	  the	  popular	  ones	  
(1986,	  45).	   	   In	   the	  case	  of	   the	  Child	  Support	  Bill,	   the	  Opposition	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  stand	  against	  a	  
policy	  that	  was	  received	  favourably	  by	  the	  media	  and	  seen	  as	   ‘putting	  children	  first’.	  Furthermore,	  
the	   Parliamentary	   majority	   held	   by	   the	   Conservatives	   meant	   that	   Opposition	   support	   was	   not	  
needed.	   	   It	   appears	   that	   the	   Opposition	   saw	   no	   benefit	   in	   opposing	   the	   policy,	   therefore	   initial	  
concern	  morphed	  into	  lazy	  support	  during	  the	  process.	  	  As	  Weaver	  states,	  ‘once	  it	  is	  clear	  which	  side	  
is	  likely	  to	  win,	  legislators,	  seeing	  little	  purpose	  in	  continuing	  to	  support	  the	  losing	  side,	  may	  switch	  
their	   vote	   on	   final	   passage…	   politicians	   may	   jump	   on	   the	   bandwagon’	   (1986,	   46).	   	   The	   support	  
provided	  by	  Labour	  was	  certainly	  not	  wholehearted,	  but	  it	  was	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  flawed	  
Bill	  successfully	  completed	  its	  passage	  through	  Parliament.	  
As	  the	  Conservatives	  enjoyed	  a	  sizable	  parliamentary	  majority,	  they	  were	  generally	  unmoved	  
by	   the	   concerns	   of	   a	   few	   back-­‐benchers	   as	   they	   did	   not	   need	   their	   support	   of	   the	  Opposition	   to	  
order	   to	   enact	   the	   policy.	   	   As	   Dunleavy	   argues	   with	   reference	   to	   his	   ‘overly	   speedy	   legislation’	  
criterion,	   a	  majority	   in	   the	   House	   of	   Commons	   is	   a	   powerful	   resource	   for	   the	   Government,	   as	   it	  
reduces	  the	  degree	  of	  scrutiny	  a	  Bill	  receives	  and	  undermines	  the	  parliamentary	  process	  (1995,	  60).	  	  
Britain	  at	  the	  time	  had	  a	  strong	  two-­‐party	  system;	  therefore	  it	  was	  usually	  the	  case	  that	  one	  party	  
enjoyed	  a	  parliamentary	  majority.	  Although	  this	  factor	  was	  not	  new	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill,	  it	  
provided	  those	  pursing	  a	   fundamentally	  and	  eventually	   flawed	  policy	  with	  yet	  another	  resource	  to	  
dominate	   the	   parliamentary	   process.	   	   However,	   although	   the	   Conservatives	   enjoyed	   a	   sizable	  
majority	   and	   therefore	   did	   not	   need	   the	   support	   of	   the	   Opposition	   to	   pass	   the	   Bill	   or	   any	   of	   its	  
clauses,	   the	   Opposition	   was	   not	   powerless.	   	   They	   could	   have	   placed	   more	   pressure	   on	   the	  
Conservatives	  to	  reconsider	  and	  amend	  elements	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  If	  the	  Opposition	  had	  listened	  to	  the	  
concerns	  of	  pressure	  groups	  and	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  they	  would	  have	  realised	  that	  there	  was	  vast	  
opposition	  to	  the	  Bill.	   	  Although	  Labour	  did	  not	  have	  the	  parliamentary	  power	  to	  prevent	  the	  Bill’s	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passage,	  they	  could	  have	  placed	  more	  pressure	  on	  the	  Conservatives	  by	  highlighting	  their	  concerns	  
publically,	   and	   thereby	   attract	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   media.	   	   Instead,	   there	   was	   very	   little	   media	  
attention	  given	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Bill,	  and	  the	  coverage	  that	  the	  Bill	  did	  receive	  was	  favourable	  
as	   it	   focused	   on	   ‘runaway	   fathers’.	   	   If	   the	   Opposition	   had	   spoken	   frankly	   about	   their	   justifiable	  
concerns	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  media	  would	  have	  picked	  up	  on	  them.	  	  This	  may	  have	  resulted	  in	  a	  loss	  
of	  the	  ‘political	  stream’	  that	  Newton	  had	  provided	  the	  Government	  (identified	  in	  Chapter	  Five).	  The	  
public,	  through	  the	  media,	  would	  have	  become	  aware	  that	  the	  policy	  was	  a	  Thatcherite	  attempt	  of	  
privatising	  a	  social	  provision	  and	  reap	  money	  from,	  in	  some	  cases,	  already	  paying	  middle	  class	  men,	  
rather	  than	  tracking	  down	  ‘runaway-­‐dads’.	  
6.4.3	  And	  Back	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Lords…	  
The	   speed	   with	   which	   the	   Bill	   had	   proceeded	   through	   consultation	   was	   maintained	  
throughout	  the	  entire	  process.	  	  As	  Garnham	  and	  Knights	  note,	  ‘[this]	  did	  not	  allow	  sufficient	  scrutiny	  
of	  a	  complex	  piece	  of	  legislation’	  (1994,	  36).	  	  When	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  was	  returned	  to	  the	  House	  
of	   Lords	   for	   consideration	  of	   the	  Commons’	   amendments	   it	   comprised	  of	   twelve	  new	  clauses	  and	  
135	   new	   amendments.	   	   Despite	   having	   21	   pages	   of	   amendments,	   and	   new	   clauses	   the	   House	   of	  
Lords	  was	  only	  given	  a	  few	  hours	  to	  read,	  scrutinise	  and	  debate	  its	  detail.	  	  Again,	  many	  peers	  were	  
aware	  of	  this	  and	  vocalised	  their	  concerns	  and	  disapproval,	  with	  Lord	  Simon	  observing	  that,	  
It	   is	   bad	   enough	   that	   your	   Lordships	   should	   be	   treated	   as	   a	   sausage	   machine	   for	  
government	  legislation.	   It	  would	  be	  quite	  intolerable	  if	  your	  Lordships	  were	  required	  
to	  work	  the	  treadmill	   in	  order	  to	  operate	  that	  machine.	  (HL	  Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	  531,	  
col.	  529).	  
Far	   from	   being	   concerned	   at	   what	   many	   perceived	   to	   be	   both	   an	   abuse	   of,	   and	   an	  
undermining	  of,	   the	   legislative	  process,	   the	  Government	  appeared	   to	  be	   rather	  dismissive	  of	   such	  
criticisms.	  Comments	  by	  Lord	  Mackay	  regarding	  the	  haste	  of	   the	  process	  attempted	  to	  defend	  the	  
lack	  of	  time	  provided	  for	  scrutiny.	  	  He	  appeared	  to	  dismiss	  the	  need	  for	  detailed	  scrutiny,	  by	  stating	  
that	   ‘a	   fair	  amount	  of	   the	  subject	  matter	  of	   these	  amendments	   is	   fairly	   technical	   in	  character’	   (HL	  
Deb	  (1990-­‐91)	  Vol.	  531,	  col.	  473).	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  Peers’	  dissatisfaction	  with	  what	  they	  viewed	  as	  
inadequate	  time,	  proceedings	  were	  adjourned	  to	  see	  if	  the	  Whips	  could	  agree	  to	  move	  the	  business	  
to	   another	   day.	   	   However	   this	   attempt	   proved	   unsuccessful	   and	   the	   Lords	   had	   to	   consider	   the	  
amendments	  under	  the	  original	  tight	  time	  constrictions	  (Davis	  et	  al,	  1998,	  11).	  	  
The	   haste	   with	   which	   the	   Bill	   was	   pushed	   through	   did	   not	   allow	   adequate	   parliamentary	  
scrutiny.	  	  The	  Bill	  was	  compromised	  in	  order	  to	  get	  it	  onto	  the	  statue	  book	  before	  Parliament	  went	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into	  summer	  recess	  (in	  an	  era	  when	  Bills	  could	  not	  be	  ‘carried	  over’	  into	  the	  next	  session).	  	  We	  can	  
also	   question	  whether	   this	  was	   a	   deliberate	   tactic	   of	   the	  Government,	   to	   force	   the	  Bill	   though	   at	  
such	  a	  speed	  in	  hope	  that	  the	  Lords	  would	  not	   identify	  and	  successfully	  highlight	  the	  controversial	  
and	  contradictory	  nature	  of	  the	  Bill.	  	  
6.5	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  Social	  Security	  Committee	  
6.5.1	  Second	  Report	  
The	  House	  of	  Commons	  Social	  Security	  Committee	  sat	  between	  January	  and	  June	  to	  perform	  
pre-­‐legislative	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  White	  Paper,	  Children	  Come	  First,	  and	  Child	  Support	  Bill	   (though	  this	  
was	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   the	   Bill	   was	   first	   going	   through	   the	   House	   of	   Lords,	   so	   can	   be	   deemed	  
‘parallel	  scrutiny’).	  	  The	  cross-­‐party	  Committee	  took	  oral	  evidence	  from:	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Tony	  
Newton,	  DSS	  officials,	  CPAG,	  Church	  Action	  on	  Poverty,	  Families	  Need	  Fathers,	  Family	  Policy	  Studies,	  
the	   Law	   Society,	   and	   National	   Council	   for	   One	   Parent	   Families.	   It	   also	   received	   13	   written	  
submissions.	   After	   undertaking	   preliminary	   scrutiny	   and	   digesting	   some	   of	   the	   evidence	   received	  
from	   various	   organisations	   and	   individuals,	   the	   Committee	   felt	   the	   need	   to	   produce	   an	   interim	  
report	  to	  voice	  some	  of	  their	  immediate	  concerns.	  As	  they	  stated:	  
A	   comprehensive	   report	   on	   the	   Committee’s	   inquiry	   will	   be	   produced	   later	   in	   the	  
session,	  but	  one	  particular	  aspect	  of	  the	  Government’s	  plans,	  the	  intention	  to	  make	  
the	   new	   proposals	   retrospective,	   causes	   us	   considerable	   immediate	   concern,	   we	  
have	  therefore	  agreed	  to	  this	  initial	  report	  to	  make	  our	  views	  known	  in	  advance	  of	  
the	  debates	  on	  the	  Bill	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons.	  (Para	  2,	  Second	  Report,	  Changes	  
in	   Maintenance	   Arrangements,	   Social	   Security	   Committee,	   Session	   1990-­‐91,	   30	  
April	  1991).	  
The	   Committee	   was	   deeply	   concerned	   over	   the	   impact	   that	   the	   retrospective	   application	   of	   the	  
policy	   would	   have	   on	   those	   individuals	   who	   had	   reached	   divorce	   settlements	   prior	   to	   the	  
introduction	  of	  this	  legislation.	  It	  stated	  that	  this	  was	  a	  concern	  that	  became	  apparent	  on	  a	  reading	  
of	  the	  proposal	  and	  a	  concern	  that	  was	  reinforced	  after	  speaking	  to	  experts	  in	  the	  field,	  such	  as	  Sue	  
Slipman,	  Director	  of	  the	  National	  Council	  for	  One	  Parent	  Families,	  who	  stressed:	  
	  The	  major	  issue	  is	  one	  of	  property	  and	  our	  belief	  is	  that	  if	  the	  formula	  is	  universally	  
applied	   the	   absent	   parents	  who	   have	   equity	   in	   a	   house	  would	   try	   to	   release	   that	  
equity	  and	  would	  not	  be	  prepare,	  in	  the	  way	  they	  always	  have	  been,	  to	  transfer	  the	  
property	  to	  the	  caring	  parents	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  children.	  (EV	  Q282	  quoted	  in	  Second	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Report,	  Changes	  in	  Maintenance	  Arrangements,	  Social	  Security	  Committee,	  Session	  
1990-­‐91,	  30	  April	  1991)	  
The	   Committee	   also	   heard	   evidence	   from	   David	   Truex,	   an	   Australian	   practitioner	   who	   had	   direct	  
experience	   of	   the	   Child	   Support	   Scheme	   in	   Australia.	   Truex	   also	   echoed	   the	   concerns	   over	   its	  
retrospective	  application,	  emphasising	  that	  Australian	  system	  was	  not	  applied	  retrospectively	   (Para	  
12,	  Second	  Report,	  Changes	  in	  Maintenance	  Arrangements,	  Social	  Security	  Committee,	  Session	  1990-­‐
91,	  30	  April	  1991).	  	  
The	   Committee	   stressed	   the	   need	   for	   greater	   consideration	   of	   ‘clean-­‐break’	   settlements.	  	  
They	  stressed	  the	  need	  for	  the	  DSS	  to	  re-­‐consider	  the	  impact	  that	  this	  would	  not	  only	  have	  on	  future	  
divorce	   settlements	   but	   how	   this	   could	   negatively	   affect	   those	   who	   had	   come	   to	   amicable	  
settlements.	  	  The	  Committee’s	  Second	  Report	  concluded	  with	  the	  recommendation	  that	  provision	  be	  
made	   in	   the	   Child	   Support	   Bill	   to	   take	   into	   account	   divorce	   settlements	   that	   involved	   a	   capital	  
settlement	   in	   lieu	   of	   child	   maintenance	   (Para	   13,	   Second	   Report,	   Changes	   in	   Maintenance	  
Arrangements,	   Social	   Security	   Committee,	   Session	   1990-­‐91,	   30	   April	   1991).	   But	   yet	   again	  
recommendations	  were	  disregarded	  and	  the	  Treasury’s	  economic	  agenda	  triumphed.	  As	  Barnes	  et	  al	  
highlight,	   ‘Treasury	   pressures	   were	   suspected	   to	   lie	   behind	   the	   decision	   to	   overturn	   existing	  
settlements’	  (1998,	  15).	  
6.5.2	  Third	  Report	  	  
The	   Third	   Report	   built	   on	   the	   evidence	   received	   to	   publish	   the	   Second	  Report.	   The	   cross-­‐
party	   Committee	   continued	   to	   take	   oral	   and	   written	   evidence	   from	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Tony	  
Newton,	  DSS	  officials,	  policy	  experts	  involved	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Australian	  Scheme,	  and	  external	  
organisation.	  However	   in	  a	  reading	  of	  the	  two	  reports	   it	  appears	  that	  the	  weight,	  and	  the	  tone,	  of	  
the	   concern	   that	   the	   Social	   Security	   Select	   Committee	   initially	   voiced	   seemed	   to	   have	   been	  
dampened	   to	   ‘a	   cautious	   welcome’	   (Third	   Report,	   Changes	   in	  Maintenance	   Arrangements,	   Social	  
Security	  Committee,	  Session	  1990-­‐91,	  1991,	  p.	  4).	  The	  Report	  raises	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  mentioned	  in	  
the	  interim	  report,	  yet	  these	  were	  articulated	  with	  far	  less	  vigour12.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  The	  composition	  of	   the	  Social	  Security	  Committee	   remained	  relatively	  similar,	  with	   the	  only	  change	  being	  
Frank	   Field	   taking	   over	   as	   Chair.	   The	   reason	   behind	   this	   change	   in	   tone	   remains	   unknown,	   but	   it	   could	   be	  
linked	  to	  the	  appointment	  of	  Frank	  Field	  as	  Chair.	  Field	  was	  highly	  concerned	  with	  the	  rise	  in	  number	  of	  lone	  
parents	   and	   the	  apparent	   ‘culture	  of	  dependency’	   that	  has	  been	   created,	  often	   stating	   that	   fatherhood	  has	  
become	   an	   ‘”optional	   extra”	   (King	   and	   Crewe,	   2013,	   80).	   On	   numerous	   occasions	   Field	   had	   called	   for	   the	  
creation	  of	  an	  effective	  child	  maintenance	  system;	  a	  system	  that	  would	  ensure	  financial	  responsibility	  and	  not	  
leave	  the	  state	  footing	  the	  bill.	  Therefore,	  Field	  was	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  emphasised	  purpose	  of	  the	  Bill.	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The	  Third	  Report	  continues	  to	  draw	  comparisons	  between	  the	  policy	  proposal	  set	  out	  by	  the	  
white	   paper	   ‘Children	   Come	   First’	   and	   the	   child	  maintenance	   scheme	   introduced	   in	   Australia.	   The	  
Committee	  highlights	  how,	  on	  numerous	  occasions,	  the	  policy	  proposed	  by	  the	  DSS	  veers	  away	  from	  
what	  was	   introduced	   in	   Australia.	   This	   again	   links	   back	   to	   Chapter	   Four	   on	   Policy	   Transfer	   which	  
highlighted	   that	   the	   creation	  of	   the	  1991	  Child	   Support	  Act	  was	   indeed	  born	   from	  policy	   transfer,	  
and	  that	  inappropriate,	   incomplete	  and	  uniformed	  dual-­‐policy	  transfer	  was	  a	  contributory	  factor	  in	  
the	  policy’s	  failure.	  	  
The	  Report	  discussed	  the	  organisational	  aspect	  of	  maintenance	  collection,	   looking	  towards	  
the	  Australian	  model	   that	  established	  a	  Child	  Support	  Agency	   inside	  the	  Australian	  Tax	  Office.	  The	  
Report	  called	  for	  the	  Government	  to	  review	  its	  plan	  to	  establish	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  as	  a	  ‘Next	  
Steps’	  agency	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  DSS,	  and	  instead	  see	  it	  better	  placed	  within	  the	  Inland	  Revenue,	  
operating	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  that	  in	  Australia.	  	  The	  Report	  also	  reiterates	  the	  concern	  of	  ‘clean	  
break	  settlements’	  that	  involved	  a	  capital	  arrangements,	  yet	  again	  the	  Third	  Report	  did	  so	  with	  again	  
far	  less	  strength.	  While	  the	  Second	  Report	  discussed	  the	  potential	  negative	  impact	  this	  would	  have	  
on	  property	  arrangements	  after	  divorce,	  highlighting	  a	  potential	   loss	  of	  the	  family	  home,	  the	  Third	  
Report	  modestly	  recommended:	  	  
In	  cases	  that	  involve	  a	  property	  or	  capital	  settlement	  where	  there	  is	  liability	  for	  child	  
support,	   a	   mechanism	   be	   built	   into	   the	   system	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   settlement	  
produces	   an	   amount	   equivalent	   to	   least	   the	   weekly	   income	   support	   rates	   for	  
children	   until	   the	   child	   reaches	   the	   of	   16.	   (Third	   Report,	   Changes	   in	  Maintenance	  
Arrangements,	  Social	  Security	  Committee,	  Session	  1990-­‐91,	  1991,	  xxiii).	  
	   The	  Report	  also	  discussed	  Clause	  22	  (the	  benefit	  penalty);	  although	  at	  this	  stage	  the	  clause	  
had	  been	  removed	  from	  the	  Bill	  following	  an	  amendment	  made	  during	  the	  Committee	  Stage	  of	  the	  
House	  of	   Lords.	  However	   the	   inclusion	  of	  a	  benefit	  penalty	  was	  discussed	  more	   favourably	  by	   the	  
Committee,	  despite	  the	  report	  including	  evidence	  from	  external	  organisations	  such	  as	  Child	  Poverty	  
Action	  Group	  who	   had	   raised	   concern	   over	   the	   possible	   negative	   effects	   a	   benefit	   penalty	  would	  
have	  on	  children.	  For	  example,	  they	  state:	  	  
	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  “benefit	  sanction”	  in	  the	  Bill	  as	  it	  now	  stands	  may	  mean	  that	  there	  
is	   no	   way	   of	   enforcing	   the	   obligation	   on	   a	   parent	   to	   provide	   information.	   (Third	  
Report,	  Changes	  in	  Maintenance	  Arrangements,	  Social	  Security	  Committee,	  Session	  
1990-­‐91,	  1991,	  xix).	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By	   framing	   the	  debate	   in	   terms	  of	   ‘enforcing’	   through	  a	  benefit	  penalty,	   rather	   than	   ‘encouraging’	  
through	  a	  benefit	  disregard	  (as	  discussed	  at	  more	  length	  in	  the	  Second	  Report)	  we	  can	  see	  the	  Social	  
Security	  Committee	  change	  its	  tone.	  
	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  pre-­‐legislative	  scrutiny	  by	  departmentally-­‐related	  select	  committees	  
was	  not	  common	  place	  at	  this	  time.	  Its	  function	  can	  be	  described	  as:	  
	  …departmentally-­‐related	   select	   committees	   might	   helpfully	   examine	   Green	   and	  
White	   Papers	   and	   other	   published	   consultative	   documents	   relating	   to	   proposed	  
legislation	   and	   make	   reports	   which	   would	   assist	   the	   preparatory	   work	   on	   the	  
legislation	  and	  inform	  parliamentary	  debate.	  (Hansard	  Society,	  Making	  the	  Law,	  the	  
report	   of	   the	   Hansard	   Society	   Commission	   on	   the	   Legislative	   Process,	   1993,	   para	  
322)	  
While	  the	  Social	  Security	  Select	  Committee	  examining	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  and	  providing	  another	  
level	  of	  scrutiny	  appears	  constructive,	  its	  effectiveness	  and	  influence	  can	  be	  questioned.	  Whilst	  the	  
Committee	  took	  evidence	  for	  a	  number	  of	  noteworthy	  individuals	  and	  organisations,	  and	  discussed	  
the	  Bill’s	   features	   in	  considerable	  detail,	   it	  appears	  that	   its	  significance	  on	   informing	  parliamentary	  
debate	  was	  limited.	  We	  could	  go	  as	  far	  as	  suggesting	  that	  its	  function	  was	  little	  more	  than	  a	  ‘talking	  
shop’.	  Putting	  the	  Bill	  to	  the	  Social	  Security	  Select	  Committee	  appears	  a	  mechanism	  used	  to	  paint	  the	  
image	  of	  a	  policy	  that	  had	  been	  scrutinised	  and	  therefore	  more	  accountable.	  	  Therefore,	  just	  as	  the	  
consultation,	   the	   House	   of	   Lords,	   and	   the	   House	   of	   Commons	   stages	   appear	   to	   be	   an	   ineffective	  
‘check-­‐and-­‐balance’	   on	   the	   policy-­‐making	   process	   in	   this	   instance,	   so	   too	   does	   the	   Social	   Security	  
Select	  Committee.	  
6.6	  The	  Media	  	  
	   The	  role	  of	  the	  media	  during	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  legislation	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  examined.	  The	  
limited	   press	   coverage	   that	   the	   Bill	   received	   focused	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   the	   policy	   rather	   than	  
debating	   its	   detail.	   	   Headlines	   at	   the	   time	   focused	   on	   the	   problem	   of	   ‘runaway-­‐dads’	   and	  
emphasised	   the	   Conservative	   Party’s	   pledge	   to	   make	   them	   face	   responsibility.	   	   For	   example:	  
‘Thatcher	  vows	  to	  make	  absent	  fathers	  pay	  maintenance’	  (The	  Times,	  October	  26,	  1990)	  and	  ‘Absent	  
fathers	  should	  shoulder	  their	  share’	  (The	  Guardian,	  October	  30,	  1990).	  	  Coverage	  largely	  focused	  on	  
the	  moral	   objective	   of	   tracing	   errant	   fathers	   and	  making	   them	   face	   responsibility,	   and	   the	   rise	   of	  
lone	  parents	  and	   the	   impact	   this	  had	  on	  public	  expenditure	  and	   the	   taxpayer.	   	  Where	   the	   system	  
was	   mentioned,	   it	   largely	   focused	   on	   the	   problematic	   nature	   of	   the	   court	   system	   and	   how	   the	  
proposed	  policy	  was	  to	  tackle	  these	  problems.	  	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  Conservatives	  attempted	  to	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conceal	   the	  policy’s	   true	  objective	  behind	  a	   ‘moral	  crusade’	   to	  bring	   the	   runaway	   father	   to	   justice	  
was	  effective.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  newspapers	  seemed	  to	  approve	  of	  Thatcher’s	  guise	  of	  defender	  of	  the	  
‘traditional’	  family.	  	  
The	  uncritical	  media	  coverage	  that	  the	  Bill	  received	  was	  promoting	  an	  emotive	  moral	  image	  
which	   persuaded	   the	   public	   to	   support	   the	   policy	   and	   gave	   the	   Labour	   Party	   little	   option	   but	   to	  
follow	   suit.	   	  The	  Guardian	   also	   supported	   the	  policy,	   stating:	   ‘It	   is	   not	   right	   that	   taxpayers	   should	  
shoulder	  the	  responsibility	  of	  maintaining	  the	  children	  of	  broken	  relationships	  when	  the	  parents	  are	  
able	   to	   do	   it	   themselves’	   (October	   30,	   1990).	   Thatcher’s	   ‘family	   values’	   struck	   a	   national	   chord.	  	  
Arguments	   about	   strengthening	   the	   system	   for	   tracing	   absentee	   fathers	   and	   creating	   a	   more	  
effective	   maintenance	   system	   prompted	   widespread	   approval	   in	   the	   media.	   	   The	   policy	   was	   so	  
skilfully	  phrased	  that	  opposition	  by	  the	  Labour	  Party	  would	  not	  have	  met	  with	  public	  approval.	  	  The	  
role	  of	  the	  press	  in	  reporting	  Thatcher’s	  speeches	  and	  their	  approach	  to	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  policy	  
moulded	   public	   opinion	   and	   prevented	   Labour	   from	   effectively	   opposing	   the	   policy.	   	   The	  
Conservatives	   effectively	   ‘managed’	   the	   press	   to	   support	   the	   policy	   by	   only	   focusing	   on	   its	   outer	  
philosophy.	  	  	  
As	  mentioned	   above,	   the	   Labour	   Party’s	   support	   for	   the	   policy	   was	   offered	   despite	   their	  
reservations;	  Meacher	  provided	  the	  Government	  with	  Labour	  support	  in	  spite	  of	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  
policy’s	   flaws,	   likely	   negative	   impact	   and	   controversial	   nature.	   	   The	  way	   the	   British	   Parliamentary	  
system	  works	  means	   that	   parties	   are	   willing	   to	   allow	   the	   passage	   of	   a	   policy,	   which	   they	   see	   as	  
flawed,	   to	   avoid	   appearing	   off	  message	   to	   the	   public	   and	   risk	   losing	   votes.	   It	   is	   easier	   to	   allow	   a	  
government	  with	  a	  sizable	  majority	  to	  pass	  a	  policy	  with	  ease	  if	  the	  public	  supports	  it	  than	  it	  would	  
be	  to	  oppose	  it.	  If	  the	  Labour	  Party	  opposed	  the	  Bill	  they	  could	  have	  been	  blamed	  by	  the	  public	  for	  
an	   ineffective	   child	   maintenance	   system,	   yet	   if	   they	   gave	   it	   reluctant	   support	   and	   it	   failed	   the	  
Conservatives	  would	  have	  been	  to	  blame.	   It	  appears	  to	  be	  rational	  choice	  based	  policy	  support.	   	   It	  
should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  was	   less	  than	  a	  year	  to	  the	  General	  Election	  and	  the	  Labour	  Party	  
was	  without	  an	  alternative.	   	   It	  was	  easier	  for	  the	  Labour	  Party	  tacitly	  to	  support	  the	  policy	  than	  to	  
challenge	  it.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  policy	  was	  going	  to	  face	  problems,	  as	  it	  did,	  the	  General	  Election	  would	  have	  
been	  before	  these	  problems	  surfaced.	  	  The	  Labour	  Party	  chose	  to	  support	  a	  policy	  they	  recognised	  
as	  flawed	  in	  order	  not	  to	  hinder	  their	  own	  electoral	  prospects.	  	  	  
6.7	  Conclusion:	  Two	  Houses,	  Zero	  Influence	  
‘The	  passage	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Act	  was	  an	  object	  lesson	  in	  how	  to	  create	  bad	  legislation’	  
(Davis	   et	   al,	   1998,	   12).	   	   The	   Parliamentary	   scrutiny	   process	   was	   undermined	   by	   the	   political	  
resources	  possessed	  by	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  lack	  of,	  or	  inadequate	  use	  of,	  power	  held	  by	  other	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actors.	  As	   the	  below	  table	  shows	  (Figure	  6.3),	   the	  problems	  experience	  by	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  
Act	  was	  identified	  at	  consultation,	  during	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  stage,	  at	  in	  large	  past,	  at	  the	  House	  of	  
Commons.	  However,	  the	  below	  table	  also	  highlights	  the	  lack	  of	  action	  taken	  by	  the	  Government	  in	  
response	  to	  those	  concerns	  raised.	  The	  problems	  were	  foreseeable,	  foreseen,	  but	  ignored.	  
Figure	   6.3:	   Anticipated	   problems	   highlighted	   at	   Consultation,	   House	   of	   Lords	   and	   House	   of	  
Commons.	  Action	  taken	  by	  Government.	  
	  





by	  H	  of	  L	  
Raised	  by	  
H	  of	  C	  
Action	  taken	  by	  
Government	  
Failure	   to	   recognise	   that	   parental	  
responsibility	   goes	   beyond	   that	   of	  
financial	  contributions	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Lack	   of	   consideration	   of	   previous	  
property	   or	   financial	   settlements	   and	  
arrangements	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Inflexibility	   and	   inadequacy	   within	   the	  
formula	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Did	   not	   fully	   acknowledge	   the	  
outgoings	  of	  the	  absent	  parents	  	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Lack	   of	   integration	   of	   childcare,	  
training,	   employment,	   education	  
support	  for	  parent	  with	  care	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Issues	  regarding	  enforcing	  co-­‐operation	  	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Benefit	   penalty	   for	   non-­‐co-­‐operation	  
making	  families	  poorer	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Lack	   of	   consideration	   for	   second	  
families	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Lack	   of	   a	   financial	   disregard	   for	  
maintenance	  from	  Income	  Support	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Administrative	  problems	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Staff	  training	  Issues	   Yes	   Yes	   	   None	  
Lack	   of	   consideration	   for	   passported	  
benefits	  	  
Yes	   Yes	   No	   None	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Intrusion	  of	  privacy	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Problem	   of	   including	   retrospective	  
cases	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Possible	  loss	  of	  marital	  home	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   None	  
Access	   related	   issues	   likely	   to	   be	  
escalated	  as	  a	   result/	   strain	  on	   current	  
family	  relations	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
Potential	   impact	   on	   the	   1989	   Children	  
Act/fragmentation	  of	  policy	  area	  
Yes	   Yes	   No	   None	  
High	  set	  up	  and	  running	  costs	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   None	  
	  
Parliament	  was	   presented	  with	   a	   policy	   that	  was	   complex,	   full	   of	   complicated	   regulations	  
and	   crowded	   with	   ambiguity.	   	   The	   details	   of	   the	   Bill	   were	   partially	   hidden	   behind	   the	   emotive	  
language	  which	   led	  the	  Opposition	  to	  accept	   it,	   lest	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  against	   ‘family	  values’.	   	  The	  
Opposition’s	   hand	   was	   also	   forced	   by	   a	   media	   which	   was	   supportive	   of	   the	   Bill’s	   apparent	  
philosophy.	  	  The	  scrutiny	  provided	  by	  the	  Opposition	  was	  limited	  and	  ineffective	  because	  they	  were	  
motivated	  by	  what	  Weaver	  identified	  as	  blame	  avoidance	  (1987,	  45).	  	  By	  the	  Labour	  Party	  ‘jumping	  
on	   the	   bandwagon’	   and	   supporting	   a	   flawed	   policy,	   they	   inadvertently	   undermined	   and	   devalued	  
the	  process	  of	  Parliamentary	  scrutiny.	  
Not	   only	   were	   there	   problems	   intrinsic	   to	   the	   Bill	   itself,	   but	   the	   timetable	   imposed	   on	  
Parliament	  meant	  that	  detailed	  scrutiny	  was	  virtually	  impossible.	  	  While	  a	  few	  Peers	  valiantly	  sought	  
to	   scrutinise	   the	   Bill	   in	   detail,	   their	   concerns	   and	   suggestions	   were	   invariably	   rejected	   by	   the	  
Government.	   	   Although	   the	   Bill	   left	   the	   Commons	   enshrining	   135	   amendments,	   these	   were	  
Government	  changes,	  responding	  to	  drafting	  errors	  or	  adding	  more	  detail	  to	  the	  Bill.	  Critical	  opinion	  
was	   ignored	   by	   the	   Government.	   	   Both	   the	   consultation	   and	   Parliamentary	   process	  were	   rubber-­‐
stamping	   exercises;	   the	   Bill	   was	   largely	   going	   through	   the	   motions	   while	   the	   ears	   of	   the	   policy	  
makers	  refused	  to	  hear	  criticisms	  or	  constructive	  recommendations.	  	  The	  major	  problems	  which	  the	  
CSA	  subsequently	  faced	  could	  have	  been	  ameliorated	  or	  pre-­‐empted	  at	  Parliamentary	  stage	  as	  the	  
problems	  were	  foreseeable	  and	  foreseen.	  	  Despite	  the	  flawed	  parliamentary	  process,	  the	  problems	  
which	  arose	  at	  implementation	  were	  signalled	  during	  the	  Bill’s	  passage:	  problems	  with	  the	  formula,	  
disincentives	   to	   work,	   intrusion	   of	   privacy,	   disregard	   of	   property	   or	   financial	   settlements,	   role	   of	  
second	   families,	  non-­‐compliance,	  poor	  administration	  of	   the	  policy,	   administrative	   complexity	   and	  
workload,	   the	   Treasury’s	   underlying	   economic	   motives,	   and	   unrealistic	   targets,	   were	   all	  
136	  
	  
acknowledged	   as	   potential	   problems.	   	   Although	   these	   flaws	   were	   identified,	   and	   it	   started	   from	  
contradictory	   origins,	   the	   Child	   Support	   Bill	   passed	   unscathed	   through	   the	   legislative	   process	  
achieving	   an	   unusual	   degree	   of	   consensus,	   and	   a	   ‘bad	   Bill’	   became	   a	   ‘bad	   Act’:	   an	   inadequate	  
consultation	  and	  a	  flawed	  and	  futile	  legislative	  process	  paved	  a	  path	  to	  policy	  failure.	  
	  
	   	  
137	  
	  
Chapter	  Seven	  –	  Positioning	  Implementation	  Studies	  
7.1	  Introduction	  
	   This	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  ‘implementation	  stage’.	  It	  will	  start	  by	  briefly	  outlining	  the	  work	  
of	  some	  of	  the	  major	  scholars	   in	  the	  field	  of	   implementation13.	  Both	  the	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  and	  the	  ‘top-­‐
down’	  approaches	  are	  discussed	  and	  critiqued.	  The	  chapter	   then	  moves	   to	  discuss	   the	  position	  of	  
implementation	  studies,	  before	  setting	  out	   the	  approach	  and	  position	  adopted	  by	  this	  study.	  Here	  
we	  do	  not	  discuss	  the	  ‘implementation’	  of	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  As	  this	  Chapter	  states,	  this	  thesis	  
suggest	   that	   some	   of	   the	   areas	   typically	   debated	   within	   ‘implementation	   studies’	   is	   better	   suit	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  policy	  process,	  be	  it	  in	  policy	  formation,	  or	  operation.	  However	  the	  theory	  engaged	  
with	  here	   is	  necessary	  for	  our	  understanding	  and	  justifying	  the	  approach	  taken.	  Chapter	  Eight,	  will	  
focus	  on	  the	  operation	  and	  apparent	  failings	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  and	  assess	  the	  root	  of	  these	  
failings.	   The	   Chapter	   ends	   by	   outlining	   ‘next-­‐steps’	   agencies,	   a	   new	   approach	   to	   implementation	  
utilised	  by	   the	  Thatcher	  Government	  and	  present	  new	  challenges	   to	   the	  Act	   ,	   and	   the	  study	  of	   its	  
implementation.	  	  
7.2	  The	  Literature,	  and	  Research	  Developments,	  within	  the	  Study	  of	  Implementation	  
Before	  discussing	  the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  assessing	  the	  ‘implementation	  stage’	  of	  the	  1991	  
Child	   Support	   Act,	   it	   will	   be	   necessary	   to	   provide	   a	   brief	  map	   and	   review	   of	   the	   implementation	  
literature.	  This	  will	  justify	  the	  position	  and	  approach	  adopted	  in	  this	  study.	  It	  utilises	  the	  dichotomy	  
between	  the	  ‘top-­‐down’	  and	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  approach	  as	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  summarise	  the	   literature	  on	  
implementation.	  Whilst	  fully	  acknowledging	  that	  using	  this	  dichotomy,	  as	  with	  all	  dichotomies,	  risks	  
over-­‐simplifying	   the	   depth	   and	   range	   of	   arguments:	   yet	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   section	   it	   is	   an	  
appropriate	  and	  valuable	  means	  to	  engage.	  It	  will	  highlight	  the	  work	  of	  the	  major	  exponents	  of	  the	  
two	  positions	  before	  discussing	  the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  this	  study.	  
• Top-­‐down	   theories	   -­‐	   Pressman	   and	   Wildavsky	   (1973);	   Van	   Meter	   and	   Van	   Horn	   (1975);	  
Bardach	   (1977);	   Sabatier	   and	   Mazmanian	   (1979,	   1981);	   Mazmanian	   and	   Sabatier	   (1983);	  
Majone	  and	  Wildavsky	  (1978);	  Hogwood	  and	  Gunn	  (1984).	  	  
• Bottom	   up	   theories	   -­‐	   Lipsky	   (1971,	   1980);	   Elmore	   (1980);	   Hjern	   and	   Porter	   (1981);	   Hjern	  
(1982);	  Hjern	  and	  Hull	  (1982);	  Sabatier	  (1986);	  Barrett	  and	  Fudge	  (1981).	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Whilst	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  include	  all	  influential	  scholars	  due	  to	  the	  confines	  of	  this	  chapter,	  other	  scholars	  




7.2.1	  The	  ‘Top	  Down’	  Approach	  
One	  of	  the	  most	   influential,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  cited	  books	  on	   implementation	   is	  Pressman	  
and	   Wildavsky’s	   Implementation:	   How	   Great	   Expectations	   in	   Washington	   are	   Dashed	   in	   Oakland	  
(1984;	  1st	  edn	  1973).	  Pressman	  and	  Wildavksy’s	   text	   is	  a	   significant	  piece	  which	   for	  many	  was	   the	  
first	  to	  fully	  focus	  a	  light	  on	  ‘implementation’	  and	  call	  for	  a	  wider	  assessment	  of	  this	  process	  (see,	  for	  
example,	   Goggin	   et	   al.,	   1990;	   Parsons,	   1995;	   Ryan,	   1995).	   This	   book	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   lay	   the	  
foundation	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   implementation	   studies;	   therefore	   its	   significance	   necessitates	   a	  
discussion	  in	  any	  section	  on	  implementation.	  	  
In	   their	   study	   of	   the	   US	   Economic	   Development	   Agency	   program	   in	   Oakland,	   California,	  
Pressman	   and	  Wildavsky	   emphasised	   the	   significant	   role	   that	   the	   implementation	   ‘stage’	   has	   on	  
determining	   the	   success	  or	   failure	  of	   a	   particular	   policy	   (1973).	   In	   their	   case	   study.	   Pressman	  and	  
Wildavsky	   took	  a	  policy	  with	  a	   ‘best	   case	   scenario’	   for	   implementation	   (adequate	   resources,	   clear	  
objectives,	   general	   agreement	   etc.)	   and	   assessed	  why	   it	   failed.	   The	   central	   argument	   to	   be	   taken	  
from	  their	  case	  study	  was	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  complexity	  of	  multiple	  layers	  of	  government	  and	  the	  
number	  of	  decision	  points	  has	  on	   successful	   implementation;	   to	  get	  anything	  done	  was	   reliant	  on	  
the	   approval	   or	   compliance	   of	   many	   actors	   (1973)14.	   They	   demonstrate	   that	   even	   when	   there	   is	  
broad	  agreement	  regarding	  intent,	  there	  is	  often	  disagreement	  on	  means.	  They	  highlight	  that	  each	  
level	  of	  government,	  each	  department	  and	  agency	  purses	  its	  own	  agenda,	  level	  of	  commitment	  and	  
set	  of	  priorities.	  As	  Smith	  and	  Larimer	  state,	  ‘Getting	  all	  of	  these	  agencies	  to	  adopt	  a	  general	  plan	  on	  
means,	   synchronize	   their	  priorities,	  and	  generally	   share	   the	   same	  vision	  of	  a	  policy	  or	  programme	  
turned	  out	   to	  be	   the	  governmental	  equivalent	  of	  herding	  cats’	   (2013,	  153).	  To	  highlight	   this	  point	  
Pressman	  and	  Wildavsky	  provided	   an	   example	  which	   involved	  30	  decision	  points	   and	  70	   separate	  
agreements	   for	  which	  approval	  was	  needed	  before	  action	   could	  be	  undertaken.	   They	  argued	   that	  
given	   a	   0.95	   probability	   of	   approval	   at	   each	   decision	   point	   there	   is	   a	   0.000395	   chance	   of	   getting	  
anything	   done.	   They	   also	   estimate	   a	   four	   and	   a	   half	   year	   delay	   due	   to	   the	   70	   agreement	   points	  
(1973,	  106-­‐107).	  	  
Often	  cited	  as	  the	   ‘founding	  fathers’	  of	   implementation	  studies,	  Pressman	  and	  Wildavsky’s	  
approach	  has	  been	  labelled	  that	  of	  a	  ‘top-­‐down’	  approach	  to	  implementation.	  As	  Barrett	  and	  Fudge	  
suggest,	   Pressman	   and	  Wildavsky	   ‘see	   implementation	   as	   a	   process	   of	   putting	   policy	   into	   effect,	  
mainly	   concerned	  with	   co-­‐ordinating	   and	  managing	   the	   various	   elements	   required	   to	   achieve	   the	  
desired	  ends’	  (1981,	  10).	  In	  their	  own	  words	  they	  define	  implementation	  as:	  ‘a	  process	  of	  interacting	  
between	  the	  setting	  of	  goals	  and	  actions	  geared	  to	  achieving	  them…	  Policies	  imply	  theories…	  a	  chain	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Similarly	  points	  were	  echoed	  and	  important	  contributions	  were	  also	  made	  by	  Derthick	  (1972);	  Williams,	  
(1971,	  1980);	  Hargrove	  (1974,	  1983);	  Berman,	  (1978);	  Dunsire	  (1978a,	  1978b).	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of	   causation	   between	   initial	   conditions	   and	   future	   consequences.	   If	   X	   then	   Y.’	   (Pressman	   and	  
Wildavsky,	  1984	  2nd	  edition,	  xxiii).	  To	  them	  implementation	  is	  ‘the	  ability	  to	  forge	  subsequent	  links	  in	  
the	  causal	  chain	  so	  as	  to	  obtain	  the	  desired	  results’	  (1984	  2nd	  edition,	  xxiii).	  Those	  in	  the	  ‘top	  down’	  
camp	   view	   policy	   as	   an	   input	   and	   implementation	   as	   an	   output.	   From	   this	   perspective,	  
implementation	   is	   seen	  as	   a	  managerial	   problem,	  whereupon	  effective	   implementation	   requires	   a	  
top-­‐down	  system	  of	  control,	  effective	  communication,	  and	  appropriate	  resources.	  	  
Following	  the	  work	  by	  Pressman	  and	  Wildavsky,	  and	  constituting	  a	  highly	  influential	  text	  on	  
implementation	  from	  the	   ‘top-­‐down	  approach’,	  was	  Bardach’s	  The	   Implementation	  Game	   (1977)15.	  
Bardach	   views	   the	   implementation	   process	   as	   a	   political	   game	   between	   central	   actors	   and	   street	  
level	  bureaucrats.	  Bardach	  suggests	   that	   to	   ‘succeed’	  at	   implementing,	  policy	  makers	  need	  to	  take	  
care	   in	   the	   ‘scenario	   writing	   process’,	   structuring,	   or	   ‘fixing	   the	   game’	   in	   a	   way	   that	   minimizes	  
opposition	  and	  maximises	  the	  chance	  of	  central	  actors	  achieving	  their	  desired	  outcomes.	  
Hogwood	   and	   Gunn’s	   Policy	   Analysis	   for	   the	   Real	  World	   (1984),	   building	   on	   the	   work	   by	  
Hood	  (1976),	   is	  another	  significant	  text	  to	  note.	  Hogwood	  and	  Gunn	  construct	  an	  ideal-­‐type	  model	  
of	   ‘perfect	   implementation’16,	   conditions	   that	  would	   lead	   to	   successful	   implementation.	   	  However	  
they	   stress	   that	   these	   are	   not	   to	   be	   read	   as	   recommendations	   to	   policy-­‐makers,	   instead	   ‘perfect	  
implementation’	   is	   unattainable	   in	   the	   real	   word	   (1984,	   198).	   Since	   Hogwood	   and	   Gunn,	   various	  
scholars	  have	  identified,	  and	  refined,	  what	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  achieved	  ‘perfect	  implementation’.	  
The	   criteria	   for	   ‘perfect	   implementation’	   can	   be	   synthesized,	   based	   on	   the	  work	   by	  Gunn	   (1978),	  
Hogwood	   (1987,	   165-­‐70),	   Hogwood	   and	   Gunn	   (1984,	   199-­‐206),	   Pressman	   and	   Wildavsky	   (1973),	  
Sabatier	  (1986),	  and	  Dorey	  (2005)	  as	  the	  following:	  
• External	  circumstances	  do	  not	  impose	  crippling	  constraints.	  
• Resources	  are	  adequate.	  
• Dependency	  relationships	  are	  minimal.	  
• Policy	  being	  implemented	  is	  based	  on	  a	  valid	  theory	  of	  cause	  and	  effect.	  
• There	  are	  a	  minimal	  number	  of	  decision	  points.	  
• Objectives	  are	  consistent,	  clear,	  and	  agreed	  upon.	  
• Objectives	  are	  fully	  understood	  and	  accepted	  by	  ‘street	  level	  bureaucrats’.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  alongside	  the	  contribution	  made	  by	  Hogwood	  and	  Gunn	  (1984),	  there	  was	  significant	  
contribution	  made	  by	  other	  scholars,	  such	  as,	  Van	  Meter	  and	  Van	  Horn	  (1975),	  	  Sabatier	  and	  Mazmanian	  
(1979,	  1980),	  Mazmanian	  and	  Sabatier	  (1981,	  1983),	  Hood	  (1976);	  Derthick	  (1972).	  Some	  significant	  scholars	  
have	  been	  left	  out	  of	  our	  analysis	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  an	  extensive	  account	  of	  the	  plethora	  of	  writings,	  yet	  their	  
significance	  should	  be	  noted.	  
16	  This	  is	  similar	  in	  approach	  to	  Weber’s	  construction	  of	  an	  ideal-­‐type	  model	  of	  bureaucracy,	  published	  after	  his	  
death	  in	  his	  seminal	  piece	  Economy	  and	  Society	  (1922).	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• People	  do	  as	  they	  are	  told	  and	  asked.	  
• Clear	  lines	  of	  communication	  and	  authority.	  
• There	  is	  a	  realistic	  time	  line.	  
• Those	  to	  whom	  the	  policy	  is	  applied	  or	  targeted	  respond	  in	  the	  anticipated	  manner.	  	  
Dorey	  states	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  those	  devising	  the	  ‘perfect	  implementation’	  criteria	  ‘has	  not	  been	  
to	  offer	  a	  normative	  or	  prescriptive	  model	  of	  how	  policy	  ought	  to	  be	  implemented,	  but,	  instead,	  to	  
provide	  a	  heuristic	  (a	  social	  scientific	  model	  or	  paradigm	  used	  for	  illustrative	  purposes)	  against	  which	  
empirical	  reality	  can	  be	  contrasted,	  and	  differences	  and	  discrepancies	  explained’	  (2005,	  197).	  A	  point	  
to	   which	   will	   be	   returned	   to	   later	   in	   this	   chapter	   when	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   instead	   of	   ‘perfect	  
implementation’,	  we	  should	  instead	  be	  striving	  for	  ‘perfect	  legislation’	  which	  is	  explicitly	  normative,	  
and	  arguably	  could	  lead	  to	  fewer	  policies	  being	  exposed	  as	  ‘failures’	  at	  implementation.	  
The	  ‘top	  down	  approach’,	  whilst	  making	  important	  contributions	  and	  breaking	  new	  ground	  
at	   the	   time,	   has	   subsequently	   been	   subject	   to	   criticisms.	   Extrapolating	   from:	   Rhodes	   and	  Marsh,	  
1992;	  Lipsky	  1978;	  Barrett	  and	  Fudge	  1981;	  Elmore	  1982;	  Hjern	  and	  Hull	  1982;	  Hogwood	  and	  Gunn,	  
1984;	  Smith	  and	  Larmier,	  2013;	  and	  Sabatier	  1986)	  we	  can	  summarise	  these	  as:	  
• Studies	  were	  based	  on	  case	  studies,	  and	  bound	  by	  place	  and	  time.	  
• Research	  leads	  to	  minimum	  prescription.	  
• Conditions	  for	  effective	  implementation	  are	  unrealistic.	  
• Some	  policies	  do	  not	  have	  explicit	  objectives.	  
• Discretion	   within	   organisational	   conduct	   is	   inevitable,	   therefore	   there	   is	  
uncertainty	  regarding	  the	  internal	  workings	  of	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrats.	  
• Too	  much	  focus	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  objectives	  and	  agendas	  of	  the	  central	  actors,	  and	  
insufficient	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  actors	  on	  the	  ground.	  
• It	  ignores	  the	  adaptive	  strategies	  of	  street	  level	  bureaucrats.	  
• The	  distinction	  between	  policy	  formation	  and	  policy	  implementation	  is	  blurred	  in	  
practice	  because	  policies	  are	  often	  remade	  or	  reformed	  during	  implementation.	  
Aware	  of	  these	  limitations	  in	  the	  approach,	  scholars	  attempted	  to	  move	  the	  focus,	  but	  this	  
was	   not	   a	   unified	   movement.	   There	   were	   those	   moving	   analysis	   from	   specific	   policies	   or	  
programmes	   towards	   theory	   building,	   attempting	   to	   develop	   a	   theoretical	   framework	   for	   the	  
implementation	   process	   but	   maintaining	   a	   top-­‐down	   perspective17,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Which	  as	  deLeon	  states,	  are	  often	  ‘lumped	  under	  the	  heading	  ‘top-­‐down’	  perspectives’	  (1999,	  316)	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alternative	  branch	  characterised	   for	  placing	  an	  emphasis	  on	   those	   implementing	   the	  policy,	   street	  
level	  bureaucrats.	  	  These	  founded	  the	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  approach.	  
7.2.2	  The	  ‘Bottom	  Up’	  Approach	  
The	  ‘bottom	  up’	  approach	  argues	  that	  analysis	  of	  implementation	  needs	  to	  move	  away	  from	  
a	  study	  of	  central	  objectives	  and	  instead	  start	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  those	  on	  the	  ground	  (‘street	  
level	  bureaucrats’).	  The	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  model	  views	  implementation	  as	  ‘a	  negotiating	  process	  in	  which	  
individual	   actors	   pursue	   their	   disparate	   objectives	   employing	  multiple	   strategies.	   Compliance	  with	  
central	  objectives	  is	  an	  inappropriate	  yardstick	  of	  success	  and	  failure’	  (Rhodes	  and	  Marsh,	  1992,	  7).	  
The	  model	  focuses	  on	  the	  individual	  actors	  and	  organisations	  involved	  in	  the	  process,	  and	  the	  need	  
to	  assess	  the	  individual	  objectives	  as	  well	  as	  the	  factors	  that	  influence	  their	  actions.	  	  This	  approach	  
emphasises	   the	   complexity	   and	   multiplicity	   of	   linkages	   in	   the	   process,	   and	   the	   potential	   issues	  
regarding	   the	   management	   of	   conflict,	   and	   creation	   of	   consensus	   (Rhodes	   and	   Marsh,	   1992,	   7).	  
However,	   the	   ‘bottom-­‐up’	   approach	   does	   not	   view	   control	   from	   the	   top	   as	   the	   mechanism	   to	  
achieve	   effective	   implementation.	   Quite	   the	   reverse,	   it	   views	   implementation	   as	   a	   process	   of	  
negotiation	  and	  consensus	  building.	  This	  approach	  views	  ‘street	  level	  bureaucrats’	  as	  policy	  makers	  
who	  exercise	  considerable	  discretion	  in	  how	  they	  interpret	  and	  administer	  a	  policy.	  	  
Lipsky	  (1971,	  1980),	  one	  of	  the	  best	  known	  advocates	  of	  the	  bottom-­‐up	  approach,	  suggests	  
that	  focus	  needs	  to	  be	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  ‘street	  level	  bureaucrats’,	  as	  they	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  really	  
determine	  a	  policy’s	   shape.	  To	  Lipsky	   ‘street	   level	  bureaucrats’	  are	   the	  primary	  policy	  makers,	  not	  
simply	  the	  implementers.	  Lipsky	  stresses	  that:	  	  
Street	  level	  bureaucrats	  are	  not	  purposefully	  sabotaging	  a	  policy	  and	  defying	  orders,	  
but	   instead	   create	   methods	   and	   practices	   that	   enable	   them	   to	   cope	   with	   the	  
pressures	   placed	   on	   them…	   people	   often	   enter	   employment	   with	   at	   least	   some	  
commitment	  to	  service	  yet	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  this	  work	  prevents	  them	  from	  coming	  
close	   to	   the	   ideal	   conception	   of	   their	   jobs.	   Large	   classes	   or	   huge	   caseloads	   and	  
inadequate	   resources	   combine	   with	   uncertainties	   of	   methods	   and	   the	  
unpredictability	  of	  clients	  to	  defeat	  their	  aspirations	  as	  service	  workers	  (1980,	  xii).	  
Barrett	   and	   Fudge	   (1981)	   expounded	   similar	   ideas	   to	   that	   of	   Lipsky.	   Utilising	   the	   work	  
within	  organisation	   theory	  and	   the	   idea	  of	   ‘negotiated	  order’,	   they	  argue	   that	  action	  depends	  on	  
negotiation,	   adaption,	   and	   interpretation,	   rather	   than	   a	   game-­‐fixing	   scenario	   as	   envisaged	   by	  
Bardach.	  Policy	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  constant	  but	   instead	  something	  that	   is	  mediated	  by	  actors	  
who	   may	   be	   operating	   with	   different	   assumptive	   worlds	   from	   those	   formulating	   the	   policy;	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inevitably,	  it	  undergoes	  interpretation	  and	  modification,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  subversion	  (Barrett	  and	  
Fudge,	  1981,	  251).	  As	  Hill	  and	  Hupe	  suggest,	  ‘their	  view	  emphasises	  the	  continuing	  political	  process	  
occurring	   through	   implementation.	   In	   effect,	   this	   suggests	   that	   it	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   separate	  
implementation	  from	  policy	  formation’	  (2009,	  55)18.	  
The	  ‘bottom	  up’	  approach,	  like	  the	  ‘top-­‐down’	  approach	  has	  also	  been	  met	  with	  criticism.	  To	  
summarise	  (adapted	  from	  Rhodes	  and	  Marsh,	  1992,	  7):	  
• Overestimates	   the	   ability	   of	   street-­‐level	   bureaucrats,	   ignoring	   the	   legal,	   financial	   and	  
organisational	  constraints	  in	  which	  they	  work.	  
• Views	  of	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  are	  identified	  but	  not	  explained.	  
• Its	   focus	   is	   not	   upon	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   policy,	   but	   rather	   street-­‐level	  
bureaucrats’	  relationship/interaction	  with	  the	  policy	  (Sabatier,	  1986,	  35-­‐6).	  
• The	  approach	  exaggerates	   the	  problems	  of	   the	   ‘top	  down	  approach’	   i.e.	   some	  policies	  
do	  have	  clear	  objectives.	  	  
7.3	  Positioning	  of	  Implementation	  Studies,	  and	  the	  Approach	  Adopted	  in	  this	  Study	  
	   Implementation	   can	   be	   defined	   as,	   ‘what	   happens	   between	   policy	   expectations	   and	  
(perceived)	  policy	   results’	   (deLeon,	   1999:314-­‐15,	   paraphrasing	   Ferman,	   1990:	   39).	   In	   slightly	  more	  
detail,	   implementation	  is	  the	  enactment	  of	  a	  policy	  decision,	  usually	  incorporated	  in	  a	  statute.	  This	  
would	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   ‘top-­‐down’	   approach	   to	   implementation;	   in	   contrast	   Barrett	   and	   Fudge	  
suggest	  that	  implementation	  is	  ‘a	  process	  of	  interaction	  and	  negotiation,	  taking	  place	  between	  those	  
seeking	  to	  put	  policy	  into	  effect	  and	  those	  upon	  whom	  actions	  depend	  (1981,4).	  Taking	  the	  ‘bottom-­‐
up’	  approach	  further,	  O’Toole	  states	  that	  policy	  implementation	  ‘refers	  to	  the	  connection	  between	  
the	  expression	  of	  governmental	   intention	  and	  actual	   results	   (1995,	  43).	   ‘Top-­‐down’	  approaches	   to	  
implementation	  see	  successful	  implementation	  as	  the	  ability	  of	  those	  ‘at	  the	  top’	  to	  get	  those	  ‘at	  the	  
bottom’	  (or	  ‘street	  level	  bureaucrats’)	  to	  dutiful	  adhere	  to	  the	  instructions	  issued.	  When	  errors	  occur	  
at	  implementation,	  then	  this	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrat’s	  conduct.	  As	  Parsons	  states:	  	  
	  The	  rational	  model	  [top-­‐down	  model]	  is	  imbued	  with	  the	  ideas	  that	  implementation	  
is	   about	   getting	   people	   to	   do	   what	   they	   are	   told,	   and	   keeping	   control	   over	   a	  
sequence	   of	   stages	   in	   a	   system;	   and	   about	   the	   development	   of	   a	   programme	   of	  
control	   which	   minimizes	   conflict	   and	   deviation	   from	   the	   goals	   set	   by	   the	   initial	  
‘policy	  hypothesis.	  (paraphrasing,	  Pressman	  and	  Wildavksy,	  1973,	  xiii).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  The	  policy	  formation/implementation	  relationship	  is	  something	  that	  will	  addressed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter	  
when	  	  the	  approach	  to	  implementation	  adopted	  by	  this	  study	  is	  stated.	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This	  thesis	  does	  not	  necessarily	  agree	  with	  this	  assessment.	  A	  top-­‐down	  approach	  can	  also	  
emphasise	  the	  need	  to	  get	  things	  done	  at	  the	  policy	  design	  stage,	  prior	  to	  implementation.	  The	  ‘top’	  
providing	  the	  framework	  of	  what	  is	  to	  be	  done,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  enforcing	  compliance	  in	  the	  way	  
Parsons	  suggests.	   	  By	  the	  implementation	  stage,	  a	  framework	  should	  already	  be	  created	  which	  the	  
‘street-­‐level	  bureaucrats’	  should	  be	  able	  to	  follow.	  As	  Hill	  and	  Hupe	  state:	  	  
	  The	  act	  of	  ‘implementation’	  presupposes	  a	  prior	  act,	  particularly	  the	  ‘cognitive	  act’	  
of	   formulating	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  and	  making	  a	  decision	  on	  that.	   In	  everyday	  
terms,	  while	  we	  may	  vary	  what	  we	  do	  when	  we	  take	  action,	  we	  very	  often	  make	  a	  
decision	  to	  take	  action	  –	  go	  on	  a	  journey	  for	  example	  –	  and	  think	  about	  how	  to	  do	  it,	  
before	  carrying	  out	  that	  action.	  (2009,	  4).	  	  
It	   is	   therefore	   logical	   to	   assume	   a	   sequence:	   deciding	  where	   to	   go	   –	   problem	  definition;	   deciding	  
how	  to	  get	  there	  –	  policy	  formulation/legislation;	  getting	  there	  –	  implementation.	  From	  this	  it	  could	  
be	  noted	   that	   there	   is	   a	  difference	  between	  arriving	   at	   the	   correct	  destination	   and	   regretting	   the	  
decision,	   following	   direction	   but	   not	   getting	   to	   the	   destination,	   and	   lastly,	   rejecting	   the	  map	   and	  
directions	  and	  getting	  lost.	  Policy	  failure	  should	  be	  viewed	  in	  this	  light.	  
It	  appears	  that	  implementation	  studies	  suffer	  from	  some	  definitional	  problems	  with	  respect	  
to	  what	  implementation	  actually	  entails.	  Top-­‐downers	  see	  implementation	  primarily	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  
‘assembling	  action	  in	  support	  of	  the	  intentions	  and	  orders	  of	  political	  leaders’,	  while	  bottom-­‐uppers	  
view	  it	  as	  ‘mobilising	  the	  energies	  of	  disparate	  stakeholders	  to	  make	  sensible	  choices	  in	  congealing	  
problem	  solving	  around	  a	  complex,	  content-­‐specific,	  and	  dynamic	  policy	   issue’	  (O’Toole,	  2001,	  10).	  
For	   the	   top-­‐down	   perspective	   the	   focus	   is	   upon	   compliance,	   for	   the	   bottom-­‐up	   it	   is	   upon	  
collaboration	  and	  innovation	  (Hill	  and	  Hupe,	  2009,	  175).	  	  
	   Ham	  and	  Hupe	  suggest	  that	  ‘implementation	  research	  has	  grown	  to	  what	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  
sub-­‐discipline’	  (2009,	  12),	  in	  which	  implementation	  has	  become	  the	  sole	  focus	  of	  analysis.	  Arguably	  
this	   has	   had	   a	   negative	   impact	   on	   the	   study	   of	   policy	   making	   in	   general,	   and	   policy	   failure	  
specifically.	   One	   cannot,	   and	   should	   not,	   isolate	   implementation	   from	   the	   other	   stages	   in	   the	  
process.	  The	  problem	   is	  not	   that	   implementation	   is	  a	   separate	  section	   for	  analysis;	   rather	   it	   is	   the	  
isolation	   of	   that	   section	   that	   is	   harmful	   for	   our	   understanding.	  We	   cannot	   study	   implementation	  
without	  studying	  what	   it	   is	   that	   is	  being	   implemented	  –	  the	  policy	   itself	   is	   the	  key.	  The	  bottom-­‐up	  
approach	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   guilty	   of	   labelling	   the	   whole	   of	   the	   policy-­‐making	   process	   as	  
‘implementation’.	  But	  as	  Pressman	  and	  Wildavsky	  state:	  ‘if	  implementation	  is	  everywhere…	  is	  it	  ipso	  
facto	   nowhere?’	   (1984,	  184).	   Similarly,	   if	   implementation	   is	  everything,	   it	   is	   ipso	   facto	   nothing.	  By	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isolating	  and	  elevating	  implementation	  we	  are	  ignoring	  factors	  that	  are	  influencing	  it	  at	  other	  stages,	  
and	  hence	  missing	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  a	  policy’s	  success	  or	  failure.	  	  
7.3.1	  Understanding	  Policy	  Success	  or	  Failure	  in	  Implementation	  Studies	  
A	  major	  focus	  of	  Implementation	  Studies	  is	  ascertaining	  the	  successes	  and	  failure	  of	  policy,	  
and	  the	  sub-­‐discipline’s	  isolation	  is	  particularly	  problematic	  as	  it	  privileges	  implementation	  in	  causal	  
explanations.	  	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘perfect	  implementation’	  which	  provides	  criteria	  for	  
avoiding	   policy	   failure.	   However,	   under	   scrutiny	   it	   becomes	   apparent	   that	   the	   criteria	   are	   not	  
necessarily	  attainable	  at	  the	  implementation	  stage.	  As	  such	  we	  need	  to	  re-­‐establish	  implementation	  
as	  a	  specific	  moment	  in	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  of	  the	  policy,	  and	  re-­‐evaluate	  the	  criteria	  of	  success	  and	  failure	  
that	  can	  occur	  at	  this	  stage.	  When	  we	  talk	  about	   implementation,	  we	  are	  really	  engaging	  with	  the	  
short	  moment	  when	  the	  elements	   laid	  out	   in	   legislation	  are	  manifest.	  The	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  the	  
policy	  however,	   is	  dependent	  on	  other	  parts	  of	   the	  policy	  making	  process	   i.e.	  assigning	   resources,	  
anticipating	  reaction,	  undertaking	  adequate	  research,19	  and	  ultimately	  of	  the	  Act	  itself.	  However	  for	  
bottom-­‐up	   scholars,	   implementation	   seems	   to	   have	   gone	   moved	   from	   being	   ‘the	   missing	   link’	  
between	   legislation	  and	  operation	   to	  superseding	  policy	   failure,	   implementation	   the	   focal	  point	  of	  
policy	  analysis.	  This	  excessive	  focus	   is	  detrimental	  as	   it	   ignores	  both	  the	  design	  of	  the	  Act,	  and	  the	  
ultimate	  operation	  of	  the	  policy.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  more	  attention	  needs	  to	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  
design	  of	  a	  policy;	  we	  should	  move	  beyond	  a	  fixation	  of	   implementation	  and	  look	  at	  what	  leads	  to	  
the	  creation	  and	  passage	  of	  a	  policy.20	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  judge	  a	  policy’s	  success	  or	  failure	  if	  looking	  at	  the	  implementation	  stage	  we	  need	  
to	  address	  the	  following	  key	  questions:	  	  
• Were	  the	  aims	  and	  objectives	  of	  the	  policy	  achieved?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	   Whilst	   sometimes	   it	   appears	   that	   details	   are	   decided,	   or	   resources	   assigned,	   at	   implementation,	   these	  
actions	  would	  be	  determined	  within	  the	  policy	  itself.	  	  As	  such,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  policy,	  rather	  than	  
implementation.	  We	   need	   to	   remember	   that	   the	   agency	   is	   chosen,	   sourced	   and	   empowered	   by	   the	   policy	  
makers.	  
20	  Similarly,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  some	  failures	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  failures	  of	  ‘operation’	  rather	  
than	   implementation.	   Therefore	   we	   would	   need	   to	   study	   operational	   failure	   separately	   to	   policy	   failure.†	  
Whilst	   policy	   design	   failure	   feeds	   into	   the	   operation	   of	   a	   policy,	   they	   are	   separate	   things.	   It	   could	   also	   be	  
argued	   that	   some	  of	   the	   things	   included	   in	   ‘implementation	   studies’	  would	   be	   better	   suited	   in	   ‘operational	  
studies’	  which	  looks	  at	  the	  delivery	  process	  in	  terms	  of	  project	  management.	  Operation	  is	  another	  stage	  in	  the	  
life	  cycle	  of	  a	  policy.	  As	  argued	  above,	  implementation	  studies	  has	  colonised	  and	  appropriated	  the	  analysis	  of	  
the	  operational	  elements	   in	  the	  same	  way	  as	   it	  appropriated	  the	   legislative	  elements.	   In	  the	  example	  of	   the	  
Child	  Support	  Agency,	   if	  we	  are	   to	   fully	  understand	   its	  operational	  elements,	  we	  need	   to	  draw	  on	   the	  work	  
done	  within	  public	  management	  and	  business	  studies,	  because	  some	  of	  the	  things	  assessed	  here	  are	  out	  of	  the	  
control	  of	  the	  policy	  design.	  
†	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  section	  of	  Chapter	  One,	  the	  operational	  failure	  of	  the	  CSA	  has	  already	  been	  
the	   subject	   of	   a	   thesis,	   by	   Brian	   Sheffield	   (Durham	   University)	   which	   provides	   an	   excellent	   account	   of	   the	  
managerial	  failings	  of	  the	  Agency.	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• Were	  the	  aims	  and	  objectives	  attainable?	  	  
• Did	  the	  ‘street-­‐level	  bureaucrats’	  comply	  with	  the	  legislation?	  	  
With	  respect	  to	  the	  first	  question,	  if	  the	  aims	  and	  objectives	  of	  an	  Act	  were	  not	  achieved	  in	  
their	   entirety	   we	   can	   see	   that	   whilst	   the	   policy	   has	   failed,	   however	   this	   is	   not	   ‘Implementation	  
Failure’	  per	  se	   rather	   it	   is	   ‘failure	  becoming	  apparent	  at	   the	   implementation	  stage’.	   	  The	  nature	  of	  
the	  failure	  will	  become	  apparent	   in	  our	  answers	  to	  the	  remaining	  questions,	  as	  will	  the	   location	  of	  
the	  point	  of	  failure.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  attainability	  of	  the	  aims	  and	  objectives,	  this	  is	  laid	  out	  within	  
the	   legislative	   stage,	   in	   that,	   the	   resources,	   time	   frames,	   goals	   and	   objectives	   should	   be	   clearly	  
established.	   If	   they	   are	   unattainable	   this	   is	   not	   a	   failure	   of	   implementation,	   but	   rather	   legislative	  
failure	  that	  was	  only	  manifest	  when	  they	  set	  the	  Act	  in	  motion.	  	  If	  the	  legislators	  failed	  to	  account	  for	  
the	  problems	  that	  manifest	  as	  the	  Act	  is	   in	  action,	  then	  the	  blame	  should	  be	  apportioned	  there.	  In	  
effect,	  if	  one	  legislates	  properly,	  failure	  at	  implementation	  should	  be	  impossible.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  
third	  question,	   if	   the	   ‘street-­‐level	  bureaucrats’	  did	  not	   completely	   carry	  out	   the	  duties	  outlined	   in	  
the	  Act,	  then	  we	  can	  argue	  that	  this	   is	   ‘failing	  to	  implement’.	   If	  they	  do	  not	  follow	  the	  instructions	  
laid	  down	  in	  the	  detail	  of	  the	  policy,	  and	  then	  the	  policy	  fails,	  then	  the	  policy	  itself	  may	  actually	  be	  
sound	  but	  rather	  the	  actions	  (or	  in-­‐actions)	  of	  those	  operating	  the	  policy	  are	  culpable	  for	  its	  lack	  of	  
success.	  However	   it	  could	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	   their	  views	  and	  expertise	  were	   ignored	  during	   the	  
consultation	  process,	  and	  as	  a	  result	   they	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  an	  element	  of	  a	  policy.	   If	   this	   is	   the	  
case,	  then	  this	  can	  be	  adjudged	  to	  be	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  process	  and	  not	  implementation.	  
It	  also	  could	  be	  the	  case	  where	  a	  policy	  is	  fully	  implemented,	  in	  which	  the	  ‘street-­‐level	  bureaucrats’	  
could,	  and	  did,	  comply	  but	  the	  policy	  still	  failed	  to	  achieve	  its	  goals.	  This	  is	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  failure	  
within	   the	   legislation,	   not	   the	   implementation.	   As	   Hogwood	   and	   Gunn	   note,	   ‘many	   so-­‐called	  
‘implementation	   failures’	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   inadequate	   policies’	   (1984,	   taken	   from:	   Hill	   and	   Hupe,	  
2014,	   172).	   Rather	   than	   implementation	   failure,	   and	   the	   criteria	   of	   ‘perfect	   implementation’,	   we	  
should	  discuss	  ‘legislation	  failure’,	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘perfect	  legislation’.	  	  	  
	   This	  thesis’s	  view	  of	  implementation	  is	  an	  evolution	  of	  that	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  top-­‐downers,	  
in	   that	   implementation	   is	   the	   process	   of	   putting	   policy	   into	   effect.	   	   Whilst	   appreciating	   the	   role	  
played	   by	   street-­‐level	   bureaucrats,	   it	   suggests	   that	   the	   negotiation	   and	   consensus	   building	  
highlighted	   by	   the	   bottom-­‐uppers	   should	   take	   place	   at	   the	   policy	   formation	   stage	   rather	   than	  
implementation.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  suggesting	  that	  ‘street	  level	  bureaucrats’	  need	  to	  merely	  be	  
compliant,	  and	  policy	  success	  solely	  lies	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  those	  above	  controlling	  those	  on	  the	  ground.	  
Rather,	  if	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  policy	  design	  process	  with	  thorough	  and	  effective	  consultation	  in	  the	  first	  
place,	   then	  we	  would	  not	  have	   the	   ‘multiple	   strategies’	   that	  Rhodes	  and	  Marsh	  highlight	   (1992,7)	  
nor	   the	  need	   to	   ‘create	  methods	  and	  practices	   that	  enable	   [street	   level	  bureaucrats]	   to	  cope	  with	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the	   pressures	   placed	   on	   them’	   that	   Lipsky	   highlights	   (1980,	   xii).	   If	   ‘fighting’	   occurs,	   or	   ‘coping	  
strategies’	   are	   required	   at	   the	   implementation	   stage	   this	   is	   a	   signal	   of	   poor	   policy	   design	   and	  
ineffective	   consultation.	   The	   approach	   adopted	   in	   this	   thesis	   argues	   that	   we	   need	   to	   place	   focus	  
back	  onto	  policy	   formation	   to	   really	  understand	  why	  a	  policy	  suffers	  problems	  at	   implementation.	  
We	  need	   to	   integrate	  analysis	  of	  policy	   formation	  with	   implementation.	   This	   thesis	   is	  not	  denying	  
that	  ‘street-­‐level	  bureaucrats’	  have	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  and	  use	  their	  own	  discretion,	  but	  if	  they	  
use	  this,	  and	  go	  against	  what	  was	  required	  of	  them,	  then	  they	  have	  failed	  to	  implement	  the	  policy.	  	  
Our	  approach	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  bottom-­‐up	  approach,	  whilst	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  top-­‐down	  consideration	  of	  the	  system.	  The	  approach	  engages	  with:	  
what	  has,	  or	  has	  not	  happened,	  at	  the	  policy	  formulation	  stage	  by	  elites	  which	  has	  led	  ‘street-­‐level	  
bureaucrats’	   to	   act	   in	   this	   way.	   It	   is	   ‘top-­‐down’,	   but	   not	   hierarchical.	   	   It	   is	   necessary	   to	   view	  
‘problems’	   at	   the	   design	   stage,	  when	   something	   can	   be	   done,	   not	   at	   implementation.	   Conflicting	  
views,	  differing	  agendas,	  and	  subsequently	  negotiation	  should	  be	  something	  that	   is	  taking	  place	  at	  
policy	   formation,	   not	   policy	   implementation.	   If	   ‘fighting’	   is	   occurring	   at	   implementation	   then	   the	  
policy	  formulation	  stage	  was	  inadequate.	  It	  should	  not	  be	  left	  until	  the	  implementation	  to	  face	  the	  
realities	  of	  the	  policy.	  We	  need	  to	  ask	  ourselves	  what	  was	  the	  root	  of	  the	  problem	  experienced	  at	  
implementation,	  what	  we	  will	  find	  is	  that	  this	  can	  be	  linked	  back	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  policy.	  That	  
is	  why	  we	  should	  be	  using	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘perfect	  legislation’	  rather	  than	  ‘perfect	  implementation’.	  We	  
need	  to	  be	  proactive	  rather	  than	  reactive,	  and	  apportion	  blame	  appropriately.	  	  
The	  next	  Chapter	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency,	  the	  coping	  
strategies	  that	  were	  adopted	  by	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  were	  a	  symptom	  of	  the	  policy	  design,	  not	  
the	  fault	  of	  implementation.	  As	  suggested	  when	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘perfect	  legislation’	  is	  presented	  in	  the	  
following	  Chapter,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   remove	   the	   chances	  of	   an	   ‘operational	  disconnect’	  by	  ensuring	  
effective	   consultation	   and	   engagement	  with	   ‘street-­‐level	   bureaucrats’,	  whereby	   the	   expertise	   and	  
views	  of	  those	  on	  the	  ground	  are	  appropriately	  considered	  at	  policy	  formation.	  
7.4	  Implementation	  and	  ‘Next	  Steps’	  Agencies	  
With	  respect	  to	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  we	  should	  also	  note	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  use	  of	  
‘next	   steps’	   and	   arm’s	   length	  bodies	   in	   the	   role	  of	   implementation.	  Under	   Thatcher	  we	   saw	   large	  
scale	   organisational	   and	   structural	   change,	   both	   at	   central	   and	   local	   government.	   One	   of	   these	  
significant	   changes	   was	   the	   introduction	   of	   ‘next	   steps’	   agencies.	   Dunsire	   describes	   them	   as	  
involving	  ‘the	  relatively	  wholescale	  adoption	  of	  structural	  separation	  of	  political	  responsibilities	  from	  
executive	  responsibilities,	  the	  former	  remaining	  with	  Ministers	  assisted	  by	  small	  policy	  departments,	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the	  latter	  divested	  to	  new	  executive	  agencies	  each	  with	  its	  chief	  executive	  and	  required	  to	  produce	  
mission	  statements	  and	  performance	  targets	  in	  a	  ‘framework	  document’	  (1995,	  24).	  	  
Under	   Thatcher	   the	   role	   of	   senior	   civil	   servants	   changed,	   from	   advising	   on	   policy	   to	  
executing	  and	  managing	  policy.	  In	  this	  period	  roles	  changed,	  and	  implementation	  became	  seemingly	  
removed	  from	  central	  government	  and	  placed	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  ‘public	  managers’,	  and	  so	  with	  it	  did	  
the	   branches	   of	   accountability	   and	   the	   placing	   of	   blame	   (something	   we	   will	   address	   later	   in	   this	  
chapter).	  But	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  often	   forgotten	  when	   judging	  the	  performance	  of	  civil	   servant	   led	  
agencies	  is	  that	  agency	  itself	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  government	  made	  legislation.	  Civil	  servants	  
can	  only	  execute	  what	  they	  are	  given,	  and	  manage	  with	  the	  resources	  they	  are	  provided.	  As	  Hill	  and	  
Hupe	   highlight,	   ‘when	   the	   results	   of	   policy	   appear	   to	   be	   disappointing	   often	   implementation	   is	  
blamed’	   (2009,	   `29).	  This	   is	  why	  this	   thesis	  views	  the	  failure	  of	   the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	   to	  be	  a	  
failure	   of	   policy,	   not	   a	   failure	   of	   the	   Agency.	   Making	   ‘public	   managers’	   appear	   responsible	   for	   a	  
policy’s	   failure	  due	   to	   its	   implementation	  was	  a	   tactic	  of	  blame	  avoidance.	  So	   to	  avoid	   falling	   into	  
this	  trap,	  and	  buying	  into	  this	  tactic,	  we	  need	  to	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  what	  is	  being	  implemented.	  It	  is	  all	  
too	   easy	   to	   blame	   Ros	   Hepplewhite;	   the	   first	   Chief	   Executive	   of	   Child	   Support	   Agency,	   but	   it	   is	  
necessary	   to	   apportion	   blame	   appropriately;	   it	   was	   the	   failure	   of	   an	   unworkable	   policy,	   a	   policy	  
whose	   failure	   was	   foreseeable	   and	   foreseen.	   Whilst	   the	   Agency	   did	   encounter	   implementation	  
problems	   and	   operational	   difficulties,	   these	   were	   consequences	   of	   an	   ill-­‐conceived,	   ideologically	  
driven	  policy	  that	  those	  at	  the	  centre	  managed	  to	  push	  through	  Parliament,	  ignoring	  the	  warnings	  of	  
many.	  	  
Next-­‐steps	   agencies	   are	   a	   decentralised	   approach	   to	   policy	   delivery,	   whereby	   ministers	  
become	  detached	  from	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  policy,	  leaving	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  management,	  day-­‐
to-­‐day	   running	  of	   the	  agency,	  and	  attainment	  of	   targets	   to	   the	  Chief	  Executive.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   the	  
Child	   Support	   Agency,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Agency	   was	   set	   out	   a	   managerial	   plan	   which	   the	   Chief	  
Executive	   was	   required	   to	   implement.	   The	   business	   plan,	   framework	   and	   targets,	   which	   Ros	  
Hepplewhite	   was	   required	   to	   work	   towards,	   had	   been	   established	   prior	   to	   her	   appointment	   by	  
ministers	   (Harlow,	   1999,	   163).	   Due	   to	   this	   detachment	   from	   responsibility	   and	   policy	   reality,	  
ministers	   ‘set	   targets	   that	   were	   unrealistic	   and	   inflexible’	   (Harlow,	   1999,	   164).	   This	   separation	  
between	  policy	  and	  delivery	  through	  use	  of	  next-­‐steps	  agencies	  raises	  issues	  of	  accountability.	  This	  
conscious	   separation	   removes	   the	   burden	   of	   blame	   and	   responsibility	   from	   the	   minister,	   and	  
therefore	  we	  see	  the	  pursuit	  targets	  that	  are	  ill-­‐thought	  through,	  reckless,	  and	  often,	  unattainable.	  
However,	  just	  because	  there	  has	  been	  delegation	  it	  should	  not	  mean	  that	  all	  responsibility	  lay	  with	  
the	  Chief	  Executive,	  as	  the	  policy	  is	  still	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  failures.	  Whilst	  a	  sound	  policy	  could	  indeed	  
fail,	  this	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  operational	  failure	  rather	  than	  policy	  failure.	  What	  is	  seen	  with	  the	  Child	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Support	  Agency	   is	   ‘policy	   failure’	  which	   inevitably	  precluded	   ‘operational	   failure’	  and	  a	  concurrent	  	  
attempt	   to	   use	   its	   agency	   status	   as	   a	   shield	   which	   ministers	   deployed	   to	   ward	   off	   criticism	   and	  
blame.	  	  
7.5	  Conclusion	  
This	   chapter	   provided	   the	   conceptual	   background	   to	   our	   approach	   to	   understanding	  
implementation,	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  policy	  formation	  and	  policy	  success	  or	  failure.	  We	  ended	  by	  
discussing	   the	   role	  of	   ‘next-­‐steps’	   agencies,	   and	  how	   they	  have	  moved	   the	   lines	  of	   accountability.	  
What	  has	  typically	  been	  seen	  as	  the	  ‘implementation’	  of	  a	  policy	  was	  not	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
As	  we	  stated,	  some	  of	  the	  areas	  typically	  debated	  within	  ‘implementation	  studies’,	  such	  as	  the	  idea	  
of	   ‘perfect	   implementation’	   are	   better	   suited	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   policy	   process,	   be	   it	   in	   policy	  
formation,	   or	   operation.	   As	   stated	   above,	   the	   problems	   experienced	   at	   implementation	   and	  
operation	  are	   in	   large	  part	  due	   to	   failings	   in	   legislature.	  Chapter	  Eight,	  will	   focus	  on	   the	  operation	  
and	  apparent	  failings	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  and	  assess	  the	  root	  of	  these	  failings	  with	  reference	  to	  

































Chapter	  Eight	  -­‐	  The	  Failure	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  
	  
8.1	  Introduction	  
	   As	   the	   start	   of	   our	   study	   set	   out,	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   is	   seen	   as	   one	   of	   the	  most	  
controversial	  and	  notorious	  policy	   failures	   in	  Britain.	   It	  has	  been	  subject	  to	   intense	  political,	  public	  
and	  media	  criticism,	  and	  described	  as	  both	  ‘catastrophic…	  a	  calamity’	  (Toynbee,	  1998)	  and	  ‘the	  most	  
incompetent	  and	  inhuman	  agency	  ever	  set	  up	  by	  a	  British	  government’	  (Ingrams,	  1997).	  From	  August	  
1993	   the	  media	  were	   regularly	   reporting	  on	   the	  hardship	   caused	  by	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  policy;	   this	  
included	  reports	  on	  suicides,	  and	  a	  murder	  of	  a	  parent	  with	  care.	  The	  first	  year	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  
Agency’s	  operation	  was	  marked	  by	   substantial	   administrative	   chaos,	  delay,	   error,	   and	   failure	   (see,	  
for	   example:	  National	   Audit	  Office,	   1994;	   Child	   Support	   Agency	  Annual	   Report,	   1994	   (CSA,	   2066);	  
Central	   Adjudication	   Services,	   1994;	   Social	   Security	   Committee	  Report	   1993,	   1994a,	   1994b,	   1994c	  
which	  all	  highlight	  the	  CSA’s	  failure	  to	  reach	  its	  targets,	  and	  the	  substantial	  controversy	  the	  Agency	  
attracted).	  Below	  will	  discuss	  the	  targets	  prescribed	  for	  the	  Agency,	  outlining	  its	  record	  of	  meeting	  
those	   targets.	   This	   Chapter	   will	   focus	   on	   bringing	   together	   the	   failings,	   or	   limitations,	   that	   were	  
highlighted	   in	  previous	  Chapters,	  Demonstrating	  how	  problems	  occurred,	   and	  were	  embedded,	   at	  
each	  stage	  of	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  It	  will	  analyse	  the	  main	  problems	  experienced	  by	  the	  Child	  
Support	  Agency,	  problems	  which	   led	   it	   to	  be	  deemed	  a	  momentous	   failure,	  before	   then	  assessing	  
the	  roots	  of	  that	  failure.	  	  
8.2	  Failure	  to	  Meet	  Targets	  	  
From	   its	   first	   year	   in	   operation	   (1993-­‐94)	   the	   Child	   Support	   Agency	   failed	   to	   meet	   its	  
performance	  targets.	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  apparent	  failings	  of	  the	  Agency	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  provide	  
an	  overview	  of	  the	  Agency’s	  targets.	  As	  a	  ‘next-­‐steps’	  agency	  the	  CSA	  was	  granted	  partial-­‐autonomy	  
but	  had	  to	  work	  within	  the	  outlined	  operational	  plans	  and	  targets	  set	  out	  by	  the	  Government.	  These	  
were	   set	   out	   in	   three	   formal	   documents,	   the	   ‘1993/4	   Business	   Plan’	   (CSA,	   1994),	   the	   ‘Framework	  
Document’	  (CSA,	  1994),	  and	  the	  ‘CSA	  Charter’	  (CSA,	  1993).	  
In	  its	  first	  year	  of	  operation	  the	  CSA	  was	  expected	  to:	  
• Obtain	  maintenance	  payments	  for	  60	  per	  cent	  of	  parents-­‐with	  care	  
• Achieve	  a	  customer	  satisfaction	  rate	  of	  65	  per	  cent,	  to	  be	  measured	  by	  an	  independent	  
survey	  
• Save	  £530	  million	  on	  social	  security	  payments	  	  
• Deliver	  its	  business	  plan	  within	  a	  total	  budget	  of	  £115	  million	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• Respond	   to	   enquiries	   within	   the	   allotted	   time	   (respond	   to	   Parliamentary	   questions	  
within	   24	   hours,	   reply	   to	   letters	   from	   MPs	   within	   20	   workings	   days,	   respond	   to	  
Parliamentary	  Commissioner	  to	  Administration	  within	  6	  weeks)	  
• Maintain	  outstanding	  customer	  service:	  provide	  an	  assessment	  within	  five	  working	  days	  
of	  receiving	  the	  information	  needed;	  respond	  to	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  telephone	  calls	  to	  the	  
Inquiry	   Line	   and	   Child	   Support	   Agency	   Centres	   within	   20	   seconds;	   reply	   to	   written	  
inquiries	  within	  ten	  working	  days;	  acknowledge	  any	  written	  complaint	  within	  two	  days,	  
and	  respond	  in	  full	  within	  ten	  days;	  not	  keep	  services	  users	  waiting	  longer	  than	  twenty	  
minutes	  for	  an	  officer	  interview	  
• Meet	   milestone	   targets	   related	   to	   major	   initiatives	   (set	   up	   computer	   system,	   open	  
national	  offices	  etc.)	  
However,	  attempts	  to	  meet	  these	  targets	  were,	  to	  be	  kind,	  unsuccessful.	  	  The	  CSA	  Annual	  Report	  of	  
1993/1994,	   dubbed	   a	   ‘23-­‐page	   apology’	   (The	   Guardian,	   3	   September,	   1994),	   acknowledged:	   ‘our	  
standards	  of	  service	  did	  not	  reach	  acceptable	  levels	  and	  we	  did	  not	  achieve	  some	  of	  our	  key	  targets.	  
We	  apologise	   to	  our	  clients	   for	   the	  difficulties	   they	  have	  experienced	  because	  of	  our	  shortcomings’	  
(CSA,	  July	  1994).	  	  
An	  assessment	  of	  the	  Agency’s	  first	  year	  in	  operation	  reveals:	  	  
• Financial	  Targets	  Had	  Not	  Been	  Met	  -­‐	  An	  annual	  saving	  of	  £418	  million	  was	  reached,	  a	  
shortfall	   of	   £112	  million	  of	   the	  £530	  million	   target	   (the	  annual	   target	  was	   set	   at	   £530	  
million	  for	  its	  first	  year	  in	  operation	  but	  planned	  to	  rise	  to	  a	  long	  term	  annual	  target	  of	  
£900	  million).	  It	  in	  fact	  took	  3	  years	  for	  the	  Agency	  to	  meet	  a	  total	  income	  target	  of	  £530	  
million	   (Barnes	  et	  al,	   1998,	  16).	  A	  Government	  Minister	   also	  admitted	   that	  out	  of	   this	  
planned	  £530	  million	  savings,	  the	  Treasury	  were	  to	  receive	  £480	  million,	  and	  the	  million	  
or	  so	  mothers	  and	  children	  would	  be	  left	  to	  share	  £50	  million	  	  (Jenkins,	  1997,	  164).	  	  
	  
• The	  Monies	  Collected	  Would	  Have	  Been	  Received	  without	  Agency	  Intervention	  –	  The	  
£418	   million	   of	   savings	   included	   money	   paid	   under	   pre-­‐existing	   maintenance	  
arrangements.	  Less	  than	  five	  per	  cent	  represented	  ‘new	  money’;	  the	  rest	  was	  gathered	  
from	  those	  that	  had	  prior	  arrangements	  which	  were	  brought	  into	  the	  system	  (King	  and	  
Crewe,	  2013,	  89).	  Marsh	  et	  al	  conclude	  that	  the	  CSA	  assessments	  had	  a	  neutral	  effect	  on	  
the	   volume	  of	   payments	   (Marsh	  et	   al.,	   1997,	   quoted	   in:	   Barnes	  et	   al,	   1999,	   19).	   They	  
provided	   the	   following	   reasons:	   assessments	  were	  made	   in	   cases	  where	  maintenance	  
was	   already	   in	   payment;	   assessments	  were	  made	   in	   cases	  where	  maintenance	  would	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have	  been	  paid	   anyway;	   assessments	  were	  made	   in	   cases	  where	  absent	  parents	  were	  
exempt	  from	  payment;	  and	  assessments	  were	  not	  being	  made	  in	  cases	  where	  payment	  
was	  not	  received,	  and	  would	  not	  have	  been	  made	  under	  the	  previous	  system	  (Marsh	  et	  
al.,	  1997,	  quoted	  in:	  Barnes	  et	  al,	  1999,	  19).	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  Agency	  to	  tackle	  the	  last	  
category	   meant	   that	   they	   were	   not	   effectively	   increasing	   the	   amount	   of	   individuals	  
paying	  maintenance.	  	  
	  
• Clearance	  Rates	  Were	  Poor	  –	  The	  target	  of	  obtaining	  maintenance	  payments	  for	  60	  per	  
cent	   of	   parents-­‐with	   care	   was	  missed.	   The	   Agency	   was	   taking	   far	   longer	   to	   complete	  
cases,	  only	  managing	  to	  reach	  just	  over	  half	  of	  its	  target,	  31.5	  per	  cent.	  	  
	  
• Clearance	   Times	  Were	   Poor,	   There	  Were	   Substantial	   Outstanding	   Cases	   –	   During	   its	  
first	   six	  months	   in	   operation,	   out	   of	   the	   527,000	   forms	   issued	   and	   cases	   started,	   only	  
36,500	  cases	  managed	  to	  reach	  the	  assessment	  stage.	  
	  
• Accuracy	  Levels	  Were	  Low	  –	  The	  first	  annual	  report	  by	  the	  Chief	  Child	  Support	  Officer	  
found	   that	   only	   14	   per	   cent	   of	   cases	   were	   correct	   in	   both	   calculations	   and	   final	  
assessment	   (Chief	   Child	   Support	   Officer	   (1994)	   Annual	   Report,	   Central	   Adjudication	  
Services,	   1993-­‐1994).	   A	   1995	   report	   by	   an	   independent	   adjudicator	   stated	   that	   of	   the	  
1,380	   cases	   examined,	   only	   half	   received	   correct	   maintenance	   assessments,	   and	   only	  
one	   in	  seven	  had	  been	  dealt	  with	  according	  to	  the	  correct	  and	  approved	  procedure	  of	  
calculating	  payments	  (cited	  by	  Barnes	  et	  al,	  1999,	  17).	  	  
	  
• High	  Volume	  of	  Enquires	  Received	  and	  Enquires	  Were	  Not	  dealt	  with	  in	  Allotted	  Time	  
–	  the	  Agency	  was	  receiving	  850,000	  enquires	  a	  month.	  The	  Chief	  Executive	  had	  received	  
5,000	  letters	  from	  MPs	  within	  the	  first	  year.	  During	  certain	  periods,	  up	  to	  400	  letters	  per	  
week	  was	   received	   from	  MPs	   (King	  and	  Crewe,	  2013,	  8).	   The	  unanticipated	  volume	  of	  
enquires	  were	  not	  met	  within	  the	  targeted	  time	  frame.	  
	  
• Customer	   Service	  was	   Deemed	   Low	   –A	   Client	   Satisfaction	   Survey	   undertaken	   for	   the	  
Department	  of	  Social	  Security	  by	  MORI	  in	  1994	  showed	  that	  satisfaction	  levels	  were	  low.	  
Delays	  in	  payments,	  complexity	  and	  confusion	  over	  the	  process,	  and	  lack	  of	  response	  to	  
enquiries	   were	   widespread	   complaints.	   The	   Data	   Protection	   Registrar	   received	   206	  
complaints	  against	  the	  CSA	   in	  1994,	  the	   largest	  number	  ever	  made	  concerning	  a	  single	  




• Running	  Costs	  Soared	  –	  It	  was	  estimated	  that	  the	  running	  costs	  of	  the	  Agency	  would	  be	  
£35	  million,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  second	  year	  running	  costs	  had	  reached	  £137	  million.	  	  
8.3	   The	   Child	   Support	   Agency	   in	   Operation	   -­‐	   Controversies	   within	   the	   CSA’s	   First	   Year	   of	  
Operation21	  
	   Before	  discussing	   the	   impact	  which	   the	  Child	   Support	  Agency	   (CSA)	  had	   in	   its	   first	   year	  of	  
operation,	   the	   Chapter	   will	   outline	   the	   reactions	   of	   the	  media,	   the	   public,	   and	  MPs.	   As	   previous	  
chapters	  have	  demonstrated,	  the	  minimal	  attention	  which	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  received	  from	  the	  
media	  had	  been	  largely	  positive,	  while	  the	  policy	  received	  cross-­‐party	  support,	  both	  of	  which	  led	  to	  
the	  Bill	  passing	   through	  Parliament	  with	   relative	  ease.	  However,	  once	   the	  policy	  was	   in	  operation,	  
support	  evaporated,	  whereupon	  it	  was	  subjected	  to	  extensive	  and	  sustained	  criticism.	  
8.3.1	  Media	  and	  Public	  Response	  
Immediately	  the	  CSA	  began	  operating,	  it	  received	  intensive	  media	  coverage,	  entailing	  almost	  
continual	  series,	  particularly	  amongst	  the	  broadsheets,	  of	  reports	  sparked	  by	  absent	  parents’	  stories	  
of	  hardship	  and	  destruction	  allegedly	  caused	  by	  the	  CSA.	  	  These	  included	  stories	  of	  desperate	  fathers	  
committing	  suicide	  because	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  placed	  upon	  them	  by	  the	  CSA.	  
In	  May	  1994	  The	   Times	   ran	   a	   story	  with	   the	  headline:	   ‘Agency	   blamed	   for	   'seventh	   suicide	   'which	  
stated	  that:	  	  
A	  coroner	  blamed	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  yesterday	  for	  the	  death	  of	  a	  nurse	  who	  
killed	  himself	  after	  receiving	  a	  demand	  for	  £3,000	  in	  maintenance	  arrears.	  Goolam	  
Hassen's	   body	   was	   found	   next	   to	   the	   letter	   from	   the	   CSA.	   The	   inquest	   at	  
Eastbourne	   was	   told	   that	   the	   demand	   had	   not	   been	   calculated	   properly	   and	  
should	  have	  been	  for	  £1,000.	  Mr	  Hassen	  killed	  himself	  with	  an	  overdose	  of	  drink	  
and	  drugs	  hours	  after	  telling	  his	  former	  wife	  Brenda	  in	  a	  telephone	  call	  that	  he	  had	  
received	  the	  demand	  for	  money.	  David	  Wadman,	  the	  East	  Sussex	  coroner,	  said:	  ''It	  
was	  the	  letter	  that	  proved	  the	  trigger	  that	  led	  to	  his	  death.	  It	  is	  a	  sorry	  state	  of	  
affairs.	  (The	  Times,	  18	  May,	  1994).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  The	  scope	  of	  this	  research	  which	  was	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  One	  should	  be	  reiterated,	  this	  study	  only	  assesses	  
the	   CSA	   in	   its	   first	   year	   of	   operation.	   Analysis	   is	   focused	   on	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   and	   not	   the	   Child	  
Support	   Agency	   itself.	   After	   its	   first	   year	   of	   operation	   the	   Agency	   was	   subject	   to	   so	   many	   reforms	   and	  
amendments	   that	   a	   separate	   analysis	   is	   needed.	   An	   inclusion	   of	   these	   reforms,	  whilst	   important,	  moves	   us	  
away	  from	  a	  study	  of	  the	  initial	  Act	  and	  cannot	  be	  adequately	  done	  within	  the	  restrictions	  of	  this	  thesis.	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Another	  story	   reported	  a	  suicide,	  accompanied	  by	  a	  note	  stating:	   ‘To	  Mr	  Major	  and	  the	  CSA,	   I	   say	  
thank	  you	  for	  nothing’	  was	  found	  next	  to	  the	  body	  (Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  Pay,	  1999).	  In	  February	  earlier	  
that	   year,	  The	   Independent	   published	   a	   story	   concerning	   an	   alleged	  murder	  of	   a	   parent	  with	   care	  
that	   was	   deemed	   to	   be	   the	   result	   of	   the	   Child	   Support	   Agency’s	   involvement.	   Much	   of	   media	  
reportage	  of	   the	  CSA	  was	  both	  very	  damning	  and	  sensationalist	   in	   tone.	  This	  coverage,	  with	  many	  
broadsheets	   support	   campaigns	   run	   by	   anti-­‐CSA	   groups,	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   have	   reinforced	   public	  
unease	  regarding	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency.	  	  
	   Public	   opposition,	   amongst	   those	   affected,	   towards	   the	   CSA	  was	   fierce.	  Within	  months	   of	  
opening	   it	   brought	   crowds	   onto	   the	   street,	   this	   intensified	   into	   a	   ‘hate	   campaign’	   towards	   the	  
Agency	   and	   its	   staff.	   Tactics	   employed	   by	   such	   campaigns	   included:	   nationwide	   anti-­‐CSA	  
demonstrations	   and	   protests;	   CSA	   staff	   receiving	   hate	   mail,	   death	   threats	   and	   bomb	   hoaxes;	  
frequent	   razor	   blades,	   parcels	   of	   excrement	   and	   used	   condoms	   sent	   to	   CSA	   offices;	   and	   frequent	  
verbal	  abuse.	  A	  leaflet	  circulated	  by	  the	  Campaign	  Against	  Parental	  Exploitation	  (CAPE),	  accused	  CSA	  
staff	  of	  being	  similar	  to	  ''SS	  employees''.	  Another	  anti-­‐	  CSA	  group,	  Strike	  Back,	  stated:	  
All	   CSA	   and	   DSS	   workers	   are	   targets.	   You	   can	   hit	   their	   cars,	   homes,	   personal	   lives,	  
belongings,	  and	  anyone	  involved	  with	  them.	  We	  need	  information	  on	  CSA	  officials'	  home	  
addresses,	  we	  need	  telephone	  numbers	  and	  office	  numbers.	  Also	  where	  they	  drink,	  social	  
clubs,	  etc.	  Ring	  every	  time	  you	  can	  and	  be	  totally	  insulting	  to	  everybody.	  (Quoted	  in	  The	  
Independent,	  20	  June,	  1994).	  	  
One	  CSA	  worker	  reported	  being	  spat	  upon	  and	  punched	  whilst	  at	  his	  local	  pub	  (The	  Independent,	  20	  
June,	  1994).	  This	  was	  not	  the	  response	  that	  the	  Government	  had	  anticipated.	  
8.3.2	  Political	  Response	  
	   A	  policy	  that	  received	  cross-­‐party	  support	  soon	  became	  a	  political	  minefield.	  Support	  for	  the	  
policy	   soon	  disappeared	  when	   its	   impact	  began	   to	  be	   felt.	   Shortly	   after	   the	  CSA	  began	  operating,	  
MPs	  became	  inundated	  with	  letters	  and	  phone	  calls	  from	  thousands	  of	  unsatisfied,	  angry	  individuals.	  
On	  the	  25	  November	  1993,	  only	  six	  months	  after	  the	  policy	  began	  operation,	  an	  Early	  Day	  Motion	  
was	  tabled	  by	  Labour	  MP	  Adam	  Ingrams,	  calling	  for	  the	  CSA’s	  abolition22.	  It	  read:	  
	  That	   this	   House	   regards	   the	   Child	   Support	   Act	   1991	   as	   a	   failure;	   believes	   that	   its	  
effect	  upon	  single	  mothers	  on	   Income	  Support	  and	  on	   second	   families	   is	   injurious,	  
that	   many	   women	   on	   Income	   Support	   have	   been	   left	   worse	   off	   through	   loss	   of	  
passported	  benefits	  and	  that	  single	  mothers	  have	  been	  intimidated	  to	  authorise	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Signed	  by	  49	  MPs.	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Agency	   to	   pursue	   fathers	   upon	   pain	   of	   losing	   benefits;	   further	   believes	   that	   the	  
imposition	   of	   new,	   high	   bills	   on	   fathers	   of	   second	   families	   if	   grossly	   unfair	   and	   a	  
serious	  poverty	  trap	  and	  that	  the	  overwhelming	  amount	  of	  money	  paid	  over	  to	  the	  
Treasury	   instead	   of	   to	   families	   is	   grossly	   immoral	   and	   is	   in	   fact	   a	   secret	   tax;	   and	  
therefore	   calls	   for	   the	   abolition	   of	   the	   Child	   Support	   Act	   and	   Agency	   and	   for	   a	  
simpler	   replacement	   system	   to	   be	   instituted	   which	   will	   ensure	   that	   court	  
maintenance	   orders	   are	   enforced	   and	   actually	   benefit	   women	   and	   their	   children.	  
(Early	  Day	  Motion	  1667,	  session	  1993-­‐1994,	  26	  October,	  1994)	  
	   The	  CSA	  remained	  a	  frequent	  and	  fierce	  topic	  of	  debate	  in	  the	  House.	  MPs	  raised	  concerns	  
regarding	  the	  negative	  impact	  the	  policy	  was	  having	  on	  many	  of	  their	  constituents.	  Topics	  discussed	  
included:	  	  
• inflexibility	  of	  the	  formula;	  	  
• the	  lack	  of	  a	  benefit	  disregard;	  the	  retrospective	  application;	  	  
• the	   inadequate	   ‘exempt	   income’	   (not	   including	   travel	   to	   work	   costs,	   contact	   costs,	   debt	  
repayment	  cost,	  pension	  contributions);	  	  
• the	  negative	  impact	  upon	  second	  families;	  the	  punitive	  nature	  of	  a	  benefits	  penalty;	  	  
• the	  CSA’s	  invasive	  investigation	  into	  sensitive	  issues;	  	  
• the	   pursuit	   of	   ‘soft	   targets’;	   and	   the	   failure	   to	   learn	   from	   the	   Australian	   system	   (see	   for	  
example,	   the	  debate	  held	  on	   the	  10	  February:	  HC	  Deb,	  10	  February,	  1994,	  vol	  237,	  cs483-­‐
556).	  	  
Debates	   dressed	   as	   discussions	   regarding	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   Agency,	   where	   in	   fact	   addressing	  
features	  that	  were	  imbedded	  in	  the	  policy	  itself.	  
	   As	   fierce	   and	   critical	   media	   coverage	   and	   complaints	   from	   constituents	   continued	   to	  
increase,	  a	  group	  of	  MPs	  decided	  to	  form	  the	  All	  Party	  Parliamentary	  CSA	  Monitoring	  Group23.	  The	  
group	  met	   once	   a	   fortnight	   to	   discuss	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   Agency,	   question	  Ministers	   and	  Officials	  
dealing	  with	  the	  CSA,	  exchange	  experience,	  information	  and	  knowledge	  regarding	  the	  complexity	  of	  
the	  new	  system,	  and	  to	  meet	  with	  voluntary	  organisations	  and	  experts	  to	  discuss	  the	  CSA,	  and	  wider	  
areas	  of	  Child	  Maintenance.	  Again,	  we	  need	  to	  note	  that	  the	  issues	  being	  raised	  were	  not	  regarding	  
the	   operation	   of	   the	   Agency;	   rather	   they	   were	   discussing	   the	   policy	   itself.	   These	   conversations	  
should	   have	   taken	   place	   as	   the	   Child	   Support	   Bill	   went	   through	   the	   House	   of	   Commons,	   yet	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	   The	  Group	   comprised	  of	   15	   formal	  members	   (Mildred	  Gordon,	   Sir	   Peter	   Fry,	   Liz	   Lynne,	   Jean	  Corstan,	   Ina	  
Bruce,	   Anthony	   Steen,	   Llin	   Golding,	   James	   Arbuthnot,	   Neil	   Gerrad,	   Joan	   Lester,	   Bill	   Olner,	   Grenville	   Janner,	  
Alan	  Simpson,	  Bryan	  Gould,	  and	  John	  Fraser),	  yet	  non-­‐members	  were	  free	  to	  attend	  any	  meetings.	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demonstrated	   in	  Chapter	  Six,	   the	  contribution	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  during	  this	  was	  minimal;	  
they	   did	   not	   perform	   an	   effective	   check-­‐and-­‐balance	   on	   the	   Government,	   and	   did	   not	   fulfil	   their	  
proper	  parliamentary	  duty.	  Instead,	  the	  Act	  was	  not	  seriously	  discussed	  or	  considered	  until	  the	  fall	  
out	  reached	  MPs	  constituency	  offices.	  
	   The	  operation	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  also	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  Social	  Security	  
Select	   Committee.	   	   Investigation	   into	   the	   conduct	   and	   operation	   of	   the	   Agency	   quickly	   began;	  
evidence	  was	  collected	  throughout	  November	  1993,	  and	  its	  first	  report,	  ‘The	  Operation	  of	  the	  Child	  
Support	  Act,	  First	  Report’,	  was	  published	  in	  December	  1993	  (HC69,	  1993-­‐94).	  This	  was	  soon	  followed	  
by	  a	  succession	  of	   further	   reports24.	  During	  the	  Committee’s	   first	   few	  months	  of	   investigation	   into	  
the	  Agency	  it	  received	  over	  800	  complaints	  from	  individuals	  who	  had	  encountered	  the	  CSA.	  The	  two	  
main	  issues	  highlighted	  by	  the	  report	  were	  that:	  	  
• Absent	  parents	  already	  paying	  maintenance	  were	  targeted	  by	  the	  Agency	  (HC69,	  93-­‐94,	  vi),	  
and	  
• the	  formula	  was	  resulting	  in	  inappropriate	  and	  unfair	  assessments	  (HC69,	  93-­‐94,	  vii).	  	  
Again,	  it	  should	  be	  emphasised	  that	  whilst	  the	  Report	  claimed	  to	  be	  looking	  at	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  
Agency,	  both	  these	  issues	  were	  due	  to	  the	  design	  of	  the	  policy	  itself,	  not	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  Agency	  
once	  established.	  The	  formula	  was	  drafted	  by	  the	  Government,	  and	  largely25	  approved	  by	  both	  the	  
Social	  Security	  Select	  Committee,	  and	  by	  Parliament.	  The	  order	  in	  which	  the	  Agency	  was	  to	  prioritise	  
cases,	  and	  indeed	  the	  ordering	  of	  its	  priorities,	  although	  ostensibly	  an	  operational	  matter,	  were	  also	  
decreed	   by	  Ministers,	   and	   thus	   fully	   imbedded	   into	   in	   the	   policy.	   The	   issues	   that	   the	   Committee	  
were	  discussing	  were	  again	  presented	  as	  operational	  matters,	  but	  were	   in	   fact	  policy	  matters	   that	  
could	  have	  been	  dealt	  with	  at	  pre-­‐legislative	  of	  the	  policy,	  not	  left	  to	  the	  post-­‐legislative	  scrutiny	  of	  
the	  Agency.	  
8.3.3	  The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Act	  
	   The	  negative	  impact	  of	  the	  CSA	  –	  ‘probably	  the	  most	  hated	  organ	  of	  the	  British	  state’	  (King	  
and	  Crewe,	  2013,	  89)	  -­‐	  was	  quickly	  felt	  by	  both	  the	  absent	  parent	  and	  the	  parent	  with	  care.	  As	  King	  
and	  Crewe	  assert:	   	   ‘the	  political	   fallout	   from	   the	  child-­‐maintenance	  debacle…	  was	  massive’	   (2013,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Such	  as:	  House	  of	  Commons	  Social	  Security	  Committee	  (1993).	  The	  Operation	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  First	  
Report	   –	   session	   1993/94,	   HC	   690.	   HMSO;	   House	   of	   Commons	   Social	   Security	   Committee	   (1994).	   The	  
Operation	   of	   the	   Child	   Support	   Act,	   Second	   Report.	   HMSO;	   House	   of	   Commons	   Social	   Security	   Committee	  
(1994).	  The	  Operation	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Act:	  Proposals	  for	  Change,	  Fifth	  Report	  –	  session	  1993/94,	  HC	  470.	  
HMSO;	  House	  of	   Commons	   Social	   Security	   Committee	   (1994).	   The	  Operation	  of	   the	  Child	   Support	  Act,	   First	  
Report	  –	  session	  1993/94,	  HC	  69.	  HMSO.	  
25	   ‘In	   large	   part’	   was	   included	   as	   some	   of	   the	   detail	   of	   the	   formula	   and	   the	   processes	   surrounding	   it	   were	  
‘subject	  to	  regulations’	  which	  were	  not	  included	  in	  the	  original	  Bill.	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85).	   Some	   absent	   parents	   claimed	   that	   they	   would	   be	   better	   off	   if	   they	   were	   unemployed,	   and	  
therefore	   not	   eligible	   to	   pay	  maintenance,	   while	   others	   argued	   that	   the	   higher	   rates	   which	   they	  
were	   ordered	   to	   pay	   after	   reassessment	  meant	   they	  were	   living	   below	   the	   poverty	   line.	   In	   some	  
cases	   this	   resulted	   in	   them	   having	   to	   reduce	   the	   quality	   and/or	   frequency	   of	   contact	   with	   their	  
children	  (Garnham	  and	  Knights,	  1994;	  Barnes	  et	  al,	  1999;	  Davis	  et	  al	  1998).	  This	  was	  not	  the	  fault	  of	  
the	  Agency,	  but	  instead	  a	  result	  of	  the	  formula	  that	  was	  stipulated	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury.	  	  	  
	   This	   was	   an	   issue	   that	   had	   previously	   been	   raised	   during	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   committee	  
stage	  of	  the	  Bill,	  when	  Lord	  Prys-­‐Davies	  highlighted:	  ‘The	  cost	  of	  maintaining	  contact	  with	  the	  child…	  
stand	   in	  a	  class	  of	   [their]	  own	  because	  expenditure	  can	  be	  said	   to	  be	   for	   the	  direct	  benefit	  of	   the	  
child’	   (cited	   in	   Garnham	   and	   Knights,	   1994,	   99).	   Yet	   as	   Garnham	   and	   Knights	   state:	   ‘inclusion	   of	  
travel	   costs	   for	   visits	   to	   children	  was	   proposed	   and	   rejected	   by	   the	  Government’	   (1994,	   99).	  One	  
individual	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  their	  MP	  asking	  if	  access	  costs	  would	  be	  placed	  with	  exempt	  income	  (in	  
this	   case,	   travelling	   from	  Edinburgh	   to	  Devon,	   seven	   times	   a	   year,	   costing	   approximately	   £3,000).	  
The	  letter	  also	  highlighted	  that	  if	  this	  money	  was	  to	  be	  absorbed	  into	  maintenance	  payments	  then	  
contact	  with	   the	   child	  would	   have	   to	   cease.	  A	   reply	   by	  Michael	   Jack	  MP,	   Social	   Security	  Minister,	  
stated:	  	  
	  I	  accept	  that	  in	  some	  case	  expenses	  can	  genuinely	  be	  heavy,	  but	  the	  issue	  is	  whether	  
it	   would	   be	   right	   to	   give	   them	   precedence	   over	   the	   Child’s	   right	   to	   basic	  
maintenance.	   It	   is	   important	   to	  get	   the	  balance	   right	  between	  the	   interests	  of	   the	  
child	  and	  the	  parents.	  (Copy	  of	  letter	  sent	  to	  CPAG,	  quoted	  in	  Garnham	  and	  Knights,	  
1995,	  46).	  
Some	  sympathy,	  or	  understanding,	  would	  be	  held	  regarding	  Michael	  Jack’s	  reply	  if	  maintenance	  was	  
not	  deducted	  pound	   for	  pound	   from	   the	  parent	  with	   care’s	   Income	   support,	   leaving	   the	   child	  not	  
only	  with	  no	   financial	  gain	  but	  now	  with	   the	  hardship	  of	  not	  being	  able	   to	   see	   the	  absent	  parent.	  
This	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  CSA’s	  formula	  did	  not	  only	  yielded	  a	  financial	  loss	  for	  the	  absent	  parent,	  
it	  also	  harboured	  the	  potential	  to	  impact	  both	  emotionally	  and	  socially	  on	  the	  children,	  given	  that	  it	  
might	  stop	  them	  from	  seeing	  both	  parents	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  
	   The	  financial	  impact	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  absent	  parents.	  Many	  parents	  with	  care	  reported	  
being	  at	  a	  financial	  loss	  due	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency.	  For	  some,	  the	  loss	  came	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  maintenance	  taking	  them	  just	  above	  Income	  Support	  levels	  which	  meant	  that	  they	  lost	  
‘passported’	   benefits	   such	   as	   free	   school	   meals,	   free	   prescriptions,	   and	   free	   dental	   treatment.	  
Others	  claimed	  that	  due	  to	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  which	  absent	  parents	  were	  formally	  required	  to	  
pay,	   they	   were	   no	   longer	   willing	   or	   able	   to	   provide	   informal	   financial	   support	   (such	   as	   buying	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clothes,	  or	  paying	  for	  school	  trips)	  as	  they	  had	  done	  in	  the	  past.	  Therefore	  reassessments	  under	  the	  
CSA	   led	   to	   cases	   whereby	   parents	   with	   care	   were,	   not	   only	   having	   their	   maintenance	   deducted	  
pound	   for	   pound	   from	   their	   Income	   Support	   but	   also	   losing	   informal	   financial	   support	   from	   the	  
absent	  parent.	  	  	  
8.4	  Policy	  Design	  Failure,	  Not	  Implementation	  Failure	  	  
	  Given	   that	   child	   support	   policy	   has	   become	   notorious,	   there	   has	   been	   much	  
speculation	  as	  to	  which	  elements	  were	  most	  to	  blame.	  Whether	  the	  policy	  principle	  
itself	  was	  unpopular	  and,	  therefore,	  not	  a	  good	  idea,	  whether	  it	  was	  a	  good	  idea	  but	  
suffered	   faulty	   construction	   and	   bad	   timing,	   and	   consequent	   unpopularity,	   or	  
whether	   the	   problems	   lay	   neither	   in	   ideas	   not	   construction	   but	   implementation.	  
(Barnes	  et	  al,	  1999,	  27).	  
	  
Our	  study	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  process	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  provides	  an	  answer	  to	  Barnes	  
et	  al’s	  question:	   the	  policy	  that	  posed	   itself	  as	   ‘putting	  children	  first’	  was	  a	  bad	   idea	  that	  suffered	  
faulty	  construction.	  The	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  was	  beset	  with	  significant	  problems	  from	  the	  outset.	  
As	  Peter	  Lilley,	  Newton’s	  successor	  as	  Secretary	  for	  State	  for	  Department	  of	  Social	  Security,	  stated,	  
when	   questioned	   about	   entering	   the	   Department	   about	   to	   launch	   the	   Child	   Support	   Agency:	   ‘I	  
realised	   it	   was	   going	   to	   lead	   to	   problems,	   immense	   problems…	   I	   expected	   outrage’	   (Peter	   Lilley,	  
Interviewed	  by	  author,	  11	  July	  2011).	  Lilley	  was	  so	  aware	  of	  the	  level	  of	  problems	  that	  were	  going	  to	  
arise	   from	   the	   CSA	   that,	   when	   he	   entered	   the	   DSS	   he	   invited	   back	   bench	  MPs	   into	   his	   office,	   in	  
groups	  of	  ten,	  and	  gave	  them	  presentations	  on	  the	  CSA,	  briefing	  them	  about	  the	  potential	  problems	  
that	  might	  arise	  (Peter	  Lilley,	  Interviewed	  by	  author,	  11	  July	  2011).	  As	  demonstrated	  in	  Chapter	  Six,	  
the	  problems	  were	  foreseeable	  and	  foreseen,	  but	  ignored	  by	  policy-­‐makers.	  It	  was	  only	  when	  these	  
foreseen	  problems	  went	  through	  implementation	  and	  into	  operation	  that	  they	  became	  a	  reality	  that	  
could	   no	   longer	   be	   ignored.	   As	   Lilley	  went	   on	   to	   reveal	   thing	   only	   began	   to	   ‘stir	   up	   on	   the	   back-­‐
benches’	  in	  the	  October:	  	  
	  It	  was	   only	  when	   people	   began	   to	   get	   demands,	   or	   get	   repeat	   demands	   because	  
they	   had	   not	   paid…	   [that]	   people	   started	   to	   go	   to	   their	  MPs	   to	   complain,	   by	   this	  
time	  the	  MPs	  had	  forgotten	  that	  they	  had	  said	  “yes	  we	  are	  right	  behind	  you,	  we	  will	  
support	   this	   through	   thick	   and	   thin”,	   but	   instead	   panic	   struck	   amongst	   the	  
backbenches	  and	  they	   forgot	  the	  commitment	  they	  once	  made	  to	  support	   the	  Bill.	  
(Peter	  Lilley	  Interviewed	  by	  author,	  11	  July	  2011).	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Given	   Lilley’s	   awareness	   of	   the	   scale	   of	   the	   problems	   that	   the	   CSA	  was	   likely	   to	   endure,	   it	   raises	  
questions	  as	  to	  why	  Lilley	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  reverse	  the	  policy.	  The	  full	  reason	  as	  to	  why	  Lilley	  did	  
not	  take	  such	  action	  is	  unknown.	  When	  asked	  whether	  abolition	  was	  discussed,	  Lilley	  replied:	  	  
It	  wasn’t	  practical!	  I	  did,	  after	  a	  while,	  have	  a	  sort	  of	  inquest	  into	  how	  this	  policy…	  
had	   come	  about,	   in	  particular	  why,	  because	   there	  was	  an	  existing	   system	  dealing	  
with	   this...	   It	   actually	   emerged	   that	   that	   old	   system	   was	   actually	   raising	   more	  
money	  than	  the	  CSA.	  But	  it	  didn’t	  take	  longer	  than	  half	  an	  hour	  to	  work	  out	  that	  you	  
can’t	   go	  back	   to	   it…	   if	   you	   could	   re-­‐run	   the	   video,	  as	   they	   say,	   then	   I	  would	  have	  
started	  on	  the	  old	  system	  and	  built	  on	  it.	  (Peter	  Lilley	  Interviewed	  by	  author,	  11	  July	  
2011).	  
	  
This	  raises	  further	  questions	  as	  to	  why	  it	  was	  deemed	  impractical.	  Was	  the	  policy	  perceived	  as	  too	  
far	  developed	   to	  be	  altered	   (be	   it	   for	  political	  or	  economic	   reasons),	  or	  was	   it	   again	  a	   case	  of	   the	  
Treasury	  imposing	  financial	  priorities?	  	  In	  either	  case,	  Lilley	  pursued	  a	  policy	  whereby	  even	  before	  it	  
was	  implemented,	  he	  was	  aware	  was	  prescribed	  to	  fail.	  	  	  
	  
	   The	  Agency	  was	  unfairly	  criticised	  because	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  formula	  and	  the	  impact	  
the	  policy	  had	  upon	  families,	  but	  this	  was	  a	  fault	  with	  the	  original	  design	  of	  the	  policy,	  and	  not	  with	  
the	   administration	   of	   the	   Agency.	   The	   Agency	   was	   indeed	   guilty	   of	   poor	   administration,	   and	  
operational	   problems	   were	   evident,	   but	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   problems	   were	   the	   results	   of	   the	  
Government’s	  incompetent	  policy	  making,	  not	  the	  Agency’s	  inefficiency.	  As	  King	  and	  Crewe	  state:	  
	  
The	  persistent	  maladministration	  of	  the	  new	  policy	  revealed	  a	  myriad	  defects	  in	  the	  
policy	  itself.	  Many	  of	  the	  accusations	  levelled	  at	  the	  agency	  should	  in	  fairness	  have	  
been	  levelled	  at	  whomever	  had	  devised	  the	  policy.	  (2013,	  89).	  	  
	  
Instead,	   accusations	  were	   largely	  misplaced	   and	   blame	  was	  wrongly	   apportioned,	   not	   just	   by	   the	  
media	   and	   the	   public,	   but	   also	   by	   back-­‐bench	   MPs,	   and	   Government	   itself.	   Accountability	   was	  
misplaced	  and	  blame	  was	  diverted.	  Ros	  Hepplewhite	  was	  ascribed	  the	  task	  of	  implementing	  a	  policy	  
that	   was	   inherently	   deficient	   and	   already	   doomed	   to	   failure.	   As	   King	   and	   Crewe	   excellently	  
summarise:	   ‘Administrators	  who	  were	  geniuses	  could	  not	  possibly	  have	  made	  the	  new	  policy	  work,	  
and	   the	   great	   majority	   of	   administrators	   who	   vainly	   tried	   to	   make	   it	   work	   were	   anything	   but	  




8.5	  The	  Roots	  to	  Failure	  
	   Above	  claimed	  that	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  problems	  suffered	  by	  the	  CSA,	  and	  the	  reasons	  behind	  
the	  policy’s	  failure	  were	  not	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  policy	  was	  implemented,	  but	  
were	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  poorly	  designed	  policy.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  look	  at	  the	  roots	  to	  this	  
failure	  that	  were	  embedded	  in	  its	  design.	  
8.5.1	  Unattainable	  Targets	  and	  an	  Operational	  Disconnect	  	  
	   The	   targets	   that	   were	   set	   for	   the	   CSA	   were	   decided	   by	   both	   the	   Department	   of	   Social	  
Security	  and	  the	  Treasury	  (Peter	  Lilley,	  Interviewed	  by	  author,	  11	  July	  2011).	  However	  these	  targets	  
were	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  unrealistic.	  As	  Alistair	  Burt,	  Minister	  for	  Social	  Security	  1992-­‐1997,	  stated:	  
‘for	   the	   CSA	   to	   reach	   their	   targets	   they	   would	   have	   had	   to	   perform	   better	   than	   any	   Agency	   in	  
existence,	   anywhere	   in	   the	  world’	   (Can’t	   Pay,	  Won’t	   Pay,	   1999).	   The	   targets	  were	   unrealistic	   and	  
arbitrary	   and	   attempts	   to	   reach	   them,	   combined	  with	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   formula,	   led	   to	  wide	  
spread	   error.	   As	   Davis	   et	   al	   state,	   ‘…their	   workload	  was	   excessive.	   To	   the	   degree	   that	   they	   could	  
never	  get	  on	  top	  of	  their	  cases…’	  (1999,	  65).	  One	  Child	  Support	  Officer	  stated:	  	  
	  We	  could	  see	  there	  were	  going	  to	  be	  major	  problems	  [when	  we	  started]	  and	  I	  don’t	  
know	  why	  they	  weren’t	   foreseen	  at	  the	  drafting	  stage.	   It	   just	  hadn’t	  been	  thought	  
out	  properly…	  if	  they	  had	  started	  off	  slowly,	  given	  us	  more	  time	  to	  get	  on	  our	  feet,	  
sort	   out	   everything	  we	  were	   doing,	   rather	   than	   taking	   on	   a	   huge	   deluge	   of	   cases	  
which	  we	  can’t	  handle…’	  (Child	  Support	  Officer,	  Dudley,	  quoted	  in	  Davis	  et	  al,	  1991,	  
65).	  	  
The	   targets	   also	   pushed	   the	   Agency	   towards	   pursing	   ‘easy	   targets’.	   The	   infamous	   internal	   CSA	  
memorandum	  written	   by	   Dave	  Moody,	   divisional	  manager	   of	   the	   CSA	   for	  Wales	   and	  Merseyside,	  
which	  was	  leaked	  to	  The	  Guardian	  on	  the	  13th	  September	  1993,	  demonstrated	  that	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  
their	   targets,	   the	   Agency	   would	   have	   to	   pursue	   those	   absent	   fathers	   who	   were	   easily	   traceable,	  
already	  paying	  maintenance,	  and	  who	  could	  be	  required	  to	  pay	  more.	  The	  Memo	  stated:	  ‘The	  name	  
of	   the	   game	   is	   maximising	   the	   maintenance	   yield	   –	   don’t	   waste	   a	   lot	   of	   time	   on	   non-­‐profitable	  
stuff!’.	  This	   saw	  the	  CSA	  pursuing	   those	  who	  were	  already	   fulfilling	   their	   financial	   responsibility	   to	  
their	   children	   from	   former	   relationships.	   This	   went	   against	   the	   portrayed	   purpose	   of	   the	   policy,	  
which	  was	   to	   track	   down	   absent	   parents	  who	  were	   deemed	   to	   be	   feckless	   and	   irresponsible	   and	  
make	   them	   pay.	   However	   as	   stated	   in	   Chapter	   Three,	   and	   have	   demonstrated	   in	   subsequent	  
chapters,	   this	   was	   not	   the	   true	   motivation	   behind	   the	   policy.	   Feckless	   fathers	   were	   simply	   the	  
portrayed	  problem	  to	  legitimise	  the	  policy;	  the	  core	  objective	  pursued	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury,	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and	  hidden	  under	  this	  portrayed	  problem,	  was	  expenditure	  savings.	  The	  targets	  clearly	  showed	  that	  
‘children	  did	  not	  come	  first’,	  instead	  the	  Treasury’s	  goal	  was	  dominant.	  	  
	   The	  targets	  were	  unrealistic,	  unattainable,	  damaging,	  and	  undermined	  by	  the	  prioritisation	  
of	  economic	  over	  social	  objectives.	  Therefore	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  CSA	  was	  unfairly	  assessed,	  not	  
only	  because	   the	  performance	   indicators	  were	  naïve	   (they	   could	  not	   realistically	   be	  met)	   but	   also	  
because	   the	   targets	   revealed	   the	   true	  motivation	  behind	   the	  policy,	  and	  deprive	   the	  Agency	  of	   its	  
public	   legitimacy.	   In	   order	   to	   meet	   its	   targets,	   and	   yield	   the	   expenditure	   savings	   sought	   by	   the	  
Treasury,	  the	  CSA	  was	  required	  to	  target	  ‘good,	  middle-­‐class	  men’.	  ‘The	  unrealistic	  targets	  forced	  the	  
Agency	   to	   focus	   on	   quantity	   rather	   than	   quality’	   (The	  Guardian,	   5	   July,	   1994).	   This	   focus	   on	   ‘soft	  
target’	  and	  ‘quick	  gains’	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  portrayed	  moral	  drive	  was	  in	  fact	  window	  dressing.	  
The	  memo	  demonstrated	   that	   the	   imperative	  was	   to	   yield	   financial	   gain,	   and	   as	   a	   result	   void	   the	  
policy	  of	  its	  social	  and	  moral	  legitimacy,	  or	  more	  in	  keeping	  with	  what	  we	  have	  argued	  throughout	  
this	  thesis,	  unmasked	  the	  true	  motives,	  and	  the	  moral	  shield,	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  As	  shown	  elsewhere	  in	  
this	   thesis,	   ‘the	  basis	   in	  which	   it	  was	  sold	  to	  the	  public	  was	  seriously	  misleading’	   (King	  and	  Crewe,	  
2013,	  261),	  and	  when	  the	  CSA	  came	  into	  operation,	  this	  become	  increasingly	  apparent.	  	  
	   The	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   also	   suffered	   because	   policy	   makers	   failed	   to	   heed	   advice	  
regarding	   the	   design	   of	   the	   policy	   from	   those	   who	   had	   direct	   experience	   of	   collecting	   child	  
maintenance,	  e.g.	  Liable	  Relatives	  Officers	  in	  DSS	  offices.	  As	  King	  and	  Crewe	  highlight:	  	  
	  Even	   within	   the	   Department,	   little	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   paid	   to	   the	   accumulated	  
wisdom	  of	  the	  ground-­‐level	  civil	  servants	  who	  had,	  under	  the	  existing	  arrangements,	  
spent	  many	  years	   trying	  to	  extract	  maintenance	  payments	   from	  absent	  parents.	   If	  
anyone	  had	  been	  listening	  to	  them,	  they	  would	  have	  had	  many	  a	  tale	  to	  tell.’	  (King,	  
2013,	  261).	  	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  policy	  that	  was	  created	  suffered	  from	  an	  operational	  disconnect,	  what	  the	  design	  of	  
the	  policy	  stipulated,	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  when	  in	  operation.	  
	   It	  can	  also	  be	  suggested	  that	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  was	  inappropriately	  and	  inadequately	  
resourced,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  being	  administered	  through	  the	  DSS	  rather	  than	  the	  Inland	  Revenue.	  
As	  demonstrated	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  there	  was	  an	  imbalance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  Core	  Executive	  which	  led	  
to	   the	   Treasury	   dictating	   elements	   the	   policy.	   Not	   only	   did	   the	   Treasury	   insert	   elements	   into	   the	  
policy	  which	  effectively	  transformed	  the	  policy’s	  objectives,	  it	  also	  had	  a	  detrimental	  impact	  on	  how	  
the	  policy	  was	  administered.	  The	   issue	  of	  who	   should	  be	  politically	   responsible	   for	   the	  CSA	   led	   to	  
inter-­‐departmental	  conflict	  between	  the	  DSS	  and	  the	  Inland	  Revenue	  (part	  of	  the	  Treasury).	  The	  CSA	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would	   have	   been	  more	   effectively	   administered	   through	   the	   Inland	   Revenue,	   for	   it	   held	   both	   the	  
expertise	  and	  the	   level	  of	  authority	  successfully	   to	  administer	   the	  policy.	  Yet,	   the	  CSA	  became	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  the	  DSS	  instead,	  because	  the	  Treasury,	  through	  the	  Inland	  Revenue,	  did	  not	  want	  to	  
take	  responsibility	   for	  an	   institution	  that	   it	  predicted	  would	  have	  problems.	  While	  the	  DSS	  wanted	  
the	   CSA	   to	   operate	   through	   the	   Inland	   Revenue,	   as	   they	   attempted	   to	   base	   their	   policy	   on	   the	  
success	  of	  the	  Australian	  system,	  the	  Treasury	  looked	  at	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  own	  interests	  rather	  than	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  policy.	  The	  Treasury	  was	  aware	  that	  the	  DSS	  were	  not	  suited	  to	  administer	  the	  CSA;	  
as	  Peter	  Lilley	  confessed	   ‘it	  wasn’t	   their	  area	  of	  expertise,’	   (Peter	  Lilley,	   Interviewed	  by	  author,	  11	  
July	   2011),	   yet	   the	   Treasury’s	   desire	   to	   keep	   a	   problematic	   policy	   at	   arm’s	   length	   prevailed.	   The	  
Treasury’s	   desire	   to	   shift	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   policy	   onto	   the	   DSS	   took	   precedence	   over	   the	  
appropriate	  resourcing	  and	  success	  of	  the	  policy.	  Therefore	  the	  policy	  could	  have	  operated	  through	  
the	   Inland	   Revenue,	   as	   did	   the	   Australian	   system,	   but	   the	   decision	   was	   made	   for	   it	   to	   be	  
implemented	   through	   the	   DSS.	   As	   we	   stated	   in	   Chapter	   Seven,	   the	   person/body	   which	   gets	   to	  
implement	  the	  policy	   is	  at	   the	  decision	  of	  policy	  makers.	  Part	  of	  effecting	  policy-­‐making	  should	  be	  
assessing,	   and	   then	   assigning,	   the	   most	   appropriate	   body.	   As	   Pressman	   and	   Wildavsky’s	   study	  
highlighted,	  ‘failure	  was	  not	  only	  caused	  by	  bad	  implementation	  but	  also	  by	  bad	  policy	  instruments.	  
Many	  of	  the	  problems	  in	  Oakland	  would	  have	  been	  avoided’	  (Winter,	  2007,	  132).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  bad	  policy	  instruments	  were	  assigned.	  	  
	  
8.5.2	  Unclear/Inappropriate	  Lines	  of	  Accountability	  
	   As	  stated	  in	  the	  previous	  Chapter,	  the	  introduction	  of	  ‘next-­‐steps’	  agencies	  not	  only	  altered	  
the	  manner	   in	   which	   policies	   were	   implemented	   and	   delivered,	   but	   it	   also	   altered	   the	   nature	   of	  
ministerial	   responsibility	   and	   accountability.	   As	   Pyper	   notes,	   ‘The	   CSA	   is	   a	   product	   of	   the	   1990s	  
public	   accountability	   culture	   as	   well	   as	   part	   of	   an	   experiment	   in	   ‘arm’s	   length’	   service	   delivery’	  
(1995,	   142).	   As	   next-­‐steps	   agencies	   become	   operational,	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   some	   agency	   Chief	  
Executives	  were	  attracting	  relatively	  high-­‐level	  public	  and	  media	  profiles,	  and	  as	  such	  were	  held	  to	  
be	   accountable	   for	   the	   conduct	   of	   their	   agencies	   (Pyper,	   1995,	   142).	   Ros	   Hepplewhite,	   the	   Chief	  
Executive	  of	  the	  CSA,	  was	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  this.	  Hepplewhite	  found	  herself	  the	  antithesis	  of	  the	  
‘unaccountable’,	   ‘anonymous’,	   ‘untouchable’	   Civil	   Servant,	   and	   instead	   faced	   with	   frequent	  
parliamentary	  inquires	  and	  media	  attention	  became	  the	  public	  face	  of	  a	  policy	  disaster.	  	  Whilst	  Chief	  
Executive,	   she	   was	   blamed	   for	   the	   suicides	   of	   seven	   men,	   and	   the	   murder	   of	   one	   woman.	  
Throughout	   the	   country,	   campaigners	   displayed	   ''Wanted''	   posters	   describing	   Hepplewhite,	   a	   civil	  
servant,	   as	   a	   Myra	   Hindley	   figure:	   ''Guilty	   of	   the	   Torture	   of	   Innocents''	   and	   ''Crimes	   Against	  
Humanity''	  (The	  Independent,	  20	  June,	  1994).	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   During	   her	   time	   as	   Chief	   Executive,	   Hepplewhite	   frequently	   attempted	   to	   differentiate	  
between	  her	   responsibility	   to	   account	   for	   the	  management	   and	  operation	  of	   the	   agency,	   and	   the	  
accountability	   of	   ministers	   for	   the	   policy	   and	   legal	   framework	   with	   which	   the	   Agency	   operated	  
(Pyper,	  1995,	  142).	  However,	  MPs	  and	   the	  Social	   Security	  Select	  Committee	   frequently	   seemed	   to	  
blur	   the	   lines	   of	   accountability	   by	   confusing	   policy	   details	  with	   operational	  matters.	   For	   example,	  
Hepplewhite,	  her	  successor	  Ann	  Chant,	  and	  also	  other	  senior	  civil	  servants,	  were	  frequently	  asked	  to	  
justify	   elements	   surrounding	   the	   formula,	   only	   to	   be	   left	   to	   explain	   that	   it	   was	   created	   by	   the	  
Government	  and	  agreed	  by	  Parliament,	  before	  the	  Agency	  was	  established.	  Yet	  her	  attempts	  were	  
fruitless,	   and	  blame	   continued	   to	   be	   levelled	   upon	  her.	   Public	   blame	   aimed	   towards	  Hepplewhite	  
reached	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  she	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  engage	   in	   ‘sofa	  diplomacy’,	  undertaking	  day-­‐time	  
Television	   interviews	  whereby	  she	  was	   frequently	  challenged	  on	  matters	   that	  were	  a	   result	  of	   the	  
legislation,	  rather	  than	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  policy.	  The	  use	  of	  ‘next-­‐steps’	  agencies	  had	  blurred	  the	  
lines	  of	  accountability,	  providing	  a	  screen	  for	  the	  Government	  to	  hide	  behind.	  When	  it	  became	  clear	  
that	   the	   CSA	   had	   failed	   to	   achieve	   its	   key	   targets,	   and	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   revelations	   that	   a	   team	   of	  
management	  consultants	  had	  been	  called	  in	  to	  review	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Agency,	  Hepplewhite	  
resigned	  in	  September	  1994.	  	  
8.5.3	  Unrealistic	  Time-­‐frames	  Allotted,	  and	  Inadequate	  and	  Inappropriate	  Resources	  Assigned	  
	   As	   we	   highlighted	   in	   our	   legislative	   chapter,	   the	   speed	   and	   haste	   with	   which	   the	   Child	  
Support	   Bill	   passed	   through	   Parliament	   was	   astonishing.	   As	   King	   and	   Crewe	   rightly	   stated	   when	  
discussing	   the	   CSA,	   ‘the	   Treasury	  was…	   in	   a	   hurry’	  with	   elements	   discussed	   ‘at	   breakneck	   speed’.	  
(2013,	   83).	   This	   speed	   continued	   into	   its	   operation.	   Just	   as	   haste	   contributed	   towards	   ineffective	  
parliamentary	   scrutiny,	   the	   unrealistic	   time-­‐frames	   imposed	   upon	   the	   Agency	   further	   steered	   it	  
towards	  failure.	  	  As	  Hill	  observes,	  ‘The	  CSA	  ran	  into	  considerable	  difficulties,	  primarily	  because	  of	  the	  
haste	   with	   which	   the	   government	   expected	   it	   to	   introduce	   the	   scheme	   and	   the	   deliver	   results.’	  
(1999,	   172).	   However,	   this	   was	   not	   something	   that	   only	   became	   apparent	   hindsight,	   Sir	   Michael	  
Partridge,	  the	  Senior	  Civil	  Servant,	  who	  had	  taken	  responsibility	  for	  devising	  the	  policy,	  had	  realised	  
this	  at	  the	  time.	  As	  Partridge	  stated:	  	  
I	  myself	  wasn’t	   very	   keen	   to	   tackle	   this	  because	   I	   could	   see	   it	  was	  going	   to	  be	  an	  
enormous	  task…	  it	  was	  a	  very	  tight	  time	  scale,	  which	  ideally	  should	  have	  been	  about	  
a	   year	   longer	   to	  get	   all	   the	   staff	   trained	  and	   the	   IT	   system	   fully	   tested	  before	  we	  
went	  live	  (Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  Pay,	  1999).	  
	   The	   Treasury	   gave	   the	   Department	   of	   Social	   Security	   less	   than	   a	   year	   to	   appoint	   a	   Chief	  
Executive,	   assign	   seniors	   managers,	   recruit	   and	   train	   5,000	   staff,	   and	   design	   and	   install	   a	   highly	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complex	  computer	  system	  (King	  and	  Crewe,	  2013,	  84).	  The	  Agency	  began	  operation	  on	  the	  5	  April	  
1993	  but	  the	  training	  of	  its	  5,000	  staff	  did	  not	  start	  until	  early	  that	  year,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  was	  not	  
complete	  until	  after	  the	  Agency	  was	  operational	  (Garnham	  and	  Knights,	  1994,	  55).	  Field	  staff	  (those	  
acting	  as	  the	  local	  contact	  point	  for	  the	  client,	  undertaking	  sensitive	  client	  interviews,	  and	  gathering	  
information	  which	  cannot	  be	  conducted	  via	  post	  of	  telephone)	  only	  had	  three	  or	  four	  weeks	  training,	  
including	   just	   one	   week	   training	   on	   interviewing	   skills.	   	   This	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   insufficient	   training,	  
especially	   since	  most	   of	   the	   staff	   had	  been	   recruited	   from	  outside	  of	   the	   civil	   service	   and	  had	  no	  
prior	  experience	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  type	  of	  work	  they	  were	  being	  asked	  to	  undertake.	  This	  had	  been	  
a	   deliberate	   strategy.	   Instead	   of	   re-­‐training	   Liable	   Relative	   Officers,	   who	   had	   vast	   experience	   of	  
dealing	   with	   child	   maintenance,	   the	   decision	   was	   made	   to	   ‘have	   a	   fresh	   start’	   to	   foster	   a	   new	  
attitude	   towards	  maintenance	   collection.	  However	  many	   of	   the	   new	   recruits	  were	   straight	   out	   of	  
school	  and	  in	  their	  first	  job.	  They	  were	  ill-­‐equipped,	  too	  inexperienced,	  and	  lacked	  the	  confidence	  to	  
manage	  the	  demands	  placed	  upon	  them,26	  such	  as	  speaking	  to	  angry	  or	  distressed	  parents	  regarding	  
highly	   emotive	   issues	   (Davis	   et	   al,	   1999,	   64).	   Some	   Field	   Officers	   within	   the	   Agency	   were	   highly	  
critical	   of	   the	  Agency’s	   approach	   to	   recruitment.	   As	   one	   Field	  Officer	   noted:	   ‘They	   took	   on	   brand	  
new	  staff	   into	  new	  centres,	   they	  were	   inexperienced	  with	  casework	  and	  they	  were	  almost	  all	  very	  
young.’	  (Field	  Officer,	  Bristol,	  quoted	  in	  Davis	  et	  al,	  1993,	  64).	  	  
	   Ironically	  the	  combination	  of	  new	  staff,	  new	  Agency,	  new	  legislation,	  and	  new	  environment	  
proved	   a	   difficult	   one,	   and	   resulted	   in	   Liable	   Relative	   Officers	   being	   called	   in	   to	   help	   clear	   the	  
substantial	  backlog	  of	  cases	  after	  just	  six	  months	  (Barnes	  et	  al,	  1999,	  18).	  The	  unrealistic	  time	  frames	  
which	  meant	   that	   Agency	   staff	  were	   not	   adequately	   trained,	   can	   also	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   Agency	   not	  
having	   the	   adequate	   resources	   to	   operate.	  One	  of	   the	   reasons	  why	   the	  Agency	   failed	   to	  meet	   its	  
customer	  service	  target	  was	  due	  to	  its	  inadequately	  trained	  and	  inexperienced	  staff.	  The	  Agency	  did	  
not	  have	  the	  resource	  of	  ‘sufficiently	  trained	  staff’	  due	  to	  the	  inflexible	  recruitment	  time-­‐frame.	  
	   Not	   only	  was	   the	   time-­‐frame	   for	   setting	   up	   the	  Agency	   detrimental	   to	   the	   policy,	   but	   the	  
time-­‐frame	  within	  which	  CSA	  staff	  were	  expected	  to	  process	  cases	  was	  also	  unrealistic.	  This	  issue	  of	  
inadequate	   time-­‐frames	   also	   feeds	   into	   the	   problem	   of	   setting	   inappropriate	   targets;	   both	   are	  
closely	  connected	  but	  warrant	  separate	  discussion.	  Staff	  were	  given	  between	  six	  and	  twelve	  weeks	  
to	  process	  cases.	  Figures	  for	  its	  first	  year	  in	  operation	  showed	  that	  it	  was	  taking	  an	  average	  of	  seven	  
weeks	   just	   to	   complete	   the	   final	   stages	   of	   the	   process	   (Garnham	   and	   Knights,	   1994,	   60).	   As	   we	  
highlighted	  above,	  clearance	  rates	  were	  poor,	  there	  were	  a	  high	  number	  of	  outstanding	  cases,	  and	  
enquires	  were	  not	  met	  within	  the	  targeted	  time-­‐frame.	  Whilst	  we	  do	  acknowledge	  other	  issues,	  such	  
as	  problems	  with	  the	  computer	  system,	  we	  can	  argue	  that	  these	  ‘poor	  clearance	  rates’	  were	  a	  result	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  This	  was	  highlighted	  by	  the	  Agency	  staff	  that	  was	  interviewed	  by	  Davis	  et	  al	  (1999).	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of	   inappropriate	   performance	   indicators	   and	   an	   unrealistic	   time	   frame.	   The	   low	   accuracy	   rates,	  
which	  we	   highlighted	   above,	   can	   also	   be	   attributed	   to	   both	   inadequate	   resources	   (staff	  were	   not	  
sufficiently	  trained)	  and	  impractical	  time-­‐frames	  (undertrained	  staff	  were	  forced	  to	  processes	  cases	  
too	   quickly).	   These	   impractical	   and	   damaging	   timeframes	   which	   the	   Agency	   could	   not	   meet	  
appeared	   to	   be	   an	   operational	   failing,	   but	   in	   reality	   they	   were	   once	   again	   issues	   relating	   to	   the	  
creation	  of	  the	  policy,	  and	  beyond	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Agency.	  	  	  
8.5.4	  Lack	  of	  Trial	  or	  Simulation	  Runs	  
	   The	   complex	   and	   ambitious	   proposals	   set	   out	   in	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   would	   have	  
substantially	  benefitted	  from	  a	  pilot	  run,	   though	  as	  King	  and	  Crewe	  state,	   there	  was	   ‘no	  testing	  of	  
the	  proposition’	  (2013,	  85).	  Piloting	  or	  simulation	  runs	  would	  have	  highlighted	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  
IT	  system,	  the	  difficulties	  of	  applying	  the	  formula,	  insufficient	  training	  of	  staff,	  and	  the	  naivety	  of	  the	  
targeted	   time	   it	  would	   take	   to	   process	   a	   case.	   Isolated	  pilot	   runs	  might	   have	   also	   highlighted	   the	  
degree	   of	   opposition	   and	   public	   unrest	   that	   the	   policy	  was	   likely	   to	   attract.	   Ombudsman	   Reports	  
documenting	  investigations	  into	  complaints	  received	  by	  the	  public	  regarding	  the	  maladministration	  
of	  the	  Agency	  concluded	  that:	  
	   	  Maladministration	   leading	   to	   injustice	   is	   likely	   to	  arise	  when	  a	  new	  administrative	  
task	   is	   not	   tested	   first	   by	   a	   pilot	   project,	   when	   new	   staff,	   perhaps	   inadequately	  
trained,	   form	   a	   substantial	   part	   of	   the	   workforce	   –	   where	   procedures	   and	  
technology	   supporting	   them	   are	   untired	   –	   and	   where	   quality	   of	   service	   is	  
subordinated	   to	   sheet	   throughput.	   (Parliamentary	   Commissioner	   for	  
Administration,	   Third	   Report,	   1995-­‐1996,	   Investigation	   of	   Complaints	   Against	   the	  
Child	  Support	  Agency,	  1996,	  p.iii,	  para	  5.)	  	  
If	  piloting	  had	  been	  undertaken,	   then	  the	  problems	  which	  many	  predicted	  at	   the	  consultation	  and	  
parliamentary	   stage	  would	   happen	   could	   have	   been	   identified	   thus	   limiting	   the	   potential	   fall-­‐out,	  
and	   there	   would	   have	   been	   sufficient	   time	   to	   alter	   the	   policy	   accordingly.	   	   However	   the	   strict	  
timeframe	  and	  a	  motivation	  of	  yielding	  financial	  gain	  did	  not	  permit	  this	  valuable	  procedure.	  	  
8.5.5	  Ineffective	  Parliament	  	  
	   The	  issue	  of	  an	  ‘ineffective	  parliament’	  was	  discussed	  in	  great	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Six,	  therefore	  
to	   avoid	   repetition	   this	   section	  will	   only	   outline	   the	   issue.	   Speaking	   after	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  
Child	  Support	  Act,	  and	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  many	  acknowledged	  the	  Parliament’s	  failure	  to	  
undertake	  effective	  scrutiny.	  As	  one	  MP	  acknowledged:	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  ‘Our	  scrutiny	  process	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  was	  defective.	  Many	  of	  us	  
simply	  did	  not	  realise	  what	  was	  to	  follow	  implementation…	  we	  did	  not	  realise	  how	  
drastic	   the	   change	   would	   be’	   (Alan	   Hazelhurst,	   MP,	   February,	   1994,	   quoted	   in	  
Garnham	  and	  Knights,	  1994,	  101).	  
Similarly,	  a	  key	  player	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  CSA	  arrived	  at:	  
	   	  ‘Looking	   back	   on	   the	   course	   of	   parliamentary	   proceedings,	   I	   can	   say	   that	   the	   Bill	  
was	   not	   adequately	   debated	   by	  MPs.	   There	   had	   been	  much	   lobbying	   by	   pressure	  
groups	  but	  amazingly	   large	   silence	   from	  MPs	  of	   all	   parties…	   just	   read	  Hansard	   to	  
see	  how	  sparse	  were	  the	  comments	  in	  the	  House’.	  (Quoted	  in	  Garnham	  and	  Knights,	  
1995,	  27).	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  and	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency,	  Parliament	  –	  
and	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  in	  particular	  –	  failed	  to	  undertake	  its	  duty	  (King	  and	  Crewe,	  2013,	  361).	  
The	  House	  of	  Commons	  needs	  to	  accept	  its	  role	  in	  the	  policy’s	  failure;	  it	  did	  not	  create	  the	  policy,	  yet	  
neither	   did	   it	   undertake	   its	   parliamentary	   function	   by	   providing	   it	   with	   sufficient	   scrutiny.	   The	  
formula	  was	  created	  by	  the	  Government	  and	  agreed	  upon	  by	  Parliament.	  The	  issues	  which	  filled	  MPs	  
postbags,	   and	  which	  many	  MPs	  were	   now	   ‘up	   in	   arms’	   over,	   had	   received	   their	   consent.	   Careful	  
reading	   of	   the	   Bill	   would	   have	   uncovered	   that	   the	   Child	   Support	   Agency	   would	   be	   applied	   in	  
retrospect,	   over-­‐riding	   previous	  maintenance	   arrangements.	   It	   would	   also	   have	   revealed	   that	   the	  
formula	   failed	   to	   take	   into	   consideration	   contact	   expenses,	   travel	   to	   work	   expenses,	   and	   second	  
families.	  Yet,	  as	  we	  highlighted	  when	  we	   looked	  at	  accountability,	  continually,	  unjust	  criticism	  was	  
levied	  on	  the	  Agency,	  whilst	  the	  complicit	  role	  of	  Parliament	  was	  ignored.	  	  	  	  
8.5.6	  Unengaged,	  Ineffective	  Opposition,	  Motivated	  by	  Political	  Blame	  Avoidance	  
	   Another	  component	  is	  the	  role	  of	  an	  unengaged,	  ineffective	  Opposition	  that	  was	  motivated	  
by	  blame	  avoidance.	  This	  point	  is	  an	  element	  of	  the	  above	  point,	  an	  ineffective	  Parliament,	  and	  was	  
also	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  Chapter	  Six.	  So	  again,	  we	  will	  simply	  provide	  a	  cursory	  overview.	  The	  role	  
of	   the	   Opposition	   was	   limited;	   it	   did	   not	   provide	   an	   effective	   check-­‐and-­‐balance	   upon	   the	  
Conservative	  Government	  by	   opposing	   a	   foreseeably	   flawed	  policy,	   but	  was	   instead	  motivated	  by	  
‘blame	   avoidance’.	   In	   effect,	   Labour	   provided	   it	   with	   cross	   party	   support	   and	   eased	   it	   through	  
Parliament.	  As	  Michael	  Jack	  MP,	  Social	  Security	  Minister,	  stated	  in	  a	  Television	  interview:	  
	  ‘I	  wish	   the	  Labour	  Party	  had	  pushed	  us	  harder	   in	   the	  detail	   committee	   scrutiny	  of	  
the	  subsequent	  parliamentary	  stages	  on	  the	  Bill	  because	  I	  think	  it	  really	  does	  help	  to	  
make	  you	  think,	  in	  terms,	  particularly,	  of	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  the	  measures.	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It	   would	   have	   been	   nice	   to	   have	   been	   pushed	   a	   bit	   harder’.	   (Punctuation	   added,	  
Michael	  Jack	  MP,	  Social	  Security	  Minister,	  “Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  pay”,	  1999).	  	  
Peter	  Kemp	   (Second	  Permanent	  Secretary,	  Cabinet	  Office,	  1988-­‐1992),	  also	  highlighted	   the	   lack	  of	  
opposition	  and	  scrutiny	  the	  Bill	  received:	  ‘everybody	  was	  in	  favour	  of	  this	  thing...	  So	  I	  don’t	  think	  it	  
got	  the	  proper	  scrutiny	  that	  it	  should	  have	  got.’	  (Punctuation	  added,	  Peter	  Kemp,	  Second	  Permanent	  
Secretary,	  Cabinet	  Office,	  “Can’t	  Pay,	  Won’t	  pay”,	  1999).	  
	   But	  as	  we	  demonstrated	  in	  our	  previous	  chapter,	  Labour	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  flaws	  within	  the	  
policy27,	   yet	   still	   offered	   its	   overall	   support.	   While	   serious	   flaws	   were	   apparent	   in	   the	   Bill,	   the	  
Government’s	   emphasis	   of	   the	   principles	   underpinning	   the	   policy,	   and	   the	   Opposition’s	   lack	   of	   a	  
viable	  alternative	  and	  its	  desire	  not	  to	  appear	  against	  ‘family	  values’,	  meant	  that	  any	  concerns	  were	  
muted.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill,	  the	  Opposition	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  stand	  against	  a	  policy	  
that	   was	   received	   favourably	   by	   the	  media	   and	   seen	   as	   ‘putting	   children	   first’.	   Furthermore,	   the	  
Parliamentary	  majority	  held	  by	   the	  Conservatives	  meant	   that	  Opposition	  support	  was	  not	  needed.	  	  
Consequently	  Labour,	  saw	  no	  benefit	  in	  opposing	  the	  policy,	  therefore	  initial	  concern	  morphed	  into	  
lazy	  support	  during	  the	  process.	  	  
	   As	  we	  stated	  in	  our	  previous	  chapter,	  although	  the	  Conservatives	  enjoyed	  a	  sizable	  majority	  
and	  therefore	  did	  not	  need	  the	  support	  of	   the	  Opposition	  to	  pass	   the	  Bill,	   the	  Opposition	  was	  not	  
powerless.	   	   If	   the	   Opposition	   had	   listened	   to	   the	   concerns	   of	   pressure	   groups	   and	   the	   House	   of	  
Lords,	  it	  would	  have	  realised	  that	  there	  was	  were	  serious	  concerns	  about	  the	  Bill.	  	  Although	  Labour	  
did	   not	   have	   the	   parliamentary	   power	   to	   prevent	   the	   Bill’s	   passage,	   it	   could	   have	   placed	   more	  
pressure	   on	   the	   Conservatives	   by	   highlighting	   their	   concerns	   publicly,	   and	   thereby	   attract	   the	  
attention	  of	  the	  media.	  The	  support	  provided	  by	  Labour	  was	  certainly	  not	  wholehearted,	  but	  it	  was	  
sufficient	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  flawed	  Bill	  successfully	  completed	  its	  passage	  through	  Parliament.	  
8.5.7	  Ineffective	  Pre-­‐legislative	  Scrutiny	  
	   As	   Graham	  Allen	  MP	   states,	   effective	   pre-­‐legislative	   scrutiny	   (performed	   from	   both	   inside	  
and	   outside	   of	   Parliament)	   is	   an	   effective	   mechanism	   that	   would	   lead	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   better	  
legislation.	  As	  Graham	  Allen	  noted	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act:	  
The	  more	  voice	  that	  are	  allowed	  to	  be	  heard,	  the	  more	  likely	  we	  are	  to	  get	  the	  ideas	  
to	   make	   good	   legislation	   even	   better.	   Many	   of	   the	   legislative	   disasters	   that	  
governments	  have	   imposed	  on	  Parliament…	  could	  probably	  have	  been	  avoided.	  To	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	   See	   for	   example	   the	   initial	   opposition	   voiced	   by	  Michael	  Meacher,	   the	   Shadow	   Social	   Security	  Minister,	  
which	  highlighted	  many	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill’s	  flaws.	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refer	  to	  my	  own	  experience,	  I	  led	  for	  my	  Party	  in	  opposition	  on	  to	  the	  Child	  Support	  
Act	  1991,	  which	  has	  to	  be	  re-­‐written	  about	  five	  times.	  I	  have	  no	  doubt	  that	  had	  we	  
had	  a	  sensible	  process	  of	  pre-­‐legislative	  scrutiny	  –	  either	  online	  or	  offline	  –	  and	  had	  
we	  listened	  to	  the	  practitioners	  and	  to	  those	  whom	  it	  affected,	  we	  would	  have	  been	  
able	   to	   make	   that	   law	   far	   better,	   far	   earlier.	   (HC	   Debates,	   6	   January,	   2004,	   col	  
2WH).	  	  	  
As	  Graham	  Allen	  highlighted,	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  received	  inadequate	  pre-­‐legislative	  scrutiny,	  and	  
this	  was	  a	  contributing	  factor	  to	  the	  policy’s	  failure.	  
	   The	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  did	  have	  a	  form	  of	  pre-­‐legislative	  scrutiny,	  because	  the	  House	  of	  
Commons	   Social	   Security	   Committee	   sat	   between	   January	   and	   June	   to	   consider	   the	  White	   Paper,	  
Children	  Come	  First,	  and	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill.	  However,	  this	  was	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  Bill	  was	  
already	  proceeding	  through	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  and	  hence	  the	  Committee’s	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  
debate	  was	  somewhat	  limited.	  For	  example,	  the	  Government	  only	  responded	  to	  the	  Social	  Security	  
Select	  Committee’s	   recommendations	   in	  October	  1991,	  by	  which	   time	   the	  Act	  was	  on	   the	   statute	  
book	   (Garnham	   and	   Knights,	   1994,	   39).	   However,	   as	   stated	   in	   our	   previous	   chapter,	   after	  
undertaking	   preliminary	   scrutiny	   and	   digesting	   some	   of	   the	   evidence	   received	   from	   various	  
organisations	  and	  individuals,	  the	  Committee	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  produce	  an	  interim	  report	  (The	  Second	  
Report)	  to	  make	  some	  of	  their	   immediate	  concerns	  known	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  whilst	   it	  was	  
still	  formally	  considering	  the	  Bill.	  	  
	   The	  Committee	   voiced	  deep	   concern	  over	   the	   impact	   that	   the	   retrospective	   application	  of	  
the	   policy	  would	   have	   on	   those	   individuals	  who	   had	   reached	   divorce	   or	   ‘clean-­‐break’	   settlements	  
prior	   to	   the	   introduction	  of	   this	   legislation,	  and	  recommended	  that	  provision	  be	  made	   in	   the	  Child	  
Support	  Bill	  to	  take	  into	  account	  divorce	  settlements	  that	  involved	  a	  capital	  settlement	  in	  lieu	  of	  child	  
maintenance	   (Para	   13,	   Second	   Report,	   Changes	   in	   Maintenance	   Arrangements,	   Social	   Security	  
Committee,	  Session	  1990-­‐91,	  30	  April,	  1991).	  But	  yet	  again,	  recommendations	  were	  disregarded	  and	  
the	   Treasury’s	   economic	   agenda	   triumphed.	   The	   Third	   Report,	   as	   stated	   in	   Chapter	   Six,	   was	  
dampened	   to	   that	   of	   ‘a	   cautious	  welcome’	   (Third	   Report,	   Changes	   in	  Maintenance	   Arrangements,	  
Social	   Security	   Committee,	   Session	   1990-­‐91,	   1991,	   	   4).	   The	   Report	   raises	   some	   of	   the	   issues	  
mentioned	   in	   the	   interim	  report,	  yet	   these	  were	  articulated	  with	   far	   less	  vigour.	   	  For	  example,	   the	  
inclusion	  of	  a	  benefit	  penalty	  was	  discussed	  more	  favourably	  by	  the	  Committee.	  
	   While	  the	  Social	  Security	  Select	  Committee	  examining	  the	  Child	  Support	  Bill	  was	  an	  attempt	  
to	   provide	   another	   level	   of	   scrutiny,	   its	   effectiveness	   and	   influence	   was	   limited.	   Though	   the	  
Committee	  took	  evidence	  for	  a	  number	  of	  noteworthy	  individuals	  and	  organisations,	  and	  discussed	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the	   Bill’s	   features	   in	   considerable	   detail,	   its	   influence	   on	   parliamentary	   debate	   was	   limited.	   The	  
Committee	   also	   failed	   to	   debate	   some	   of	   the	   issues	   that	   contributed	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  
fundamentally	  unworkable	  policy.	  As	  Garnham	  and	  Knights	  note:	  ‘Even	  though	  substantial	  evidence	  
had	   been	   given	   by	   DSS	   officials,	   the	   Committee	   failed	   to	   comment	   upon	   the	   emphasis	   on	  
expenditure	  savings	  targets’	  (1994,	  39).	  We	  could	  go	  as	  far	  as	  suggesting	  that	  its	  function	  was	  little	  
more	  than	  a	  ‘talking	  shop’.	  Putting	  the	  Bill	  to	  the	  Social	  Security	  Select	  Committee	  appears	  to	  have	  
been	  a	  mechanism	  used	  to	  paint	  the	  image	  of	  a	  policy	  that	  had	  been	  scrutinised	  and	  therefore	  more	  
accountable.	  	  
8.5.8	  Unclear,	  Complex,	  Ill-­‐throughout	  Policy	  Details	  
	   As	  we	   have	   stated	   above,	   the	   CSA	   experienced	   a	   vast	   amount	   of	   administrative	   and	   staff	  
management	   problems.	   During	   its	   first	   year	   in	   operation,	   of	   the	   1,380	   cases	   examined	   only	   half	  
received	  correct	  maintenance	  assessments,	  and	  only	  one	  in	  seven	  had	  been	  dealt	  with	  according	  to	  
the	  correct	  and	  approved	  procedure	  of	  calculating	  payments	  (Barnes	  et	  al,	  1999,	  17).	  By	  the	  end	  of	  
January	  1994,	  16,600	  case	  reviews	  had	  been	  requested	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  were	  incorrect;	  of	  the	  
5,800	  that	  were	  processed,	  in	  approximately	  half	  recalculations	  and	  revisions	  were	  made	  (Garnham	  
and	  Knights,	  1994,	  61).	   In	   large	  part,	   these	  errors	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  an	  overly	  complex	   formula,	  
one	  which	  was	  described	  by	  CSA	  staff	  themselves	  as	   ‘confusing,	  complex,	  ambiguous,	  and	  in	  many	  
ways	  intimidating	  and	  off-­‐putting,	  too	  long,	  and	  daunting’	  (Garnham	  and	  Knights,	  1994,	  59).	  As	  Peter	  
Lilley	   confessed,	   ‘the	   policy	   was	   over	   ambitious	   and	   over	   complex	   and	   that	   made	   it	   almost	  
guaranteed	  to	  run	  into	  problems’	  (Peter	  Lilley,	  Interviewed	  by	  author,	  11	  July	  2011).	  The	  system	  of	  
assessment	  and	  formula	  was	  over-­‐complicated;	  staff	  experienced	  difficulties	  in	  interpreting	  the	  rules	  
for	  assessment,	  the	  guidelines	  for	  appeals,	  and	  the	  method	  of	  assessing	  arrears.	  	  
	   It	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  application	  of	  universal	   formula	  to	  child	  maintenance	  would	  deliver	  
uniformity	   of	   treatment	   across	   individual	   cases,	   and	   hence	   eradicate	   the	   problems	   experienced	  
under	  the	  previous	  court	  system,	  but	  in	  reality	  ‘individual	  claims	  to	  justice	  collide	  with	  the	  rigidities	  
of	   formulaic	   assessment’	   (Davis	   et	   al,	   1998,	   222).	   The	   rigidity	   of	   the	   formula	   was	   unable	   to	   be	  
effectively	   applied	   to	   the	   nuances	   of	   contemporary	   arrangements	   and	   family	   circumstances.	   The	  
formula	   could	   not	   handle	   the	   complexity	   of	   reality.	   	   For	   example,	   individuals	   with	   frequently	  
changing	   circumstances,	   those	   with	   informal	   maintenance	   commitments	   (such	   as	   payment	   of	  
mortgage,	  or	   the	  payment	  of	  private	  education),	   those	  with	   frequently	   changing	  employment	  and	  
relationship	   status,	   those	   with	   complex	   housing	   costs	   and	   arrangements,	   and	   those	   undertaking	  
shared	  custody	  of	  the	  child(ren).	  The	  formula	  assumed	  that	  individuals	  and	  circumstances	  were	  far	  
more	  fixed	  than	  reality	  proved.	  As	  Davis	  et	  al	  state:	  ‘As	  a	  result	  we	  observed	  request	  for	  change	  of	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circumstances	  reviews	  chasing	  each	  other	  through	  the	  system,	  each	  one	  becoming	  obsolete	  before	  
it	  was	  complete’	  (1998,	  222-­‐223).	  Therefore	  the	  data	  needed	  to	  be	  considered	  by	  CSA	  staff	  assessing	  
maintenance	  claims	  was	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  flux.	  The	  formula	  also	  received	  widespread	  opposition	  
due	  to	  not	   including	  second	  families,	  private	  pension	  contribution,	  debt	  repayments,	  and	  travel	   to	  
work	  costs,	  in	  its	  exempt	  income.	  	  
	   As	  we	  highlighted	  above,	  the	  root	  of	  public	  unrest,	  media	  hostility,	  and	  political	  opposition	  
to	   the	   CSA	  was	   due	   to	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   formula.	   	   The	   formula,	  which	  was	   frequently	   producing	  
absurd	  maintenance	  assessments,	   in	  one	  example	  leaving	  an	  absent	  father	  with	  only	  £3.00	  a	  week	  
to	  live	  on	  (The	  Sunday	  Times,	  21	  November,	  1993),	  was	  seen	  as	  responsible	  for	  pushing	  many	  absent	  
parents	  into	  poverty,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  resulting	  in	  the	  absent	  parent	  not	  having	  enough	  money	  to	  
maintain	   contact	  with	   their	   children	   (Garnham	   and	   Knights,	   1994;	   Barnes	   et	   al,	   1999;	   Davis	   et	   al	  
1998).	  The	  financial	  impact	  was	  also	  felt	  by	  parents	  with	  care,	  for	  some,	  the	  loss	  came	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
maintenance	  taking	  them	  just	  above	  Income	  Support	  levels,	  which	  meant	  that	  they	  lost	  ‘passported’	  
benefits.	  For	  other	  it	  was	  not	  only	  having	  their	  maintenance	  deducted	  pound	  for	  pound	  from	  their	  
Income	  Support	  but	  also	  losing	  informal	  financial	  support	  from	  the	  absent	  parent.	  	  
8.5.9	  Ineffective	  Consultation	  	  
As	  demonstrated	  in	  Chapter	  Six,	  considerable	  doubt	  can	  be	  raised	  over	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  
consultation	   period,	   and	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   the	   Government	   acknowledged	   the	   concerns	   and	  
criticisms	  expressed.	  	  The	  quality	  of	  the	  consultation	  responses	  were	  commendable,	  but	  the	  manner	  
in	  which	   they	  were	   received	  was	   poor.	   Several	   responses	   prophesised	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   CSA	   and	  
warned	   the	   Government	   against	   many	   of	   its	   proposed	   features.	   However,	   the	   Conservative	  
Government	  was	  very	  dismissive	  of	  expert	  organisations	  and	  pressure	  groups,	  and	  very	  reluctant	  to	  
modify	  the	  policy	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  comments	  of	  others.	  In	  many	  respects,	  the	  ‘consultation’	  
period	   can	  be	   viewed	  as	   a	   façade.	   The	  unwillingness	  of	   the	  government	   to	   consider	   the	  expertise	  
offered	   in	   many	   of	   the	   responses	   to	   the	   White	   Paper	   was	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   the	   policy.	   	   The	  
problems	  were	  foreseen	  by	  many,	  but	   ignored	  by	  Government.	  The	  arrogance	  of	  particular	  policy-­‐
makers,	   and	   their	   refusal	   to	   reassess	   many	   of	   the	   policy’s	   elements,	   played	   a	   vital	   role	   in	   the	  
subsequent	  failure	  of	  the	  CSA.	  	  
8.5.10	  Uninformed	  Anticipated	  Reaction,	  a	  Deficit	  in	  Deliberation28,	  and	  a	  Cultural	  Disconnect	  
	   According	  to	  King	  and	  Crewe,	  ‘The	  CSA	  was	  the	  bastard	  child	  of	  Whitehall	  infighting	  between	  
the	   Treasury	   and	   the	   Department	   of	   Social	   Security,	   not	   the	   child	   of	   a	   more	   public	   process	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  A	  phrase	  used	  by	  King	  and	  Crewe	  (2013).	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deliberation’	   (2013,	  387).	  King	  and	  Crewe	  stress	   that	  a	  contributing	   factor	   to	  some	  cases	  of	  policy	  
failure	   is	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   ‘cultural	   disconnect’,	   and	   that,	   ‘[t]he	   Child	   Support	   Agency…	   was	   an	  
almost	  classic	  instance	  of	  cultural	  disconnect	  at	  work’	  (2013,	  387).	  King	  and	  Crewe	  highlighted	  policy	  
maker’s	  ignorance	  regarding	  of	  the	  lives	  of	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  people	  to	  whom	  the	  CSA	  would	  
be	  applied.	  They	  argued	  that	  policy-­‐makers	  were	  totally	  ignorant	  of	  a	  world	  in	  which	  children	  often	  
had	  multiple	  fathers,	  and	  one-­‐night	  stands	  or	  casual	  relationships	  were	  frequent.	  One	  senior	  policy	  
maker	  at	  the	  DSS	  confessed	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  King	  and	  Crew,	  that	  he	  had	  been	  surprised	  by	  the	  
large	   numbers	   of	  women	   claiming,	   probably	   truthfully,	   that	   their	   children	   had	   three,	   four,	   or	   five	  
different	  fathers.	  ‘We	  hadn’t	  appreciated	  that	  very	  large	  numbers	  of	  people,	  both	  women	  and	  men,	  
now	   lead	   very	   complicated	   lives’	   (quoted	   in	   King	   and	   Crewe,	   2013,	   247).	   A	   more	   informed	  
understanding	   of	   the	   complexities	   of	   people’s	   lives–	   a	   lack	   of	   a	   cultural	   disconnect	   –	  might	   have	  
steered	  the	  Government	  away	  from	  introducing	  such	  an	   inflexible	  and	  restricted	  (in	  terms	  of	  what	  
was	   included	   in	   the	   ‘exempt	   income’)	   formula.	   King	   and	   Crewe	   also	   suggest	   that	   an	   informed	  
understanding,	  and	  more	  engaged	  public	  deliberation,	  ‘would	  have	  almost	  certainly	  have	  thrown	  up	  
the	  obvious	  fact	  that	  some	  absent	  father	  would	  not	  pay,	  that	  many	  of	  them	  could	  not	  pay	  and	  that	  
some	  already	  made	  their	  own	  arrangements’	  (2013,	  387).	  Public	  deliberation	  would	  have	  led	  policy	  
makers	  to	  realise	  the	  degree	  of	  resistance	  and	  opposition	  which	  the	  policy	  was	  likely	  to	  receive.	  	  
	   Yet	   the	  details	  of	   the	  policy,	  and	   the	   rejection	  of	   concerns	   raised	  both	  at	   the	  consultation	  
stage,	   and	   voiced	   in	   the	   House	   of	   Lords,	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   anticipated	   reaction	   was	   either	  
ignored,	  or	  naïve.	   	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  maintenance	  disregard,	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  prioritise	  cases	   in	  
which	   the	  parent	  with	  care	  was	   in	   receipt	  of	  benefits	   removed	   the	  moral	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  policy,	  
and	  void	   it	  of	   its	   claim	  of	   ‘putting	   children	   first’.	  Many	  quickly	   came	   to	   realise	   that	   they	  were	  not	  
going	  to	  derive	  any	  personal	  financial	  benefit,	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  they	  would	  be	  at	  a	  financial	  loss	  as	  
a	  result	  of	  reassessment.	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  condemned	  the	  policy	  for	  not	  benefitting	  anyone	  other	  
than	   the	   Treasury,	   and	   therefore	   refused	   to	   co-­‐operate	   with	   the	   Agency	   (King	   and	   Crewe,	   2013,	  
387).	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  there	  might	  be	  opposition	  to,	  and	  non-­‐co-­‐operation	  with,	  the	  Agency	  was	  
not	  deliberated	  by	  policy-­‐makers.	  As	  Davis	  et	  al	  state:	  ‘To	  the	  framers	  of	  the	  legislation	  it	  appeared	  
self-­‐evident	   that	   the	   principle	   of	   requiring	   absent	   parents	   to	   support	   their	   children	  was	   one	   that	  
would	   command	   widespread	   support.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   this	   principle	   was	   not	   supported,	   they	  
meant	  to	  bring	  about	  cultural	  change’	  (Davis	  et	  al,	  1999,	  221).	  	  
	   The	   policy	   making	   approach	   adopted	   by	   the	   Conservatives	   at	   this	   time	   was	   that	   of	   the	  
obligations	  of	  single	  parents	  and	  absent	  fathers,	  rather	  than	  that	  of	  encouragement	  to	  co-­‐operate.	  
Not	  only	  did	  policy	  makers	   fail	   to	  consider	  the	  real	   life	   impact	  the	  Agency	  would	  have	  on	  people’s	  
lives,	   they	   also	   failed	   to	   ‘appreciate	   that	   cultural	   change	   cannot	   be	   achieved	   simply	   through	   the	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imposition	  of	  a	  new	  tax’	  (Davis	  et	  al,	  1999,	  221),	  someone	  other	  than	  the	  Treasury	  had	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  
benefit.	  As	  Davis	  et	  al	  superbly	  summarise:	  ‘If	  the	  Treasury	  interests	  had	  not	  been	  so	  dominant,	  and	  
if	  parents	  with	  care	  and	  their	  children	  had	  been	  allowed	  to	  benefit	  to	  some	  degree,	   it	   is	   likely	  that	  
the	   CSA	   would	   have	   attracted	   greater	   support.	   This	   in	   turn	   may	   have	   eased	   its	   administrative	  
burdens’	   (Davis	   et	   al,	   1999,	   221).	   A	   ‘deficit	   in	   deliberation’,	   a	   cultural	   disconnect,	   and	   a	   naïve	  
anticipated	  reaction,	  led	  policy-­‐makers	  to	  pursue	  a	  policy	  that	  was	  unlikely	  to	  obtain	  public	  support	  
and	   co-­‐operation.	   However,	   this	   could	   have	   been	   avoided,	   greater	   consideration	   of	   the	   concerns	  
raised	  by	   charities	  and	  pressure	  groups,	  better	  engagement	  with	   the	  public,	   involvement	  of	   those	  
who	  had	  prior	  experience	  of	   collected	   child	  maintenance	   (Liable	  Relative	  Officers),	   and	   the	  use	  of	  
piloting	   would	   have	   uncovered	   the	   degree	   of	   opposition	   and	   resistance	   the	   Agency	   was	   likely	   to	  
receive.	  
8.5.11	  Policy	  Based	  on	  an	  Inaccurate	  Theory	  of	  Cause	  and	  Effect	  
	  
	   This	  point	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  above,	  ‘uninformed	  anticipated	  reaction,	  a	  deficit	  in	  deliberation,	  
and	  a	  cultural	  disconnect’	  point,	  though	  it	  speaks	  more	  to	  the	  desired	  outcomes	  of	  the	  policy.	  At	  the	  
heart	  of	  any	  policy	   is	  an	  understanding	  that	   if	  we	  do	  X	  then	  Y	  will	  occur.	   It	   is	  this	  desire	  for	  Y	  that	  
informs	  the	  building	  of	  the	  mechanism	  that	  creates	  X.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  this	  
is	   a	   complex	   point,	   as	   there	  were	   conflicting	   desired	   outcomes.	   The	   involvement	   of	   the	   Treasury	  
robbed	   the	   policy	   of	   its	   ability	   to	   have	   a	   clear	   theory	   of	   cause	   and	   effect.	   	   As	   demonstrated	   in	  
Chapters	  Four	  and	  Five,	   inter-­‐Departmental	  and	   inter-­‐Ministerial	  battles	  occurred	  over	  the	  policy’s	  
objectives,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  policy’s	  true	  intentions	  were	  hidden	  under	  a	  veil	  of	  rhetoric.	  The	  desired	  
outcomes	  of	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  were	  at	  odds	  with	  that	  of	  Newton	  and	  Mackay.	  However,	  as	  
Chapter	   Five	   claimed,	  Newton	  and	  Mackay	  did	  not	  have	   the	   sufficient	  power	   resources	   to	  uphold	  
their	  policy.	  	  However	  their	  theory	  of	  cause	  and	  effect,	  that	  CSA	  would	  lead	  to	  absent	  fathers	  taking	  
more	  responsibility	  and	  to	  create	  a	  fairer	  system	  for	  the	  children,	  was	  internally	  now	  detached	  from	  
the	   policy	   that	   was	   created,	   despite	   being	   publically	   maintained	   to	   win	   support	   for	   the	   policy.	  	  
Instead,	   if	  we	   take	   the	   objectives	   of	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury,	   as	   they	  were	   the	   objectives	   that	  
triumphed	  and	  embedded	  themselves	  into	  the	  policy,	  we	  see	  that	  an	  inaccurate	  theory	  of	  cause	  of	  
effective	  was	  present.	  Their	  desired	  objective	  was	  to	  cut	  public	  expenditure,	  as	  Peter	  Lilley	  stated,	  ‘it	  
was	  unashamedly	  to	  transfer	  the	  responsibility	  away	  from	  the	  taxpayer’	  (Peter	  Lilley,	  interviewed	  by	  
author,	  11	  July	  2011).	  However,	  their	  assumption	  -­‐	  the	  policy	  would	  reap	  great	  financial	  reward	  -­‐	  was	  
misplaced.	  In	  fact	  it	  had	  the	  opposite	  effect	  and	  instead	  took	  from	  the	  Treasury’s	  purse.	  This	  conflict	  
over	  outcomes	  meant	  that	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  policy	  was	  an	  inconsistent	  idea	  of	  what	  needed	  to	  be	  
done.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  covert	  desires	  of	  the	  Treasury	  being	  embedded	  into	  the	  policy	  ‘under	  the	  nose’	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of	  Newton	  and	  Mackay	  lead	  to	  a	  disconnect	   in	  the	  chain	  of	  cause	  and	  effect.	   Irrespective	  of	  which	  
chain	  we	  follow	  (either	  the	  Thatcher/Treasury	  revenue	  stream	  or	  the	  Newton/Mackay	  responsibility	  
stream)	  neither	  was	  fit	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  outcomes.	  As	  Pyper	  suggests,	  ‘when	  a	  policy	  is	  based	  
on	   an	   invalid	   theory	   of	   cause	   and	   effect	   is	   a	   ‘bad’	   policy.	   A	   ‘bad’	   policy	   cannot	   be	   properly	  
implemented	  simply	  because	  it	  is	  based	  upon	  a	  poor	  understanding	  of	  the	  problem	  being	  addresses	  
and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  can	  be	  resolved’	  (Pyper,	  1995,	  101).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  
Act,	   it	   was	   not	   only	   that	   it	   was	   based	   on	   an	   invalid	   theory	   of	   cause	   and	   effect,	   but	   also	   it	   was	  
conflicting	  attempts	  at	  obtaining	  versions	  of	  cause	  and	  effect,	  which	  led	  it	  to	  be	  a	  ‘bad’	  policy.	  
8.5.12	  Inadequate	  Research	  Undertaken,	  Alternative	  Options	  Not	  Fully	  Considered	  
As	   Chapter	   Four	   argued,	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   was	   the	   result	   of	  	  
‘incoherent	   dual	   policy	   transfer’;	   an	   inconsistent	   mix	   of	   the	   DSS’s	   attempt	   to	   introduce	   an	  
appropriate,	  complete,	  and	  informed,	  well	  researched,	  policy	  transfer	  from	  Australia,	  and	  Thatcher	  
and	  the	  Treasury’s	  determination	  to	   introduce	  what	  an	   incomplete,	   inappropriate,	  uniformed,	  and	  
poorly	  researched,	  policy	  transfer	  from	  America.	  Whilst	  Newton	  and	  Mackay	  strived	  to	  introduce	  the	  
Australian	   system,	   the	   policy	   that	   was	   created	   was	   a	   rejection	   of	   many	   positive	   elements	   found	  
within	  that	  system,	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  refused	  to	  fully	  consider	  alternative	  options.	  Several	  
of	   the	   problems	  which	   the	   CSA	   faced	  were	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury’s	  
uninformed	   perception	   of	   the	   CSES,	   the	   pick-­‐and-­‐mix	   manner	   in	   which	   components	   were	  
transferred,	  and	  a	  disregard	  for	  social,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  
There	  was	  inadequate	  research	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  policy,	   its	  goals	  and	  its	  operation	  
in	  its	  original	  country.	  There	  was	  also	  insufficient	  understanding	  and	  consideration	  of	  the	  economic,	  
political,	   social,	   legal,	   and	   ideological	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   countries.	   	   As	   a	   result	   of	   poor	  
research,	  ‘crucial	  elements’	  of	  the	  policy	  were	  missed	  or	  ignored,	  and	  ‘inappropriate	  elements’	  were	  
include	  in	  the	  transfer	  process.	  Chapter	  Four	  also	  highlighted	  that	  the	  Thatcher	  Government’s	  New	  
Right	  ideological	  outlook	  shaped	  what	  it	  extrapolated	  from	  the	  Wisconsin	  system	  ‘to	  such	  an	  extent	  
that	  it	  was	  able	  to	  ignore	  the	  problematic	  operational	  realities	  of	  the	  system	  in	  favour	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  
help	   advance	   their	   ideological	   rhetoric’	   (Dolowitz,	   2001,	   378).	   Thatcher’s	   strongly	   ideological	  
perspective	  meant	   that	   she	  possessed	  an	   inaccurate	  understanding	  of	   the	  policy.	   Thatcher	  was	   in	  
such	  awe	  of	  the	  policy’s	  apparent	  ability	  to	  achieve	  aspects	  of	  her	  New	  Right	  agenda	  that	  it	  obscured	  
the	  operational	  reality	  of	  the	  policy.	  Another	  reason	  as	  to	  why	  there	  was	  inadequate	  research	  was	  
the	  haste	  to	  which	  Thatcher	  wanted	  to	  produce	  a	  policy	  to	  present	  to	  Parliament.	  As	  Sir	  Peter	  Kemp,	  
recalled:	   ‘It	   happened	   so	   fast,	   she	   wanted	   it’	   (Second	   Permanent	   Secretary,	   Cabinet,	   1988-­‐1992,	  
“Can't	   Pay	  Won’t	   Pay,	   1999).	   Political	   hyper-­‐activism	  had	   overcome	   Thatcher,	   and	   as	   a	   result	   she	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was	   bypassing	   appropriate	   policy-­‐making	   procedure	   in	   order	   to	   quickly	   bring	   about	   change.	   As	   a	  
result,	   the	   practical	   failures	   and	   negative	   effects	   of	   the	   CSES	   were	   either	   disregarded	   or	   not	  
recognised,	  and	  the	  system	  was	  viewed	  as	  desirable	  to	  emulate	  in	  Britain.	  	  
8.6	  Summarising	  the	  Roots	  of	  Failure	  
	   The	   Child	   Support	   Agency	   was	   rushed	   through	   Parliament,	   checks-­‐and-­‐balances	   were	  
undermined,	  opposition	   scrutiny	  was	  absent,	   consultation	  was	  a	   rubber-­‐stamp	  process,	   a	   trial-­‐run	  
was	  rejected,	  and	  warnings	  were	  continually	  ignored.	  The	  policy	  was	  based	  on	  multiple,	  inconsistent	  
and	  hidden	  objectives.	  There	  was	   incomplete,	   inappropriate,	  uninformed,	   inadequately	  researched	  
‘dual	   policy	   transfer’	   taking	   place.	   The	   separation	   from	   accountability	   led	   to	   unrealistic	   targets	  
operating	  on	  a	  farcical	  time	  frame.	  The	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  was	  imbedded	  with	  flaws;	  the	  Child	  
Support	   Agency	  was	   prescribed	   to	   failure,	   operational	   failure	  was	   inevitable.	   As	   Emma	  Nicholson,	  
Conservative	  MP,	   declared	   at	   the	   time	   of	   its	   establishment,	   the	   Child	   Support	   Act	   is	   ‘a	   tripartite	  
prescription	   for	   chaos,	   slackness	   and	   slowness’	   (Hansard,	   HC	   Debates,	   Vol.	   195,	   col	   536,	   18	   July,	  
1991).	  The	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  has	  been	  placed	  under	  intense	  scrutiny,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  policy	  design	  
that	   needed	   to	   be	   placed	   under	   intense	   scrutiny,	   not	   the	   product	   of	   the	   policy.	   The	   flaws	   in	   the	  
legislation	  were	   deep-­‐seated,	   partly,	   as	  we	   saw	   in	   Chapters	   Four,	   Five	   and	   Six,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  
Treasury’s	  power,	  and	  never	  ending	  victories,	  over	  the	  DSS.	  ‘Ministers	  as	  well	  as	  officials	  in	  the	  DSS	  
found	  themselves	  saddled	  with	  the	  task	  of	  implementing,	  or	  trying	  to	  implement,	  via	  the	  Agency,	  a	  
policy	  markedly	  different	  from	  the	  policy	  they	  had	  originally	  devised’	   (King	  and	  Crewe,	  2013,	  283).	  
However,	  the	  policy	  was	  not	  only	  the	  failure	  of	  Newton	  and	  Mackay	  to	  introduce	  a	  policy	  that	  aimed	  
genuinely	  to	  ‘put	  children	  first’;	   it	  was	  also	  a	  complete	  disaster	  in	  terms	  of	  raising	  revenue.	  As	  King	  
and	  Crewe	  state:	   ‘In	   terms	  of	   raising	  revenue	  and	   improving	  the	  health	  of	   the	  public	   finances,	   the	  
Treasury	   had	   shot	   itself	   in	   both	   feet	   –	   expect	   that	   the	   DSS	  was	   left	   holding	   the	   gun’.	   (2013,	   89).	  
However,	  as	  we	  have	  discussed	  above,	  in	  our	  view,	  it	  was	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency	  that	  was	  unjustly	  
left	  ‘holding	  the	  gun’	  and	  absorbing	  the	  blame.	  	  	  
8.7	  The	  Idea	  of	  ‘Perfect	  Legislation’	  
	   The	  chaos,	  and	  ‘complete	  shambles’,	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  is	  not	  only	  interesting	  in	  
its	  own	  right,	  but	   it	  may	  also	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  representative	  example	  of	  policy	  failure	   in	  the	  UK.	  The	  
aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  was	  not	  only	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  failed,	  but	  to	  gather	  an	  
understanding	   how	   a	   fundamentally	   flawed	   policy	   can	   be	   formed	   and	   passed	   through	   Parliament	  
with	  cross-­‐party	  support.	  Therefore,	  not	  only	  to	  understand	  the	  root	  behind	  the	  CSA’s	  failure,	  but	  to	  
see	  what	  insight	  could	  be	  gained,	  or	  lessons	  learnt,	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	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deficiencies	   of	   the	  UK	   policy	  making	   process	   –	  what	   leads	   to	   the	   creation	   and	   passage	   of	   flawed	  
policies.	  Then	  see	  if	  we	  could	  use	  this	  insight	  to	  help	  prevent	  policy	  mistakes	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
	   Instead	  of	  utilising	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘perfect	  implementation’	  and	  deeming	  it	  as	  ‘unattainable’,	  we	  
should	  instead	  be	  striving	  for	  ‘perfect	  legislation’,	  which	  arguably,	  is	  ‘attainable’.	  Unlike	  scholars	  that	  
propagate	   ‘perfect	   implementation’,	   this	   thesis	  does	  hold	  a	  normative	   tone,	  and	  believes	   that	   this	  
should	  not	  be	  dismissed	  as	   something	   that	   is	   unattainable,	   instead	  actively	  pursued	  as	   something	  
that	   is	   desired.	   Whilst	   fully	   acknowledging	   that	   the	   criteria	   for	   ‘perfect	   implementation’	   are	  
unattainable,	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  stage	  at	  which	  they	  are	  pursued,	  many	  of	  them	  are	  in	  fact	  attainable	  
when	  pursued	  at	  the	  appropriate	  stage.	  This	  view	  is	  explicitly	  prescriptive,	  arguing	  it	  would	  lead	  to	  
fewer	  policies	  being	  exposed	  as	   ‘failures’	  at	   the	   ‘implementation	  stage’.	  This	  approach	  agrees	  that	  
‘perfect	   implementation’,	   or	   rather	   the	   criteria	   for	   perfect	   implementation,	   is	   unattainable,	   if	  
assessed	  at	   this	   stage.	   The	   implementation	   stage,	  whilst	  making	   failures	   apparent,	   is	   ill-­‐placed	   for	  
assessing	   why	   a	   policy	   has	   failed.	   However,	   when	   placing	   the	   criteria	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	   policy-­‐
making	  process	  then	  the	  criteria	  are	  achievable.	  How	  a	  policy	  performs	  during	  implementation	  or	  in	  
operation	   is	   not	   a	   result	   of	   chance,	   but	   a	   result	   of	   the	   policy	   itself.	  We	   should	   not	  wait	   until	   the	  
implementation	   to	   then	   face	   the	   realities	  of	   the	  policy.	  An	  assessment	  of	   the	   root	  of	   the	  problem	  
experienced	   at	   implementation	   will,	   as	   it	   does	   in	   our	   case	   study	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act,	  
inevitably	  be	  linked	  back	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  policy.	  That	  is	  why	  we	  should	  be	  using	  the	  idea	  of	  
‘perfect	  legislation’	  rather	  than	  ‘perfect	  implementation’.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  be	  proactive	  rather	  than	  
reactive,	  and	  apportion	  blame	  appropriately.	  	  











Figure	  8.1	  Criteria	  for	  ‘Perfect	  Legislation’	  
Criteria	  for	  ‘perfect	  legislation’	  
Effective	  Parliamentary	  Scrutiny	  
	  Engaged	  Opposition,	  Motivated	  by	  more	  than	  Political	  Point	  Scoring	  or	  Blame	  Avoidance	  
Thorough	  and	  Effective	  Consultation	  
Effective	  Pre-­‐legislative	  Scrutiny	  
Informed	  Anticipated	  Reaction,	  No	  Deficit	  in	  Deliberation	  or	  Cultural	  Disconnect	  
Adequate	  Research	  Undertaken,	  Alternative	  Options	  Considered	  
Adequate	  and	  Appropriate	  Resources	  Assigned	  
Clear	  Lines	  of	  Accountability	  
Realistic	  Time-­‐frames	  both	  in	  passing	  of	  Bill	  and	  Delivery	  of	  Act29	  	  
Attainable	  Targets	  and	  No	  Operational	  Disconnect	  
Unclear,	  Complex,	  Ill-­‐throughout	  Policy	  Details	  
Effective	  Checks	  and	  Balances	  within	  the	  Core	  Executive30	  
Clear	  Aims	  and	  Objectives	  with	  the	  ‘Problem’	  clearly	  defined	  	  
Policy	  Based	  on	  Accurate	  Theory	  of	  Cause	  and	  Effect	  
U-­‐Turns	  Not	  Dismissed/Perceived	  as	  Weakness	  (Policy	  Learning	  Encouraged)31	  	  
Piloting,	  Trial	  or	  Simulation	  Runs	  
	  
8.8	  Conclusion	  
	   The	   formation	  of	   the	   legislation	   is	   the	  bottle	  neck	  of	  policy	  success	  or	   failure.	  Criteria	   that	  
are	   indeed	   unattainable	   at	   the	   implementation	   stage	   are	   attainable	   at	   the	   legislation	   stage.	   The	  
responsibility	  should	  not	  only	  be	  placed	  on	  Ministers	  to	  draft	  an	  effective	  piece	  of	  legislation,	  rather	  
it	   is	  also	  the	  duty	  of	  Parliament	   (and	  others)	   to	  ensure	  the	   flaws	  are	  detected	  and	  voiced.	  As	  King	  
and	  Crewe	  state:	   ‘Government	  ministers	  are	  not	  the	  only	  ones	  to	  blame.	  As	  a	   legislative	  assembly,	  
the	  Parliament	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  is,	  much	  of	  the	  time,	  either	  peripheral	  or	  totally	  irrelevant.	  It	  
might	  as	  well	  not	  exist.’	  (2013,	  361).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  A	  point	  made	  by	  Dunleavy	  when	  highlighting	  the	  ‘fastest	  law	  in	  the	  west’	  syndrome	  that	  was	  present,	  and	  
contributing	  to	  the	  creating	  of	  policy	  disasters	  in	  British	  policy	  making	  (Dunleavy,	  1995,	  60).	  
30	  Again,	  another	  point	  that	  had	  previously	  been	  made	  by	  Dunleavy	  and	  in	  his	  work	  on	  policy	  disasters	  (1995,	  
64).	  
31	  Whilst	  we	  have	  not	  discussed	  ‘U-­‐Turns	  Not	  Dismissed/Perceived	  as	  Weakness	  (Policy	  Learning	  Encouraged)’	  
in	  our	  application	  to	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  the	  Child	  Support	  Agency,	  this	  criteria	  does	  apply	  when	  we	  assess	  
the	  continuing	  operation,	  and	  amendments	  and	  reforms	  made	  to	  the	  policy,	  and	  the	  policy	  area.	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   One	  of	  the	  tragedies	  with	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  is	  that	  lessons	  were	  not	  learnt,	  but	  in	  
fact	   repeated	   and	   compounded	   by	   subsequent	   Governments	   in	   further	   iterations	   of	   the	   Child	  
Support	  Agency.	  Subsequent	  changes	  were	  more	  concerned	  with	  limiting	  political	  damage,	  driven	  by	  
blame	  avoidance,	  or	  political	  gain,	  not	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  undergo	  ‘leaning’	  and	  remedy	  a	  failing	  policy.	  
If	   we	   are	   not	   to	   repeat	   the	   mistakes	   of	   this	   policy,	   or	   any	   failed	   policy,	   the	   ‘perfect	   legislation’	  
criteria	  should	  be	  strongly	  considered	  as	  an	  appropriate	  framework	  to	  guide	  policy-­‐makers	  through	  
the	  complexities	  of	  policy	  making	  by	  placing	  the	   legislative	  stage	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	  policy	  making	  
process.	  This	  criterion	  would	  not	  only	  reduce	  the	  creation	  of	  flawed	  policies,	   it	  would	  also	  prevent	  
foreseeable,	  and	  foreseen	  failures	  passing	  through	  Parliament	  with	  cross-­‐party	  support	  and	  relative	  
ease.	  	  	  
	   The	  field	  of	  policy	  studies,	  and	  especially	  the	  study	  of	  policy	  failure,	  seems	  to	  understate	  the	  
role	   of	   policy	   design	   and	   legislation.	   As	   highlighted	   in	   Chapter	   One,	   the	   literature	   that	   looks	  
specifically	   at	   policy	   design,	   formation,	   or	   legislature	   is	   somewhat	   limited,	   especially	  when	  placed	  
beside	   the	   wealth	   of	   literature	   on	   the	   other	   stages;	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   legislation	   and	   policy	  

















The	   thesis	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  CSA	  was	   a	   result	   of	   Thatcher	   and	   the	  
Treasury	   hijacking	   a	   policy	   pursued	   by	   the	   Department	   of	   Social	   Security	   and	   Lord	   Chancellor’s	  
Office.	  It	  has	  shown	  that	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  utilised	  Newton	  and	  Mackay’s	  image,	  ‘problem’	  
and	  policy,	   as	   a	  mechanism	   to	  achieve	   their	   neo-­‐liberal	   economic	  objectives.	   The	   thesis	   discussed	  
the	   ‘battles’	   that	   took	  place,	  each	  time	  showing	  that	  Newton	   lacked	  the	  power	  resources	  to	  resist	  
their	  demands,	  leaving	  Newton	  to	  introduce	  a	  policy	  that	  was	  remarkably	  different	  to	  the	  one	  that	  
he	  had	  envisaged.	  This	  thesis	  has	  also	  shown	  that	  throughout	  the	  policy’s	  formulation	  and	  during	  its	  
passage	  through	  Parliament,	  Ministers,	  Senior	  Civil	  Servants,	  Peers,	  and	  the	  Opposition	  foresaw	  the	  
policy’s	  failure,	  yet	  did	  nothing.	  This	  thesis	  has	  highlighted	  the	  root	  the	  CSA’s	  failure,	  illuminating	  the	  
inadequate	  scrutiny	  that	  occurred	  throughout	  the	  process.	  	  
	  
Each	   chapter	   focused	   on	   a	   distinct	   stage	   of	   the	   policy-­‐making	   process,	   drawing	   on	   and	  
engaging	   with	   different	   bodies	   of	   literature.	   Chapter	   One	   provided	   the	   intellectual	   basis	   and	  
methodological	   approach	   for	   the	   study.	   It	   argued	   that	   the	   ‘stages	   heuristic’	   has	   not	   outlived	   its	  
usefulness	   in	  policy	  analysis,	  but	  rather	  remains	  a	  valuable	   framework	  to	  utilise	  when	  undertaking	  
research	  into	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  It	  stressed	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  was	  to	  undertake	  
both	   an	   ‘analysis	   of	   policy’,	   and	   ‘analysis	   for	   policy’,	   this	   being	   the	   view	   that	   the	   field	   of	   policy	  
analysis	   should	   use	   its	   knowledge	   of	   policies,	   and	   policy-­‐making	   process,	   to	   improve	   the	   policy-­‐
making	  process	  and/or	  policies.	  	  
	  
Chapter	   Two	   set	   the	   scene	   for	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	   context	   in	  which	   the	   1991	  
Child	  Support	  Act	  was	  formulated,	  and	  how	  the	  ‘problem’	  was	  constructed.	  It	  provided	  an	  historical	  
and	   contextual	   background,	   looking	   at	   the	   trends	   relating	   to	   lone-­‐parent	   families	   in	   Britain.	   This	  
Chapter	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  period	  preceding	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	  was	  one	  
of	   considerable	   change,	   not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   changing	   landscape	   of	   lone-­‐parents,	   but	   also	   a	  
change	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  New	  Right	  ideas	  within	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  popular	  press.	  	  
	  
Chapter	   Three	   focused	   on	   the	   problem	   definition	   stage.	   It	   demonstrated	   that	   the	  
developments	  highlighted	   in	  Chapter	  Two	  fed	   into	  how	  the	   ‘problem’	  was	  defined,	  how	  the	  policy	  
was	  represented,	  and	  subsequently,	  how	  policy	  makers	  utilised	  ‘problem	  representation’	  as	  a	  power	  
resource	  to	  pave	  the	  path	  for	  successful	  passage	  of	  the	  policy.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  
this	  Chapter	  highlighted	  that	  were	  considerable	  links	  between	  how	  the	  problem	  was	  defined	  and	  the	  
policy’s	   subsequent	   failure.	   This	   Chapter	   argued	   that	   there	   were	   numerous	   actors	   in	   the	   policy-­‐
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making	   process,	   each	   viewing	   the	   policy	   through	   a	   different	   frame,	   and	   thus	   attaching	   different	  
definitions	  of	  what	  the	  problem	  was	  that	  the	  policy	  sought	  to	  rectify.	  The	  Chapter	  highlighted	  that	  
there	  was	  an	  unclear	  definition	  of	  the	  ‘problem’,	  which	  led	  to	  ambiguous	  and	  incompatible	  aims	  and	  
objectives	  being	  contained	  within	  the	  Bill.	  The	  Chapter	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  view	  ‘problem	  
representation’	  as	  being	  different	  to	  ‘problem	  definition’,	  and	  indeed	  how	  ‘problem	  representation’	  
is	  a	   tactic	  used	   to	  mask	   true	  motives	  and	  objectives.	  The	  Chapter	  ended	  by	  arguing	   that	  Thatcher	  
and	   the	   Treasury	   deployed	   this	   strategic	   use	   of	   ‘	   problem	   representation’	   to	   frame	   the	   debate	   in	  
terms	   of	   parental	   responsibility	   to	   children	   and	   an	   attempt	   to	   remedy	   a	   failing	   system.	   It	  
demonstrated	  that	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  hid	  their	  definition	  of	  the	  problem	  under	  the	  problem	  
identified	   by	   Newton	   and	   Mackay,	   using	   language	   and	   imagery	   that	   not	   only	   garnered	   popular	  
support,	   but	   also	   limited	   any	   potential	   opposition.	   It	   stressed	   that	   even	   before	   the	   formal	   policy-­‐
making	  process	  had	  begun,	  the	  roots	  of	  policy	  failure	  had	  started	  to	  spring.	  	  
Chapter	   Four	   began	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act.	   It	  
assessed	  the	  role	  of	  Policy	  Transfer	  in	  both	  the	  creation	  and	  failure	  of	  the	  Act.	  The	  Chapter	  argued	  
that	   in	  the	  case	  of	   the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act	   it	  was	  not	  exclusively	  a	  case	  of	  policy	  transfer	   from	  
one	   country	   to	   another.	   Instead,	   this	   Chapter	   argued	   that	   what	   took	   place	   was	   ‘incoherent	   dual	  
policy	  transfer’:	  an	  inconsistent	  mix	  of	  the	  DSS’s	  attempt	  to	  introduce	  an	  appropriate,	  complete,	  and	  
informed	  policy	  transfer	  from	  Australia,	  and	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury’s	  determination	  to	  introduce	  
what	   was	   incomplete,	   inappropriate,	   and	   uninformed	   policy	   transfer	   from	   America.	   The	   Chapter	  
argued	   that	   there	  was	   no	   condensing	   process,	  whereby	   a	   strategic	   plan	  was	   devised	   to	   integrate	  
elements	  of	  both	  policies;	  instead	  both	  groups	  of	  actors	  fed	  directly	  into	  the	  new	  policy.	  It	  ends	  by	  
suggesting	   that	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   allowed	   the	   DSS	   to	   undertake	   policy	   transfer	   from	  
Australia,	  only	  to	  undermine	  it	  by	  injecting	  parts	  of	  their	  policy,	  as	  the	  policy	  presented	  by	  the	  DSS	  
seemed	  more	  likely	  to	  win	  support.	  It	  suggested	  that	  Thatcher	  and	  the	  Treasury	  allowed	  ‘incoherent	  
dual	  policy’	  transfer	  to	  occur,	  using	  it	  as	  a	  convert,	  strategic	  tool	  to	  embed	  their	  desired	  attempt	  at	  
policy	  within	  that	  of	  the	  DSS	  and	  LCOs’,	  just	  as	  they	  did	  with	  their	  definition	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  
	   Chapter	  Five	  focused	  on	  the	  role	  power	  within	  of	  the	  core	  executive,	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  
formation	  of	   the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	   It	  stressed	  that	   in	  the	  drafting	  of	   the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  
Bill,	   there	   were	   two	   strands	   of	   thought,	   and	   that	   these	   conflicting	   perspectives	   reflected	   the	  
objectives	  pursued	  by	  different	  Government	  Departments	  and	  Ministers.	  It	  assessed	  the	  imbalance	  
of	  power,	  looking	  at	  how	  divergent	  agendas	  gained	  position	  within	  the	  single	  policy.	  It	  evaluated	  the	  
power	   resources	   (that	   of	   direct,	   indirect,	   and	  misdirected	   power)	   that	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	  
utilised	   to	   successfully	  push	   through	   their	   Treasury	  driven	  agenda.	  The	   chapter	  also	  discussed	   the	  
power	  relations	  and	   ‘battles’	   that	  occurred	  within	  the	  core	  executive,	  proving	  an	  understanding	  of	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why	  Newton	  introduced	  a	  policy	  despite	  not	  entirely	  agreeing	  with	  the	  details.	  	  This	  Chapter	  stated	  
that	  while	  the	  fundamental	  policy	  proposal	  of	  Newton	  and	  Lord	  Mackay	  was	  maintained,	  the	  detail	  
inside	  the	  Bill	  was	  controversial,	   ill-­‐judged,	  and	  contradictory	  to	  the	  original	  aims,	  due	  to	  Thatcher	  
and	   the	   Treasury’s	   involvement.	   The	   Chapter	   ended	   by	   advancing	   upon	   Kingdon’s	   idea	   of	   ‘policy	  
windows’	   (1984),	   demonstrating	   that	   Thatcher	   and	   the	   Treasury	   were	   aware	   that	   their	   approach	  
would	  be	  unlikely	   to	  obtain	  support	  and	   lead	   to	   the	  desired	  policy	  change,	  and	  so	   they	  concealed	  
their	  ‘problem	  stream’	  and	  ‘policy	  stream’	  within	  that	  of	  Newton	  and	  Mackay’s.	  	  
Chapter	   Six	   examined	   the	   legislative	   process,	   assessing	   it	   as	   the	   significant	   contributing	  
factor	   in	   policy	   failure.	   It	   argued	   that	   the	   consultation	   process	   was	   merely	   a	   ‘rubber-­‐stamping’	  
exercise	   and	   that	   the	   Parliamentary	   scrutiny	   process	   was	   both	   undermined	   and	   inadequate.	   The	  
Chapter	  argued	  that	  the	  plethora	  of	  administrative	  and	  implementation	  problems	  that	  the	  CSA	  faced	  
could	   all	   be	   accredited	   to	   the	   policy	   itself.	   The	   Chapter’s	   assessment	   of	   the	   consultation	   process	  
demonstrated	  that	  several	  pressure	  groups	  highlighted	  the	  problems	  which	  the	  CSA	  would	  face,	  but	  
these	  concerns	  were	  received	  with	  disdain	  by	  policy	  makers.	  It	  then	  moved	  to	  examine	  the	  House	  of	  
Lords	  stage,	  highlighting	  that	   they	  too	  raised	  a	  number	  of	  concerns	  over	   the	  detail	  of	   the	  Bill.	  The	  
Chapter	  also	  discussed	  the	  role	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons,	  arguing	  that	  it	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  ineffective	  
source	  of	  checks-­‐and-­‐balance,	  ultimately	  allowing	  a	  flawed	  policy	  to	  pass	  through	  its	  chamber.	  The	  
problems	   experienced	   by	   the	   1991	   Child	   Support	   Act	   were	   identified	   at	   consultation,	   during	   the	  
House	  of	  Lords	  stage	  and,	  in	  large	  part,	  at	  the	  House	  of	  Commons;	  the	  problems	  were	  foreseeable,	  
foreseen,	  but	  ignored.	  The	  Chapter	  also	  assessed	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Opposition,	  stating	  that	  the	  scrutiny	  
they	   performed	   was	   motivated	   by	   ‘blame	   avoidance’,	   therefore	   limited,	   ineffective,	   and	  
inadvertently	   undermining	   and	   devaluing	   the	   process	   of	   Parliamentary	   scrutiny.	   It	   demonstrated	  
that	   the	   failings	   of	   the	   Parliamentary	   scrutiny	   process	   allowed	   a	   ‘bad	   Bill’	   to	   become	   a	   ‘bad	  Act’,	  
paving	  the	  path	  to	  policy	  failure.	  	  
	  
Chapter	   Seven	   provided	   the	   conceptual	   background	   to	   this	   study’s	   approach	   to	  
understanding	   implementation,	   and	   its	   relationship	   to	   policy	   formation	   and	   policy	   failure.	   The	  
chapter	   is	   brief,	   this	   is	   because	   it	   argued	   that	   what	   has	   typically	   been	   debated	   within	  
‘implementation	   studies’,	   such	   as	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘perfect	   implementation’,	   are	   better	   situated	  
elsewhere	   in	   the	   policy	   process.	   The	   Chapter	   argued	   that	   instead	   of	   using	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘perfect	  
implementation’,	   rather	   the	  criteria	  of	   ‘perfect	   legislation’	  should	  be	  pursued.	  The	  Chapter	  argued	  
that	  the	  problems	  experienced	  at	  implementation	  and	  operation	  are	  in	  large	  part	  due	  to	  failings	  in	  
legislature.	   It	  ended	  by	  discussing	  the	  role	  of	   ‘next-­‐steps’	  agencies,	  and	  how	  they	  have	  moved	  the	  




Chapter	  Eight	  focused	  on	  the	  operation	  and	  apparent	  failings	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act,	  
and	  highlighted	   the	   root	  of	   these	   failings.	   	   This	  Chapter	   linked	  back	   to	   the	  work	  done	   in	  previous	  
chapters,	   reiterating	  how	  policy	   failure	  was	   foreseeable	   and	   foreseen,	   but	   ultimately	   avoidable.	   It	  
discussed	   in	   turn	  what	  not	  only	   led	   to	   the	  creation	  of	  a	   flawed	  policy,	  but	  also	  what	  allowed	   it	   to	  
pass	   through	  Parliament	  with	   ease.	   The	  Chapter	   argued	   that	   formation	  of	   legislation	   is	   the	  bottle	  
neck	   of	   policy	   success	   or	   failure.	   It	   ended	   by	   briefly	   discussing	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘perfect	   legislation’,	  
suggesting	   it	   	   	   as	   an	   appropriate	   framework	   to	   guide	   policy-­‐makers	   through	   the	   complexities	   of	  
policy	  making,	  and	  avoid	  policy	  failure.	  	  
	   This	  thesis	  has	  examined	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  of	  the	  1991	  Child	  Support	  Act.	  The	  use	  of	  
the	  stages	  approach,	  in	  which	  this	  study	  is	  framed,	  has	  not	  only	  facilitated	  our	  examination,	  but	  also	  
demonstrated	  its	  analytical	  worth.	  This	  thesis	  aimed	  to	  be	  a	  dual	  examination,	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  
the	  stages	  approach	  had	  not	  outlived	  its	  analytical	  worth	  in	  policy	  analysis,	  and	  secondly	  to	  provide	  
an	  in-­‐depth	  understanding	  of	  how	  a	  foreseeable	  and	  foreseen	  policy	  failure	  was	  able	  to	  obtain	  cross	  
party	  support	  and	  pass	  through	  Parliament	  unscathed.	   In	  so	  doing,	   the	  study	  has	  also	  provided	  an	  
understanding	  of	  what	  caused	  the	  failure,	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  possible	  lessons	  we	  can	  take	  from	  this.	  
Final	  Thoughts	  and	  Scope	  for	  Future	  Research	  
	   In	   undertaking	   this	   research	   project,	   possible	   areas	   for	   future	   research	   have	   been	  
illuminated.	   Firstly,	   extending	   this	   study	   to	   continue	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   policy-­‐making	   process	   to	  
include	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   ‘evaluation’	   and	   ‘reform’	   stages,	   and	   looking	   at	   the	   subsequent	  
iterations	   of	   the	   Child	   Support	   Agency,	   assessing	   whether	   policy-­‐makers	   undertook	   an	   effective	  
‘learning	  process’	  and	  if	  not,	  why.	  The	  second	  area	  for	  future	  study	  would	  be	  too	  apply	  the	  vision	  of	  
the	   ‘perfect	   legislation’	   criteria	   to	   another	   policy,	   possibly	   this	   time	   assessing	   a	   policy	   success,	   or	  
another	  area	  of	  policy-­‐making,	  such	  as	  foreign	  policy,	  an	  area	  that	  remains	  relatively	  understudied	  
by	  policy	  analysis.	   	  A	  third	  area	  of	  potential	  research	  would	  be	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  scrutiny	  and	  
accountability	  process,	  particularly	  when	  a	  policy	   is	  administered	  through	  a	   ‘next-­‐steps	  agency’,	  or	  
‘arms-­‐length	  body’.	  Throughout	  the	  study	  of	   the	  Child	  Support	  Agency,	   the	  reoccurring	   issues	  that	  
emerged	  were	  that	  of	  ineffective	  pre-­‐legislative	  scrutiny,	  blurred	  accountability,	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  
an	   ‘operational	   disconnect’.	   An	   interesting	   area	   of	   future	   research	   would	   be	   an	   assessment	   of	  
effective	   mechanisms	   for	   pre-­‐legislative	   scrutiny	   and	   involvement	   of	   ‘arm’s	   length	   bodies’	   in	   the	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   One	   –	   List	   of	   Organisations	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   on	   the	   Government’s	  White	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   Children	  
Come	  First	  
	  
Organisation	   Response	  
Received	  
Association	  of	  County	  Court	  and	  District	  Registrars	   Yes	  
Association	  of	  Metropolitan	  Authorities	   Yes	  
Barnado’s	   Yes	  
Basildon	  Council	   Yes	  
Building	  Societies	  Association	   Yes	  
British	  Bankers	  Association	   Yes	  
British	  Agencies/Adoption	  and	  Fostering	   Yes	  
Bradford	  University	  (Department	  of	  Applied	  Social	  Studies)	   No	  
Bristol	  University	   Yes	  
British	  Computer	  Society	   Yes	  
Campaign	  for	  Justice	  in	  Divorce	   No	  
Campaign	  for	  Work	  (now	  Employment	  Policy	  List)	   Yes	  
Catholic	  Family	  Care	  Society	  (Northern	  Ireland)	   No	  
Chelmsford	  Women’s	  Aid	   No	  
Chief	  Adjudication	  Officer	  –	  Social	  Security	  Legislation	   No	  	  
Child	  Poverty	  Action	  Group	   Yes	  
Children’s	  Legal	  Centre	   Yes	  
Children	  and	  Lone	  Parent	  Centre	  (Plymouth)	   Yes	  
Church	  Action	  on	  Poverty	   Yes	  
Citizens	  Advice	  Bureau	  (Scotland)	   Yes	  
Confederation	  of	  British	  Industry	  (Northern	  Ireland)	   Yes	  
Convention	  of	  Scottish	  Local	  Authorities	   Yes	  
Council	  of	  Her	  Majesty’s	  Circuit	  Judges	   No	  
County	  Councils	  Women’s	  Forum	   No	  
Department	  of	  Economic	  Development	  (Northern	  Ireland)	   Yes	  
Disability	  Alliance	   Yes	  
Dudley	  Law	  Centre	   Yes	  
Gingerbread	   Yes	  
Gingerbread	  (Scotland)	   Yes	  
Families	  Need	  Fathers	   Yes	  
Family	  Charter	  Campaign	   No	  
Family	  Law	  Bar	  Association	   No	  
Family	  Welfare	  Association	   Yes	  
Forum	  of	  Private	  Businesses	   No	  
Hammersmith	  Unemployed	  Workers	  Group	   Yes	  
Hillingdon	  Women’s	  Centre	   No	  
Justices’	  Clerks’	  Society	   Yes	  
Lambeth	  TUC	  Unemployed	  Branch	   Yes	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Law	  Society	   Yes	  
Legal	  Action	  Group	   Yes	  
London	  Boroughs	  Association	   Yes	  
Mencap	   Yes	  
Moorpark	  Lone	  Parent	  Group	   No	  
National	  Association	  of	  Citizens	  Advice	  Bureau	   Yes	  
National	  Association	  of	  Welsh	  Medium	  –	  Nursery	  School	  and	  Play	  Groups	   No	  
National	  Children’s	  Home	   Yes	  
National	  Commission	  of	  Women	  in	  Great	  Britain	   No	  
National	  Council	  of	  One	  Parent	  Families	   Yes	  
National	  Council	  of	  Women	  in	  Great	  Britain	   Yes	  
Newcastle	  University	   No	  
North	  East	  Money	  Advice	  Centre	   No	  
Northern	  Ireland	  Resident	  Magistrates	  Association	   No	  
Northern	  Ireland	  Family	  Las	  Association	   No	  
Norwich	  City	  Council	   No	  
One	  Plus	  One	  Parent	  Families	  Strathclyde	   Yes	  
One	  Parent	  Families	  York	   Yes	  
Oxfordshire	  Welfare	  Rights	   Yes	  
Pay	  Day	   Yes	  
Payroll	  Advice	   No	  
Portsmouth	  Women’s	  Aid	  Support	  Group	   Yes	  
Principe	  Registry	  of	  Family	  Division	   No	  
Save	  the	  Children	   Yes	  
Scottish	  Council	  for	  Single	  Parents	   Yes	  
Scottish	  Family	  Conciliation	  Service	   Yes	  
Scottish	  Law	  Commission	   Yes	  
Scottish	  Women’s	  Aid	   Yes	  
Sheffield	  University	   No	  
Social	  Security	  Advisory	  Committee	   No	  
Social	  Security	  Medical	  Appeal	  Tribunals	  Northern	  Ireland	   No	  
Soldiers,	  Sailors,	  Airmen	  Family	  Association	   Yes	  
Solicitors	  Family	  Law	  Association	   Yes	  
Spastics	  Society	  (now	  Scope)	   Yes	  
Step	  Family	   Yes	  
The	  Children’s	  Society	   Yes	  
Thamesdown	  Law	  Centre	   Yes	  
TUC	   Yes	  
University	  College	  London	   Yes	  
Wages	  for	  Housework	  Campaign	   Yes	  
Wandsworth	  Social	  Services	  Department	  –	  Welfare	  Rights	  Unit	   No	  
Welsh	  Women’s	  Aid	  Trust	   Yes	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West	  Yorkshire	  Probation	  Service	   Yes	  
Women’s	  National	  Commission	   Yes	  
Women’s	  Aid	  Federation	   Yes	  
Wythenshawe	  Law	  Centre	   Yes	  
	  
	  	  
	  
	  
	  
